

OUR BURMESE WARS

AND

RELATIONS WITH BURMA.

Shudeb Mukherjee Collection

OUR BURMESE WARS

AND

RELATIONS WITH BURMA:

BEING AN ABSTRACT OF MILITARY
AND POLITICAL OPERATIONS, 1824-25-26, AND 1852-53.

WITH VARIOUS

LOCAL, STATISTICAL, AND COMMERCIAL INFORMATION,
AND A SUMMARY OF EVENTS FROM 1826 TO 1879, INCLUDING A SKETCH
OF KING THEBBAU'S PROGRESSES

BY

COLONEL W. F. B. LAURIE,

AUTHOR OF "RANGOON," AND "PEGU," NARRATIVES OF THE
SECOND BURMESE WAR

"As long as the sun shines in the Heavens, the British flag shall wave over those
possessions —" MARQUIS OF DALHOUSIE (1854)

"Arakan, Pegu, and Tenasserim are British, and British they will remain for many
generations of men. We govern in order that you should live in peace, pro-
sperity, and happiness." — EARL OF MAYO at Rangoon (1872)

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1885.

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TO

GENERAL SIR WILLIAM HILL, K.C.S.I.,

WHOSE GALLANT DEFENCE OF PEGU

WILL EVER BE CONSIDERED ONE OF THE MOST REMARKABLE EVENTS

IN THE HISTORY OF OUR BURMESE WARS,

THIS VOLUME

IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED.

GENERAL PREFACE.

IT seems almost superfluous to ask the attention of intelligent Britons to a region little known among them, but one, most assuredly, that has “a greater future before it than any country in Asia.” Experience, however, has shown the necessity of so doing; for if we do not yet nearly realise the immense interests we possess in our old and “loved India”—the most splendid dominion under the sun—how is it to be expected we should do so in our comparatively new portion of Chin-India? That people often require to be reminded as well as informed, is another reason for the appearance of this volume, the greater portion of which is devoted to the operations of our Burmese Wars, and much of the remainder to the bright and hopeful effect. As regards the Military portion, the object of the present “Abstract” is two-fold. It is to supply the place of a new edition of the Author’s former Narratives, by giving a considerable part of what seemed

best worth preserving, and a few additional incidental remarks, with an especial view to interest those who served in the last war, and to make it in some degree useful in case of future operations.

In his preface to "Rangoon," the first Narrative of the Second Burmese War (August 1852), it was stated as one of the Author's principal objects, "to give the reader as much information regarding Burma, and take from him as little time, as possible. Wherever it is a soldier's lot to roam, the pleasant duty may be frequently performed of attempting to gather and afterwards to diffuse knowledge. It is a duty which our age demands of every man who thinks he has a sufficiency of capacity." Again, he added, while the war was not yet finished:—"Apart from the extreme probability of the cause of civilisation being advanced, in a distant and comparatively unknown land, by the Second Burmese War, which should make the subject one of general interest, there must be a vast number of readers at home and in India who have friends and relatives in Burma. This is the grand key to the interest of Englishmen in the war. The possession of Rangoon may be said to have put nine-tenths of the Burmese Empire at our disposal. The conquest of the remainder of the country may ensue, and other pens will probably describe the course of events. But on account of the liberal encouragement bestowed on the present undertaking, the Author may be disposed, if all goes well, to write another volume."

"Pegu," the concluding volume—written after the Author reached Toungoo—completed an account of

the conquest of the province; and the book, more than double the size of "Rangoon," with more plans and sketches, originally appeared under circumstances far from favourable. The adverse influence of the time—the outbreak of the Crimean War—operated on his Oriental military narrative in much the same manner as that bewailed by a famous sensation novelist, who brought out one of his great works in 1854, but which had no great sale while England was watching a serious national event, and new books, in consequence, "found the minds of readers in general pre-occupied and indifferent." Still, "Pegu" struggled on, being the only authoritative standard of reference on the subject and, aided by Government patronage, the book eventually became out of print. It is now, doubtless, to be found in many libraries throughout England and India; and not the least pleasing retrospect in the writer's life, is to the time when the writer, travelling with his father in Sweden, and personally presented a copy of "Pegu" to King Charles the Fifteenth—soldier and artist—thereby making sure of at least one Narrative of the Second Burmese War being honoured by a place in the royal library at Stockholm.

It was gratifying, some years ago, to learn from a distinguished member of Her Majesty's Indian Council that "Pegu" had been found "useful and interesting"; and various officers, from time to time, notwithstanding (as remarked in the preface) the difficulty of producing a good book with the heat, the din of war, and the frequent impossibility of procuring correct information to contend against, have signi-

approbation. The Author having considered it most important at the present time—when Burma promises to be of far more than usual interest to the military as well as to the commercial world—to give a summary of events during the First Burmese War, in order that the conduct of the two wars, and our relations with Burma, may be better understood than hitherto, of course it comes first in order. The very brief account of that now famous war given in the Introductory Sketch will, it is to be hoped, tempt the reader, should he have time, to go through the more lengthy abstract which is contained in the second and third chapters (Part I.), of which the present writer appears, in a very great measure, as editor rather than author or compiler. The First Burmese War will also be found alluded to, and occasional extracts given, in connection with the operations of the Second; but the study of a connected sketch of such eventful Burmese Campaigns as those of upwards of fifty years ago, will enable military readers to better understand the few remarks on the operations, given in the fourth chapter. Again, Pegu and the Irawady being now ours—forming our grand base of operations—in the event of another war we should probably have to make use of (and of course improve) the same theatre of action as that in which the gallant first Army of Ava played so distinguished a part.

There is no desire in this work to advocate an annexation—far less an aggressive policy; and such a desire is hostile to the intentions of a wise Government; but no intelligent Englishman will deny—and if he has

denied it hitherto, it is to be hoped he will do so no longer—that the First Burmese War was vigorously prosecuted because we sought to save Bengal at least from invasion. And if, during the Mutiny of 1857, we had not possessed the lower provinces of Burma, there is no saying what trouble might have been created on our south-eastern frontier, and what the consequences might have been. When the Mahomedan began to discover he had lost his military and the Brahman his social sway, they might also have discovered that Pegu was a very convenient province for the game of murder and rebellion. The Second War, followed by the grand political stroke of annexation—which was forced on us—prevented the chance of Burma aiding the fiends engaged in the Mutiny!

Talking one day with that eminent Anglo-Indian writer, the late Sir John Kaye, on the subject of annexation, and having incurred his displeasure by alluding to “the force of circumstances,” of course it was useless to point out to the Political Secretary how valuable the possession of British Burma was to us during the Indian rebellion; how the isolation of Burma kept the Court of Ava out of the influences of the mutinies altogether; how the Bengal sepoy regiment stationed in Pegu found no sympathy from such a different race as the Burmese in the matter of disaffection; how we could spare British troops from the province at such a critical time; or how the Golden Foot sent a handsome donation of one thousand pounds to relieve the sufferers by the Mutiny! All was lost on Sir John, who conscientiously—like his

admirable friend, Sir Henry Lawrence, denounced annexation.

As the time is probably near at hand when, if the Golden Foot does not make a better wheel into the ranks of civilisation, there may no longer be a King of Burma, it is curious to notice that the last of the so-called "Great Moguls," the King of Delhi, died while a State prisoner at Rangoon on the 11th November 1862, and was buried the same day—the Mahomedans of the town being heedless of the event. Such was the end of the Mogul, who disputed the Empire of India with us, but now had been so long harmless, realmless, and "a prince without the shadow of power," that even at his death the pious Mahomedans deemed him hardly worthy of notice!

One word more about "Annexation"—a word frequently used in the following pages—a word which should never be connected with "party" where its realisation is meant for the good of mankind. Thinking of the great Canning's remark about the tremendous power Great Britain is destined to wield in the world, it is almost impossible not to fall in with Paley's observation on the cases in which the extension of territory may be of real advantage to both parties. The moral and political Archdeacon writes of the case where "neighbouring states"—one of them Upper Burma, for instance—"being severally too small and weak to defend themselves against the dangers that surround them, can only be safe by a strict and constant junction of their strength: here conquest will effect the purposes of confederation and alliance; and

the union which it produces is often more close and permanent than that which results from voluntary association.'

This is a very "pithy" sentence and one well worthy of study. How could Upper Burma ever keep back China, or Russia, or, perhaps, Germany—if she is to be allied with the flowery land—single-handed, and probably with a hostile league of tribes against the Golden Foot, in case of an attack from the northward?

When a much younger man, the Author was all in favour of annexation. Like many other sanguine patriots, he thought we should be everywhere, and annex every country that fell out with us; but time has sobered down his ambitious views; and he now adopts the more Conservative principle of non-interference, when it can possibly be adopted without injury to our *prestige*. On the point of annexing only a part of a country, the writer, it will be seen, has expressed his decided views. He may further add that, as Euclid teaches us—"the whole is greater than its part"; so, in political result, the axiom is—If annexation *must* come, the whole is safer than a part! Commercial activity and enterprise also are seldom safe when dealing with fractions.

The fourth part of his work will probably possess more interest for the general reader and the merchant than the others. To get a good general knowledge of Burma, the Author must refer his readers to the interesting volumes of Colonel Yule, General Fytche, Dr. Mason, Dr. Anderson, Captain Forbes, and a few others of less pretensions, such as Surgeon-General

Gordon, Colonel McMahon, and Mr. Wyllie (in his "Essay on the External Policy of India"). Mr. St. Barbe, in reviewing the latter book, which has "nothing specially to do with Burma," says that the essays are "valuable for the most part as expounding a policy which is fast becoming effete—the policy of masterly inactivity, which their author was the first to designate and describe." Of course, in times like the present, when so much ambition among European Powers is afloat, "masterly inactivity" is simply ridiculous and impossible.

It is to be hoped that commerce in Burma, and its enemy, the eccentric, cruel, and obstructive King Theebau, have received the attention they deserve. Doubtless, there is a brighter day at hand for the country, at which, of course, London, Liverpool, Glasgow, and Calcutta—above all, Rangoon—will especially and naturally rejoice. The foreign trade of British Burma—unparalleled in the annals of Eastern Asia—notwithstanding the disadvantages under which it has recently laboured, affords a prospect most bright and advancing.

In conclusion, the author is pleased at being able to add to the utility of his work by giving an excellent map by that safe and experienced geographer, Mr. Trelawney Saunders. With reference to the numerous plans and sketches which enriched his former volumes—among the artists being Lieutenant (now Major-General*) Alexander Fraser, of the Bengal Engineers,

* R.E., and Secretary to the Government of India. To this officer the author was indebted for military sketches of Shwé-gyeen and Gongoh.

where light-houses and other engineering works will ever honourably connect his name with British Burma—only two illustrations have been selected—the scene Donabew, where the greatest of all Burmese generals died, and where a distinguished British general of the present day first saw active service—which will give some idea of Burmese forest or jungle warfare.

W. F. B. L.

1, *Oxford Gardens, London, W.*
December 1879.

CONTENTS

PART I.

	Page
CHAPTER I.—Introductory Sketch	1
II.—The First Burmese War	19
III.—The First Burmese War (<i>continued</i>)	49
IV.—Remarks on the Operations	64
V.—The Finances of India fifty years ago ; or, after the First Burmese War	76

PART II.

THE SECOND BURMESE WAR.

CHAPTER I.—The Burmese provoke a Second War	81
II.—From Madras to Rangoon	95
III.—Naval Operations before Rangoon and Dalla. —The Landing and Advance.—The White House Stockade	107

	Page
CHAPTER IV.—The Grand Advance on the Shwé Dagon Pagoda	122
V.—Capture of Bassein.—Burmese Attack on Martaban	141
VI.—Pegu.—Prome.—The Grand Question.—Lord Dalhousie at Rangoon	157

PART III.

FROM THE ADVANCE ON PROME TO THE ENTIRE CONQUEST OF PEGU.

CHAPTER I.—The Advance on Prome.—Capture and Occupation of Pegu	181
II.—The Burmese Investment of Pegu.—Critical Position of Major Hill and his Troops.—Summary of Military Transactions	219
III.—Relief of Pegu, and other Operations.—The Proclamation	236
IV.—Sir John Cheape's Operations against Myathtoon	257
V.—Lord Dalhousie's Policy in the Second Burmese War.—Various Remarks	275
Notification.—Troops in British Burma, 1853 and 1864	310
Account of Gross Revenue from Territory ceded by the Burmese, including the annexed Provinces of Pegu and Martaban, for 1855–56	314
Letter from Lord Dalhousie to Major Hill	316

PART IV.

VARIOUS PAPERS ON BURMA.

	Page
PAPER I.—View of the Condition of Burma in 1854–55	318
II.—Sparseness of Population, and Health of the Indigenous Races	328
III.—A Brief Review of the Progress of Trade in Pegu (1864)	346
NOTE.—Revenue (1878–79) and Commerce	350
IV.—From Mandalay to Momien (<i>Review</i>).—Trade Routes from Burma to Western China	353
The Shan Tribes.—Productive Capacity of the Shan Countries	366
V.—The Value of Upper Burma	369
VI.—Summary of Events from 1826 to 1879, including a Sketch of King Theebau's Pro- gress	374
Annexation and Non-Annexation	416
POSTSCRIPT :—The Looshais and the Nágas	420
NOTES :—1.—The Burmese Royal Family	425
2.—Withdrawal of the British Re- sident from Mandalay	426
3.—Population of Mandalay	427
4.—King Theebau's Head Queen	427
British Burma Division (1879)	429
ADDENDA to PART I.	431
" " II.	440
" " III.	446
" " IV.	466
INDEX	475

MAP AND SKETCHES.

- 1.—Central Portion of British Burma.
- 2.—Rough Sketch pertaining to Operations against Myat-htoon.
- 3.—Plan of Breastwork captured from Myat-htoon.

OUR BURMESE WARS

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RELATIONS WITH BURMA.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY SKETCH.

It is still an interesting problem to solve, whether the Mongolian race, up to the present time, has retarded the beneficial progress of the world. Taking an extensive yet fair view of the question, the mind is puzzled by its numerous intricacies, till at length we are obliged to fall back on a somewhat similar conclusion formed by Gibbon regarding the Mogul Empire,* that, perhaps, it has been rather the scourge than the benefactor of mankind. From childhood we learn the lesson that war is only justifiable when defensive and unavoidable, not when it is offensive and unnecessary. Common sense teaches us that the barter of commodities is "necessarily coeval with the first formation of society," and that trade and commerce form

* The Mogul Empire generally. We agree with the author of "Burma, Past and Present," in considering the Mogul dynasty in India a misnomer, as Baber and his descendants were not Moguls, but of the kindred race of Turks.

the very key-stone of progressive civilisation. In the matters of war and barter, therefore, the Mongolian race has been largely to blame, inasmuch as it has given to the world far too much of the one and far too little of the other. Wellingtons and Richard Cobdens have been required from time immemorial in Asia. And yet, perhaps, had similar luminaries, especially during the last two centuries, for their hour, become lords of the ascendant in China and Chin-India (or Indo-China), a bombastic general of the flowery land could never have mastered the art of war on just principles, nor an arrogant Burmese sovereign the soothing influences and mighty advantages of free trade. Of course a strong natural love of exclusion lies at the root of the evil; and this is more evident in the Mongolian race than among the other varieties of mankind.

Friendly relations with Eastern countries, among us, as with other European empires and kingdoms, have ever been few and far between. Even in Europe shrewd and practical statesmen know well that what is styled "a supposed community of interest" must form a chief ingredient in the friendships, and especially in the commercial relations, of empires and states; and not balancing this consideration properly, the result must ever be a monopolizing tendency, which must in the end generally lead to war. Of course this is very lamentable, and very derogatory to human nature; but it cannot be helped, particularly in the case of nations less civilised than our own.

It is curious to think what the result would now have been had the little band of zealots who, tired of the excellent yet bare morality of Confucius, left China, early in the Christian era, in search of a new religion, brought back (65 A.D.), instead of Buddhism from India, Christianity from Palestine. There is one thing almost certain, that, were the four hundred millions of Chinese (Buddhists), and say the eight or ten millions of Indo-Chinese, Christians at the present time, there would be an almost entire absence of a deep love of seclusion among them; the possession of an eager and continual thirst for barter

on the largest scale; no fear to zealous members of the Senate regarding the crippled finances of India, and, perhaps, Chinese, Burmese, and Siamese firms in London rivalling the British houses.

But China and Indo-China are still Buddhistical, and India is still the land of the Veda and the Koran—the principle of life apparently still so strong within these creeds as to make it difficult to think when they are to perish. So we proceed at once to give some popular information regarding our Burmese wars and relations with Burma.

As early as the middle of the sixteenth century the Burmese had conquered the inhabitants of Pegu, their former masters, and had established a strong independence. This brave and warlike nation speedily assumed a high rank in the East. The Burmese accession of power and territory naturally produced a desire for increased traffic; and, as regards the British, about the middle of the seventeenth century—not many years after the surgeon, Boughton, had done his country service by obtaining for the English nation permission to traffic, free of duty, in Bengal—our trade with Burma flourished to a considerable extent. Grain, oil, timber, ivory, and other valuable commodities, were not to be neglected in the early fervour of commercial speculation.

The fertile delta of that magnificent river, the Irawady, was visited by our countrymen under great disadvantages. The European *barbarians*—for the offensive term was used in the same sense by Burmese and Chinese—dared not sail up the Rangoon river, or any other of Burma's noble waters, without acknowledging the supreme authority of the Lord of the White and all other Elephants, whose trunks "put a girdle round about the earth," while under the shade of their master's golden umbrella the spheres steadily and gracefully reposed. But our merchants too frequently made respect for local authorities a secondary consideration, which, perhaps, first inclined the higher order of Burmese to look upon us in no very favourable light.

Far different was the conduct of the early servants of the East India Company. These functionaries, we are told, knew well how to humour the Burmese national vanity; and even governors of Fort St. George addressed the "Golden Feet" in terms of great humility. An old letter has recently been discovered, filled with what the writers in the "Spectator," had the gorgeous epistle come in their way, might have denounced as a brilliant example of an effort to be ridiculous for a political purpose. It is impossible to mistake the "studied ornaments of style"* in a letter from Nathaniel Higginson, Esq., &c., Governor of Fort St. George, to the King of Ava, dated the 10th September 1695.

"To His Imperial Majesty, who blesseth the noble city of Ava with his Presence, Emperour of Emperours, and excelling the Kings of the East and of the West in glory and honour, the clear firmament of Virtue, the fountain of Justice, the perfection of Wisdom, the Lord of Charity, and Protector of the Distressed; the first mover in the Sphere of Greatness, President in Council, Victorious in War; who feareth none, and is feared by all: Center of the Treasures of the Earth, and of the Sea, Lord Proprietor of Gold and Silver, Rubys, Amber, and all precious Jewells, favoured by Heaven, and honoured by Men, whose brightness shines through the World, as the light of the Sun, and whose great name will be preserved in perpetual memory. . . .

. . . "Your Majesty has been pleased to grant your especial favours to the Honourable English Company, whose Servant I am; and now send to present before the footstool of your Throne a few toys, as an acknowledgment of your Majesty's goodness, which I beg your Majesty to accept; and to vouchsafe an Audience to my Servants, and a gracious Answer to my Petition."

* "Spectator," essay on "Metaphors."

Let us now hear the object of the petition, one of curious interest at the present time.

"I humbly pray your Majesty's fountain of goodness to continue your wonted favours to the Right Honourable English Company, and to permit our Factors to buy and sell, in such Commodities, and under such Privileges, as your Royal bounty shall please to grant; and allow us such conveniencys, as are necessary for the repair of Shippes, whereby I shall be encouraged to send my Shippes yearly to your Majesty's Port, having orders from the Honourable Company, to send Shippes and Factors into all parts of India, when their Service requires it."

It was well said, early in 1852, "We shall look with additional interest for the Burmese Blue Book, that we may have an opportunity of comparing the humble, cringing, obsequious memorial presented by the Agent of the Governor, on his knees, to the Lord of the White Elephant, with the cold and imperious missive of the present Governor-General. These two letters would of themselves form no incorrect index of the difference between the Company Bahadour, as a pedlar, and as an emperor."

And now, before inviting the reader's attention to a slight historical retrospect, let us ask him to turn to the map of Asia, and mark how the country of Arakan and the province of Chittagong are situated relatively to Calcutta and the countries of Ava and Pegu.

Every one knows that the Portuguese were the first regular European traders in India, round the Cape of Good Hope.

Many of these adventurers, about the year 1600, had settled on the coast of Chittagong and Arakan. Ten years after their arrival, the Portuguese and Arakanese, acting in concert against the Subahdar of Bengal, agreed to invade his Subah by land and by water. The limited forces went boldly to the attack; but the invaders were entirely defeated. The perfidious commander persuaded the Governor of the Portuguese settlement

in India, who resided at Goa, to equip a large fleet, and upon its arrival on the coast Gonzales joined the admiral in attacking the city of Arakan. They were repulsed with great loss, reckoning their naval leader among the killed, while the captain escaped to the island of Sundeeep, defeated, disgraced, and ruined. It is remarked, by a competent authority, that the attempt of the Arakanese to revenge themselves against the inhabitants of Sundeeep and all the neighbouring coasts, with succeeding inroads of a similar nature, created the Soonderbuns,* which region once flourished as the abode of wealthy and industrious men.

We next hear that the Assamese, occupying a fertile country to the north of Ava, were repulsed, and the Arakanese driven off by the occupants of Sundeeep, to secure the peace and prosperity of Bengal. It is curious to compare the progress of an expedition set on foot by Meer Joomla, the Subahdar, in the year 1661, against Assam, with the British martial adventures during the first Burmese war. Having crossed the Brahmapootra, with his stores and provisions, at Rungamutty, Meer Joomla, forming a road as he went,† marched his army by land. The march was tedious, seldom exceeding one or two miles a day; the army was harassed by the enemy. Meer Joomla shared every privation with the troops. At length, coming to conclusions, the Mogul army struck terror into the hearts of the Assamese. Their Rajah fled into the mountains, and many of the chiefs swore allegiance to the conquerors. Meer Joomla, in the plenitude of his triumph, contemplated planting the Mahomedan flag on the walls of Pekin. But reverses now fell upon the Mussulman. The valley of the Brahmapootra, from

* "History of Bengal," by Marshman, p. 89.

† This system of making war in a wild country was much in favour with the late Duke of Wellington, and he ascribed Sir Harry Smith's failure at the Cape of Good Hope entirely to his neglect of so salutary a precaution.

the violence of the rains which set in, became one vast sheet of water. The cavalry were rendered useless by want of forage, and the enemy cut off the provisions of the invaders. At length dire pestilence ravaged the camp; but with the change of season the land dried, disease disappeared, the Moguls regained health and courage, and, resuming the offensive, forced the Rajah to solicit peace. Meer Joomla was happy to grant this, for he was suffering from disease brought on by exposure.

A large sum of money was paid to the Moguls; but yet was Assam unconquered.

Burmese supremacy over the once independent kingdom of Pegu continued till about the middle of the eighteenth century. The Peguese (or Peguers*), however, having obtained assistance from the Dutch and Portuguese, at length took up arms against their oppressors, gained many victories, reduced the far-famed capital, Ava, and took prisoner Dweepdee, the last of a long line of Burmese kings.†

But the fallen people were naturally too brave and energetic to remain long in a state of vassalage. The history of European countries presents us with more than one instance of a nation long prostrate throwing off a foreign yoke through the powerful and seemingly magical agency of one man; and such a fortune Burma was destined to realise. About the year 1753, Alompra, the hunter, arose. He was a man of humble birth, but through the exercise of an indomitable will acquired the

* They are also styled Peguans, whom the Burmese call Talains or Talaings. The Burmese, Karens and Shans are the other chief distinct races.

† Bonna Della, or Beinga Della, the Pegu Sovereign, after the conquest of Ava returned to his own country. "Renegade Dutch" and "Native Portuguese" are the terms applied to the European powers above noted. We mention this because "the Portuguese, in the middle of the sixteenth century, assisted the Burmans in their wars against the Peguese, and continued to exercise an influence in the Burman and Pegu countries, and still greater in Arracan."—"Account of the Burman Empire."

possession of a fort in the neighbourhood of the capital. At first he carried on a sort of guerilla warfare against his enemies the Peguese, and his forces speedily increasing, he suddenly attacked and took Ava. Alompra afterwards invaded Pegu, became master of its capital, extinguished the Pegu or Talaing dynasty, and founded the great empire which has existed to this day (1852). It was during Alompra's reign that the British Government was first brought into political relationship with the Kings of Burma.

During the war of conquest against the Peguese, we find the French and English traders playing conspicuous parts. M. Bourno, beyond the Ganges, appears to have been as zealous in his way as was the great Dupleix when in his glory at Chandernagore or Pondicherry. The former, no doubt, had an eye to the acquisition on the part of France of the capitals of Ava and Pegu, while the latter plodded over his favourite scheme of reducing Madras and Calcutta to their original condition of fishing towns. The Frenchman intrigued with both parties; the Englishman, Mr. Brooke,* declared for Alompra.

Alompra appears to have entertained considerable respect for the English character, notwithstanding that the conduct of some of Brooke's countrymen was highly discreditable; and it is difficult to believe that the great Burmese leader participated in the massacre of the English at Negrais, on the 16th of October 1759. This tragedy seems to have been brought about through a combination of French treachery and jealousy. The massacre was contrived by an Armenian named Gregory, who, jealous of the growing influence of the English, found a ready agent in a young Frenchman named Lavine. This Lavine had been left by his treacherous friend, Bourno, as a hostage, during one of the pretended negotiations with Alompra.

* Resident at Negrais, then the company's chief timber-station.

Lavine and Gregory projected the extermination * of the English in Burma. At an entertainment given by one Southby, the successor of Brooke, a Portuguese interpreter, well known to Lavine, was present as a guest. At a signal given during the evening the room was filled with armed men. Southby and his English friends were instantly murdered, and soon after all the Indian servants of the factory, upwards of one hundred in number, shared a similar fate. The guns of the fort were turned on the British ships by Lavine, who of course gloried in having performed the chief part in a treacherous and cowardly act, while he beheld our vessels steering for Bengal. Happily in the latter part of our Eastern possessions events were occurring of a cheerful character.

Since the commencement of 1757 Admiral Watson and Clive had regained Calcutta, Chandernagore had been taken from the French, Plassey had been won, and in the same year as the above massacre Clive wrote his famous note previous to the entire defeat of the Dutch at Chinsurah:—

“DEAR FORDE,—Fight them immediately; I will send you the Order in Council to-morrow.”*

It was not long after Clive had fixed the destiny of India that the famous Alompra died.† One of his last actions was to invade Siam, a great valley at the head of a wide gulf, shut in by two ranges of mountains. Death arrested the sword of the conqueror just as he had commenced the siege of the capital. It was left for future adventurers to possess the rich plain of Siam. The inhabitants of this country, unlike the Burmese, are indolent and wanting in courage. It was, therefore, in

* Clive received the Colonel's letter while he was playing at cards. Without quitting the table, he wrote the reply in pencil. (History.) This is, perhaps, the shortest order to fight a battle ever written,—no words lost, all to the point.

† 15th May 1760.

their destiny to become the prey of the valiant and enterprising.

For many years after the affair at Negrais, English traders confined their operations to Rangoon, "where traffic with the natives was comparatively uninterrupted, except when the ships were impressed by the Burmese to be employed as transports during successive Pegu rebellions."

Shemburen (or Shembuan), who may be said to have succeeded Alompra, crushed one of these serious revolts. He further added to the glory of the empire by defeating a large army of Chinese; but failed in an attempt to possess the territory of Siam, excepting that part which is at present styled the Tenasserin Provinces, including Mergui.* Shemburen's brother afterwards succeeded in annexing the province of Arakan,† reaching about five hundred miles along the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal to the Burmese Empire, which now embraced Ava, Arakan, Pegu, a portion of Siam, and various minor territories bordering on the British possessions. The town and district of Chittagong had been finally lost to the Arakanese in 1666, and annexed to the Subah of Bengal.

The Burmese and British territories now coming into contact, a series of misunderstandings commenced; the seeds of future war were sown. At the conclusion of a dispute concerning some refugees from Arakan, who had, about the year 1794, found their way into the British territory, Colonel Symes was sent by the Bengal Government on a mission to the Court of Ava. His object was to establish "amicable relations between the two Powers, and especially to procure for British

* Our landing at Rangoon in 1824 gave the Siamese hopes of recovering these lost possessions, which our capture of them entirely destroyed.

† This was the work of the famous Minderajee Praw, fourth son of Alompra, who, in 1783 (corresponding with the Burman year 1145), sent a fleet of boats against, and conquered Arakan. The surrender of Cheduba, Ramree, and the "Broken Isles," followed the conquest.

traders immunity from the oppression and extortion to which they were constantly exposed in their visits to Burmese ports." By the treaty thus concluded, this oppression and extortion was lessened; but only for a short time.

Some years after the mission, about 1811, a serious rebellion having broken out in Arakan, the King of Ava believed that it had been instigated by the English, and accordingly laid an embargo on all British vessels at Rangoon.

Here was sufficient cause for hostilities. But the cost of the wars in India, promoted during the government of the Marquis Wellesley, had rendered it imperative upon the local rulers who succeeded him to avoid such an expensive alternative; and another mission was, therefore, in the first instance, preferred. What other inference could an ignorant and isolated potentate draw from this apparent acceptance of indignity than that the English were powerless to resent, or rated an amicable intercourse with Burma too highly to risk a permanent rupture? He mistook a prudent policy for fear, founded on inherent weakness, and his arrogance proportionately increased. At first his designs were cloaked by an appearance of inaction, and the time of the British Indian Government was too much occupied by the quarrels with Nepaul and the Maharrattas, to allow of its watching the movements of any Power in the south-east. But gradually the King of the White Elephant unfolded his schemes of aggrandisement, invaded Assam, reduced Munnipoor* through the agency of his general, one Bandoola, and, although at peace with the British, sent troops into the Company's territories, oppressed our traders, and insulted our flag and country in every possible way.

Thus we were forced into preventing the future encroachments of a very warlike and ambitious neighbour whose "arrogant pretensions and restless character" had so frequently interrupted the peaceful relations subsisting between India

* Then an independent state lying between Burma and Assam.

and Buſma, keeping "the frontier provinces in constant and danger of invasion." Then we were just beginning to learn that in India we must be "everything, or nothing."

At this juncture Lord Amherst landed in Calcutta, on the 1st of August 1823, as Governor-General of India. He gave his immediate attention to the conduct of the Burmese. An explanation was demanded of the numerous offences committed against the British Government; but the haughty and independent reply betrayed a spirit of aggression, and every attempt at an honourable and satisfactory adjustment was met with scornful silence. The Governor-General then declared war against the Burmese. The declaration was dated the 5th of March 1824, and operations commenced by the advance of a British force, which had been collected at Goalparah, into Assam, while arrangements were made to vigorously prosecute the war in other quarters. We should state that the Assamese were subjugated by the Burmese in 1822, when their General was proclaimed Rajah of Assam, subordinate to the Emperor of Ava.

It will give some idea of how British tenure of India was valued by the Rajah of Burdwan at this period, to relate that at the time of the Burmese war Lord Amherst asked the Rajah for a loan of a certain sum of money, promising to repay it at the end of twenty-five years. The Rajah declined, saying, he did not know whether twenty-five years hence the Company would possess the country. And now commenced the most expensive and harassing war in which the British had ever been engaged in India. Almost totally unacquainted with the character and resources of the country into which our arms were to be carried—unaware of the nature of the climate, which in the marshy districts scarcely yielded to Walcheren in the pestiferous quality of the atmosphere—the Government entered upon its arrangements with a recklessness of expense, and a disregard of the future, which ignorance might account for, if it did not wholly excuse.

am, at this time, had scarcely asserted its wonderful agency. As an engine of war it was certainly unknown everywhere, although steamers peacefully traversed all the rivers of Great Britain and some parts of the continent of Europe; and in India, so backward had been the endeavours of the Government to honour the enterprise of "James Watt," that not more than two or three vessels had begun to boil and bubble through the seas which washed the coasts of Coromandel and of Burma. Slow-sailing trading-vessels were consequently the only means of transport available for one portion of the army destined to invade Burma; and such were the difficulties of the country lying between Calcutta and Arakan, that the other part of the force, despatched by land, was three months in reaching its destination.

Rangoon, situated on a branch of the Irawady called the Rangoon river, about thirty miles from the sea, was captured by the British in May 1824, and a movement was soon afterwards made into the interior; for the Governor-General of India had resolved to dictate terms to the haughty Burmese ruler only at his capital, in presence of an army prepared to dethrone him as the penalty of refusal. A gallant and stubborn resistance was made by the Burmese throughout the war, which actually lasted nearly two years.

About the opposing army not the least interesting feature was that of a body of eight thousand Shans forming a part of it. These were opposed to the British in 1825; and the troops were accompanied by three young and handsome women of rank, who were believed to be prophetesses and invulnerable. These females rode on horseback at the head of the troops, encouraging them to victory. At length they were utterly defeated, and two of the heroines were killed in action. The Ranee of Jhansi in 1857-58 appears to have had something of this mysterious bravery about her.

Formidable stockades, consisting entirely of timber, everywhere presented a barrier to our advance, and cover to the

enemy, who employed musketry and cannon as well as the more savage implements of war in the prolonged contest. The heavy periodical rains, flooding the land, impeded operations for several months; and during this period of inaction disease, the result of malaria, penetrated the British camp, and nearly decimated the regiments. Not less than one-half the invading force was destroyed by the combined agencies of fever and patriotic resistance.

It appears by a return drawn up by Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, the Deputy Adjutant-General, that during the first year $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the troops were killed in action, while 45 per cent. perished from disease. In the ensuing year the mortality from the same causes had decreased one-half; but the total loss during the war amounted to $72\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the troops engaged. There were present at Rangoon on the 1st of January 1825. officers included:—

Artillery, including rocket-troops	.	1,071
European infantry	4,146
Native infantry, &c.	7,628
Total		12,845 men.

At Arakan and the South-east Frontier, on the 1st February 1825, there were 9,937; and at Prome, on the 11th August of the same year, 12,110. The loss from the commencement to the close of the war was:—

	Killed.	Deceased.	
Grand total of officers	24	41	= 65
Native commissioned	6	28	= 34
Non-commissioned rank			
and file, Europeans	105	3,029	= 3,134
Ditto, Natives	90	1,305	= 1,395
Extra. killed, deceased, and missing			450

Total casualties . . . 5,078

(According to the Deputy Adjutant-General's return, 5,080.)

he mortality was frightful ; the country, devastated or unfriendly, yielded nothing in the way of sustenance to the troops, and supplies were therefore continually forwarded from India, increasing the cost fearfully, and rendering the condition of the army extremely precarious. By dint of perseverance, and the courage which never deserts British or native troops, ably commanded, and with a grand object in view, Assam, Arakan, and Mergui, fell into our hands ; the Burmese were defeated at Promé, on the Irawady, and elsewhere ; and the troops approaching Ava, the monarch, terrified at the prospect of losing his capital, and perhaps his empire, met them at Yandaboo, where he signed a treaty consenting to pay one million sterling towards the expenses of the war, and ceding Assam and all the places on the Tenasserim coast. This contribution and these cessions fell far short of indemnifying the British India Government for the outlay, which, from first to last, had exceeded twelve millions sterling.

The territorial acquisitions, though by no means productive, have not been without their advantages in a commercial and political view. Extending from about $17^{\circ} 35'$ to 10° north latitude, and from $97^{\circ} 30'$ to $99^{\circ} 30'$ east longitude, the "Tenasserim Provinces" as they have since been called, embrace a distance of five hundred miles in length, and forty to eighty miles in breadth, according as the sea-coast approaches or recedes from the range of mountains which forms the eastern boundary of the British territory. This chain of mountains, rich in tin ores and other valuable minerals, runs, under different names, from north to south, and, draining its eastern slopes into the Gulf of Siam, and its western slopes into the Indian Ocean or Bay of Bengal, forms a clear, well defined boundary between the kingdom of Siam and our Indian possessions.

The town of Tenasserim was once famous ; it is now of less importance. Not far from it are tin mines, worked by Chinese,

which may arrest the attention of the inquiring traveller. These mines are farmed from our Government; but are understood to be generally unprofitable to the merchants. In Siam, the cultivation of the soil is chiefly carried on by Chinese. Brass and rubies form the principal treasures of this strange country, which, on account of various misunderstandings between the king and other nations, has now an insignificant traffic. After the conclusion of the treaty of Yandaboo, Sir A. Campbell, the Commander-in-Chief, selected the commanding position of Maulmain, at the point of junction of the Salween, the Gyne, and the Attaran rivers, for the permanent cantonment of a British force.

The town of Maulmain has gradually become of considerable commercial importance, and with a good port for shipping, and every prospect of an extended timber trade, there is hope that it may one day rise to the dignity of an enlightened and wealthy city.

But why should only one town gain happiness and prosperity in such a land as this? Let us hope that Rangoon, and the other towns of Pegu, once a mighty and independent kingdom, may likewise soon prosper through the blessings of an extensive and well-protected commerce, doing honour to our government, and adding glory to the name of Great Britain in India beyond the Ganges.

The above remarks, which may give some historical interest to his pages, include, with some other matter, the whole of the original sketch with which the writer introduced his readers, during the second Burmese war, to "Rangoon." Since then, the enterprising and munificent East India Company has given way to Her Majesty, who, in April 1876, assumed the title of "Empress of India." And, as will be fully seen towards the close of this volume, what a change has come over Rangoon! It is now the Liverpool of Chin-India, the commercial capital of Burma, which only wants a greater development of trade with the

upper portion of the country, and south-west China, to increase the wealth of Pegu, which chiefly requires a larger population, and which even now is the most hopeful princess among all Her Majesty's Eastern provinces. The Burmese hereafter will, doubtless, be glad to learn that we entertained this strong view of their golden land's excellence, especially if our hopes should be realised; for we learn from high authority that, in speaking of their country, they often call it Ashé-Pyee, the Eastern country—"the country before, or superior to all others."*

It may here be useful to introduce the reader of this sketch to the correct spelling of Burma. In the present volume we have taken two letters out of the next most important word, Irrawaddy—in the Arabic *wādī* we find only one *d*—now presenting it as Irawady, although Irawadi, or Irawadee, may be better. From Burmah we have also lopped off the final and most unnecessary *h*. There is no *h* in the original Burmese word, which is "Myamma"; or Burma is a corruption of Mrumma. By all Burmese scholars the word is written Burma; and it must be clearly understood that the spelling of Indian words, as now used, has nothing to do with that of Chin-Indian. "Burma," however, is strictly used in the India Office. We were glad to notice this spelling adopted in a popular journal some six years ago; but on the death of the late king, in particular, the intruding *h* came forth again, and has been universally wrong ever since. The peculiarly Hindustani word *súbah*, a province, may be so written in English because it ends with an *h* in the original character; although *súba* is quite sufficient, and looks better or more simple when coupled with *dár*,—*súba-dár*, the chief of a province. But for the *h* in Burmah there is no possible excuse, except that worst of all, bad habit. So let it be written BURMA in the English language for the future! It is good to turn attention even to such "trifles," especially when

* General Albert Fytche's "Burma, Past and Present," vol. i., note, p. 212.

Oriental notice them, and when we are so forcibly reminded, by a well-known statesman,* that we are an Eastern as well as a Western Power !

* Viscount Cranbrook, Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

CHAPTER II.

THE FIRST BURMESE WAR. FROM THE OUTBREAK OF THE
WAR TO THE DEATH OF BANDOOLA AT DONABEW. •

WE now purpose to cite the chief military and political operations during the First Burmese War. But first it may be stated that, as a reason for an earlier rupture not taking place, the Burman emperor's hereditary enemies, the Siamese, in 1822 engrossed the greater part of his attention. Subsequent events, however, speedily showed that the pacific or conciliatory disposition evinced by the East India Company only tended to increase the insolence and rapacity of the Burmese.

In 1823 various acts of aggression were systematically committed. Several of our Mugh subjects (Arakanese emigrants) were attacked and killed on board their own boats in the Naaf river; and a party of the Company's elephant hunters were taken from within the British boundaries and carried prisoners to Arakan. Even these insulting acts might have been overlooked; but an attack made upon the British guard, in the island of Shuparee, of which we had retained possession for many years, was of a still more serious kind, and could be regarded in no other light than as an explicit declaration of undisguised hostility.

The attack was made on the 24th of September by a body of six hundred Arakanese troops, who killed and wounded several of our soldiers, upon whom they came altogether unexpectedly. They were, however, speedily reinforced, and the enemy was driven out of the island. A remonstrance was also immediately addressed to the Court of Amarapura, but no answer was deigned to be returned. The Governor-General now became aware that there was but one line of conduct left for him to follow, and that further forbearance on his part would have been attributed to pusillanimity, and advantage taken of it accordingly. On the 5th of March 1824, therefore, an official declaration of war was issued by the Government of Fort William—characterised not more strongly by its temperate firmness than by its British frankness and honesty..

This step excited, as was to be expected, no inconsiderable sensation throughout our possessions in British India, as well as in England, as soon as the news arrived. It was at Calcutta, however, from its vicinity to the Chittagong frontier, that its importance was principally felt.

It was known there that one of the Burmese generals had already gasconadingly announced his intention of taking possession of the town, preparatory to his *march to England*! It was destined, however, that ere long the arrogance of this haughty nation should be effectually tamed. The war opened with military operations on the frontiers of Sylhet and Chittagong, to both of which districts troops were speedily marched. It was in Sylhet and Assam that affairs of greatest consequence took place. Our troops there were under the command of Major Newton, who, in several engagements with the far superior forces of the Burmese, gained decisive advantages over them. The first success obtained by the enemy was in an affair which took place at Doodpatlee, after Colonel Bowen had arrived to the assistance of Major Newton with a force from Dacca. The Burmese, amounting to about two thousand, had, according to their invariable custom, stockaded themselves with

unusual strength and care, and "fought," says Colonel Bowen, "with bravery and obstinacy which I had never witnessed in any troops." The action lasted from early in the day till night-fall, when the British were obliged to retire with a severe loss.

The Burmese, however, also suffered much; and soon after, evacuating their stockades, retreated in the direction of Assam. Fresh troops were sent into Assam under the command of Colonel M'Morine, who, by the latter end of March, had penetrated as far as Gowahati. The Burmese Government, finding it necessary to concentrate their force in another quarter, withdrew the greater part of their troops from Assam, and left Colonel M'Morine in quiet possession of the country. In Chittagong, in the meantime, affairs were going on less successfully. Captain Noton held the chief command on this frontier, but an error seems to have been committed in intrusting too few men to his charge. The small corps he commanded was attacked in May by a powerful body of Burmese, and totally defeated, Captain Noton and most of his brother officers being slain in the engagement. The alarm speedily reached Calcutta, before which it was imagined the Burmese would instantly make their appearance, there being no intermediate force to oppose their advance. In this emergency, the European inhabitants formed themselves into a militia, and a large proportion of the crews of the Company's ships were landed to aid in protecting the town. But the panic was soon discovered to be greater than the occasion required.

The enemy did not think of approaching one step nearer than Ramoo, where, for a time, they took up their headquarters.

While these events were passing on the northern frontiers of the Burman Empire, a plan was matured by the Bengal Government, the execution of which was to effect an entire change in the features of the present war. Hitherto we had been acting principally on the defensive; but it was necessary, con-

sidering the enemy we had to deal with, to make it a leading object not more to repel aggression than to humble arrogance and intimidate foolhardiness. It was necessary to show the Burmese that we could not only endure, but inflict; that as we were not easily roused into anger, so our animosity was only the more fearful when it at length broke forth. The measure which was about to be carried into effect was that of despatching a considerable force by sea to make a descent upon some part of the enemy's coast, where probably such a visitation was but little expected. The force destined for this important expedition was supplied by the two Presidencies of Bengal and Madras; and, when united, was put under the command of Brigadier-General Sir Archibald Campbell.

The place of rendezvous was the Port of Cornwallis, in the Andaman Islands, where the troops arrived by the 3rd of May 1824. From thence Sir Archibald Campbell sailed on the 5th direct for Rangoon, detaching one part of his force under Brigadier M'Reagh, against the island of Cheduba, and another, under Major Wahab, against the island of Negrais. On the 10th the fleet anchored in the Rangoon river, and on the following morning sailed up to the town in order of attack, receiving little or no molestation by the way.

The Burmese at Rangoon seem to have been taken completely by surprise; and when the news of the arrival of a British fleet spread over the country, nothing could exceed the wondering consternation of the inhabitants. In whatever virtues, however, the Burmese may be deficient, certainly courage is not of the number; and as soon as their first emotions of astonishment had subsided, they prepared at all hazards for a resolute, and, in this instance, we ought perhaps to say patriotic, defence. Perceiving their feebleness, and being not as yet sufficiently aware of their hardihood and folly, the British commander humanely forbore opening a fire upon the town, in expectation that its governor would offer him some terms of capitulation. But it was soon discovered that no such

intention was entertained. A feeble and ill-directed fire was commenced upon the ships from a sixteen-gun battery, which was in a very short time effectually silenced. The troops were then ordered into the boats to effect a landing, and in less than twenty minutes the British flag was seen flying in the town, without the loss of a single life, or the discharge of a single musket. It was only the houses of Rangoon, however, that were thus got possession of. The inhabitants had all betaken themselves to the jungles in the neighbourhood, and our troops found nothing but a collection of empty habitations to refresh themselves in after their fatigues. The quantity of ordnance captured was indeed considerable, but in general of a very imperfect description. The islands of Cheduba and Negrais fell into our hands much about the same time, though not without a spirited opposition on the part of the inhabitants of both.

The prospects of our little army, now quartered in Rangoon, were anything but encouraging. The town was empty, in the most literal sense of the word. Every attempt to establish any intercourse with the native Burmese, for the purpose of obtaining provisions, was found to be fruitless. The rainy season was just setting in, which in Eastern climates is always peculiarly unhealthy to European constitutions; and, as far as any accurate information could be procured, it was ascertained that his golden-footed Majesty was making preparations, on the most magnificent scale, "to cover the face of the earth with an innumerable host, and to drive back the wild foreigners into the sea from whence they came!" To add still further to the discomfort of Sir Archibald Campbell's situation, some disagreements unfortunately took place between the naval and land forces. It had been expected, it is true, that the mere capture of Rangoon, together with the two other maritime possessions of the Burmese, already alluded to, would have produced such an effect on the Court of Ava that terms of peace would have been immediately proposed.

Nothing, however, was further from the intentions of that

proud Court; and subsequent events proved, that, though the Burmese may be beaten, they will die rather than confess they have been so.

The Commander-in-Chief, therefore, finding that as yet no practical benefits had resulted from his success, and that, on the contrary, the almost impenetrable jungles which surround Rangoon were rapidly filling with troops from all quarters, admirably skilled in every species of desultory warfare, and prepared to drive him either once more into his ships, or, if he thought of advancing, to dispute every inch of ground with him, saw the necessity of having recourse immediately to bold and vigorous measures. His first object was to ascertain the possibility of obtaining a sufficient number of boats, manned by skilful pilots, to convey a considerable portion of his force up the Irawady. This river may be set down as the great high road of the Burman Empire. Indeed, all the knowledge which we possess of that country was gathered by Colonel Symes, and our other envoys, upon its banks. It runs from north to south, through the whole of the kingdom of Ava; and to it alone is to be attributed the internal commercial prosperity of the empire.

Every village on its banks is obliged to furnish one or more war-boats, carrying from forty to fifty men each; and of these His Majesty can muster, on the shortest notice, four or five hundred. An impression appears to have been entertained by our Indian Government that, from the spirit of dissatisfaction which they supposed must necessarily exist in the minds of many of the inhabitants against the tyranny of their despotic monarch, they would be found, in numerous instances, willing to give all the aid in their power to the British. It was recollected, besides, that Rangoon was a town of Pegu, one of the conquered provinces of the Burman Empire, and that, for a long period of years, the most determined hostility had existed between the two countries. There was perhaps nothing irrationally sanguine in the hopes which these considerations

gave rise to, but they were entirely fallacious. Whatever complaints the Burmese might have among themselves against their government, and however severely the Peguers might continue to feel the subjection into which they had been reduced from a state of independence, yet, like the people of ancient Greece, at the appearance of a common foe all these causes of internal dissension were forgotten.

Not a single boatman acquainted with the navigation of the Irawady was to be procured; and whether inspired with fear or patriotism, but one desire was manifested, from the throne to the hovel,—to shun all intercourse with the English. It would probably also have been dangerous to have ventured far up the Irawady unless the co-operation of a land force could have been depended on; and before that could be the case, it would be necessary to clear the way by some hard fighting. The design, therefore, was for the present abandoned. In the meanwhile, the rainy season set in with all its attendant evils. The rain fell in such torrents that it was impossible for our troops to keep the field and act upon a regular system. Harassed, too, by continual incursions of the enemy, threatened with an approaching famine, and reduced by an epidemic which broke out amongst them to a state of the greatest debility, it seemed almost impossible for them to achieve anything of importance. Neither the hostility, however, of the Burmese, nor of the climate, could subdue British courage. For six months, from May to December, our operations were confined to Rangoon and its vicinity, it being the determination of the enemy to prevent us, if possible, from advancing a step into the country. Our ultimate success in compelling them to retreat further into the interior, and thereby affording us an opportunity of following them, depended not so much on the decisive advantage gained in any one action, as on the continued judgment and skill which regulated the whole system of our military tactics. We never advanced a few miles out of Rangoon for the purpose either of dislodging the enemy

from a position they had taken up, or of gaining possession of some post which appeared of importance, without being almost sure of achieving our object. But as soon as a certain resistance had been made, the Burmese were accustomed to retreat leisurely from their stockades into the jungles, where, though we knew we had beaten them, it was impossible for us to follow. Many rencontres of this description took place, into the details of which it is unnecessary for us to enter. A short account of one or two of the most remarkable will suffice as a description of the whole.

On the 28th of May the British and Burmese troops came into contact for the first time. Sir Archibald Campbell led his forces about five miles up the Rangoon river, and found the enemy had taken a position in one or two scattered villages, flanked on both sides by a jungle. Confident in the strength of their situation, they received the British with shouts and cries of "Come! come!" A heavy fire was immediately commenced upon our troops, whose muskets, having suffered from rain, were so inefficient that it was necessary for them to close without loss of time. The Burmese were altogether unable to withstand the violence of our charge; but, shut in as they were in their own encampment, and thrown into irretrievable confusion by the impetuosity of our attack, their only alternative was to continue fighting with desperate resolution until they were cut to pieces. Being unaccustomed to give, they did not expect quarter; and in self-defence, therefore, our soldiers were unfortunately obliged to disregard the dictates of humanity. Having taken possession of the villages, in which about four hundred Burmese lost their lives, Sir Archibald re-conducted his troops to Rangoon.

Soon after this affair two deputies arrived from the Burmese camp under pretence of negotiating a peace, but in reality only with the view of gaining time for the main body of the enemy to strengthen themselves as much as possible at Kem-mindine, a village three miles above Rangoon, on an elevated

situation, with a thick forest in its rear. They were intended, perhaps, to act also as spies, and report upon the condition and spirits of the British army. Whatever was their object, nothing satisfactory was proposed by them in the interview they had with our commissioners.

Determined to convince the Burmese that we were not to be lulled into a treacherous security, our commander, on the morning of the day after their departure (10th June), ordered a general advance upon Kemmindine. The road was not left undisputed. About half-way a strong stockade ran across it, the fruitless attempt to defend which cost the enemy two hundred men.

The way being cleared, the column again moved forward, consisting of about three thousand men, and by nightfall the troops had taken their position in many places within a hundred yards of where the enemy was posted. At daybreak on the following day, firing commenced, which upon our part, in less than two hours, produced a very visible breach in their fortifications. This, together with the recollection of their discomfiture the day before, operated so powerfully on the Burmese, that, notwithstanding the still existing strength of their stockade, they thought proper quietly to evacuate the place during the cannonade. It was this facility of securing a retreat, assisted as they were by the chain of posts which they occupied, and the thickness of the surrounding jungle, that particularly annoyed our troops, who, just in the very moment of victory, constantly found that their enemy had slipped as it were from between their very fingers. The object, however, which Sir Archibald Campbell had in view in making this attack was fully accomplished.

A terror of the British arms began to pervade the country; and, in the course of a few days, every stockade in the immediate vicinity of Rangoon was abandoned. In this, as well as in all his other expeditions on the banks of the river, the Commander-in-Chief received most effective and valuable

assistance from the co-operation of the naval part of his force. A short cessation from active hostilities took place after the affair of Kemmindine; but both parties were preparing to renew operations with increased vigour. A reinforcement arrived at Rangoon from Madras; and the detachments which had taken possession of Cheduba and Negrals, returned very seasonably to the main army, now a good deal weakened from various causes. The Burmese, on their part, were not idle. Their former generals having failed in driving "the wild foreigners into the sea," had fallen into disgrace, and were succeeded by a senior officer of some reputation, who brought with him a considerable body of fresh troops.

His object was, not so much to meet the British in open fight, as to hem them in within a limited space and harass them with a protracted system of desultory warfare. To such proceedings it was of course not our interest quietly to submit; and accordingly, various expeditions were undertaken for the purpose of breaking through the cordon which the enemy was attempting to form round us. In one of these, ten stockades were taken in one day, and the new general, with many other chiefs of rank, were killed. Still, however, no thoughts of peace were entertained by the Burmese; and it was now evident that, whatever successes were gained, as long as our operations were confined to the neighbourhood of Rangoon no effect would be produced by them on the Court of Ava. Unprovided, therefore, as Sir Archibald Campbell was with the means of advancing into the interior, he resolved to have recourse to the only other alternative left him, which was to intimidate the Burmese still further by the capture of some of their southern maritime possessions. An expedition was fitted out for this purpose, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Miles; who, in the course of a few months, made himself master of Tavoy, Mergui, and Tenasserim, seaports of much importance on the eastern shores of the empire. Two of the King's brothers, the Princes of Toungoo and Sarawuddy, now took the command of

the army. The one fixed his head-quarters at Pegu, and the other at Donabew, both at a considerable distance from Rangoon. Along with them came a body of astrologers, who were most probably kept in pay by the Burmese Government, as useful engines by which to act on the superstition of the people; and likewise a party of troops called the King's Invulnerables, from the belief entertained, or affected to be entertained, both by themselves and their countrymen, that the fire of an enemy could not injure them. Notwithstanding the extensive nature of their preparations, however, and the confidence they expressed in their own success, the operations of this new armament ended as disastrously as those of any which had preceded it. Instead of gaining any advantage over the British, they were invariably driven back with considerable loss as often as they attempted to approach our encampments. Yet it is not to be denied or concealed that the Burmese are no contemptible antagonists; they are constitutionally brave, they are trained to arms from their cradle, and there is a persevering obstinacy in their style of fighting, which, with troops less perfectly disciplined than those of England, would have every chance of being ultimately crowned with success.

But the golden-footed monarch of Ava had found out, at length, that however he might at first have affected to despise the small army which had taken possession of Rangoon, five or six hundred miles distant from his capital, it was more than a match for the best generals he could send against it, followed by thousands of his favourite troops. He saw the necessity, therefore, of collecting his energies for a yet more powerful effort. His forces, he found, were too much scattered; he was convinced that he was attempting to do too much at once. He recalled, therefore, the armies he had sent into Assam and Arakan; and, concentrating the whole military power of his kingdom, he gave the entire command to Maha Bandoola, the well-known Burmese general, whose reputation, from his partial successes over the British in

Chittagong, stood exceedingly high. Bandoola had advanced to Ramoo, where he was probably making preparations for an expedition into Bengal; and it is not unlikely that he found it exceedingly disagreeable to be awakened from his dream of future victory, by being recalled to defend his own country from invasion.

His retreat from Ramoo, and subsequent march through Arakan (which, in the midst, as it was, of the rainy season, must have been a peculiarly arduous one), relieved the inhabitants of Calcutta from considerable anxiety; and, shortly afterwards, enabled our troops in that quarter to advance with little opposition into the very interior of Arakan, taking possession of the capital itself.

As soon as Maha Bandoola arrived at Ava, every honour and attention was conferred upon him by his sovereign; and after a short delay in the capital, he set out for Donabew, accompanied by a large fleet of war-boats, which carried down the river strong reinforcements of men and military stores. We were not, however, unprepared to receive these new enemies; and some overtures of a friendly nature which we had a short time before received from the Siamese tended to inspire us with additional confidence.

As it was now also clearly foreseen that an advance towards the capital of the empire would be necessary before we could expect to intimidate the Burman monarch into a desire for peace, five hundred native artisans had been sent to Rangoon from Chittagong, who were busily employed in preparing boats to convey our troops up the Irawady. The arrival, likewise, of several battalions of British and native infantry, as well as of some troops of cavalry, added considerably to our numerical and actual force. Towards the end of November the largest and best appointed army which the Burman Government had yet sent into the field marched down from Donabew, and made their appearance in the neighbourhood of Rangoon, with the intention of driving us first from our position at Kemmindine,

and then on forcing the scattered remains of our army to seek for safety in their ships.

The name of the Commander-in-Chief, Bandoola, was in itself a tower of strength; and there was not probably a Burman into whose imagination the thought ever for a moment entered that this invincible leader could, by any possibility, be unsuccessful. Both armies met for the first time on the 1st of December; and as the particulars of their first engagement, where so much talent was displayed on both sides, cannot fail to be read with interest, we shall make no apology for introducing in this place an extract from the "London Gazette Extraordinary" of April 24, 1825, consisting of—

"Copy of a letter from Brigadier-General Sir A. Campbell, K.C.B., to George Swinton, Esq., dated Head-quarters, Rangoon, 9th December 1824.

"SIR,—The long-threatened, and, on my part, no less anxiously wished for event, has at length taken place. Maha Bandoola, said to be accompanied by the Princes of Tonghoo and Sarawuddy, appeared in front of my position on the morning of the 1st instant, at the head of the whole united force of the Burman Empire, amounting, upon the most moderate calculation, to from fifty to sixty thousand men, apparently well armed, with a numerous artillery, and a body of Cassay horse. Their haughty leader had insolently declared his intention of leading us in captive chains to grace the triumph of the Golden Monarch; but it has pleased God to expose the vanity of his idle threats, and crown the heroic efforts of my gallant little army with a most complete and signal victory.

"The enemy had assembled his forces in the heavy jungle in our front during the night of the 30th ult., and, being well aware of his near approach, I had previously made every necessary arrangement for his reception, in whatever way he might think proper to leave his impervious camp. The absence of

Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin* at Martaban, and of a strong detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Mallet, which I had sent to display the British flag in the ancient capital of Pegue, had much weakened my force; but I had been too long familiar with the resolute resolution of British troops to have felt any regret that fortune had given me an opportunity of contending with Bandoolla and his formidable legions, even under circumstances of temporary disadvantage.

“Early in the morning of the 1st inst., the enemy commenced his operations by a smart attack upon our post at Kemmindine, commanded by Major Yates, and garrisoned by the 26th Madras Native Infantry, with a detachment of the Madras European Regiment, supported on the river by as strong a naval force as could be spared. As the day became light it discovered numerous and apparently formidable masses of the advancing enemy issuing from the jungle, and moving, at some distance, upon both our flanks, for the purpose of surrounding us, which I allowed them to effect without interruption, leaving us only the narrow channel of the Rangoon river unoccupied in our rear.

“Bandoolla had now fully exposed to me his plan of operations, and my own resolution was instantly adopted of allowing, and even encouraging him to bring forth his means and resources from the jungle to the more open country on his left, where I knew I could at any time attend him to advantage.

“The right corps of the Burmese army had crossed to the Dalla side of the Rangoon river, and in the course of the morning was observed, in several divisions, crossing the plain towards the site of the ruined village of Dalla, where it took post in the neighbouring jungle, sending on a division to occupy

* Afterwards Major-General Godwin, C.B., commanding “the army of Ava” in the second Burmese war.

the almost inaccessible ground on the bank of the river, and from which they soon opened a distant fire upon the shipping. Another division immediately took ground in front of Kemmindine, and for six successive days tried in vain every effort that hope of success and dread of failure could call forth, to drive the brave 26th and a handful of Europeans from this post; while tremendous fire-rafts, and crowds of war-boats, were every day employed in the equally vain endeavour to drive the shipping from their station off the place.

"The enemy's right wing and centre occupied a range of hills immediately in front of the great Dagon pagoda, covered with so thick a forest as to be impenetrable to all but Burman troops; and their left extended nearly two miles further, along a lower and more open ridge to the village of Puzendoon, where their extreme left rested. They were no sooner thus placed in position, than muskets and spears were laid aside for the pick-axe and shovel, and in an incredibly short space of time every part of their line out of the jungle was strongly and judiciously entrenched.

"In the afternoon of the 1st, I observed an opportunity of attacking the enemy's left to advantage, and ordered Major Sale, with four hundred men from the 13th Light Infantry, and 18th Madras Native Infantry, under Major Dennie of the former and Captain Ross of the latter corps, to move forward to the point I had selected; and I never witnessed a more dashing charge than was made on this occasion by His Majesty's 13th, while the 18th Native Infantry followed their example with a spirit that did them honour, carrying all opposition before them. They burst through the entrenchments, carrying dismay and terror into the enemy's ranks, great numbers of whom were slain; and the party returned loaded with arms, standards, and other trophies. Having correctly ascertained everything I required, I now, as I originally determined, abstained from giving any serious interruption to the indefatigable labour of the opposing army, patiently waiting until

I saw the whole of their material fully brought forward and within my reach. About sunset in the evening, a cloud of skirmishers were pushed forward close under the north-east angle of the pagoda, who, taking advantage of the many pagodas and strong ground on our front, commenced a harassing and galling fire upon the works. I at once saw we should suffer from their fire, if not dislodged; therefore ordered two companies of the 38th Regiment, under Captain Piper (an officer I have often had occasion to mention), to advance and drive them back. Were it permitted, on such an occasion, to dwell upon the enthusiastic spirit of my troops, I would feel a pleasure in recounting the burst of rapture that followed every order to advance against their audacious foe; but it is sufficient to remark that the conduct of these two companies was most conspicuous. They quickly gained their point, and fully acted up to the character they have ever sustained. At daylight on the morning of the 2nd, finding the enemy had very much encroached during the night, and had entrenched a height in front of the north gate of the pagoda, which gave them an enfilading fire upon part of our line, I directed Captain Wilson of the 38th Regiment, with two companies of the corps and one hundred men of the 28th Madras Native Infantry, to drive them from the hill. No order was ever more rapidly or handsomely obeyed. The brave sepoy, vying with their British comrades in forward gallantry, allowed the appalled Burmese no time to rally, but drove them from one breastwork to another, fighting them in the very holes they had dug, finally to prove their graves.

“In the course of this day Colonel Mallet’s detachment returned from Pegue, having found the old city completely deserted, and gave me the additional means of attacking the enemy the moment the time arrived.

“During the 3rd and 4th the enemy carried on his labours with indefatigable industry; and but for the inimitable practice of our artillery, commanded by Captain Murray in the

absence, from indisposition, of Lieutenant-Colonel Hopkinson, we must have been severely annoyed by the incessant fire from his trenches.

“The attacks upon Kemmindine continued with unabating violence; but the unyielding spirit of Major Yates and his steady troops, although exhausted with fatigue and want of rest, baffled every attempt on shore; while Captain Ryves, with His Majesty's sloop ‘Sophia,’ the Honourable Company's cruiser ‘Teignmouth,’ and some flotilla and row gun-boats, nobly maintained the long-established fame of the British navy in defending the passage of the river against the most furious assaults of the enemy's war-boats, advancing under cover of the most tremendous fire-rafts, which the unwearied exertions of British sailors could alone have conquered.

“Captain Ryves lost no opportunity of coming into contact with the much-vaunted boats of Ava; and in one morning, five out of six, each mounting a heavy piece of ordnance, were boarded and captured by our men-of-war's boats, commanded by Lieutenant Kellett of His Majesty's ship ‘Arachne,’ and Lieutenant Goldfinch of the ‘Sophia,’ whose intrepid conduct merits the highest praise.

“The enemy having apparently completed his left wing with its full complement of artillery and warlike stores, I determined to attack that part of his line early on the morning of the 5th. I requested Captain Chads, the senior naval officer here, to move up to the Puzendoon creek during the night, with the gun flotilla, bomb-ketch, &c., and commence a cannonade on the enemy's rear at daylight. This service was most judiciously and successfully performed by that officer, who has never yet disappointed me in my most sanguine expectations. At the same time two columns of attack were formed, agreeably to orders I had issued on the preceding evening, composed of details from the different regiments of the army. The first, consisting of one thousand one hundred men, I placed, under the orders of that gallant officer Major

Sale, and directed him to attack and penetrate the centre of the enemy's line; the other, consisting of six hundred men, I entrusted to Major Walker of the 3rd Madras Native Light Infantry, with orders to attack their left, which had approached to within a few hundred yards of Rangoon. At seven o'clock both columns moved forward to the point of attack; both were led to my perfect satisfaction, and both succeeded with a degree of ease their intrepid and undaunted conduct undoubtedly insured; and I directed Lieutenant Archibald, with a troop of the Governor-General's body-guard, which had been landed the preceding evening, to follow the column under Major Sale, and take advantage of any opportunity which might offer, to charge.

"The enemy were defeated and dispersed in every direction; and the body-guard, gallantly charging over the broken and swampy ground, completed their terror and dismay. The Cassay horse fled, mixed with the retreating infantry; and all their artillery, stores, and reserve depôts, which had cost them so much toil and labour to get up, with a great quantity of small arms, gilt chattahs, standards, and other trophies, fell into our hands. Never was victory more complete or more decided; and never was the triumph of discipline and valour, over the disjointed efforts of irregular courage and infinitely superior numbers, more conspicuous. Majors Dennie and Thornhill of the 13th Light Infantry, and Major Gore of the 89th, were distinguished by the steadiness with which they led their men; but it is with deep regret I have to state the loss we have sustained in the death of Major Walker, one of India's best and bravest soldiers, who fell while leading his column into the enemy's entrenchments; when the command devolved upon Major Wahab, who gallantly conducted the column during the rest of the action; and I observed the 34th Madras Native Light Infantry, on this occasion, conspicuously forward.

"The Burmese left wing thus disposed of, I patiently waited

its effect upon the right, posted in so thick a forest as to render any attack in that quarter in a great measure impracticable.

"On the 6th I had the pleasure of observing that Bandoola had brought up the scattered remnant of his defeated left to strengthen his right and centre, and continued day and night employed in carrying on his approaches in front of the great pagoda. I ordered the artillery to slacken its fire, and the infantry to keep wholly out of sight, allowing him to carry on his fruitless labour with little annoyance or molestation. As I expected, he took system for timidity; and on the morning of the 7th instant, I had his whole force posted in my immediate front—his first line entrenched so close that the soldiers in their barracks could distinctly hear the insolent threats and reproaches of the Burman braves.

"The time had now arrived to undeceive them in their sanguine, but ill-founded, hopes. I instantly made my arrangements, and at half-past 11 o'clock everything was in readiness to assault the trenches in four columns of attack, under the superintendence of Lieutenant-Colonel Miles, my second in command, and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonels Mallet, Parlby, Brodie, and Captain Wilson of the 38th Regiment. At a quarter before 12 I ordered every gun that would bear upon the trenches to open, and their fire was kept up with an effect that never was surpassed; Major Sale at the same time, as directed, making a diversion on the enemy's left and rear. At 12 o'clock the cannonade ceased, and the columns moved forward to their respective points of attack. Everything was done under my own immediate eye, but, where all behaved so nobly, I cannot particularise; but I must in justice state that Captain Wilson's and Lieutenant-Colonel Parlby's divisions first made an impression, from which the enemy never recovered. They were driven from all their works without a check, abandoning all their guns, with a great quantity of arms of every description; and certainly not the least amusing part of their formid-

able preparations was a great number of ladders for escalading the great pagoda, found in rear of their position. The total defeat of Bandoola's army was now most fully accomplished. His loss in killed and wounded, from the nature of the ground, it is impossible to calculate; but I am confident I do not exceed the fairest limit when I state it at five thousand men. In every other respect the mighty host, which so lately threatened to overwhelm us, now scarcely exists. It commenced its inglorious flight during last night. Humbled, dispersing, and deprived of their arms, they cannot for a length of time again meet us in the field; and the lesson they have now received will, I am confident, prove a salutary antidote to the native arrogance and vanity of the Burmese nation.

"Thus vanished the hopes of Ava; and those means which the Burmese Government were seven months in organising for our annihilation, have been completely destroyed by us in the course of seven days. Of three hundred pieces of ordnance that accompanied the grand army, two hundred and forty are now in our camp, and in muskets their loss is to them irreparable.

"Our loss in killed and wounded, although severe, will not, I am sure, be considered great for the important services we have had the honour to perform.

"Of my troops I cannot say enough; their valour was only equalled by the cheerful patience with which they bore long and painful privations. My Europeans fought like Britons, and proved themselves worthy of the country that gave them birth; and I trust I do the gallant sepoys justice when I say that never did troops more strive to obtain the palm of honour than they to rival their European comrades in everything that marks the steady, true, and daring soldier.

"My obligations to Captains Chads and Ryves, and the officers and seamen of His Majesty's navy, are great and numerous. In Captain Chads himself I have always found that ready alacrity to share our toils and dangers that has

ever characterised the profession he belongs to, and the most cordial zeal in assisting and co-operating with me on every occasion. I have also to notice the good conduct of the Honourable Company's cruisers, the gun-flotilla, and row-boats. Nor ought I to omit mentioning the handsome conduct of Captain Binny, acting agent for the Bengal transports, in volunteering both his European crew and ship for any service. On the present occasion she was anchored off Dalla, and sustained some loss from the enemy's fire. I may also add that every transport in the river was equally anxious to contribute every possible assistance to the public service."

Notwithstanding the defeat, so unexpected on his part, which Bandoola thus sustained, not many days elapsed before that indefatigable leader succeeded in rallying his scattered forces, and with a body of about twenty-five thousand men returned to within three miles of the pagoda alluded to in Sir Archibald Campbell's despatch, and "commenced entrenching and stockading," in the words of that general, "with a judgment in point of position such as would do credit to the best instructed engineers of the most civilised and warlike nations." This position,* however, Sir Archibald determined to attack on the 15th of December; and from the admirable manner in which the fire of the artillery was directed, in less than fifteen minutes the columns destined for carrying the breach were in possession, not only of the enemy's work, but of his camp, which was left standing, with all the baggage, and a great proportion of his arms and ammunition. "When it is known," says the Commander-in-Chief, "that one thousand three hundred British infantry stormed and carried by assault the most formidable entrenched and stockaded works I ever saw, defended by upwards of twenty thousand men, I trust it is un-

* Kokeen, four miles from the great pagoda at Rangoon.

necessary for me to say more in praise of soldiers performing such a prodigy ; future ages will scarcely believe it."

It is proper, however, to mention that upon this occasion Bandoola did not command in person ; the chief to whom he had entrusted that duty was mortally wounded whilst gallantly defending the stockade.

On the same day on which this very brilliant action took place, under the superintendence of Captain Chads, the senior naval officer at Rangoon, an attack was made upon a fleet of thirty-two of the enemy's war-boats. Of these, principally through the aid of the " Diana " steamboat, which accompanied this expedition, and the celerity of whose motions, even against wind and tide, inspired the Burmese with the greatest consternation, thirty were captured, having been previously abandoned by their crews, who, upon the approach of the steamboat, threw themselves into the river, and were either drowned or swam ashore, apparently in an agony of terror.

In consequence of these continued disasters, Maha Bandoola found it necessary to lead back his army, much shattered, to Donabew.

It was now for the first time that the British army at Rangoon found itself in undisturbed possession of a considerable district of country, and active preparations were immediately made for taking every advantage of this new situation of affairs. Orders were issued to prepare for a speedy advance into the interior ; and besides the continual arrival of transports from the Presidencies, this object was not a little favoured by the return of many of the inhabitants of the country to their former places of residence in Rangoon and its vicinity, and by their consenting to open a regular traffic with the British in all articles of consumption. Some of the native watermen, too, volunteered into our service, by whose assistance we were enabled to obviate many of the difficulties which our ignorance of the navigation of the Irawady would otherwise have occasioned.

Certainly at this moment the situation of the Burmese monarch was anything but enviable. The most numerous armies, headed by the most skilful generals he could send into the field, had been defeated again and again. The victorious troops at Rangoon were about to march for Ava; and from the north-east frontier of Arakan a large force under Brigadier-General Morison was preparing to enter his empire, and, if possible, to co-operate with Sir Archibald Campbell's division; from Sylhet, another army, under Brigadier-General Shouldham, threatened to advance to the capital through Cassay; in Assam, Lieutenant-Colonel Richards was busy with a small but active corps; and on the south the Siamese, who had already manifested their friendly dispositions towards the British, held out hopes of their making a movement in conjunction with our columns which were to march up the Irawady. His celestial Majesty, however, is not easily terrified, or, if he is, he has too much pride to show it. Upon the present occasion he boldly stood at bay, and manfully prepared for resistance at whatever cost.

It was on the 13th of February 1825 that the general advance of the British troops commenced. They were divided into two columns; the one, about two thousand strong, proceeding by land, under the command of Sir Archibald Campbell; and the other by water, under Brigadier-General Cotton, consisted of about one thousand European infantry, with a powerful train of artillery, which was embarked in a flotilla of sixty boats, commanded by Captain Alexander. The land column was to proceed, in the first place, up the Lain river, and effect a junction with Brigadier-General Cotton as near Donabew as possible. A smaller force, under Major Sale, was also ordered to take possession of Bassein, after which it likewise was to join the main body at Donabew. Brigadier M'Reagh, with the remainder of the troops, was left in command at Rangoon, and was to employ himself in superintending the fortification of that town, which went on briskly. The land force, under General Campbell, marched to Lain, without meeting any resistance

whatever. Its distance from Rangoon is about fifty miles; but, owing to the uncultivated state of the country, and the absence of everything like regular roads, the troops, though in high health and spirits, could seldom advance more than eight miles a day.

They left Rangoon on the 14th, and did not reach Lain till the 23rd of February. The town, though the capital of a pretty extensive district, was found quite deserted, and a halt was made at it for only a single night; after which, the column resumed its march towards Donabew with all possible expedition. By the 7th March it was near enough that place to hear distinctly the sound of a cannonade which the marine division under General Cotton, having arrived first, had already opened upon it. The operations of this division, in passing up the Irawady, had necessarily been much more arduous than those of the land column. Various stockades and entrenchments had been thrown up upon the banks to oppose its progress. At Panlang, in particular, a very spirited affair took place, where between four thousand and five thousand Burmese were driven back from very powerful fortifications with considerable loss. Upon this and other similar occasions, the shells and rockets used by the British were found of the greatest service, both as tending to throw the enemy into confusion and to save the lives of our men.

After these successes, Brigadier-General Cotton proceeded direct to Donabew; and though Sir Archibald Campbell had not yet come up, he determined upon attacking the enemy, who, headed by Bandoola, mustered about fifteen thousand strong, and had fortified their position in the most skilful and soldier-like manner. An outer stockade, which our marine force first attacked, was carried with a loss to the enemy of about four hundred men. The attempt made upon the second stockade was less successful; and, after being exposed for a considerable time to a heavy fire, General Cotton found it necessary to re-embark the troops he had landed for the purpose of making the assault, and dropped down four miles

below Donabew, there to wait until reinforced. Our loss in this second affair was serious.

In the meanwhile, Sir Archibald Campbell, not altogether aware of the formidable resistance which was to be made at Donabew, had pushed on several days' march towards Prome, a city of some magnitude, and which he understood was the head-quarters of the enemy. On the 11th of March he received despatches informing him of the failure of the attack upon the outworks at the former place, and, after some deliberation, he judged it proper to retrace his steps to the assistance of General Cotton. On the 14th, and four following days, his troops were employed in crossing the Irawady, which it was necessary to do before they could reach Donabew. The task was one of no slight difficulty; but, in the words of Major Snodgrass, "energy and perseverance, aided by the cheerful and hearty exertions of the soldiers, finally triumphed over every obstacle." It was not, however, till the 25th that the army arrived within gun-shot distance of Donabew.

The main stockade at the fort of Donabew was upwards of a mile in length, composed of solid teak beams, from fifteen to seventeen feet high, and from five hundred to eight hundred yards broad. Behind this were the brick ramparts of the place, surmounted by a large deep ditch filled with spikes, nails, and holes; and the ditch itself was shut in with several rows of strong railings, together with an abatis of great breadth. Our camp was hardly pitched before a sortie was made from the fort, which, though of a formidable appearance at first, ended in smoke. For several days skirmishes of a desultory kind took place before the works, without producing any serious impression on either side. On the 1st of April a continued fire of rockets was kept up on our part, with little or no return from the enemy, a circumstance which occasioned some surprise. The cause, however, was satisfactorily enough explained next day. The fort of Donabew was nearly evacuated; for, on the morning of the 1st, Maha Bandoola, while going his rounds,

had been killed on the spot by a rocket ; and such was the panic which instantly took possession of the garrison, that the surviving chiefs found it utterly impossible to keep it any longer together.

Just as the enemy's rear-guard flew towards the neighbouring jungle on the 2nd, our army took possession of the place, and found in it a great store not only of guns and ammunition, but of grain sufficient for many months' consumption. The death of Maha Bandoola was probably the greatest misfortune which the Burman monarch had yet sustained. There can be little doubt that he possessed talents of no mean order ; and the respect, approaching to awe, which he had inspired in his soldiers, made them a great deal more formidable when under his command than that of anyone else. One of the prisoners found in the fort related the particulars of his general's death in these words : " I belong to the household of Menghi Maha Bandoola, and my business was to beat the great drums that are hanging in the verandah of the Wongee's house. Yesterday morning, between the hours of nine and ten, while the chief's dinner was preparing, he went out to take his usual morning walk round the works, and arrived at his observatory (that tower with a red ball upon it), where, as there was no firing, he sat down upon a couch which was kept there for his use. While he was giving orders to some of his chiefs, the English began throwing bombs, and one of them falling close to the general, burst, and killed him on the spot. His body was immediately carried away and burnt to ashes. His death was soon known to everybody in the stockade, and the soldiers refused to stay and fight under any other commander. The chiefs lost all influence over their men, every individual thinking only of providing for his own personal safety."

Mah Bandoola.

The death of Bandoola, which was the turning-point of the First Burmese War, forces Major Snodgrass, in his excellent

narrative, to dwell at some length on the character^o of the greatest of all Burmese generals; and some points therein suggest a comparison with our clever and wily warlike enemy at the Cape, King Cetawayo, who, strange to say, may now (August 1879) be bearded^d in his den, or *kraal*, wherever that may be, by Sir Garnet Wolseley, who, as will be seen hereafter, in the Second Burmese War first distinguished himself while, as a dashing and fearless ensign, leading a storming party in the land of the Golden Foot* at Donabew.

Before giving the Major's summing-up of Bandoola's character, it may be remarked that, in our opinion, two qualities reigned pre-eminent in him, namely, vainglory—according to Bacon an essential point in commanders and soldiers—and a superstitious fear, inseparable from a Burman and a believer in Gautama, in which religion spirits, charms, transmigrations, *Niebban* or Nirvâna—annihilation, and yet, as Gautama mentions an “eternal city,” hardly perfect annihilation—form the leading features. We know that, East and West, superstition has been the confusion of many States, and we also know that (to support the philosopher's theory) its practical effect, during the last fifty or sixty years in Upper Burma, has been to bring in a new *primum mobile* that has “ravished all the spheres of government.” Bandoola was certainly, without intending it, a man glorious for mischief. The biographer of Charles XII. considers conquerors a species between good kings and tyrants; and we are ever eager to know the most minute circumstances of their lives. The Burman, like many great European warriors in history, must needs be violent to “make good his own vaunt”; and

* When a Burmese subject means to affirm that the King has heard anything, he says “It has reached the golden ears”; he who has obtained admittance to the royal presence has been at the “golden feet.” The perfume of otto of roses is described as being grateful to the “golden nose.” Gold is the type of excellence among Burmans—as Shakspeare says, “Gold—yellow, glittering, precious gold!” Yet, although so highly valued for ornament, it is not used for coin in the country.

it was probably in this state of mind that, sometime before a similar threat, already mentioned, with regard to Calcutta, Bandoola marched with his army through the Aeng pass into Arakan—asserting Burmese rights to Bengal—taking with him *a pair of golden fetters to bind the Governor-General* (Lord Hastings) !

Another anecdote of him, bringing forth the superstitious fear, may be related :—

During an early period of the operations, Bandoola, having heard so much of the destructive properties of a shell, desired that one should be brought to him for inspection. A shell, with a very long fuse, having been projected by the British, the live *creature* was being brought, fizzing at a dreadful rate, to the chief. This they thought to be a decided failure, and the thing might be examined. The warrior, at some distance, surveyed, with great curiosity, the unfortunate men bringing the fiery fiend along. Another second or two, and it burst, killing the carriers and everyone beside it. Bandoola was thunderstruck : and, for the whole of that day, his courage left him.

The civilised “Swedish Charles” comes to the mind at this juncture ; and we think of his placid air on the bursting of the bomb in the house at Stralsund, where he was dictating, and his cool remark,—on the consternation of his secretary, after the latter’s “Ah, Sire, the bomb !”—“What has the bomb to do with the letter I am dictating ? Go on.”

True enough, in the case of Charles, the shell had killed no one ; but, would Bandoola, like him “who left a name at which the world grew pale,” have exposed his own life to save a fellow-creature, as he did to protect one of his generals (Lieven) at Thorn ?* We think not. And this forms an important

* This is one of the most remarkable instances of true courage in military history. As the general had on a blue coat, richly trimmed with gold, thus inviting destruction, Charles, in his plain blue with brass buttons (which, as well

difference in the military character of the Asiatic and the European.

It, doubtless, does so also in that of the African warrior and the British officer or soldier; for we have not yet heard of the renowned King Oetawayo, on any occasion, emulating the gallant and noble lord who has received the Victoria Cross for conspicuous bravery in saving the life of a sergeant, at the risk of his own, during a reconnaissance before the battle of Ulundi.

We now turn from this perhaps pardonable digression to Major Snodgrass's character of Bandoola, with the remark that no other leading Burman has since displayed similar warlike capacity and energy, although the nearest approach to him in the second war was the powerful robber chieftain Myat-htoon, who gave us so much trouble at and around Donabew. Major Snodgrass writes :—

"The character of Maha Bandoola seems to have been a strange mixture of cruelty and generosity, talent with want of judgment, and a strong regard to personal safety, combined with great courage and resolution, which never failed him till death. The acts of barbarous cruelty he committed are too numerous to be related; stern and inflexible in all his decrees, he appears to have experienced a savage pleasure in witnessing the execution of his bloody mandates; even his own hand was ever ready to punish with death the slightest mark of want of zeal in those he had intrusted with commands or the defence

as the cocked hat with a bullet-hole in it, the writer saw religiously preserved in a glass case at Stockholm), placed himself before his "subject," entirely screening him, to save him from being hit; but a volley of cannon, which came in flank, "struck the general dead on the spot which the King had scarcely quitted." The death of this officer, apparently killed exactly in his stead, made him, says his biographer, believe in "absolute predestination," and that he was reserved for yet greater things—an idea which Bandoola may also have cherished, till what was probably a *shell* Congreve rocket caused his death.

of any post. Still his immediate adherents are said to have been sincerely attached to him; uncontrolled license to plunder and extort from all who were unfortunate enough to meet Bandoola's men, may no doubt have reconciled them to their situation, and confirmed them much in their attachment to their leader. The management of a Burmese army, for so long a period contending against every disadvantage to which a general can be subjected, evinced no small degree of talent; while the position and defences at Donabew, as a field-work, would have done credit to the most scientific engineer. But it is difficult to account for his motives, or give credit to his judgment, in giving up the narrow rivers of Panlang and Lain, where a most effectual opposition could have been given, to fight his battle on the banks of the broad Irawady, where the ground was favourable to the regular movement of disciplined troops. During the days of his prosperity Bandoola seldom exposed his person—in the battles of Rangoon and Kokeen he was never under fire; but he did not hesitate, when circumstances required it, to allow himself to be hemmed in at Donabew, where he boldly declared he would conquer or die, and, till he actually fell, set his men the first example of the courage he required in all."

It is not probable that Upper Burma will furnish another Bandoola; but, under any circumstances, we must be prepared for him, and never be so mad as to despise our enemy!

CHAPTER. III.

FROM THE ADVANCE ON PROMÉ TO THE CONCLUSION OF A
TREATY OF PEACE AT YANDABOO, 24TH FEBRUARY 1826.

THE British force now pushed on to Promé with as little delay as possible, well aware that decisive measures alone would produce any effect on the obstinate and arrogant Court of Ava. No hostile interruption was attempted to be made; but "letters were received, in the course of the march, from the Burmese authorities at Promé, intimating the willingness of the Government to conclude a peace." "As it was suspected, however," continues Mr. Bell,* "that this was merely a stratagem for the sake of gaining time, Sir Archibald Campbell replied that as soon as he had taken military possession of Promé, he would be happy to listen to any overtures of an amicable nature which might be made to him." The prudence of this determination was very clearly perceived when the army arrived before that city, where every preparation was making for a vigorous defence. The celerity of our motions, however, was too much for the enemy, who, being taken by surprise before

* The Calcutta publisher (in 1852) of "An Account of the Burman Empire," compiled from various standard works, thus alludes to Mr. Henry G. Bell's succinct and clear narrative:—"The Account of the Burmese War of 1824, by Mr. H. G. Bell, which concludes the work, will be a good substitute for the voluminous narrative of Snodgrass, to those who have not access to the latter volume."—The greater portion of Mr. Bell's narrative is contained in the present Abstract.

their fortifications were completed, retired during the night of the 24th of April, and, on the 25th, General Campbell entered the place without firing a shot. As the rainy season was about to set in, and the campaign therefore necessarily near a close, our head-quarters were fixed at Prome, from whence a detachment marched, during May, towards Toungoo, taking possession of the intermediate country, and returning about the end of May to Prome. The Prince of Sarawuddy, who now headed the remnant of the Burmese army, fell back upon Melloon, and busied himself in raising recruits, to the number of about thirty thousand, for the ensuing campaign.

During the stay of the British at Prome, everything was done to conciliate the good-will and secure the confidence of such of its native inhabitants as returned to it. The consequences were particularly happy. The tide of population flowed back; and not only at Prome, but in all the towns and districts which had been already passed, an active and cheerful people returned to live in unmolested quiet, perfectly satisfied of the good faith and honesty of their invaders. In fact the whole of Pegu, as well as a considerable portion of Ava Proper, may be considered as having, at this time, been under the jurisdiction of the British. We had certainly conquered the country so far; and, without attempting any material alteration of their ordinary modes of civil government, we found it necessary to supply the place of their magistrates and other creatures of the crown, who had for the most part absconded, by organising a system of official authority, to which we gave the sanction of our approval and assistance. Into the details of these arrangements it is unnecessary here to enter. It is sufficient to say that they were at once simple and effective; and reflect no small credit on our Commander-in-Chief and his advisers.

The resources of the Court of Ava, great as their efforts had already been, were yet far from being exhausted. During the period in which there was a necessary cessation of hostilities,

a new army was organised, amounting to seventy thousand men, and all thoughts of peace appeared to be laid aside. It was the earnest desire, however, of our Commander-in-Chief to avoid, if possible, the shedding of more blood; and, in the beginning of October, he despatched a letter to the Burmese head-quarters, urging strongly upon the chiefs the propriety of advising their sovereign to listen to the lenient terms of peace he proposed. In consequence of this letter a meeting took place at Neoun-Ben-Zeik, between commissioners appointed on both sides; but after much useless conversation, prolonged to a ridiculous length by the Burmese, it was found impossible to prevail upon them to agree to the proposals we made; and soon after the Burmese commissioners had returned to head-quarters, the army advanced, in battle array, to the very gates of Prome, its general having previously honoured Sir Archibald Campbell with the following laconic epistle:—"If you wish for peace, you may go away; but if you ask either money or territory, no friendship can exist between us. This is the Burman custom."

It was not long before "Burman custom" underwent a change. To oppose the formidable force which now threatened to shut us in, and bury us among the ruins of Prome, we were able to muster an army of only five thousand men, of whom only three thousand were British. It seemed to be the wish of the Burmese leaders not to risk a general engagement, but to proceed by the slower, though perhaps more certain, method of blockade. As soon as these intentions were discovered, it was resolved to attack the enemy at once, without allowing him more time for strengthening his position. On the 1st. December our marine and land forces advanced at the same moment; and, after a well-contested fight of some hours, the Burmese were driven back, with much slaughter, to a stockade they had erected some miles distant on the heights of Napadee. It was remarked, as a curious feature of this engagement, that three young and handsome women, evidently of high rank, fought with the most persevering obstinacy and

courage among the ranks of the Burmese, recalling to the recollection of our officers all they had ever read of the Amazons of earlier ages. It was believed that at least two of these ladies perished in the field. The Burmese general, Maha Nemiou, and many of the Chobwas, or tributary princes, who had grown grey in the service of their sovereign, also lost their lives on this day. But, after all, our troops had only achieved half of what it was necessary for them to do. Until the enemy was driven from his formidable position at Napadee, we could not congratulate ourselves on having gained any decisive victory. On the 2nd of December, therefore, and the four following days, the army was employed in probably the most arduous duty it had yet undertaken—that of forcing the heights of Napadee. They were fortified with unexampled strength, although the natural obstacles they presented made artificial means of defence almost unnecessary. All things considered, we do not think we can be accused of giving way to national vanity when we assert that none but British soldiers, powerfully assisted by a flotilla commanded by British sailors, could have succeeded in steadily advancing from one stockade to another, under the continued volleys of the Burmese, and in driving at the point of the bayonet, without returning a shot, their opponents from a position three miles in extent. On the 5th the victory was complete. Every division of the Burmese army, and these were several, had been beaten in succession; and, completely disheartened, the fugitives dispersed themselves in all directions, wherever the woods or the jungles seemed to offer concealment.

It was now determined to lose no time in advancing to Ava itself, which is about three hundred miles distant from Prome; and on the 9th of December the march was commenced. On the 29th our army reached Melloon, about halfway between Ava and Prome, having seen nothing on the way but a deserted country, covered with the wounded, the dead, and the dying. The Burmese monarch was at last awakened to some-

thing like a becoming knowledge of the situation in which he stood; and at Melloon a flag of truce was sent to meet us, and to intimate the arrival of a commissioner from Ava, with full powers to conclude a treaty of peace. That this was really the case was attested by the amicable conduct of the enemy's troops who were assembled at Melloon. Our army, therefore, halted on the opposite side of the river, and a barge was moored in the middle, where the first meeting with the new delegate was to take place.

On the 1st of January, the commissioners of both nations met. The demand made upon our part of a crore of rupees, as well as of the cession of Arakan and the restoration of Cassay, was what principally startled the Burmese commissioners; but at length, finding it impossible to make us alter our terms, the treaty was agreed to and signed, fifteen days being allowed for obtaining the ratification of the King. At the expiration of that period it was communicated to us from Melloon that no answer had yet been received from Ava, and a further delay of some six or eight days was requested. But as this must evidently have been a preconcerted scheme, suspicions were aroused of the sincerity of that designing Court, and Sir Archibald Campbell gave the Burmese the choice of only two alternatives—either to evacuate Melloon, and allow him to take possession of it, in which case he would remain quiet for a short time longer; or to prepare for an assault, which he would make upon it that very night. The Burmese, with much courage, instantly prepared for their defence. Though not inferior in bravery, however, the military tactics of the Burmese will not for a moment bear any comparison with ours. Early on the 19th January 1826, the British standard was erected on the walls of Melloon, fifteen thousand men having been driven out of the town by comparatively a mere handful. In the house of Prince Memiaboo, a half-brother of the King, who had taken the command, was found money to the amount of from thirty thousand to forty thousand rupees; and what was still more

surprising, though perhaps not quite so agreeable, both the English and Burmese copies of the treaty lately made, signed and sealed as they had been at the meeting, and bearing, consequently, undeniable evidence of their never having been perused by the King.

"It is no easy matter," says an officer from whose work we have already quoted, "to divine what object the Court of Ava could have had in view in opening negotiations they had no intention of abiding by, or what possible result they could have anticipated from a short and profitless delay, which to us was in every point of view desirable, as much to allow the men to recover from the debilitating effects of their late fatigue, as to afford time for collecting cattle from the interior and sufficient supplies of every description for prosecuting our journey along a sacked and plundered line of country." "Memiaboo and his beaten army," adds Major Snodgrass, "retired from the scene of their disasters with all possible haste, and the British commander prepared to follow him up without delay. Before, however, commencing his march he despatched a messenger with the unratified treaty to the Kee Woongee, as well to show the Burmese chiefs that their perfidy was discovered, as to give them the means of still performing their engagements; but merely telling the latter in his note that, in the hurry of departure from Melloon, he had forgotten a document which he might now find more useful and acceptable to his Government than they had a few days previously considered it. The Woongee and his colleague politely returned their best thanks for the paper, but observed that the same hurry that had caused the loss of the treaty had compelled them to leave behind a large sum of money, which they also much regretted, and which they were sure the British general only waited an opportunity of returning."

Our army now resumed its march upon Ava. On the 31st of January it was met by a Doctor Price, an American missionary, and an Englishman of the name of Sandford,

assistant-surgeon of the Royal Regiment (who had been taken prisoner some months before), and who were now sent on their parole of honour to communicate the sincere desire which his celestial Majesty at last entertained for peace, and to ascertain the lowest terms upon which it would be granted. The terms offered at Melloon were renewed, and, the British general having promised not to advance for twelve days nearer their capital than Pagahm-Mew, the two delegates returned to Ava.

There can be little doubt that the Burmese monarch now saw the necessity for peace, and was therefore anxious to secure it; but the terms proposed, lenient as they were, he found dreadfully galling to his pride. At all hazards, therefore, he resolved upon one effort more; and if that failed, peace was to be immediately concluded. On the fall of Melloon, he made an appeal to the patriotism and generosity of his subjects. He represented himself as tottering on his throne, and the immortal dominion of Ava as about to pass away into the hands of strangers. To the troops which he now collected, to the amount of about forty thousand men, he gave the honourable appellation of "Retrievers of the King's Glory"; and a warrior, bearing the formidable titles of "Prince of the Setting Sun," "Prince of Darkness," and "King of Hell," was entrusted with the command of this force. He took his position at Pegahm-Mew, where he was attacked by the British on the 9th of March. The result was the same as had attended all our engagements with the Burmese. We took possession of the place, and the "Retrievers of the King's Glory" fled in detached parties over the country. The unfortunate "Prince of the Setting Sun" ventured to return to Ava after his defeat, where he was immediately put to death by order of the King.

Peace was now inevitable, unless it had been resolved to allow Ava itself to fall into our hands. The army, which continued to advance, was met only forty-five miles from that city by Dr. Price and Mr. Sandford, accompanied by two Ministers of State and all the British prisoners who had been taken, during

the war, and bringing the first instalment of the money payment (twenty-five lakhs of rupees), as well as an authority under the sign-manual, to accept of such terms of peace as we might propose. These were finally settled and signed on the 24th of February 1826. This important Treaty of Peace between the Honourable East India Company on the one part, and His Majesty the King of Ava on the other, consisted of the following Articles, to which we have much pleasure in giving a place in this work:—

“ART. I.—There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable Company on the one part, and the King of Ava on the other.

“ART. II.—His Majesty the King of Ava renounces all claims, and will abstain from all future interference with the principality of Assam and its dependencies, and also with the contiguous petty states of Cachar and Jynteea. With regard to Munnipore, it is stipulated, that, should Ghumbeer Singh desire to return to that country, he shall be recognised by the King of Ava as Rajah thereof.

“ART. III.—To prevent all future disputes respecting the boundary between the two great nations, the British Government will retain the conquered provinces of Arracan, including the four divisions of Arracan, Ramree, Cheduba, and Sandoway, and His Majesty the King of Ava cedes all right thereto. The Unnoupectowmien, or Arracan mountains (known in Arracan by the name of Yeomatoung, or Pokhingloun range), will henceforth form the boundary between the two great nations on that side. Any doubts regarding the said line of demarcation will be settled by the commissioners appointed by the respective Governments for that purpose, such commissioners from both Powers to be suitable and corresponding in rank.

“ART. IV.—His Majesty the King of Ava cedes to the British Government the conquered provinces of Yeh, Tavoy, and Mergui and Tenasserim, with the islands and dependencies thereunto appertaining, taking the Salween river as the line of

demarcation on that frontier. Any doubts regarding their boundaries will be settled as specified in the concluding part of Art. III.

"ART. V.—In proof of the sincere disposition of the Burman Government to maintain the relations of peace and amity between the nations, and as part indemnification to the British Government for the expenses of the war, His Majesty the King of Ava agrees to pay the sum of one crore of rupees.

"ART. VI.—No person whatever, whether native or foreigner, is hereafter to be molested by either party, on account of the part which he may have taken, or have been compelled to take, in the present war.

"ART. VII.—In order to cultivate and improve the relations of amity and peace hereby established between the two Governments, it is agreed that accredited ministers, retaining an escort or safe-guard of fifty men from each, shall reside at the durbar of the other, who shall be permitted to purchase or to build a suitable place of residence, of permanent materials; and a commercial treaty, upon principles of reciprocal advantage, will be entered into by the high contracting Powers.

"ART. VIII.—All public and private debts contracted by either Government, or by the subjects of either Government, with the others previous to the war, to be recognised and liquidated, upon the same principles of honour and good faith as if hostilities had not taken place between the two nations; and no advantage shall be taken by either party of the period that may have elapsed since the debts were incurred, or in consequence of the war; and according to the universal law of nations, it is farther stipulated that the property of all British subjects who may die in the dominions of His Majesty the King of Ava shall, in the absence of legal heirs, be placed in the hands of the British Resident or Consul in the said dominions, who will dispose of the same according to the tenor of the British law. In like manner, the property of Burmese subjects dying under the same circumstances, in any part of the British domi-

nions, shall be made over to the Minister or other authority delegated by his Burman Majesty to the Supreme Government of India.

“ART. IX.—The King of Ava will abolish all exactions upon British ships or vessels in Burman ports that are not required for Burman ships or vessels in British ports; nor shall ships or vessels, the property of British subjects, whether European or Indian, entering the Rangoon river, or other Burman ports, be required to land their guns, or unship their rudders, or to do any other act not required by Burmese ships or vessels in British ports.

“ART. X.—The good and faithful ally of the British Government, His Majesty the King of Siam, having taken a part in the present war, will, to the fullest extent, as far as regards His Majesty and his subjects, be included in the above treaty.

“ART. XI.—This treaty to be ratified by the Burmese authorities competent in the like cases, and the ratification to be accompanied by all British, whether European or Native, American and other prisoners, who will be delivered over to the British commissioners; the British commissioners, on their part, engaging that the said treaty shall be ratified by the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council, and the ratification shall be delivered to His Majesty the King of Ava, in four months, or sooner if possible; and all the Burmese prisoners shall, in like manner, be delivered over to their own Government, as soon as they arrive from Bengal.

(Signed)

“LARGEEN MIONGA,
Woongee, L.S.
Seal of the Lotoo.

(Signed)

“SHWAGUIN WOON,
Atawoon, L.S.

(Signed)

“A. CAMPBELL,
Major-General and Senior
Commissioner.

(Signed)

“T. C. ROBERTSON,
Civil Commissioner, L.S.

(Signed)

“H. D. CHADS, Captain, R.N.

"**ADDITIONAL ARTICLE.**—The British Commissioners being most anxiously desirous to manifest the sincerity of their wish for peace, and to make the immediate execution of the fifth article of this treaty as little irksome or inconvenient as possible, His Majesty the King of Ava consents to the following arrangements with respect to the division of the sum total, as specified in the article before referred to, into instalments, viz. :—Upon the payment of twenty-five lakhs of rupees, or one-fourth of the sum total (the other articles of the treaty being executed), the army will retire to Rangoon. Upon the further payment of a similar sum at that place, within one hundred days from this date, with the proviso as above, the army will evacuate the dominions of His Majesty the King of Ava with the least possible delay ; leaving the remaining moiety of the sum total to be paid by equal annual instalments in two years, from this 24th day of February 1826, A.D., through the Consul or Resident in Ava or Pegue, on the part of the Honourable East India Company.

(Signed)

" **LARGEEN MIONGA,**

Woongee, L.S.

Seal of the Lotoo.

(Signed)

" **SHWAGUIN WOON,**

Atawoon, L.S.

(Signed)

" **A. CAMPBELL,**

Major-General and Senior
Commissioner.

(Signed)

" **T. C. ROBERTSON,**

Civil Commissioner, L.S.

(Signed)

" **H. D. CHADS, Captain, R.N."**

Such, then, was the end of the First Burmese War, which altered the territories or relations of the British in India, and first made us acquainted with the Burmese in the eastern peninsula. However much the various writers on this interesting war may differ as to the conduct or justice of it on our part, they all agree as to the matchless coolness and arrogance of the Burmese history which records it. The victory cost us dear.

The King of Ava had been compelled to renounce all claims on Assam, Cassay, Arakan, Martaban, Tavoy, and Tenasserim, and to pay a crore of rupees—one million sterling—as an indemnity for the expenses of the war. The following is from the Royal Chronicle of the Burmese:—"In the years 1186 and 1187" (of the Burmese era) "the *Kulā pyu*, or white strangers of the west, fastened a quarrel upon the Lord of the Golden Palace. They landed at Rangoon, took that place and Prome" (properly Pyê Myo), "and were permitted to advance as far as Yandaboo; for the King, from motives of piety and regard to life, made no preparation whatever to oppose them. The strangers had spent vast sums of money in their enterprise, so that by the time they reached Yandaboo their resources were exhausted, and they were in great distress. They then petitioned the King, who, in his clemency and generosity, sent them large sums of money to pay their expenses back, and ordered them out of the country."

Thus did the Burmese, ignoring the fact of their being the aggressors, cleverly and resignedly register their case in the national archives, according to Burman custom! The boastful character of the Burmese, as with the Chinese, and in a lesser measure with the Siamese, fifty years ago, made it more difficult than at present for the Western nations to bring them to their complete senses, and cause them to acquire that degree of civilisation to which such ingenious people might otherwise have speedily aspired. Throughout this long war the British and native soldiers deserved and received the gratitude of their country. On the 8th of May 1827, Mr. C. W. Wynn moved in the House of Commons, and on the 14th Lord Goderich in the Lords, "That the thanks of each House be given to the officers and men engaged in the late glorious successes in India" (or rather in India beyond the Ganges, or, as Malte-Brun styles it, Chin-India). The remark by the British Parliament, "glorious successes in India"—erring on the right side—is apt to raise a smile when compared with that of a popular historian

of British India, who, after asserting that the Burmese war was the principal event of Lord Amherst's administration, and that by the successful operations the Company gained a large extent of territory on the eastern coast of the Bay of Bengal, writes :—
 “As this conquest, however, was carried on entirely beyond the limits of India proper, it does not belong to the subject of the present work !” This is a remarkable statement. The war was actually undertaken to protect Bengal, or give us a better “scientific frontier” to the eastward (or south-east) than formerly ; and yet even the principal operations of such an important war did not require to be handed down to posterity ! As well might we say that Canada or South Africa should be excluded from a History of the British Empire. Regarding our Eastern Empire, we must ever consider each square mile or even acre of it an important part of “the stupendous whole !”

It is impossible to consider the effects of the first Burmese war without thinking of the foreign policy of the illustrious statesman and orator, Mr. Canning. Having gained a considerable knowledge of Indian affairs at the Board of Control, he had been selected to proceed to India as Governor-General. But he could ill be spared from Europe ; the people of England especially could not spare him ; so Lord Amherst went in his stead. It was during his mighty achievements as Foreign Secretary, therefore, that he could only hear at a distance of the war and our relations with Burma ; and it is curious to reflect what policy he might have recommended to the Court, or himself adopted, had the Lord of the White Elephant and the Golden Foot come under his special control. The great political “adventurer”—as he was styled by his enemies—might in a burst of eloquent enthusiasm—as Viceroy he would have exhibited the ready writing genius, vigour, and foresight of Lord Dalhousie, combined with the statesman-like moderation of Lord Mayo—have informed the people of both Upper and Lower Burma, that he called the British or New power in portions of their golden land into existence “to redress the

balance of the Old,"* which robbed them of independence, and made them the slaves of tyranny and oppression. Mr. Canning's remarks on war as well as politics—say, the balance of power—appear to be equally just: they are especially so when we regard the progress of British power in the East. On the uncertainty of war he says:—"How seldom in the whole history of the wars of Europe has any war between two great Powers ended in obtaining the exact, the identical object for which the war was begun!" May not the same be said with regard to our Indian wars against minor powers? And again—particularly applicable at the present time (1879), when the encroachments of Russia in certain quarters have been arrested by that stern sentry, a "scientific frontier"—he exclaims:—"The balance of power! . . . Is it not a standard perpetually varying as civilisation advances, and as new nations spring up and take their place among established political communities?"

During two centuries the balance of power has been adjusted over and over again. Upwards of half a century ago, as in later times, there were revolutions and counter-revolutions, Greek and other settlements in Europe, and a boundary dispute in Europe and America; and in Africa and Chin-India the Ashantee and Burmese wars. Time moves rapidly on; vast changes throughout the world are now on the eve of being accomplished, till, at no distant period, universal civilisation may be found emerging from chaos.

The balance of power in the East will soon be a very difficult problem to solve, especially if Russia and Germany† (which

* The great statesman's celebrated sentence, with which the above liberty is taken, the reader may recollect, was uttered in allusion to his being the first European minister to recognise South American independence:—"I called the New World into existence to redress the balance of the Old." In 1827 Mr. Canning became Premier, and died in August of that year.

† In 1879 styled "the natural ally of China."

seems probable) become mixed up with China; and Russia, with the usual steadiness of purpose, becomes too eager about establishing a profitable inland trade with the flowery land—the vast region whose people are still exclusive, but now more progressive and wonderful and pliable than at any former period! With so many “coming events” casting their “shadows before,” it becomes almost an imperative duty on Great Britain to keep a watchful eye on Upper Burma, as Chinese relations* with the Golden Foot may expand at any moment; and during some great crisis, or sudden convulsion, we might lose the chance of better securing our eastern and south-eastern frontier, and thus risk those vast commercial interests for which the way has been so admirably paved by the first and second Burmese wars.

* Burma is a sort of vassal of China.

CHAPTER IV.

REMARKS ON THE OPERATIONS.

‘How true it is that in military operations time is everything!’

WELLINGTON.

IN the event of a third Burmese war, or any future military operations in Chin-India, it may be well to gather a few lessons from the experiences of the old campaigns. The first grand failure of the Burmese in opposing or standing against us has been attributed to their ignorance of the *art of war*, or at least to their knowledge of the *art* being very limited. But even had they possessed a general-in-chief like Baron De Jomini among them, without the feeling that it is the discipline of an army that makes the multitude act as one man, the result would have been the same. Such a Burmese strategist must have worked after his own fashion, the proper use of jungles, fastnesses, trees, stockades, rivers, swamps, old guns, and jinjals,* being to him what field-works teeming with improvements in engineering and artillery science are to us; the

* Wall pieces, carrying small balls, varying from half a pound to two or three pounds in weight.

above forming a large portion of his idea of the *art of war*—as we found to our cost, no very bad one.

The Burmese, when the first war broke out, and fifteen years before, had a very exalted idea of their knowledge of the art of war; so much so that in 1810 one of the ministers at Ava informed Captain Canning, the British envoy, that if application had been originally made in a proper manner, His Burman Majesty would have sent an army, and put the British nation in possession of the whole of France, thus ending the revolutionary war in Europe. Another absurdity of the same period is given in a draught of a letter to the Governor-General, composed by the Ava ministers, declaring the King of England to be a vassal of the Burman monarch; but this, it is written, "was too much even for the despotic Minderajee Praw, who ordered it to be expunged."

During the long series of operations in which we were engaged throughout the first war, exemplary patience under difficulties, and admirable conduct in retreat, among the Burmese, were especially observable. The retreat of Maha Bandoola from Rangoon was managed with considerable skill. When, with the remnant of his army, he retreated finally upon Donabew, he left posts on the Lain and Pahlang rivers, to harass and detain the British force in moving forward. And even after their hero's death, in a desultory and disorderly flight, we are informed that the characteristic cunning and caution of the nation was conspicuous, as Major Snodgrass writes, "effecting their retreat with such science and circumspection as would have been a lesson to the best disciplined army in Europe."*

Variety of resource to facilitate operations is also strikingly apparent in the Burmese tactics. For instance, what could be more ingenious than converting a huge tree into a battery?

* Major Snodgrass's "Narrative of the Burmese War," p. 176.

Bandoola's look-out tree at Donabew—mounting four guns—was certainly an extraordinary work, on which even Vaspán or Cormontaigne could never have calculated, and which would have raised a smile on the calm visage of Jinnæus, the father of the peaceful science of botany. From an engraving, the tree appears to be cleft in twain, all the smaller branches being lopped off, and a series of props or arms left of considerable dimensions. Across and resting on these are three tiers, the lowest mounting one gun in the centre; on the second, a gun left and centre; and on the top tier, a gun left; the whole surmounted by a shed, with strong posts and a well-matted roof, in which warlike domicile are seated two warriors, armed with muskets, apparently engaged in feeling if their powder is dry. So much for Bandoola's look-out tree at Donabew. The Burmese operations during the war, as will have been seen, were offensive as well as defensive, of course chiefly the latter; the stockade—in the construction of which they are perfectly wonderful, and in making which even women and children assisted—being given them, as it were, by Nature for their own fortification. In attack, the Burmese varied considerably; at times being very feeble, but occasionally very desperate, as will be seen from the general's account of the attack on the British post at Kemmindine, where the First Madras Fusiliers* and the gallant 26th Madras Native Infantry so greatly distinguished themselves. The Burmese attack on Pegu—gallantly defended by Major (now General Sir William) Hill—in the second war was the only approach to the determined assault on Kemmindine of the first.

But the most desperate Burmese attacks during the first

* Her Majesty's 102nd Royal—"The Royal Tigers"—*spēctamur agēdo*—bearing on its colours glories commencing at Arcot and Plassey, down to "Ava," "Pegu," and "Lucknow." This was the famous Neill's regiment—General Neill, the "avenging angel of the Indian Mutiny."

campaigns were those made at Watty-goon* (or Watty goung) before we forced the heights of Nepadee. The veteran chief, Maha Nemiow, had at length arrived from the Court of Ava as if to supply the place of a Bandoola, and direct the general operations of the army. Two brigades had been ordered to dislodge the enemy. They were to be assaulted in flank and rear, while the main body attacked in front. The Burmese, obtaining information of this plan, did not wait "to be visited in their position," but met the British columns halfway, commenced an animated and continual skirmish, and thus frustrated the simultaneous attack of the three corps. When Watty-goon was reached it was found to be strongly stockaded. Colonel M'Dowall was killed while reconnoitring the place. So at length, finding the position far too strong for a divided force, "a retreat was ordered, and conducted with steadiness and regularity"; but we met with severe loss, "the enemy closely following it up for several miles." The caution of Maha Nemiow was remarkable for a Burman. Advancing direct upon Prome, he moved slowly, stockading himself at *every mile* as he advanced.

Regarding the British operations during this war, of course they were, as usual, chiefly successful through bold and dashing attack; and considering the length of the campaigns, and the local disadvantages (chiefly from the want of a good intelligence department) we laboured under, we managed admirably, and committed very few mistakes. Our attacks were generally, as they ever should be in such regions, sharp, short, and decisive. Taking into account the natural obstacles of the country, and the mode of warfare adopted by the Burmese, we could hardly have done more. As will have been seen, the enemy seemed to favour a position flanked on both sides by a jungle; but the British charge, even through this obstacle,

* Sixteen miles from Prome, in a north-east direction.

was generally irresistible. And the Burmese fear of a terrible rush of cold steel reached its climax when, twenty-eight years after, we attacked Rangoon, or rather the great Shwé-dagon pagoda, and achieved, as our readers will soon observe, "a brilliant feat of arms."*

The decisive action at Kokeen in the first war was highly creditable to the British arms, and shows what effects can be gained against a formidable stockade by a well-organised and well-managed plan of attack. It will have been observed that on this occasion a well-directed fire of artillery speedily made a breach in the work, which was then so gallantly carried by the infantry; but as a general rule we think that what the great Duke said with reference to attacks on Indian forts, notwithstanding the uncertainty in their issue, is applicable to warfare in Chin-India,—that it is more expedient and more creditable to our arms if we can attack *without wasting time in making an actual breach*. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to breach some stockades—the very nature of their construction affording such vast powers of resistance—so the artillery must just be content with throwing shells, fire-balls, rockets, or such-like projectiles, into the Burmese fort, while the infantry are looking out for some weak point in the flanks or rear to enter, and the irregular cavalry are all on the alert to cut off the enemy while attempting to escape from the stronghold. Of course, covering advance and assault by a heavy fire of musketry on the defences; enfilading the part attacked, if possible; and, if the ground were favourable, taking the place by escalade, would all be considered by a judicious commander.

It is impossible to read De Jomini's famous chapter on "Offensive and Defensive Operations" without giving preference in the system to the former. Applied to a more transient operation, the offensive is considered always advan-

* "The Times," 1852.

tageous, specially in strategy. "In fact," writes the Baron, "if the art of war consist in directing one's forces upon the decisive point, it is comprehended that the first means of applying this principle will be to take the initiative of movements." Again: "The offensive, considered morally and politically, is almost always advantageous, because it carries the war upon foreign soil, spares your own country, diminishes the resources of the enemy, and augments yours." In tactics, the offensive has also its immense advantages; but they are "less positive, because the operations not being upon so large a sphere, he who has the initiative cannot conceal them from the enemy, who, discovering this instantly, can, by the aid of good reserves, remedy it on the spot."* Defensive war, nevertheless, has its advantages when "the inert or passive" and the "active defence with offensive returns" are wisely combined. It is a great talent to know how to retake the initiative in the midst even of a defensive struggle. To the non-military reader it may be well to say a word on *strategy* and *tactics*. The former includes "the ensemble of the theatre of war," including in such the different combinations which it might offer, and "the choice and the establishment of the fixed base and of the zone of operations." Tactics have merely to do with the manoeuvres of an army on the field of battle, and the different formations for leading the troops to attack. Perhaps our admirable young volunteers of the present day will keep these definitions strictly in mind.

Of course, the most important point in a plan of operations is a good base; and if an army operating against Germany would be right in selecting for its base the Rhine, so would a British army operating against Upper Burma, and other parts of Chin-India, select for its base the Irawady, and other noble rivers. With reference to the Irawady it may be said, "A base

* See "The Art of War," Art. xvi., "Statistical combinations," pp. 83, 84.

supported upon a large and impetuous river, the banks of which should be held by good fortresses, situated in command of this river, would be, without contradiction, the most favourable that could be desired." Throughout Chin-India many rivers would be found for bases, on which we could fall back, or from which we could move forward at pleasure; while British Burma surely has capacity sufficient for establishing thereon any amount of magazines or depots. Touching on Burmese rivers brings forth the difference between Burmese and British strategy; as has already been observed in the case of Bandoola, who is blamed for having given up the narrow Panlang and Lain rivers, where he could have presented a most effectual opposition, to fight on the banks of the broad Irawady at Donabew. If, then, during the first Burmese war, the noble Irawady formed a splendid base of operations for the invader, what would it be now with the whole of Pegu at our command, and, what we must obtain at all hazards, entire control over the eastern and western Karennee country! With such bases of operations, strategy with the British in Chin-India will be supreme, or, at least, better than any invading army in that quarter ever had before for conquest. Even with a second-rate general, provided the ordinary rules of the art of war were attended to—no over confidence, but even more caution than against an European foe—it would be simply a case of *veni, vidi, vici*. With such bases of operations, we should be far more than a match for any power that could be arrayed against us.

In the event of any extensive operations in and around Upper Burma, we would probably have, say, three sorts of allies—Karens, Shans, and some other powerful tribe which would be sure to arise if the Shans joined us. In Upper Burma, and to the north and east of the capital, should the King be so insane as to hold out against us, there would be no chance—as there might be in South Africa—of a predatory or guerilla warfare; such is quite foreign to the country. The

enemy would rely, as of yore, chiefly on their stockades. But if, in imitation of other nations, they thought that a predatory war—which would certainly have no foundation in strength—might be more successful in the end,—if the allies, the first to be attacked, only stood close by us, as the great Duke said when fighting the Mahrattas, there would be no chance of the enemy's success, but they would meet with utter discomfiture.

The "Diana."

We must now make a few remarks on the important part the little steamer "Diana" played during the operations. It will have been seen that on the same day as the brilliant action at Kokeen, the navy was not behind the army in gaining distinction, Captain Chads having made a successful attack on the enemy's war-boats. In their capture the "Diana" was chiefly instrumental. Her exploits were so numerous, and she proved so very serviceable, that while the campaigns lasted she never was allowed to leave the Irawady. She reconnoitred the stockaded positions, chased and captured war-boats, greatly advanced the movements of the army to Prome, and carried Mr. John Crawford (the Envoy) as far as Amarapura, some five hundred miles up the stream from Rangoon. With the "Diana" steamer, as Lord Bacon has it, to "choose time" was to "save time." No waiting for wind or tide, the little vessel, like Havelock's saints at Rangoon, when called upon to attack, was always ready.* She seemed, as it were, determined to be successful, for she was in earnest everywhere. Could the immortal James Watt, and the ingenious Patrick Miller of Dalswinton (inventor of practical steam navigation), only have looked on "Diana"

* "Call out Havelock's saints," said Sir Archibald Campbell on one occasion, at Rangoon, when Bandoola had taken him by surprise; "they are never drunk, but always ready!"

during the first Burmese war, they would have been happy men ever after; and, doubtless, while on the Irawady, she elicited admiration and drew forth many a witty remark from our most popular naval writer, who served in the operations—Captain Marryat, the “Sea Fielding.” The novelty of the structure produced a powerful effect on the minds of the natives, who of course could not know the limits of its power; and if, it is thought by some, we had been able to avail ourselves of a flotilla of such steamers the war would have proved much shorter and more decisive, as well as less expensive and bloody. History repeating itself is not uncommon now-a-days: it seems to have been repeated in a fashion at the end of this war; for Alompra, the hunter, began the old Burmese Empire; and “Diana,” the huntress, in the form of a little steamer, seventy-three years after, seemed busy in helping British power to the dawn of a new one!

With regard to the effect produced on the Burmese mind by a steamer—which will also be found touched on hereafter—it will be interesting to the reader, should he, like the present writer, recollect April 1852, to carry his memory back to the magnificent appearance in the Rangoon river of the Queen’s and Company’s war-steamers, aided by other subtle political sailing persuasive instruments, such as the “Fox” frigate and the brig “Serpent,” as they lay opposite Rangoon—all ready to bestow on Great Britain what is now the Liverpool or Glasgow of Chin-India!

It may here be well to remark, that rockets were very effective during the first Burmese war; and the writer had more than one opportunity of observing their utility in the second. These “devil-sticks”—as the Burmese style them—can be brought rapidly into action, when there may be a considerable delay in bringing on the guns; the tubes are light, and all can be carried on elephants with great rapidity. In the event of

further operations, a corps of Pegu mounted rifles would be very useful; but in any case of war, no operations should take place without a tight little force of irregular cavalry like the Nizam's, or those which were employed in Central India. Such troops are always invaluable in jungle warfare, as they can act under all circumstances.

The novelty of introducing a few gatling guns into the equipment of any field force *in esse*, of course, would be highly desirable. We presume that officers who have seen them used at the Cape and elsewhere are well aware of their destructive as well as portable capabilities. The Americans, we understand, have just invented a new gun, with only two barrels, of a most destructive and portable nature, which would suit Chin-Indian warfare admirably. For, after all, to get man or gun quickly into position is a leading principle in the great art of war. Light mountain guns would be useful, especially if we were forced into operations in the Shan country, which is mountainous and woody. They would not be so much required in Upper Burma proper, now that we possess Pegu. When, through the possession of Arakan, we freed our territories on that side from Burmese interference, and our troublesome neighbours were confined within their ancient boundaries by the lofty Anoupectoumiew, it was then remarked:—"The King is not ignorant that, should he again offend, we can march a force across these mountains and appear on the Irawady, from our post at Aeng, in eight or ten days, and probably reach his capital within a month." Now, we can appear at once on the Irawady, which we virtually command; and with the railway to Prome, and the telegraph, we have everything ready—except, perhaps, a sufficient fleet of small steamers, none of them drawing more than three feet of water—for a grand advance, in the event of a third war!

The topography of the country over which, to the north of Prome, the operations were conducted in the first campaigns, and which might again become the theatre of conflict, is now

pretty well known. Want of good roads*—frequently none at all—plenty of jungle, occasional thick forests, and wooded hills, towns filled with large and small temples, plenty of good (though sometimes hard) water, and occasionally beautiful scenery, enriched by the unrivalled *flora* of Burma, would chiefly attract the attention of the soldier or the traveller.

Pegu, the capital of the ancient Talaing kingdom, in lat. 18° N. and long. $96^{\circ} 30'$ E., about ninety miles from Rangoon, would have to be strengthened in case of an advance. Tonghoo, or Toungoo, is in the same latitude as Prome, $18^{\circ} 45'$ N., long. $96^{\circ} 45'$ E.,† and is a hundred miles to the eastward of that town, from which the advance upon Ava was made in the first war. It is separated from Prome by the Galadzet mountains. The next most important town to Prome was Meaday (now on our frontier), once of considerable magnitude. Then comes Melloon (or Melown), in lat. $19^{\circ} 46'$ N., long. $94^{\circ} 54'$ E.; next Pagam, in lat. 21° N., long. $94^{\circ} 40'$ E., a town famous for its numerous temples; and then Yandaboo, forty-five miles from Ava.

Umrapoora (or Amarapúra, “City of the Immortals”) is in lat. $21^{\circ} 55'$ N., long. $96^{\circ} 7'$ E., and Ava in lat. $21^{\circ} 45'$ N., long. 96° E. Both of these cities had been the capital of the Burmese Empire at different times, “according to the caprice of the King.” The country from Pagam (or Pagahm-mey) to Ava is described as most beautiful:—“Extensive plains of the finest land watered by the Irawady, interspersed with ever-green woods, only sufficiently large to give beauty and variety to the scenery; and the banks of the river so thickly studded with villages, temples, monasteries (*kyoungs*), and other handsome buildings, as to give under one *coup-d’œil* all the charms of a richly varied landscape, with the more sterling beauties of a populous and fertile country.” This rapturous description is

* Still, Major Snodgrass considered the roads and country upwards generally more advantageous for military operations than those in the lower provinces.

† Longitude of Prome, $95^{\circ} 5'$ E.

a little exaggerated; but every campaigner *in esse* may be preserved for an interesting and novel tract of country.

The dispositions for the advance were ably conceived. The first division, with head-quarters and commissariat, was encamped eight miles in front of Prome. The second division, under Brigadier-General Cotton, was on the left—ordered to move in communication with Sir James Brisbane, in command of the river flotilla; the first division preceding the march of the second by three days. The route of the first was by Watty-goon and Seindoup. On the Pegu side, Colonel Pepper advanced upon Toungoo, and threatened the capital from that quarter. Mandalay could also be easily threatened from Assam. We learn from high authority:—It has been recently ascertained that the route by which the Burmese effected their last invasion of Assam, crossed the Patkoi mountains by a depression of the range, where its height is only about 2,500 feet above the sea.

CHAPTER V.

THE FINANCES OF INDIA FIFTY YEARS AGO, OR,
AFTER THE FIRST BURMESE WAR.

THE following short statement, taken from the old East India Company's accounts, as laid upon the table of the House of Commons in 1829, will show how pecuniary matters stood in India for 1827-8; and it is altogether exclusive of the debts and establishments at home.

INDIAN ESTIMATES FOR 1827-28.

BENGAL.

<i>Charge.</i>		<i>Revenue.</i>	
Expenditure	- £11,894,282	Revenue	- £14,695,998
Interest	- 1,667,034	Commerce	- 79,905
Commerce	- 179,591		
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Total charge	- 13,740,917	Total	- 14,775,903
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Surplus revenue in Bengal		-	£1,034,986.

MADRAS.

<i>Charge.</i>		<i>Revenue.</i>	
Expenditure	- £5,488,208	Revenue	- £5,373,756
Interest	- 177,078	Commerce	- 28,459
Commerce	- 21,474		
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Total charge	- 5,686,760	Total	- 5,402,215
<hr/>		<hr/>	
Deficiency at Madras		-	£284,545.

BOMBAY.

<i>Charge.</i>		<i>Revenue.</i>	
Expenditure	- £3,820,013	Revenue	- £2,635,023
Interest	- 41,013	Commerce	- 39,375
Commerce	- 54,551		
<hr/>		<hr/>	
Total charge	- 3,915,577	Total	- 2,674,398
<hr/>		<hr/>	
Deficiency at Bombay		-	£1,241,179.

OUT-PORTS.

<i>Charge.</i>		<i>Revenue.</i>
Prince of Wales' Island	£195,418	000
St. Helena	- 119,511	000
Canton	- 320,761	000
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Total charge	- £635,690	
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Deficiency at Out-ports - £635,690.

Collecting these, we have—

<i>Revenue.</i>	<i>Expenditure.</i>
Bengal - £14,775,903	£13,740,917
Madras - 5,402,215	5,686,760
Bombay - 2,674,398	3,915,577
Out-ports <i>nil</i>	635,690
Total abroad 22,852,516	23,978,944
Deduct revenue - -	22,852,516

Net annual deficiency abroad 1,126,428

This is the annual deficiency in the revenue of the company abroad, after three years of profound peace, the Burmese war having terminated on the 24th February 1826; and with a debt of very nearly *thirty-five millions sterling*, bearing an annual interest of more than five per cent. upon the average.*

When Lord Hastings left India in January 1823, the Treasury was full, and the income exceeded the expenditure by nearly two crores of rupees a year (two millions sterling). It may here also be of interest to remark that, after 1818, Scindiah's government was so well administered and his finances had so improved, that, in 1827 (a year after the Burmese war, and after the capture of Bhurtpore), he was able to lend half a million sterling to the Company!

This was a noble and liberal action on the part of a native prince; and we may question if any of our feudatories of the present day would do likewise, even if we were so impolitic as to ask their assistance in either money or men.

Such an act of Scindiah becomes the more remarkable when it is considered that he and Holkar were once the most deadly

* See Mudie's "Picture of India (1832)," vol. ii. p. 207.

foes to the British name; and Sir John Malcolm said he would never forget the loss of empire sustained through Britain. Unlike the Rajah of Burdwan, Scindiah knew we were good and sure paymasters—though, perhaps, rather slow at getting out of debt!—and, like many other native princes, he seemed to have studied Lord Bacon, who, writing on usury, declares that “no man will lend his monies far off, nor put them into unknown hands.”

So long as there must be borrowing or lending among men, there must be, with a less severe form of usury, the same financial processes among states—the difference being, in the latter case, that the money is always supposed to be lent for some good or useful purpose. On this grand hypothesis neither England nor India will ever be out of *debt*.* In the foregoing statement we read of an Indian debt of nearly *thirty-five millions sterling*, which, if there had been no Burmese war, or other important military operations, we may suppose would not have exceeded twenty millions, or, deducting the Burmese war only (twelve), twenty-three millions.

What wars did formerly in India, public works and their supervision have done in more recent times. In reading about the vast machinery of the latter, however, the mind of the state financier is solaced by coming on such a remark as “Productive Public Works.” Why should we not likewise be satisfied with the fact that some wars are *productive* also? Paley, one of the shrewdest writers that ever lived, declares the *justifying* causes of war to be “deliberate invasions of right, and the necessity of maintaining such a balance of power amongst neighbouring nations as that no single state, or confederacy of states, be strong enough to overwhelm the rest.” In the case of the first Burmese war the just objects were precaution,

* The amount of debt of the Government of India, in India and in England, at the close of 1878, was nearly one hundred and thirty-five millions sterling.

defence, and reparation. The twelve millions were spent in saving Bengal from invasion and constant annoyance, and in preventing the Governor-General from being taken in "golden fetters" to Ava. The seeds of future productiveness for our benefit were sown in Chin-India—which we trust hereafter to make apparent—and the way was paved for the second Burmese war, which, at a cost of less than a fourth of the first, has long been *un grand fait accompli*, and the cause and principal operations of which we shall now—when likely soon to be forced into a *third*—have the honour of presenting, for the second time, to our courteous and indulgent readers.

In the following chapters it has been thought advisable to preserve many of the details recorded in the original narratives, as not a few officers and others who were engaged in the operations are yet alive, and may feel pleased to look back upon them, even if not among the few "green spots in memory's waste." As acute British critics have long been well inclined to consider details the very life and soul of a social narrative—the lights and shades which give animation to the picture—so they may consider them of some importance in a military record, as furnishing materials, and, if not thus rendering a service to society, at least forming a ready accessory or guide for the future historian.

PART II.

THE SECOND BURMESE WAR.

CHAPTER I.

THE BURMESE PROVOKE A SECOND WAR.

THE treaty of Yandaboo guaranteed the security of our merchants and of our commerce. There was to be no oppression of British subjects. The merchants trading at Rangoon were to be liable to no inordinate exactions. On the whole, it seemed as if civilisation had taken a stride, and from intercourse with our countrymen, that the empire founded by Alompra was in a fair way to gain reason and wisdom. But a dark cloud soon gathered on the political horizon which, twenty-six years after the treaty was signed, was to destroy every hope of friendship between us, and force the Indian Government, after unexampled long-suffering and patience, to put down "barbarian insolence" by force of arms. At first, the King agreed to receive a representative at Ava; two of our Residents were, however, successively treated with every indignity, and the last was planted

on an island in the Irawady without provisions, till the river rose and threatened to swamp him and his suite. We therefore withdrew the representative altogether, rather than irritate the barbarous court.

Latterly, our merchants at Rangoon, contrary to the stipulations of the treaty, were subjected to a series of oppressions and exactions, which, if unredressed, must have obliged us to quit the port. The merchants now applied for the interposition of the Government of India, by whom the treaty was made.

It is unnecessary to enter into a detail of all the insults heaped upon us by the Burmese. Suffice it to mention one case of injustice and oppression, that of a British captain of a vessel, who, on the false representation of a Burmese pilot, was imprisoned, placed by the Governor of Rangoon in the stocks, and fined nine hundred rupees. This outrage brought forth the sympathy of the good people at Maulmain, who raised a subscription equal to the fine to release the merchant from his unpleasant situation.

To satisfy our oppressed merchants, the Most Noble the Governor-General, remote at the time from Calcutta, demanded the removal of the tyrannical Governor, and the payment of the sum of nine hundred pounds sterling, "the price," as was humorously remarked, "of four or five of the golden spittoons in the palace of Ava." The admission of a Resident or agent at Rangoon, or Ava, was also required. The small sum of money was considered necessary as compensation for losses sustained by Messrs. Lewis and Shepperd, the former of whom had also been imprisoned and fined, though not placed in the Burmese stocks. The pacific disposition manifested by the Court of Ava, on the receipt of the Governor-General's despatch, induced Commodore Lambert, of the Royal Navy, with his squadron, who had been some time previously deputed to Rangoon, to demand reparation for the extortions practised upon British subjects, contrary to the treaty of Yandaboo. On the 1st of January 1852, the King's reply to the Governor-General

was delivered; and, with consummate assurance, the Golden Foot expressed an anxious desire "to comply with the demands which had been made, and to maintain the relations of peace."

On the morning of the 4th, the new Governor arrived at Rangoon from Ava, "empowered by the King to settle the claims of the Indian Government." He came in regal pomp, attended by a large retinue, consisting of an armament of barges and war-boats. The latter, decorated with elaborate carving and gilding, are said to have contained about three thousand followers. Altogether, during his stately march, the Governor was accompanied by nearly four thousand men. He had levied the severest exactions on all the towns as he passed, and had in his train ten boats laden with powder.

The ex-Governor of Rangoon, who had for some days been occupying a small dwelling near Government House, paid his respects to the Viceroy on his arrival, and was repeatedly closeted with him. It was at first supposed that he would be subjected to a trial—at least an investigation—in the presence of the Viceroy, and a great number of the foreigners had drawn up statements of their grievances. But on the 5th, it was ascertained that he was in high favour with his Excellency, and, on the 6th of January, he departed in triumph to Ava, with all his family and a large retinue, and all the plunder he had accumulated, in fifty boats. A clever trick, truly, in a Governor, whose will for so long a time had been law five hundred miles from the capital!

The day after arrival, the Governor sent an order to Mr. Birrell, a merchant, to take down a flag-staff he had erected, and to remove a gun he had placed in position on his landing-place. Mr. Birrell very properly replied, that the flag-staff having been placed there by the consent of the Commodore, either to signal him in case of their being attacked, or to establish a communication between the Europeans on shore and the ships of war, he could not alter the arrangement without the Commodore's permission. The Governor became

enraged at this reply, and immediately ordered all communication with the shipping to be stopped. Commodore Lambert, unwilling to give the Burmese any cause of offence, directed the flag-staff to be removed. But the prohibition of all intercourse with our ships, had already caused the flight of unfortunate carpenters, coolies, and workmen of every description.

Mr. Birrell, on the removal of the flag-staff and gun, had been directed to inform the Governor that the Commodore had done so on the assurance that their property and persons were safe under his government. Trade was then resumed.

On the evening of this day, Mr. Edwards, the interpreter, visited the Governor of Dalla—a picturesque town, situated opposite Rangoon—and inquired if the promised Governor had *really* arrived. Doubt appears to have arisen on this point among our functionaries, from the fact of so many hours having elapsed without any Viceroy taking notice of the Commodore, either by letter of friendship or simply by the announcement of arrival. The old Governor answered in the affirmative, and wondered at the question “when he must have seen, by the great state and display on the river, that the Governor had arrived.”

On the morning of the 6th, Mr. Edwards was sent to inquire the cause of the Viceroy's silence, and also to ascertain if it would be convenient for the Governor to receive a deputation, or any public communication. At the door of the mansion, dignified with the appellation of a palace, Mr. Edwards was stopped by a Burmese menial, who, according to one statement, “drawing his sword, desired him to crouch to the ground, on nearing the presence of his Governor.” Mr. Edwards sent word by another servant, that he was waiting with a message from the Commodore. He was then admitted. On the Interpreter's complaining of the ill-treatment received at the door, the culprit was ordered into the presence: he was then, we were

told, "punished, and dragged out of the room by the hair of his head."

Orders were also issued, that no one was to be stopped who had business with the Governor from the Commodore.

The Viceroy's bearing was courteous. He informed Mr. Edwards that he would at all times be happy to hear from the Commodore, or to see him. In this there was good behaviour on the part of the Viceroy; but, according to another statement, the Governor "spoke in a tone of derision which created no small merriment among the officers around him." Not long after this curious interview, a deputation started to wait on the Viceroy.

It consisted of Captain Fishbourne, of H.M.S. "Hermes," Captain Latter, the chief Interpreter, and some other officers.* And now commenced Burmese incivility to the fullest extent, notwithstanding the fact that the Commodore had received every deputation from shore with the greatest courtesy. On their arrival at Government House, the members were not admitted to the Viceroy's presence. Some of the Burmese officers had thought them mad in attempting what was considered such audacity towards their new Governor. Our officers, therefore, had been obliged to force their way, through a crowd of insolent barbarians, to the neighbourhood of the hall of audience. They were prevented from going upstairs, till the Viceroy's permission had been obtained. After some minutes, Captain Latter was informed that his Excellency was asleep, and could not be disturbed. At this very time of glorious repose, the wily Governor had telegraphed for Mr. Edwards to come into the presence, which the deputation, of course, would not allow him to do. Captain Latter urged the necessity of seeing the Viceroy, before their departure; but

* The deputation likewise included Mr. Southey, the Commodore's secretary.

“every remonstrance on his part, with the most distinguished of the officers present, proved unavailing.” The members of the deputation returned to the Commodore, reporting what had taken place and the great insult to which they had been subjected.

According to the established law of nations, on a demand for justice being refused, reprisals follow of right. The property of any Burmese subjects “might have been lawfully seized, but it was deemed much better to take what was notoriously the King’s than to distress individuals who might never have been compensated by their own Government, and who would probably have been punished for complaining.” Certainly, the whole affair was left to the Commodore’s discretion, and it is difficult to see how any act of his could have been more natural or proper than that of seizing the King’s ship, then lying in the harbour; this was done. In the afternoon of the day on which the deputation was insulted, a message was sent from the flag-ship, requesting all British merchants and residents at Rangoon to repair on board the frigate. Those who claimed British protection, were but too glad to find it in this instance. The Commodore stated to them what he had done, how he had failed to maintain pacific relations, and how the British Government and Flag had been grossly insulted, “and that the insult was manifestly intentional, and not accidental.” All were ordered to embark that evening, as the town was to be placed under blockade. The “Proserpine” steamer would be sent to cover their embarkation. The grand flight is thus graphically described, and is evidently from the pen of an eye-witness:—“The ‘Proserpine’ steamer ran close into the main wharf, and eight or ten of the boats from the frigate and steamers came to the shore to protect and receive the fugitives. Meanwhile the streets were filled with armed Burmese, and Burmese officers were moving to and fro on horseback, threatening all who gave assistance to the foreigners; in consequence of which, not a coolie could be procured.” All classes of foreigners—Moguls, Mussulmans, Armenians, Portuguese,

and English—were seen crowding down to the river with boxes and bundles, and whatever they could carry, but they were obliged, generally, to abandon all the property they possessed. Mr. Kincaid, the American missionary, left his library, consisting of more than a thousand volumes, the collection of twenty years, behind him to be destroyed, too happy, however, to find his wife and children safe under the British flag.” “By eight o’clock,” says one authority, “all the British subjects had embarked, and by midnight the whole of the ships were removed by the steamers from off the town; the men-of-war all moved, and the King of Burma’s ship taken with the fleet some five miles down the river.” On the 7th, all ships were ordered to prepare for their departure out of the Rangoon waters, to be conveyed by the men-of-war out of the river.

On the 8th, the H. C.’s steamer “Proserpine” left for Maulmain with upwards of two hundred refugees—nearly four hundred, with their families—on board. During these important transactions, we are informed that Burmese officers came repeatedly to the flag-ship “to offer excuses for the rudeness of the Viceroy, but none of them were accredited. The Commodore insisted that the Viceroy should himself apologise for the insult offered to the British flag, and engaged in that case to return and forget the past.” At length it seemed that there was one exception to the intolerable arrogance and insolence of the Burmese officials, in the person of the old Governor of Dalla, who came on board the “Fox,” and entreated the Commodore “to give him time to see the Viceroy, and persuade him to apologise.” Out of regard to the venerable age of the Governor, he was allowed till the evening to try his best at this work of peace. But his Highness of Rangoon had come from Ava and Prome with no such views. The Lord of the White Elephant would again try conclusions with us in the field. He had forgotten the campaigns of 1824-26, and did not deem favourably of our prowess from comparatively recent victories over the Chinese only—a nation over which

the kingdom of Ava had been triumphant many centuries ago.

While the old Governor of Dalla was supposed to be absent on his mission, a written document arrived from the Viceroy, stating that, "if the Commodore attempted to pass the two stockades which had been erected down the river, he would be fired upon." The Commodore replied that if even a pistol were fired, he would level the stockades with the ground. And with this mutual determination may be said to have commenced the second Burmese war !

In the fulfilment of his plans, the Commodore now issued the following

"NOTIFICATION.

"In virtue of authority from the Most Noble the Governor-General of British India, I do hereby declare the rivers of Rangoon, the Bassein and the Salween above Moulmein, to be in a state of blockade ; and with the view to the strict enforcement thereof, a competent force will be stationed in or near the entrance of the said rivers immediately.

"Neutral vessels lying in either of the blockaded rivers will be permitted to retire within twenty days from the commencement of the blockade.

"Given under my hand, on board Her Britannic Majesty's frigate 'Fox,' off the town of Rangoon, the 6th of January 1852.

(Signed) "GEORGE ROBERT LAMBERT,
"Commodore in Her Britannic
"Majesty's Navy.

"By Command of the Commodore.

(Signed) "JAMES LEWTHER SOUTHEY,
"Secretary."

Before the departure of the "Fox," large war-boats were observed proceeding from Rangoon to rendezvous at the stockades at which, it was said, five thousand men were congregated.*

It was soon reported in Maulmain and Calcutta, that, even at this early period, twelve thousand men were ready at Rangoon to do battle with us : in a few weeks there would be at least thirty thousand.

On the 9th of January, the day after the "Proserpine" left, and the threatening letter had been written to the Commodore, the "Hermes" steamer towed the "Fox" down to off the upper stockade. The "Hermes" then returned to bring on the King's ship to keep the frigate company. The merchantmen, at the same time, prepared to pass down the river. It was early in the morning when these decisive movements commenced. The sun seemed not to shine with its usual splendour. It was evident that some great change had taken place in our relations with Burma, and that the British lion had been roused from his forbearance.

At length, the "Hermes" came in sight, rounding the point with the Burmese prize-vessel in tow. As she passed the stockade, guns in rapid succession were opened on the vessels of war ; at the same time, volleys of musketry were discharged upon them. The "Fox" immediately returned the enemy's fire by a terrific broadside ; she likewise thundered forth against the war-boats which had ventured into the river.

The "Hermes" then came up, and poured forth her shot and shell into the line of stockade. The "Phlegethon" steamer, likewise, did vast destruction to the works. For nearly two hours were our vessels employed in spreading ruin and dismay around. During the conflict, a large gun-boat, having on board a gun of considerable calibre, and upwards of

* The Burmese were jealous of these river defences ; for it was a popular belief among them, that if they were destroyed, the temple of Gautama, who was supposed to keep a watchful eye over them, would be lost.

sixty armed men, was sunk by a broadside, when nearly all on board perished. Altogether, about three hundred of the enemy were killed, and about the same number wounded, in this first encounter with the Burmese. As the vessels proceeded down to the next stockade, they were again fired on, but only by musketry.

It was remarked, at the conclusion of these operations, that the enemy "probably had no intention of serious resistance, but felt themselves obliged to make some show of defence, when they saw the King's property taken off, as the heads of the leading men were at stake." And, again, wrote a reliable authority :—

"The Governor did not state that the Commodore would not be permitted to pass the stockades with the King's ship ; but that he would be fired on if he attempted to remove any British property. There is, therefore, every reason to believe, that if the royal vessel had not been touched, the stockades would equally have opened a fire on our vessels as they passed down the river."

After the Commodore's engagement with the stockades, he departed for Calcutta in the "*Hermes*," to report progress, and receive additional instructions. The "*Proserpine*," from Maulmain, with despatches for Government, and intelligence of the insult to the deputation, the "flight," and the blockade, had previously reached Calcutta.

Commodore Lambert did not, as was expected, find the Governor-General at Calcutta ; but, on the 18th of January, an Extraordinary Council was held, after which a despatch was sent off to Lord Dalhousie ; and the 18th Royal Irish were ordered to hold themselves in readiness for embarkation. It was afterwards decided to send down at once to Maulmain a wing of the regiment, and a company of artillery, in all about five hundred men, for the protection of that important post in the Tenasserim Provinces. The Commodore, in the "*Hermes*," reached the Rangoon river about the 27th, without, on account

of the absence of, the Governor - General, any positive instructions.

The Governor-General arrived at Calcutta on the night of the 29th of January; and, on the following day, as was to be expected, Burmese affairs formed the absorbing business of the Council. It was stated that his Lordship gave his entire approbation to the proceedings of Commodore Lambert. A report reached Calcutta, on the 30th ult., of the Burmese having threatened an attack on the province of Arakan. And now despatch really became the order of the day. The "Precursor," a magnificent steam-vessel, belonging to the P. O. S. Navigation Company, with the 67th N. I., and half a company of Native Artillery on board, departed immediately from Calcutta for Arakan. The vessel was coaled, victualled, and made ready for sea, in eight-and-forty hours after obtaining the contract for transporting the troops! "When the huge 'Precursor' made her appearance at Kyook Phyoo," writes an officer, "all the native boats fled, frightened at her size." The 80th—Queen's regiment—reached Fort William from Dinapore on the 30th of January; and it was expected the remaining wing of the 18th Royal Irish would be immediately despatched to Maulmain or Arakan. This last movement, fortunately, never took place. The threatened province remained in a state of profound tranquillity. An officer had been deputed to the Aeng Pass, in the heart of the Zama mountains, which separate Arakan from the basin of the Irawady; and he saw trade going on as briskly as ever. Many Burmese and Shan* (Siamese) merchants were passing and re-passing with their

* *Shyan* is a Burman name, and *Low*, or *Lao*, the Chinese, which is adopted by the Portuguese. They call themselves *Tay* (pronounced *Tie*). They seem to be the parent-stock of both Assamese and Siamese.—*Assam*, *Siam*, and *Shyan* or *Shan* are but different forms of the same word. The *Southern Shyans*, we read, bordering on Siam and Camboja, were conquered in 1829 by the Siamese, and their king carried in chains to Bankok.

cattle, laden with merchandise, as though nothing had happened, or was likely to happen. But, notwithstanding the undisturbed state of the upper part of the valley of the Irawady, the despatch of some troops to Arakan was "a wise measure at such a crisis."

We return to the gallant Commodore. A steamer was detained at Calcutta, immediately on his departure for Rangoon, to bring an answer to the despatch sent off by express to the Governor-General. The "Fire Queen" arrived off Rangoon river at the end of January. Soon after arrival, she anchored ahead of the "Fox," and "towed her up off the Hastings Sand, which is about four or five miles below Rangoon." On proceeding up the river, or passing the first stockade—some twelve or fifteen miles from the entrance—the steamer and frigate were both fired upon, by which the "Fox" lost a man. The frigate returned the fire with shot and shell. The "Tenasserim," while passing up the river the following day, was also fired upon, and the "Fire Queen" in passing down.* The "Fire Queen" had brought a despatch to the Commodore, also a letter to "His High Mightiness" on shore, from the Governor-General. The "Fox," on arriving off Rangoon, sent a boat in charge of a lieutenant, accompanied by Captain Latter, with a flag of truce, to convey letters from the Governor-General and the Commodore to the Viceroy.

A written apology, we believe, was required by Lord Dalhousie from the Rangoon governor to himself, for the insult offered to the deputation. And with this exception no fresh demands were made. The next day a reply was returned to the Commodore, and one forwarded for the Governor-General by the hands of a dirty non-official, who might have passed for a coolie or a cow-herd, in a canoe befitting his appearance. This

* The "Fire Queen" took the intelligence to Calcutta, arriving on the 9th of February.

was probably intended as a mark of disrespect by the authorities to the straightforward negotiator on board the "Fox." To avoid the Commodore as much as possible, letters were now sent from the Viceroy to the Governor-General *via* Martaban to Maulmain, to be forwarded by the Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces. One of these despatches is said to have been forwarded with due civility, the messenger asking permission of the blockading vessel to pass over.

Then came a letter, about the 7th of February, from the King of Ava, which arrived at Maulmain in due state. The Martaban officials wished the Commissioner, and not the Commodore, to settle the whole affair.* Colonel Bogle and Commodore Lambert were, in their opinion, personages as different in relative importance and character as Gautama and Siva. One was all thunder and lightning, the other a beautiful example of calm and dignified repose. But this Burmese interpretation of the character of the gallant sailor, or that of his frigate, did not lessen the power of a saying, which every sharp school-boy can translate—*Ingenium in numerato habet*.

H. M.'s brig "Serpent," some days before the arrival of the King of Ava's letter at Maulmain, destroyed three small stockades at the entrance of Negrais river, off which she was stationed. The Burmese fired upon her, in fulfilment of repeated threats. Captain Luard very humanely abstained from returning the fire, on account of the number of harmless villagers about; he simply landed his men, and burned the

* Towards the middle of February, the H. C.'s steamer "Phlegethon" arrived in Calcutta. The news ran thus:—His Majesty was said to write peacefully. He professed to have been deceived by the authorities at Rangoon; of course, the usual plea—it was his servants, not himself, who were insolent; and desired, hereafter, to be communicated with through Major Bogle, the Commissioner, and not through the Commodore. The time for the intervention of the civil power was past. It was not said that his Majesty professed "any desire to come into the terms proposed as indispensable before amicable relations could be resumed."

works of the enemy. The Burmese seemed determined to provoke a war.

At length, on the 10th or 12th of February, it was decided by the Indian Government to send an expedition to Burma. It was conjectured that, if actual hostilities should not ultimately become necessary, the appearance of an armament might probably excite the apprehensions of the Burmese, and induce them to yield to the just demands of the British.*

* See "Rangoon," Appendix No. I. Minute by the Governor-General of India (Extract).

CHAPTER II.

FROM MADRAS TO RANGOON.

By the middle of February 1852, orders were received at St. Thomas's Mount* for three European companies of Artillery to hold themselves in readiness for field-service in Burma. Instructions were also received by the Madras Government, to hold in readiness "for immediate embarkation for Rangoon, if necessary," H. M.'s 51st Regiment, K. O. L. I., two regiments of Native Infantry, and one Engineer officer. Bengal was to furnish a similar force, and an officer of rank was to command the whole. A company of Artillery from that Presidency, with Major Reid and Lieutenant Voyle, also a wing of H. M.'s 18th Royal Irish, had left Fort William about a month before, in the Hon. Company's steamers "Tenasserim" and "Proserpine," to reinforce Maulmain. In the papers it was stated that a spirit of life and activity reigned among the military establishments in Calcutta. Of course in Madras, too, it was to be all double work—work for the prospect of "glorious war" being a

* Head-quarters of the Madras Artillery, about eight miles from Madras.

capital sauce to exertion. About the 21st. of February, orders were received in Bombay, from the Governor-General, for all the war-steamers that could be spared to be sent to Rangoon without a moment's delay, ready for immediate action. The "Feroze" was to be at once converted into a frigate, and placed under the command of Captain Lynch, as Commodore of the Indian Navy Squadron. The "Moozuffer," "Zenobia," "Sesostris," and "Medusa," were the other vessels appointed; the "Berenice" to act as troop and store ship. A month hence there would, in all likelihood, be a fleet of at least eight large and five second-class war-steamers assembled in the Burmese waters; one of the largest collections of this fearfully formidable class of ships that had ever been brought together for purposes of actual hostility. The "Feroze" and "Moozuffer" were each vessels of 500 horse-power and 1,500 tons, the "Sesostris" of 300 horse-power and 1,200 tons, all armed with guns of eight-inch calibre, throwing hollow shot and shells to the distance of a couple of miles. Expedition in marine matters was never practised with greater success than in the preparation of these Bombay war-steamers for service. In a few days everything was ready, reflecting the highest credit on Commodore Lushington, and the officers of the Indian Navy. The squadron was ordered round to Madras for the conveyance of the troops to Rangoon. The steamers were expected to arrive early in March.

The bustle at the Mount was exciting. "They won't go after all!" said some. "There will be tough work!" said others. But even those who had a fancy that the troops would "never cross the surf," were very busy withal. News at length arrived that the Burmese had one hundred guns at and about Rangoon. It was reported that the old town of Rangoon, founded by Alompra, had been burned by order of the Governor, and that the new one was strongly fortified. The new town was founded by Tharawadi not many years before, and a fort built about one mile and a half inland from the old

site. From Calcutta information was received that all the houses in Rangoon were razed to the ground, and the inhabitants removed to the new town; and that this position was being doubly stockaded with the wooden materials from the houses destroyed at the old.

Early in March the Madras Artillery officers of the expedition to Rangoon dined with Colonel St. Maur, and the officers of H. M.'s 51st K. O. L. I., meeting those of the 35th and 9th Madras Native Infantry. It was a grand and social entertainment. The Artillery returned the compliment paid us by H. M.'s 51st next evening.

These social gatherings, before proceeding on service, are unquestionably conducive to the establishment of mutual good feeling in the army. They tend to keep that friendship, which should ever exist amongst soldiers, in good repair at a critical time.

Regarding the curiosity excited among the Burmese by firing off a 68-pounder shot into one of their stockades, the following absurd but characteristic "story" was brought to Madras from Rangoon. The shot was taken before the Governor by an official. The latter functionary, who had weighed it, declared its weight to be equal to sixty-eight pounds. The Governor was sceptical; but at length, having fully satisfied himself as to the weight, and having commended rather than punished the official for his information, to crown his surprise, and probably show his master, from the demon just projected by a ship's gun, what a dreadful enemy he had to deal with in the British, he ordered the huge shot to be immediately forwarded to the King of Ava!

On the 7th of March the squadron of war-steamers of the Indian Navy, with the exception of the "Zenobia" and "Medusa," arrived in the Madras roads.

From Calcutta we learned that, in the Governor-General's reply to the King of Ava's letter, there was a demand for the expenses of the war to the extent of ten lakhs of rupees

(£100,000) "to be paid within a limited period, and to be doubled if not immediately made good." Preparations for war were uninterrupted.

The "Calcutta Gazette," of the 25th of February, had the following notification regarding Burma, "which showed that the Governor-General was determined to enforce his demand for satisfaction from the Golden Foot"—

"The following additional notification of blockade issued by Commodore G. R. Lambert, under authority from the Government of India, is published for general information.

"The Barragu river, and other outlets of the Irawady, are included in the blockade declared by me on the 6th instant.

"Given under my hand, on board her Britannic Majesty's steam-sloop "Hermes," in the Bassein river, on the 25th of January 1852.

(Signed)

"G. R. LAMBERT,
"Commander in her Britannic
"Majesty's Navy.

"By order of the M. N. the Governor-
"General of India, in Council."

"They insist on war; war they shall have with a vengeance." The papers quoted this well-known remark, made by the Governor-General, in his speech at Barrackpore, before the triumphs of the second Sikh or Punjab war, asserting that war with Burma, on the most extensive scale, had been resolved on. They were likewise informed, in the north-west, that a requisition for ten thousand men, including two Queen's regiments, had reached Madras. It is recorded in history that Madras sepoys were the first, if not the last, among our native troops, to cross bayonets with French infantry; they surely never could forget that. What would Bernadotte, the late King of Sweden, have thought had he read these words? "Native troops cross bayonets with French infantry?" he might have muttered, while one of the scenes of a long eventful life rushed

to his memory. He was once a plain *sergeant*, serving in the Deccan, and first distinguished himself at Cuddalore! Had the Government of France possessed the sagacity of the English East India Company, Bernadotte might have shared in the foundation of an Eastern empire.*

“Look there, sir! Do you know who that is at the end of the room?” said a late Governor of Pondicherry to the writer of this Narrative. A marble bust of Duplex adorned the audience-chamber at Government House. “There, sir, is the man who gave Clive the idea of conquering and keeping this country by its own inhabitants! The East India Company assisted Clive, and cherished the idea. But Duplex, for this, and many other of his mighty schemes, was thought a madman by the French; and thus the empire *we* should have founded and preserved was lost!” [And, strange revolution in history, nearly lost again (for a time, at least), by *our* placing too much reliance in the majority of those very “inhabitants” in 1857!]

Towards the end of March the news was various and interesting. Some Burmese had arrived in Calcutta, and reported that twenty thousand men were ready to stand against us. From Rangoon to Ava, the enemy were said to be determined to dispute every inch of the way. April is the hottest month in the year in Burma, the thermometer ranging from 90° to 95°; and in that month we were to be employed! But that was better than delay until after the rains, in October. When war is to be, with such resources as ours, “*’T were well it were done quickly.*”

Major Oakes, Director of the Madras Artillery Depôt of

* Little thought the writer, at the time of making the above remark, that, in 1861, he would be in the presence of King Charles XV. of Sweden, grandson of Bernadotte, in the Palace of Stockholm, answering a question or two about Burma.

Instruction, and Major Montgomery, of the Mysore Commission, were to command two of the three artillery companies going on service. The former had long been desirous of distinguishing himself in the field; while report spoke highly of the intelligence and activity of the latter. Practical hints on the coming war were freely given to the men.

At Dum Dum,* a small stockade had been erected, which was to be immediately blown up, for practice. The men of H. M.'s 80th Regiment, just arrived from Dinapore, had performed the mimic task of storming the Burmese stockades, which they practised in the cunette of Fort William, crossing the ditch, and placing their bamboo scaling-ladders against the angle of the bastion opposite Calcutta.

The "Zenobia" and "Medusa" were at length added to the squadron in the Madras roads; and we now expected to start in a few days for Rangoon.

Orders were received for immediate embarkation.

Colonel Elliott, K.H., of H. M.'s 51st Light Infantry, was to command the Madras Brigade.†

At two o'clock, on the morning of the 31st of March, the artillery set out from St. Thomas's Mount for the beach. The band accompanied the force and played several appropriate airs. The march was distinguished by the usual shouting, cheering, and singing, in which European soldiers love to indulge on departure from an old station. The embarkation presented a grand and exciting scene—such as a man may only witness once in his life. It was a splendid morning, which, added to the refreshing appearance of the blue waters, and the numerous vessels afloat, was calculated to fill the adventurer with life, and hope, and joy. The Madras shore at any time is impressive and picturesque, from the roar of the wild and

* Head-quarters of the Bengal Artillery, near Calcutta (now removed to Meerut).

† For Formation of, see "Rangoon," Appendix No. III.

dashing surf, the clear blue sky, the long line of elegant buildings fringing the beach, and then the incessant going to and fro of *massulah* boats and *catamarans* communicating with ships in the roads. But now the whole line of beach was covered with a vast multitude of living creatures, men, women, and children. Hundreds of boats were in readiness to be filled, and all the Madras troops were to embark as nearly as possible at the same time. Old bullock bandies came creaking along, very late, wending their way to the boats. Knapsacks, under the superintendence of Europeans and Jack Sepoy, were thrown into the uncouth machines, so admirably adapted for crossing the surf. In spite of the excellent arrangements made by the Quartermaster-General, and the presence of many distinguished officers, to maintain anything like order was absolutely impossible. The Madras surf alone is enough to put order out of countenance. There were parting scenes with relatives, of the most tender nature. Among many pictures, it was painful to notice the anxious countenance of the Hindu-British wife, who, perhaps, was never to see her husband more: and then, in case of misfortune, *who* would father the children in their journey through life? The grief of some relatives was excessive; for, certainly, of those now departing to encounter "moving accident by flood and field," many would not be spared to return to the familiar shore on which they had just taken such an affectionate farewell!

A total of four thousand four hundred, officers, soldiers, and followers, embarked on board the several vessels of the fleet, which consisted of six steamers of the Indian Navy, and four transports.

By the 7th of April we expected to reach the mouth of the Rangoon river, if we did not put in to Amherst for water. At break of day it was discovered that the "Feroze," leading the first division, was out of sight. The Commodore had been too fast for us; but after a short time, the squadron reunited. It was in two divisions: the "Feroze," "Moozuffer," "Bere-

nice," and "Medusa,"* forming the first, the "Sesostris" and "Zenobia" the second.

We saw land at 1 P.M., and anchored at the mouth of the Rangoon river about half-past three. The coast is a picturesque line of territory, with palmyras, mangroves, and many large trees, nobly extending to the rear. Passing Elephant Point, so styled from two famous trees growing there in the form of an elephant, a conical red pagoda, falling to ruins, appeared rising from the jungle. Gautama certainly showed some wisdom in selecting such a position for a shrine, as if he had once showered down commercial prosperity on the empire, and placed a sentinel over it at the mouth of one of his rivers, which prosperity, on account of the misconduct of his devotees, was, like the small temple, hastening to a fall.

At the mouth of the river we discovered that the Admiral and General had proceeded with H. M.'s war-steamers, "Hermes," "Rattler," "Salamander," and the Hon. Company's steamer "Proserpine," to attack Martaban, and bring on troops to the chief scene of action.

On the 28th of March, Admiral Austen, commanding in the Eastern seas, had left Penang in the screw steamer "Rattler." He arrived off the mouth of the Rangoon river on the first of April. On the 2nd the Bengal division, in four steamers, the "Hermes," "Tenasserim," "Enterprise," "Fire Queen," and four transports, arrived, under General Godwin, who, with his staff, had left Calcutta on the 25th of March.

Martaban.

On the 3rd of April, the General and Admiral left for Maulmain, nearly opposite which is Martaban, and reached the

* This useful little iron steamer had been towed by the "Berenice" since the 2nd inst. Slow at sea; but, from her drawing not more than three or four feet of water, invaluable in Burma.

capital of the Tenasserim Provinces* the next day at noon. Martaban is situated on the right or north bank of the Salween river. The town to be attacked had been considered by the Burmese a position of high importance. And there could be no doubt that it was so. In a military point of view, it is capable of making a very formidable defence. On the river appears the usual array of houses ; then, as you recede, trees extending to a hill, at the top of which is a pagoda ; then other hills stretching further away, adding dignity and grandeur to the landscape.

On the 5th of April the war-steamers appeared in front of the town, and immediately opened fire against the defences. A storming party was then formed, headed by Colonel Reigolds, H. M.'s 18th Regiment. They attacked the chief position under a heavy fire of guns and musketry, and in a few seconds Martaban fell. A company of Bengal Artillery did not come into action, and thus, with few troops engaged,† and a loss of life on our side hardly worth mentioning, the occupation of an important position formed a brilliant commencement to the campaign. Martaban is distant from Rangoon about seventy miles. On the afternoon of the 8th, the Admiral and General were again at the mouth of the Rangoon river. We were all on the tip-toe of expectation ; at length the " Rattler " came steaming in gloriously, showing off her screw power to great advantage.

Then came the " Hermes." The right wings of H. M.'s 18th and 80th Regiments, also a company of Bengal Artillery, and two of Madras Sappers,‡ were the troops brought from Maulmain by the General. Loud cheering greeted the arrival of the two steamers. The distinguished 18th Royal Irish were

* *i.e.* Maulmain.

† Only a wing of the Royal Irish.

‡ The Sappers under Lieutenant Ford, who commanded them at Martaban.

now "all present." While the right wing passed along in the steamer to take up position, the band struck up the favourite air of "St. Patrick's Day"; then came the "British Bayoneteers"; this music on the waters had a fine effect, producing that indescribable military enthusiasm which even the most peaceful Briton must feel at times!

Towards sunset the "Berenice," preceded by the "Feroze," started for about ten miles up the river to procure water. The luxuriant mangrove down to the water's edge was exceedingly striking. Occasionally you might see a picture of rare beauty: a small creek, like a sheet of glass, sleeping among the foliage.

On arrival, we found H. M.'s brig "Serpent," and other ships, at anchor. A party of Europeans were at Bassein Creek for the protection of those who went to fetch water. All night we were watering, watering; and very muddy and brackish stuff the water was, nearly as bad as what the tired British troops drank before fighting the battle of Múdkí in the first Sikh war.

On the 9th, the "Berenice" (with the Madras Artillery) towed the "Juliana," containing the Bengal Commissariat establishment, to Rangoon. She had a motley set on board. Some with handsome solemn faces; some with broad, grinning mouths, and every variety of *pugaree**; some very dirty, some very clean; dirty and clean, busy and idle, all packed together in a little world. As the steamer approached to take her in tow, a difficult business commenced. The hawsers would go wrong; for a time it was "confusion worse confounded"; but time, which sets nearly everything right, at last set the "Berenice" with the "Juliana" on their way rejoicing. About three in the afternoon we were rapidly advancing to a new position, some three or four miles from Rangoon. Proceeding

* Turband.

up the river, two stockades in ruins were visible. These had been destroyed by the men-of-war; the smoke, rising from some huge piles of wood, told a very recent tale of demolition.

The scenery on both banks of the river appeared of a novel character: numerous small picturesque villages, with scarcely a soul visible. At intervals, a few fishermen with their canoes were observable; but these vanished on the appearance of the "Feroze" and "Berenice," with their transports, as if they really believed his Satanic Majesty was after them.

We had a splendid view of the Syriam pagoda in the distance—a grand and imposing pile; as far as some of us could observe, like an irregular cone, elaborately gilt. Its elevated position makes it appear of enormous height. The country about is very irregular; no hills of any size, but continual elevations of ground, thickly studded with trees, resembling portions of Southern India.

About 5 P.M. we anchored a mile or two from the "Serpent," which useful craft had preceded us, as a skilful pioneer. There the wily one now lay at her position, the name impressing you with the idea that she brooded over mischief to be accomplished. The "Feroze" lay a short way before us, majestic, and rejoicing in her strength. Here we had been ordered to rest until the arrival of the remainder of the fleet. From sunset till a late hour, many an eye was turned towards Rangoon and the celebrated Shwé (Shwé) Dagon Pagoda. SHWÉ signifies GOLDEN; and everything is either yellow or gilt in this part of the world.

Mr. C. M. Crisp, merchant at Rangoon and Maulmain, less than a month before, had written to the Government of India regarding the strong position we were now about to attack. On the upper terrace of the great pagoda at Rangoon, he had formerly counted eight pieces of cannon at each of the three principal entrances to the same terrace, viz. at the south, west, and east; at the north entrance only one cannon was placed, making in all about twenty-five pieces, three of which were

eighteen-pounders; the rest may have been from six to twelve pounders. He had heard that a number of swivel-guns were kept in readiness at the pagoda; but never saw any. Along the south front of the Temple, at the lower part, a wall had been built by order of the late king, with embrasures for cannon; this being the principal entrance, the Burmese authorities had taken great trouble to defend it. The north side he considered the weakest point. On the west side, a range of godowns for grain had been built. The *bund* (rude rampart) enclosing the new town, was very similar to the one round the cantonment at Maulmain; about fifteen feet high, and twelve feet broad at the top; twenty feet from the *bund* a ditch ran all round, about twenty feet wide, and from six to twelve feet deep. Government House, in the new town, was in a state of defence. Mr. Crisp counted twelve pieces of cannon of moderate calibre in the compound,* also two twenty-four pounders. Some guns were also at the custom-house and wharf; altogether, he considered there might be forty pieces of ordnance at Rangoon.

The forenoon of the 10th was one of great excitement among the majority on board. People doing things in place and out of place; some looking at plans, and examining swords and pistols. The deck presented a scene of extraordinary animation: many a feature seemed to be lighted up with the fire of hope; and the sick and the dying victims of that dire pestilence, cholera, momentarily revived at the prospect of a contest. Contrary to our expectations, the head-quarters, with the remainder of the fleet, did not arrive so early as we anticipated; but all were present at dawn of the next day, which was Easter Sunday.

* Ground surrounding or in front of the mansion.

CHAPTER III.

NAVAL OPERATIONS BEFORE RANGOON³⁰ AND DALLA.—THE
LANDING AND ADVANCE.—THE WHITE-HOUSE STOCKADE.

THE noble and humane forbearance of the Indian Government towards the Burmese has been already mentioned. But more still may be advanced, before recording further operations. The Governor-General had written a final letter to the King of Ava, through the Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces, to be presented for despatch to the Governor of Martaban. Colonel Bogle, at the time of presenting the letter, informed the Burmese functionary, "that the English were sincerely desirous of peace, but that, if a reply were not received from Ava by the 1st of April, fully agreeing to the terms proposed by the Governor-General, our forces would inevitably invade the country; and that the guilt of having provoked the war would rest with them." The Burmese officers around were said to have replied, that, if we were prepared for war, so were they!

General Godwin, on his arrival at the Rangoon river from Calcutta, immediately sent Captain Latter, the interpreter, in the "Proserpine," to Rangoon, with a flag of truce, to inquire

if any reply had been received from the Court of Ava to the Governor-General's letter. On reaching the stockades, which guarded both banks of the river, the steamer was fired on. The cool courage of Commander Brooking was admirable on this trying occasion. He not only extricated the "Proserpine" from danger, but blew up a magazine on shore, which inflicted a severe loss on the enemy. The meaning of a flag of truce had been explained to them some weeks before by Commodore Lambert; so that no pretext for not understanding it would hold for one instant. Their firing on the flag was a sure indication that the Burmese authorities wished for war; that they would have it at any price: they were now about to have it "with a vengeance!"

It had been understood among us that no operations would take place before Monday. The fulfilment of this resolution, however, depended upon circumstances. These fortunately tended to expedite matters, as there was no time to be lost.

On the evening of the 10th, the "Phlegethon" had reconnoitred the enemy's works on the river in a cool and intrepid manner. Next morning, about 9 o'clock, the "Berenice," with the several war-steamers and vessels, changed position. Our place was very near the "Serpent." The steam-frigates were to our right, and in front, the smaller steamers filling up the picture—which was one of imposing grandeur. Firing had already proceeded from the direction of Rangoon; it struck us that the Burmese were simply at morning practice, in expectation of a coming struggle. The General and Admiral now steamed off to look at the defences, which had been represented of so formidable a nature. We fully expected to see a shot fired at the splendid "Rattler," and the other steamers, as they seemed to approach the works. The Burmese, however, reserved their ammunition. They either supposed that we should refrain from attacking them on the Sabbath, or deemed it superfluous to employ their artillery until our whole force should be arrayed in presence of their fortifications. We

watched for some time for the first symptom of resistance, and watched in vain. •

We beheld the “Feroze,” under Commodore Lynch, moving on, evidently to take up position opposite the stockades. With the animated crowd of soldiers on her decks, she was a grand picture in motion—a “political persuader,” with fearful instruments of speech, in an age of progress! Next came the “Sesostris.” At length, the Burmese, unable to stand this gradual augmentation of the steam-warriors in front of their position, fired at the frigates, and the operations began. The “Moozuffer,” “Feroze,” and “Sesostris,”* also the “Medusa” and “Phlegethon”—the two latter, from their drawing little water, approaching nearer and nearer the coast—came severally into action. The fire from the vessels, Queen’s and Company’s, was kept up with terrific effect against Dalla, on our left, and the Rangoon defences on our right. At first the enemy returned the fire with considerable dexterity and precision; but, shortly after the “Fox” had come up and poured in her broadside, and the “Serpent” had moved on to destroy, by about 11 o’clock the firing on our right almost ceased. However, the war-steamers kept on, thundering forth against the works on both sides of the river; utterly destroying the stockades on the shore at Rangoon, and cannonading Dalla with decided effect. The large stockade, south-west of the Shwé-Dagon, was set on fire by a well-directed shell, which caused the explosion of a powder-magazine; and then, all the work soon became filled with black smoke and vivid flame—up, up to the bright skies ascending, till the scene became one of extreme beauty and awful grandeur! At this crisis, an occasional gun was heard from the shore. Two or three pieces were still observable in the burning stockade; and, as no Burmese

* The “Moozuffer,” under Captain Hewitt; the “Sesostris,” under Captain Campbell.

were visible, some conjectured it to be the flame firing them off without orders.

While the ruined defences on the Rangoon side were burning, the town of Dalla, or Dalla Creek, became the chief point of attack. A determined force had evidently taken up a position in this quarter. Several of our shot and shells struck the principal pagoda of the place; but, beyond knocking a piece out here and there, with little effect. The stockade at Dalla having been silenced, a party of seamen and marines, in four boats, effected a landing, and took the place by storm. But something must be said about this exciting scene. Every one on board the fleet had his telescope with him, ready to observe with interest the proceedings of the attacking party. When the boats emptied their loads on the bank, a loud cheer sprung from several vessels in the river. The party now rushed boldly forward to the stockade: some coolly inspected it all round; some, we could behold, trying to scramble over it; at length they entered it with little opposition, its chief defenders having fled in every direction to escape the terrible fire of our guns. One unfortunate Burmese soldier, on the approach of the naval party, jumped into the water, and swam bravely; a few more followed his example, as if resolved on becoming targets for practice. The works were soon all fired by the destructive exertions of the soldiers and marines. About 2 P.M., the stockade and a portion of the town were wrapped in one mighty blaze. The quiet landscape on each side of the river became disturbed with the fierce and raging element. The enemy had played upon us with guns of considerable size—some of them twelve and eighteen pounders—and, occasionally, these were remarkably well laid. The shot flew over the decks of the war-steamers; on board one, the “Sesostris,” a young officer of H. M.’s 51st,* was mortally wounded. Several shots struck

* Ensign Armstrong.

the vessels: the "Moozuffer" was maimed a little, and the "Feroze" had part of her rigging shot away. According to some, "the fire of the enemy proved fatal to many on board the shipping"; but our casualties were by no means numerous on this day.

These highly successful operations by both the Queen's and the Honourable Company's navy—the chief work, doubtless, of the 11th having fallen to the latter—cleared the coast for nearly a mile, and made a splendid landing-place for the troops, who were now eager to commence land operations on the following morning. The Navy had acted as a pioneer of true civilisation.

Just a quarter of a century had passed away since Lord Amherst, on the conclusion of the first Burmese war, proceeded to the western provinces of India, and visited Delhi. He there told the King that all vassalage for the British Indian possessions, which till then had been acknowledged, was at an end. Thus, about seventy years after the battle of Plassey, we fairly established ourselves—and the reward was not too great for so much labour and enterprise—sole possessors, in every respect, of what Macaulay styles, "the magnificent inheritance of the house of Tamerlane."* For anything we knew now, the landing of the troops about to take place in Burma might be the foundation of a new empire, which one day may teem with Anglo-Saxon industry, and do honour to those who had secured the golden inheritance of the descendants of Alompra!

There was little sleep that night among many of us; the excitement attendant on preparation for work had kept away its refreshing influence. About half-past 3 next morning, the decks of the several steamers and vessels were crowded with living creatures, all eagerly sharing the bustle which invariably precedes the landing of troops in an enemy's country. Some of the boats for conveyance on shore did not arrive until the

* Essay on Lord Clive.

morning had considerably advanced ; and then we beheld Surya ascending in full splendour, as if seeking a vantage point whence to view the coming fray. The river before Rangoon presented an animated scene, the like of which had not relieved its monotonous aspect for eight-and-twenty years. Boats rowing to and fro, steamers changing position ; the detachments already landed drawn out in martial array ; here, the boats of the "Hermes," with two 9-pounders, brought to join their companions two 24-pounder howitzers, from the "Lahore" ; there, the men shouting and working, assisted by the gallant tars, as they took each gun from the boat, and set it in readiness for the carriage mounted to receive it. The troops landed under a well-sustained fire from the steamers. The right column consisted of H. M.'s 51st, the 18th Royal Irish, the 40th Bengal Native Infantry, and the Sappers and Miners. The 18th Royal Irish were on the right ; the 51st K. O. L. I. on the left ; and the 40th Bengal Native Infantry in the centre. The Sappers and Miners were drawn up with their ladders in rear of the left flank. The troops were ordered to carry sixty rounds of ammunition in their pouches, and all to have one day's full rations, ready cooked, with them. The Artillery formed in rear of the Brigade. Next landed, as soon as boats were available, the wing of H. M.'s 80th, and the 35th and 9th Madras Native Infantry—the wing of H. M.'s 80th in the centre ; the 9th Madras Native Infantry on the right ; and the 35th Madras Native Infantry on the left. The 9th Regiment N.I. had served in the first Burmese war. The order for position appointed by the General was quarter-distance column, right in front. The ludicrous features of the landing scene may be described as follows :—Guns and carriages dismounted, wheels lying here and there, boxes of medicine, boxes of shot, rations of beef, powder, arrack, and ladders, all in one confused mass, while the troops moved in the midst of them to form into position.

In contrast to these lively and exciting doings, the following melancholy accident may be related :—On one occasion, just

as we were employed in mounting guns for the third detachment of Artillery, some European soldiers and a sepoy had recklessly approached the smoking ashes of a ruined stockade, where quantities of loose powder had been left about by the Burmese on the previous day; a portion of this exploded, burning the poor fellows in the most dreadful manner. Some now thought that the ground we stood on was well mined; a few probably expected to be in the air shortly, especially the sepoys; but all was soon lost in some new cause of excitement. At intervals the ships' guns roared forth destruction on the town.

On, on to the Shwé Dagon! was soon the grand animating thought of every officer and soldier. The General had advanced with the first division that landed. His wise plan was to take the circuitous route and attack on the eastern side. The old road from the river led up to the southern gate of the pagoda, through the new town, by which route it was generally believed the enemy expected us. But events of considerable importance were to take place before we got near any gate of Gautama's splendid Temple. Colonel Foord, Commandant of Artillery, with Major Turton and Brigade-Major Scott, and four Bengal guns under Major Reid, were with the General in advance, the guns covered by four companies of the 51st Light Infantry. They had not proceeded far, however, when, "on opening some rising ground to the right," they were fired on by the enemy's guns, and immediately afterwards Burmese skirmishers appeared in the jungle. On this audacity, General Godwin, who served in the first Burmese campaign, afterwards remarked in his despatch, that it was a new mode of fighting with the Burmese, "no instance having occurred last war of their attacking our flanks, or leaving their stockades, that I remember to have taken place." They had profited by time, and, perhaps, by European instruction.

The enemy's artillery fire proceeded from a position which was styled the White House Stockade. It was a very strong defence, as will be seen hereafter, and well situated to

annoy our advance. Lieutenant Ford, of the Madras Sappers and Miners, had constructed three temporary bridges in a very short space of time, which would greatly facilitate the progress of more guns required to assist Major Reid's battery, which was now in full play against the stockade, at a range of about eight hundred yards. "I am sorry to say, sir," remarked an officer to the General, "that unless Major Oakes soon comes up, we shall not be able to go on. I have but two rounds a gun left." The accuracy of the enemy's range was shown by two of the Bengal gunners receiving mortal wounds at their guns, from two successive shots. At this critical time, Major Oakes fortunately came up with two 24-pounder howitzers, leaving the remaining portion of his battery in the rear. Colonel Foord told him to open with spherical case at a range of eight hundred yards. The gallant Major, with his usual alacrity, drew up in line with the Bengal battery, and opened an effective fire on the outwork, which he continued until the whole of his ammunition was expended. The Bengal guns had for some time withdrawn from the line of action, until more ammunition should arrive. The heat of the sun was now terrific; it gave Major Oakes his death-blow just as he was about to fire the last gun.

Shortly before the Artillery ceased firing, a storming party was formed from H. M.'s 51st K. O. L. I., and the Sappers and Miners. It consisted of four companies of Europeans, Major Fraser, the chief Engineer, with the Sappers under Captain Rundall. The third division of ladders was in the rear under Lieutenant Ford, who had been constructing and repairing wooden bridges for the passage of the Artillery. After the work was finished, he had orders to rejoin the leading division. While passing on for that purpose, a heavy flanking fire from the left was opened on his detachment. This not being returned, the enemy became bolder and the fire hotter, so much so, that the men were obliged to ground their ladders, unsling their carbines, and open a fire on the Burmese skir-

mishers. This silenced them for a while ; and resuming their ladders, the men marched on with all speed. From the continual firing in front, it was evident that severe work was going on at the stockade. The party moved on with their heavy ladders, and, passing through a thick wood which screened the place, the officer beheld Lieutenant Donaldson, of the Bengal Engineers, passing by mortally wounded, his pale face lighted up with a smile of triumph, although suffering extreme agony. On reaching the White House Stockade,* there were to be seen the ladders reared against it, and troops crowding up them. Four ladders† went at the place in two divisions.

Closely following the gallant Major Fraser in the assault, came Captain Rundall, who mounted the ladders about the same time as his superior. The storming party immediately carried the stockade ; but not without considerable loss on our side. The brave Captain Blundell, who commanded the leading company of the party, was shot down, and afterwards died of his wounds. In him the gallant 51st lost an excellent officer—one who had nobly done his duty. The companies of Sappers suffered severely, and their bravery was everywhere conspicuous. Three of them alone reared a ladder, four more having been shot down beside it. Lieutenant Trevor was here wounded, and Lieutenant Williams had a narrow escape of his life. The Burmese, on our carrying the stockade, fled precipitately ; but many of these resolved to give us further trouble in the jungles. They left many dead about the place ; amongst them was a warrior, clad in a red jacket with the buttons of the 50th Regiment.

It was not yet near noon, and the sun had made severe havoc among several members of our small army. Major Griffiths, Brigade Major of the Madras Division, was fatally

* For Supplementary Narrative of, See "Rangoon," Appendix No. VI. p. 249.

† Or more, as four were reared, a fifth broke ; but four were enough.

struck on the field. Colonel Foord, Brigadier Warren, commanding the Bengal Division, and Colonel St. Maur, H. M.'s 51st K. O. L. I., were disabled by its overpowering effects. Many of the European soldiers suffered, and here and there were to be seen, on the ground for the advance, to the left of the White House Stockade, the medical officers and their subordinates administering relief by pouring cold water over the patients. The remaining portion of Major Oakes' battery—four 9-pounders—arrived from the shore shortly after that gallant officer was struck. Next came Major Montgomery's battery,* with the D Company 3rd Battalion of the Madras Artillery, which had done good service in China. Major Back, commanding, with Lieutenant and Adjutant Harrison, accompanied this division of the corps. Captain Cooke, with the D Company 2nd Battalion, had already made some excellent practice with his rockets while and after the Artillery fired on the stockade, clearing the jungles on the left, and thereby saving us for some time considerable trouble and annoyance.

Among the wounded in the early operations, may be mentioned Captain Allan, Quartermaster-General to the Force, and Colonel Bogle, Commissioner of the Tenasserim Provinces. The former was shot in the calf of the leg, and the latter in the knee.

Reposing in a shady spot, a small number of officers caught the attention of the passer-by. Two of them, it seemed highly probably, would recover from their misfortunes. But on the face of Major Oakes death had set his seal. Several were around him rendering every possible assistance, while the tear of sorrow fell from even those who liked him not too well.

The Artillery were now commanded not to advance till further orders; and after a good deal of sharp skirmishing, as the day

* Two 24-pounder howitzers, and two 9-pounders. To this battery the writer was attached.

drew to a close, a general cessation of operations took place. All now began to prepare for a night's bivouac on the field. In the evening it was whispered among us, that Major Oakes was dead ! that he who, since being appointed to command a Service Company, had shown no ordinary zeal for the high efficiency of that Company—who, a few hours before, had rejoiced in a triumphant might—was now ranked among the fallen. He had been taken into the general hospital on the beach, where he died. The gallant deceased was in the forty-fifth year of his age. In person Major Oakes rose above the ordinary stature. Six feet one inch in height, with a chest of uncommon breadth, a striking military deportment, and a countenance betraying a restless ambition, wherever he went he could not escape observation. *Aut Cæsar aut nullus*, might be read in his pale, hard features. He had entered the Madras Artillery under the old *régime*, about the time when our first war with Burma formed a subject of general interest throughout the British dominions. Towards the end of the year 1827, Majors Oakes and Montgomery were riding-masters to the Horse Brigade. The Major was great in all matters of drill, and was conspicuous as the man who gave the regiment an entire system of manœuvres. His publications on that subject were acknowledged by the Honourable Court of Directors, who rewarded him for his services.*

Major Oakes was not, in the ordinary sense, a man of genius ; the creative faculty was in him but slightly developed. But he was gifted with great energy, and was remarkable for his untiring industry. Well-directed labour, steadily continued, is a rare virtue in India, where climate and the absence of any powerful motive for exertion, induce languid habits. He, therefore, who shakes off the lethargy, and toils assiduously, may, without a glimmering of genius, acquire a pre-eminence

* Order published at Fort St. George, 18th March 1851.

even over those of his fellow-men who may be more highly endowed by Nature. In this way may we account for the position Major Oakes wrought for himself. Through his efforts the Madras Artillery was presented with several very useful works, and he will long be remembered by officers of the old Corps as one of its most useful members.

After the White House Stockade was taken, and picquets had been placed in front, a good opportunity was presented for examining the work. A vast quantity of ammunition was found in the place. The grape was of the usual barbarous description, common among some of the hill-tribes of India: badly shaped iron bullets or bits of iron, closely packed in a canvas bag, dipped in dammer. Into a well outside, all the ammunition that could be found was thrown. The work, like all Burmese defences, was very strong, and they had evidently taken much trouble in its construction. In the last war the "White House" was surrounded by a brick wall, which this time they again surrounded with a stockade, at a distance of about ten feet, filling the interval with rammed earth. This formed a good parapet, to which they gave a reverse slope, so as to get up and mount their guns on it. Some excellent guns were found, of iron and brass; two of the latter kind were deemed handsome enough afterwards to be sent to Calcutta. The work had on its front face an insignificant ditch. In the centre of the little fort was the "White House," from which the place took its name. It was approached at one end only by a steep flight of steps, and within, at the further end, was placed a colossal figure of Gautama. A great deal of ammunition was found scattered about this central building. After the place was burned by the Engineers and Sappers, the same night the entire roof of the house was destroyed, and the huge figure seen from a distance, overtopping the shell of the ruined mansion, had an extraordinary effect. All the outside wood-work of the place was also destroyed by fire, so that the parapet became exposed; consequently, had the enemy attempted to

retake the stockade, we could have swept them from the face of the earth, or say, the top of it, in various ways. A Burmese warrior, who had been severely wounded, must have acquired some idea of British kindness towards an enemy, when a high officer patted him on the back, to reassure him of our protection, while others gave him water, and he was allowed with his wife and relations, who had sought him out, to leave the stockade and go peacefully away.

The "White House Picquet"—so called in the last war—was well situated for an out-post. The enemy knew every inch of the ground we should necessarily pass over to get at them; and it is highly probable they had practised for some time with ranges to bear upon certain points, which may account for their accuracy of fire in the morning. The fort being situated on slightly rising ground, a picturesque view inland was afforded: at about a mile and a half distant, was a small village, somewhat concealed by wooden ruins, to which considerable numbers of the enemy retreated.

Allusion has already been made to the Burmese skirmishers. It was amusing enough to see them cheived through the bushes, across the plain, where the Artillery were drawn up, by the European soldiers. Crack! crack! crack!—away they ran, as if a legion of evil spirits were after them! But the retreat of many was only temporary. Towards dusk, they showed themselves in front of our camp; but a few rounds of canister quickly drove them back into their jungles. There could be no doubt that Europeans were in the service of His Golden-footed Majesty. A European Portuguese was taken prisoner; and a Conductor picked up, in one of the stockades, the first volume of a work on anatomy, and a treatise on steam navigation, both in English; he also beheld plates, tumblers, and wine-glasses.

A report was current, that an officer of the Madras Artillery recognised a renegade of that corps, named Govin, in the ranks of the enemy, clad in Burmese uniform. He was soon after

shot dead. This man was said to have been an able artillery-man, and had got up light field-trains, drawn by Pegu ponies. It was strange, that the moment he was laid low the Burmese Artillery fell into confusion. A panic had ensued; and every "volunteer" knows that, in the game of war, when confusion or a panic takes place, all is nearly over. Even among Europeans confusion or panic may destroy the bravest troops; and as it may come when least expected, a reserve should ever be at hand.

No man seemed to bear the fatigues of the day better than the gallant General; he was busy everywhere—the cocked hat he wore rendering his vicinity anything but safe—animating the troops by his presence. He came forward, and expressed his sorrow to Colonel Foord—who had slightly recovered—for the accident which had befallen him. About this time, he said, regarding the conduct of the Burmese that day, that they had acted boldly and well, beyond all expectation. At night the force bivouacked on the open plain, without tents or covering of any description for officers or men. During the night, the enemy fired on the camp with musketry, but did not otherwise molest us. There may be more disagreeable things in life than sleeping beside a howitzer, on some straw, to escape as much dew as possible, after a hard day's work under a burning sun; getting up at intervals for duty; and washing in the morning out of a gun-bucket.

The alarm, when the camp had gone to rest, led some to suppose that the White House Stockade was about being re-occupied; but it turned out to be only the flickering blaze from some smouldering timbers, which looked as if people were moving about with lights. Their conjectures were groundless. The White House Picquet, or what remained of it, was speedily becoming a blackened ruin, which it would take the Burmese much trouble and time again to put in a proper state of defence.

The night of the 12th of April will long be remembered by

many of the force. Towards the new town, and the great Shwé Dagon, fire continued to spread through the darkness—observing which formed amusement for the weary who could not sleep. It proceeded from the steamers and men-of-war pouring their destructive fire into the town. Huge hollow shot and carcasses were continually projected, doing fearful execution. Sometimes the effect, from our camp, was terribly sublime. It seemed as if many a wrathful deity were, like Vishnu, hurling the fiery *discus* through the air !

CHAPTER IV.

THE GRAND ADVANCE ON THE SHWÉ DAGON PAGODA.

THE 13th of April was a busy day in camp.* In addition to the Artillery already up, four 8-inch iron howitzers were required by the General for the grand advance on the great pagoda. This was fixed for the morrow, when, many believed, from what had already been experienced, the enemy would make a desperate resistance. The whole of this day was employed in disembarking and taking into camp these noble pieces of ordnance. The Naval Brigade rendered us the most hearty assistance in this arduous task.

At one spot on the field might be seen a knot of artillery-men, under some zealous officer, cutting and fixing fuses; at another, the infantry cleaning and examining their trusty percussion muskets and bayonets, the best Infantry weapons procurable; at another, a cluster of talkers, very eloquent some of them, discussing the operations of the previous day; the sun,

* Situated about one mile from the beach, and, by the route we took, two from the pagoda.

apparently, being quite disregarded in the zeal of a wordy contest. In the shade—and a good deal was afforded by the surrounding jungles—the thermometer stood considerably above one hundred degrees.

The King of Ava, no doubt, all this time, believed that, through the re-agency of such troops as those composing “Shwé-Pee Hman-Geen,” or the Mirror of the Golden Country—a body of Royal Guards—and other bodies equally well gilt, the English would soon be driven into the river; and that then the Tenasserim Provinces would be taken from us, and even Calcutta might become submissive to the Golden Feet! “On the night of the 13th,” wrote an intelligent Armenian, one of the oppressed, “orders came to send us up to the great pagoda. We were accordingly conveyed thither in files of ten men, three Armenians and seven Mussulmans: Rockets and shells* poured down on every side. Our escape must solely be ascribed to the mercy of Providence. To have escaped from the shells, some of which burst near us—from the Governor’s hand, and the hands of the Burmese soldiery, who had already commenced pillaging the new town—must be set down as a miracle. However, two files of our comrades had scarcely gone, when the guard placed over us thought it prudent to save themselves from the impending danger by flight; yet their chief stood with his drawn sword. We sheekoed,† prayed, and conjured him to save his life and ours. In my long experience of the Burmese generally, I have never found them wantonly cruel in nature. It is the system of the insane Government of Ava that produces monsters. So the man released us, and, with good grace, after seeing us depart, departed himself also. We at first returned to our abodes, but found them uninhabitable. Many of the houses in

* From the shipping.

† *Salaamed*, or made salutation.

the new town were in a blaze from the rockets. We then thought of our safety: some tried to escape to the river-side—they fell among the Burmese soldiery, were maltreated, stripped even of their upper garments, and obliged to return, and hide themselves under a Kyoung*; others took shelter under the foot of the great pagoda, and a few disguised got safely out of the town through the kind assistance of their Burmese friends. This night was a night of flight.”

We were informed that, shortly before the fleet arrived, the Governor called a sort of Cabinet Council together, to deliberate over the probability of beating back the English. An old and respected inhabitant of Rangoon, who remembered the last war, and many years before it, was called on to give his opinion. The old man was afraid to speak out what he thought would be the result; but being pressed to do so, *as there was no fear he would suffer for telling the truth*, he declared that the British, on account of their superior skill and discipline, would certainly be victorious. “With them,” said he, “one mind guides all; with the Burmese, each guides himself in the fight; what if we have fifty to one, the Europeans will conquer!” The fine old fellow was immediately ordered to be branded, and otherwise tortured for his candour.

An idea of the strength of new Rangoon may be gathered from the fact that the new town, already mentioned, upwards of a mile from the river, was described as “nearly a square, with a bund, or mud wall, about sixteen feet high and eight broad; a ditch runs along each side of the square, and on the north side, where the pagoda stands, it has been cleverly worked into the defences, to which it forms a sort of citadel.”

Wednesday morning, the 14th, beheld the force moving on. The troops were certainly in the finest temper for dealing with the enemy. The halt of yesterday had refreshed them con-

* Poongi, or priest-house.

siderably, notwithstanding the intense heat ; and recollection of the 12th prompted them to double exertion, if such were possible, to-day.

H. M.'s 80th Regiment, with four guns of Major Montgomery's battery,* formed the advance, covered by skirmishers. About 7 o'clock, the sound of musketry fell upon the ear. It seemed to those composing the reserved force in rear to proceed from the dark jungles, through which our march lay. The troops in our front had come into action ; and the enemy were being driven before the fire of the European and Native Infantry. But this was not effected without some loss, as several *doolies*,† with their wounded, which passed by us, clearly testified.

The sound of artillery, from a Madras battery, likewise told that the guns were in position.

Major Montgomery, having brought one 9-pounder and a 24-pounder howitzer into a favourable position, had opened fire at a distance of about seven hundred yards from the stockade. Passing on through the jungle way, we at length came within range of the enemy's jinjals, which appeared to fire at us from beside a small pagoda. A succession of well-directed shots were now launched against the reserved force, in rear of which the heavy 8-inch howitzers were being nobly brought along by the gallant Naval Brigade. Our guns inclined to the right, and halted to make way for the coming young giants of ordnance—all the while, the fire proceeding from the enemy near the small pagoda by no means abating.

* The A Company, 4th Battalion, so recently commanded by his friend Major Oakes.

† Rudely constructed palankeens, for carrying sick and wounded. [They are not "ferocious" ; neither are they a "tribe," as was once cleverly imagined in England ! This is almost as good as when a member of the British Senate asked, whether Surajah Dowlah (Sir Roger Dowler *anglicised*) was a baronet !]

Again we marched on, and came upon a large body of our troops, the Europeans, with fixed bayonets, as if ready for an attack as soon as a breach could be made. The 40th Bengal Native Infantry were likewise in this position, a petty *midun*,* sheltered by a small hill covered with jungle. Shot from the Burmese guns, as well as jinjals, fell fast and thick upon the plain. The troops wisely remained under cover of the hill, passing an occasional remark on the correct range the enemy had attained, as shot after shot bounded along only a few yards before us; and then would come a jinjal, with its strange whistling sound, over your head, making a man thankful he was not quite so tall as men are represented in ancient writ. In spite of all philosophy, such music must sound very strange to all ears, for the first time! At length, the greater portion of the infantry moved on.

The D Company's Battery,† under Captain Cooke, was ordered to remain in the old position till required. Certainly, it is galling to be under fire, without any order to advance; and such was our case for about four hours. It was amusing enough to observe the cattle attached to the guns, while the shot continued to fly about. Strange to say, not one bullock of the reserve battery was struck, nor did they seem to be at all affected by the firing of the determined enemy!

The Burmese soon got the range more exact than ever. Probably guessing that some of the troops were under cover of the small hill, they gave less elevation, when their shot fell very near us, and the jinjals continued to whistle with fearful rapidity. An intelligent Bengal officer, who had been engaged in several of the great Punjab battles, declared to us that he had not, on those occasions, "bobbed" his head so much as he had.

* Plain.

† Madras Artillery. With this battery, which was in reserve, the writer and Lieutenant Bridge remained. Lieutenant Onslow was occupied at the beach in landing stores and ammunition.

done to-day. At length, the range of one of the enemy's guns entirely differed from the previous practice; which led us to believe that the devoted warrior, who had shown so much skill, was no more.

Major Montgomery's battery had, no doubt, done considerable execution.* It may have laid the aforesaid warrior low. The gallant Major himself came past us while the jinjals were flying, his Lascar orderly following him. A spent ball struck the unfortunate orderly in the forehead, when he immediately fell, but not dead, as at first supposed.

About this time, our Assistant-Surgeon, Dr. Smith, was slightly wounded. A tar of the Naval Brigade was also struck while giving assistance in bringing along a heavy gun; and several others, European and native, were wounded near the spot we occupied. The 9th Madras Native Infantry had gallantly driven back a body of Burmese skirmishers in our rear.

At about 10 A.M., the heavy howitzer battery, under Major Back, manned by the Bengal Artillery, was, after great labour, brought into position.† We were delighted to hear the howitzers sounding forth in the advance, as they opened fire against the great stockade. This continued about one hour and a half, under a very galling and well-directed fire from

* After firing a few rounds, the commanding officer left those pieces—the 9-pounder, and 24-pounder howitzer—under the charge of 2nd Lieutenant Lloyd, who kept up a well-directed and spirited fire during the whole time the action lasted. The Major then placed the other three 9-pounders of his battery in another position, about a quarter of a mile to the right of the first one. Lieutenant Tayler and 2nd Lieutenant Blair had each of them charge of a piece in this position, which they served with precision and effect. With reference to the Burmese gunners, we found, in some cases, that they had been chained to the guns.

† But for the valuable assistance of Lieutenant Dorville, of Her Majesty's ship "Rattler," with a party of one hundred and twenty seamen, we could scarcely have got the heavy howitzers into position, and to them also we are chiefly indebted for disembarking these pieces on the previous day.—Major Back's Report.—The two howitzers on the right were under the charge of Captain Malloch, of the Bengal Artillery.

the enemy's guns and wall-pieces, from which our troops suffered considerably. The Artillery operations of the Wednesday were under the direction of Major Turton, of the Bengal Army, whose accustomed zeal was fully displayed throughout. Colonel Foord had not recovered from the '*coup de soleil*' in time to proceed with the force; nothing could have disappointed him more.

It may be mentioned that, just before the heavy guns were dragged into position, Major Turton told Lieutenant Ashe, of the Bengal Artillery, to take his gun, a 24-pounder howitzer, to the left of the heavy battery, to dislodge some Burmese skirmishers from the bushes in front. This was the only Bengal light field-gun engaged that day; and it was highly necessary, as those determined skirmishers were fast closing in on the crowded mass of our troops, who with great difficulty kept down their fire.

At about half-past 11, Captain Latter, the Interpreter, proposed to the General an attack on the eastern entrance of the great pagoda; it was his opinion that, for ten of our troops now being killed or disabled, we would lose but one with a storming-party; which would naturally draw off the enemy's attention, and excite their surprise. This sensible advice was by no means disregarded.

Eventually, Captain Latter asked General Godwin's permission to lead the storming-party. The gallant General replied, "With the greatest pleasure, my dear friend!" This reply was quite characteristic of our brave and courteous Commander.

The storming-party was formed of the wing of H. M.'s 80th, under Major Lockhart, two companies of the 18th Royal Irish, under Lieutenant Hewitt, and two companies of the 40th Bengal Native Infantry, under Lieutenant White; the whole commanded by Colonel Coote, of the 18th Royal Irish, Captain Latter leading. From the elevated position—on which were our heavy guns—to the pagoda is a sort of valley to be

crossed before reaching the eastern entrance ; the distance might be about eight hundred yards. The hill on which the great temple stands is divided into three terraces, each defended by a brick and mud rampart.* There are four flights of steps up the centre of each terrace, three of which are covered over ; the east, south, and west. On went our gallant troops, crossing over to the pagoda in the most steady manner, under a heavy and galling fire from the enemy on the walls. At length they reached the desired gate, which was immediately pushed open. Captain Latter had beheld Lieutenant and Adjutant Doran, of H. M.'s 18th Royal Irish, rather in advance of his proper position : on being spoken to, we believe he said that his regiment was in rear. Now, a grand rush was made up the long flight of steps they had discovered. The storming-party, however, suffered from the shower of balls and bullets which immediately came down upon them with dreadful effect ; but nothing could ever check the determined rush of British Infantry ! Near the foot of the steps fell Lieutenant Doran, mortally wounded ; and by his side fell also two men of his regiment. The young hero lay pierced by four balls. Colonel Coote was also wounded. But our troops nobly gained the upper terrace. A deafening cheer rent the air ! The Burmese defenders fled in all directions before the British bayonet. The Shwé Dagon, or say, "Dagon the Great," had fallen for the second time into our hands ! The blow had been struck ; the first grand act of the drama was over !

"On the 14th," wrote the Armenian, "there were but a few thousand Shwaydown and Padoung men, say about five thousand in all, that kept to their post on the pagoda, under the immediate command of the Governor. They held out until

* Their heavy guns were on the upper terrace ; their light ones on the second and third. The rampart of the upper terrace, being mostly of bricks and mortar, is of a superior description.

noon, when the Governor, in despair, gave orders to retreat, himself setting the example of flight. His men, distinguished by their gilt hats, remained to the last. They stood the first onset of the British, and then fled to the west"; that is, towards Kemmendine. "Had there been a brigade of cavalry, or a division of troops, at the north-west, the Governor could not have escaped. He had a few days previously despatched his plunder to his country, Shwaydown, in charge of one of his trusty relatives. Thus dispersed the grand army of Rangoon, computed at about twenty thousand strong at the beginning, some of whom did not even exchange a shot with the English, and many were driven away by the rockets and shells."

The reserved force moved on. A loud cheer from the advance made us long to get near the heavy guns. There was enough in that hearty cheer to tell that Rangoon was entirely in the British possession. Having proceeded a short distance, the battery halted in rather dense jungle. There, among other sights, we beheld three of the 40th Bengal Native Infantry lying dead on a bank—all three, as well as a bullock, having been struck down with a shot from one of the enemy's 18-pounders. Ascending a little, we found the four 8-inch guns in position*; and a good view of the piece of country at the base of the Shwé Dagon was presented, to all appearance jungly and confined. We were now informed that the General and his Staff had entered the Pagoda.

After our Europeans had refreshed themselves with a little tea—and nothing is more refreshing on the field—the Artillery†

* Lieutenant and Adjutant Voyle, of the Bengal Artillery, in addition to commanding a howitzer, had cut and set many of the fuzes for these guns, which had now done their duty. Brigade-Major Scott, Madras Artillery, was observed doing everything in his power to encourage the gunners as they worked under a heavy fire. Lieutenant and Adjutant Harrison, Madras Artillery, is likewise reported by Major Back as most active in pointing and commanding one of the 8-inch howitzers.

† Covered by the 40th Bengal Native Infantry.

were ordered to proceed in a southerly direction, and take up quarters where they best could till the morrow. These were on the cold ground, as on the two previous nights. To get thither, we had a short march through the jungle; and while passing along, we frequently came across a Burmese soldier who lay dead, with a look of determination, and a smile of apparent contempt on his countenance. Curious enough, many of them had adopted a sort of red jacket as a portion of their costume; this had been frequently a source of confusion to our troops, who could with difficulty distinguish them from our own skirmishers. The *Burmese* muskets were old flint ones from England, "condemned," the excuse for their being sold to our enemies; and with the dhá—a sharp, square-pointed sword with a long wooden handle—and with other weapons, such as a British bayonet stuck on the handle of a spear, the Burmese Infantry equipments were found to be tolerably complete. It may be mentioned that the enemy's musket-ball was found to be considerably smaller than ours, composed of iron as well as lead, not cast in a mould, but rough and varying in size.

Towards the south side of the pagoda we passed a Poonghi house in ruins. Gautamas of huge size gazed upon the stranger with beneficent countenance, as if they were giving him a hearty welcome to the new land. A huge tree, lying across the road, was speedily cut asunder, to make way for the light field-guns; after a short period a portion of the heavy battery arrived. When the guns were all in position, preparations were made for the night's bivouac. Beside our halting-place we found a fine tank and well. Many had never before enjoyed a bathe or a wash so much as they did upon this occasion. After a comfortable night's rest in the open air, in the morning we moved into a Poongi house for breakfast.

Some necessary stores for hot-weather campaigning had found their way to us through the faithful followers, who, since the capture of the Great Pagoda, had been streaming forth to the camp; some of them, during the early part of the

day, having nearly fainted from fear, while performing their philanthropic duties, as the enemy's bullets flew about rather too near to be agreeable. Where we now were stood various ruins of the new town. The remainder of the force passed the night in the covered entrances and immediate vicinity of the pagoda. By the route we had come, it was expected there would be no very great difficulty in placing our guns on the ramparts for the defence of Gautama's Temple.

Notwithstanding what has been already said in the first part of this Abstract; a few particulars by another valuable authority—no less than Sir Henry Havelock, the future hero of Lucknow—regarding the occupation of Rangoon by the British in the first Burmese war, may be interesting at this stage of our narrative.

The Court of Ava had never dreamed of the sudden blow about to be aimed against the southern provinces, and maritime commercial capital of the Burmese Empire. At this time,* there was no actual Governor (*Myo-woon*) in Rangoon. A subordinate officer, styled *Rewoon*, exercised the chief authority in the town.

On receiving intelligence of the arrival of a large fleet of ships at the mouth of the Rangoon river—ships of unusual size and belonging to the British—"this unfortunate barbarian became almost beside himself with wonder, consternation, and rage." His first order ran thus—"English ships have brought foreign soldiers to the mouth of the river. They are my prisoners; cut me some thousands of spans of rope to bind them."

He next ordered the seizure of all the English residents in Rangoon. The order extending to all those "who wore the English hat," American missionaries, American merchants, and other foreign adventurers, were confined in the same building with

five British merchants, a ship-builder, and two pilots. They were immediately loaded with fetters, and otherwise cruelly treated.

At length the fleet came in sight of a "considerable Asiatic town." This seemed to be encircled by a rampart of solid timber from fifteen to twenty feet in height, pierced with embrasures. Boats of various sizes and shapes lay moored along the banks of the river; on these were constructed wharfs, jetties, and landing-places. Clumps of light green forest occupied the plains around.

They were everywhere decorated with the gilded spires of pagodas. Above them all, on a height at some distance, was seen the grand monument, which had first attracted remark. But attention was now fixed by the defences of the town. A Burman stockade had been the theme of wonder and curiosity for weeks and months at either Presidency. It was to try its mettle against this redoubted species of work that the army had sailed. Hence, as each ship neared the town, the first glance towards the embrasures produced a murmur of deep interest amongst the troops. "There it is, at last; the stockade, the stockade of Rangoon!" *

The enemy heard the roar of that cannonade which covered the landing of the troops. The streets were swept with cannon-shot from the fleet. The Rewoon abandoned himself to his fears. "He mounted a horse, and hurried through the south-eastern gate into the country, followed in confused flight by the armed rabble he had collected." Terror reigned in the town. "Burman, Peguer, Portuguese, Parsee, Moguls, and Chinese, male and female, young and old, followed by the rushing sound of eighteen and thirty-two pounder shot, fled like frightened deer to the neighbouring forests."† When the

* Havelock's "Campaigns in Ava," p. 26.

† *Ibid.*, page 33.

troops were fairly landed, several of the unhappy prisoners were released. The reason of four of them had given way. Major Sale, afterwards the hero of Jellalabad, found Mrs. Judson, of missionary celebrity, tied to a tree, and immediately released her.

The troops took possession of a town scarcely tenanted by a living being. With regard to the disposition of the troops in Rangoon during the first war, we read that the Brigade from Bengal had its right supported in the direction of the town, and its left on the great temple. The troops from Madras rested their right on "Shoé-da-gong-praw" (Shwé Dagon), and their left on the town.* Their houses were wooden dwellings of the priests, convents or monasteries, the abodes of pilgrims, under the arched recesses of shrines, and in the square chambers of temples. All of these abounded in either road. The army in 1852 found little or no difference in this respect.

And now let us return to our second visit to Rangoon and the Shwé Dagon Pagoda. With regard to the Burmese troops at first opposed to us, the "Armenian" of 1852 gave the following information:—These had commenced pouring down upon Rangoon from different towns and villages since the seizure of the King of Ava's ship, "Helen," the golden apple; and a large army arrived from Amarapura itself. They were all in high spirits, and were employed in erecting the stockade round the mud wall or fort, which they finished in the short space of two months. They even fortified the king's old wharf, the roof of which was constructed like a vat about two feet deep, and filled with water to extinguish the shells and rockets that might fall on it. But their magazine, in large jars, ranged in rows on each side, having, as before stated, caught fire on the 11th, blew this one of their seven wonders into the air, at the

* Four miles were occupied by the force, with a continuous chain of sentries.

same time killing many men on duty. Before the works had been completed, a portion of the Burmese army became dispirited by over-fatigue and disease. "Many determined not to fight the English, and they stuck to their determination. Shwé-Pee Hman-Geen, or the Mirror of the Golden Country, a body of Royal Guards stationed at the south and west, were the first to set the example on the first day of the fight."

Some curious Burmese plans were discovered in a magazine by our excellent Commissary of Ordnance, Captain Robertson, of the Bengal Artillery. Some square feet of a compressed black substance, as usual in this country, took the place of cloth or drawing-paper, and the drawing was produced by means of a sort of hard chalk and a ruler. This we believe to be the common mode of planning in Burma. One of the plans in question minutely exhibited the stockade, also gave in Burmese the strength of each detachment, with its designation, told off for its defence. We saw a translation of the writing, from which it would appear the Burmese think there is much in a name.

The following were among the detachments which composed the Burmese garrison of Rangoon* :—

	MEN.
The Dennobhew (Donabew) City Contingent .	500
The Golden Palm Royal Boat's crew . .	500
The Kanaung City Contingent	600
The Padoung	300
The Great Hill Royal Boat's Crew .	130
The Water Fowl	119
The Golden Parrot	65
The Rethay Braminy Goose	76

* For the complete list, see "Rangoon; a Narrative," p. 101.

And so on, with the White House Picquet and village of Puzendoun (2,500), making a total of nearly 10,000 men in 33 detachments.

Each man with two baskets of rice and a piece of silver.

The names of the gates were also remarkable :—

GATES.

1. North Gate.
2. Shwé Gycen Gate.
3. Red Earth Gate.
4. Sacred Tray Gate.
5. Shwé Doung Gate.
6. Tree Gate.
7. Tree Gate.

GATES.

8. Banyan Tree Gate.
9. Smith's Gate.*
10. Sacred Hair Gate.
11. Little Lake Gate.
12. Twisted Umbrella Gate.
13. Stone Gate.

The enemy had, in the opinion of the General, "settled" that the British should attack the town by the old road from the river to the pagoda, leading to the south gate, and running through the town, "where they had made every preparation to receive us, having armed the defences with nearly a hundred pieces of cannon and jinjals, and with a garrison of at least ten thousand men. The attempt to assault on this side would, I am convinced, from the steady way the Burmese defend their works, have cost us half our force."

Our casualties in the land force were at first reported to be nearly two hundred. They were afterwards set down at three officers killed in action, and two by *coup de soleil*. Out of fourteen officers wounded, one, Captain Blundell, died. The total number of killed was reckoned at seventeen, and wounded at one hundred and thirty-two. The casualties in the fleet were about seventeen, out of which one of the "Fox's" men was

* South Gate.

accidentally drowned, and another of the "Tenasserim" was "blown away from an after pivot gun."

An indefatigable chronicler of the 12th of April wrote:—
"14th, *Wednesday*.—Our troops attacked the enemy at the Dagon pagoda; the contest was severe and bloody; several of our men were so badly wounded, that it was found necessary to amputate their limbs on the field of battle. The enemy fell in heaps, and we are in possession of Rangoon. . . . The Burmese fought like furies; the poor fellows had no alternative: their wives and children being held in security by their king for the fulfilment of their duty as fighting men."

It is impossible to give a correct estimate of the number of the enemy who fell at the capture of the pagoda, or during the previous operations. Say, out of 18,000 who were at first prepared to meet us, and 20,000 is the number generally supposed, only two hundred bodies were discovered, it does not follow that only that number fell.

It is the Burmese custom on the field to carry away, if possible, the dead and wounded. This is considered a sacred duty, and it is performed with every alacrity. A bamboo is quickly passed through the cloth encircling the loins, and the dead man is carried off. Should he be only wounded, more care and ceremony are used to take the sufferer to some place of refuge.—Our force consisted of European troops, 2,727, and Native, 3,040 = 5,767. According to one authority, the entire force engaged in this expedition consisted of 8,037 men of all arms; that is, reckoning, in addition to the foregoing, for five Queen's ships,* 808; six steamers of the Indian Navy, 952; seven Bengal Government steamers, and one gun-boat, 510. Some of these vessels, and a portion of the land force, did not come into action.

* Including three steamers. To the force were attached fourteen transports.

RETURN of Killed, Wounded, and Missing, at the attack and storming of Rangoon on the 11th, 12th, and 14th April 1852.

Corps or Department.	Killed.	Wounded.
Personal Staff	One officer.
General Staff	One officer.
Madras Engineers	Three officers, one N. C. officer.
Madras Sappers . .	Three rank and file .	Two officers, one sergt., eight rank and file.
ARTILLERY.		
Bengal Contingent .	One N. C. officer . .	Six N. C. officers.
Madras ditto. . .	ditto.	One N. C. officer, one Lascar, three Syce drivers.
INFANTRY.		
<i>1st or Bengal Brigade.</i>		
H. M.'s 18th Royal Irish.	One officer, one sergt., and two rank and file.	Three officers, one N. C. officer, one trumpeter, thirty-seven rank and file.
H. M. 80th Foot (one wing).	One N. C. officer . .	One officer, three N. C. officers, one trumpeter, twenty-one rank and file.
40th Regt. N. I. . .	One trumpeter, three rank and file.	Eleven rank and file.
<i>2nd or Madras Brigade.</i>		
H. M.'s 51st Regt.* of Foot.	One officer, one rank and file.	One officer, three N. C. officers, thirteen rank and file.
9th Regt. Mad. N. I. .	One rank and file . .	One officer.
35th Regt. Mad. N. I.	One officer, one N. C. officer, five rank and file.

* We were pleased to observe, while in England in 1862, a handsome monument erected in the noble old York Cathedral to the memory of the 51st officers and men who died or were killed during the Burmese war. In the middle of 1864 the news reached us in Burma that Capt. Glover, of the 51st L. I., had been killed in New Zealand, with his gallant Colonel (Booth) and other officers. Captain Glover (then Lieutenant) served at the capture of Rangoon.

Officers and Men.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
European officers	2	14	0
Native officers	0	0	0
Warrant and Non-Commissioned officers, rank and file, &c.	15	114	0
Lascars, Syce drivers, Syces, &c.	0	4	0
Total	17	132	0

Grand total of killed, wounded, and missing—149.

(Signed)

H. GODWIN, Lieutenant-General,
Commanding the Forces in Ava,
Arakan, and Tenasserim.

W. MAYHEW, Captain,
Assistant Adjutant-General of
the Forces.

OFFICERS KILLED AND WOUNDED.

No. Killed.	No. Wounded.	Corps or Department.	Killed.	Wounded.
1	0	H. M. 18 R. I.	Lt. R. Doran, 14 April.	
1	0	H. M. 51 Foot	Ensign A. N. Armstrong, 11 April.	
0	1	Personal Staff	Lieutenant W. J. Chads (slightly).
0	1	General Staff	Captain G. Allan (severely).
0	1	Eng. Depart.	2nd Lieutenant E. C. S. Williams (slightly).
0	1	ditto	2nd Lieutenant L. Donaldson (mor- tally), 12 April.
0	1	ditto	2nd Lieut. W. S. Trevor (severely).
0	1	Madras Sapp. and Miners	Captain J. W. Rundall (slightly).
0	1	ditto	Lieutenant B. Ford (slightly).
0	1	H. M. 18 R. I.	Lieut.-Col. C. J. Coote (severely).
0	1	ditto	Captain W. T. Bruce (slightly).
0	1	ditto	Lieutenant G. H. Elliott (slightly).
0	1	H. M. 80 Foot	Lieutenant J. L. W. Nunn (slightly).
0	1	H. M. 51 Foot	Captain W. Blundell (dangerously).
0	1	9th Mad. N. I.	Ensign G. F. C. B. Hawkes (slightly).
0	1	35th ditto	Lieutenant W. C. P. Haines (dan- gerously).
0	1	Commissioner Tenasserim . Provinces	Lieutenant-Col. A. Bogle (severely).

LIST OF ORDNANCE Captured at the WHITE HOUSE STOCKADE, on the 12th,
and at Rangoon on the 14th April 1852.

Description of Ordnance.		No.	Remarks.
Iron Guns	3-pdrs.	2	Captured at the "White House" Stockade, on the 12th April 1852.
Brass "	3 "	2	
Iron "	18 "	9	
" Carronades*	18 "	3	
" "	12 "	2	The whole of these are mounted on carriages.
" Guns	9 "	6	
" "	6 "	3	
" Carronades	6 "	1	
" Guns	3 "	11	
" "	2½ "	7	
" "	2 "	2	
" "	1½ "	11	
Brass "	6 "	5	
" "	4 "	3	
" "	3 "	13	
" "	2½ "	3	
" "	1½ "	9	
Total		92	
Iron Jinjals or Wall Pieces, on Wooden Carriages		82	

(Signed)

H. S. FOORD, Lieutenant-Colonel,

Shwé Dagon Pagoda,

Commanding Artillery serving in Burma.

Rangoon, 15th April 1852.

* Regarding carronades, we gained the following information while in Europe in 1862, having also visited the country of their Royal inventor:—"I caused a light gun, a 12-pounder" (writes the far-famed Patrick Miller, of Dalswinton) "to be cast at Carron." Eventually, "I caused a privateer to be fitted out at Liverpool, under the direction of a relative, who was a merchant there. She was a ship of two hundred tons burden, and carried sixteen light 18-pounder guns, which, from being cast at Carron, I directed to be named CARRONADES, —and these were the first carronades put aboard a ship. This ship I named the 'Spitfire.' Gustavus Adolphus may be said to have been the inventor of the carronades. Having always thought so, I directed the following inscription to be engraved upon a brass 32-pounder carronade:—

'Quantum momenti sit in levibus tormentis, monstravit
Gustavus magnus qui coriaceis usus est.'"

A pamphlet exists, printed by Miller in 1779, giving a full account of the carronade, which he would appear to have invented ten years before.

CHAPTER V.

CAPTURE OF BASSEIN.—BURMESE ATTACK ON MARTABAN.

THE capture of Bassein, on Wednesday, the 19th of May, brought about by an attack, ably planned, well timed, and bravely executed, formed one of the most brilliant achievements recorded in this narrative.* Bassein, it appears, was once a valuable port, under the Portuguese power; and this position was declared by Sir Archibald Campbell to be the key of the Burmese Empire. In the last war the gallant Sale occupied Bassein, with a considerable force; but neither the force nor the station rendered much service to the army. This, of course, was occasioned by circumstances over which the British commander had no control; for Bassein really is an important position. With Prome and Donabew it forms a right-angled triangle, of which Prome and Bassein constitute the hypothenuse. It may be some eighty-five or ninety miles nearly direct west from Rangoon. Its chief advantage consists in

commanding one of the three great navigable branches of the Irawady.

On the 17th of May, General Godwin proceeded with a detachment of 800 men, some 400 European and 300 Native Infantry, 60 Sappers, and a party of Marines, to take possession of Bassein. To reach this port they were forced to make for Negrais's island, and ascend the Bassein river—"the Rangoon river not being yet quite navigable upwards by the steamers"; or rather, being navigable for boats only, by the way of Bassein Creek. The squadron consisted of the "Sesostris," the "Moozuffer," the "Tenasserim," and the little steamer "Pluto," all under the command of Commodore Lambert.

Bassein, about sixty miles above Negrais, was reached on the afternoon of the 19th. The "Pluto," in advance, had intercepted a boat, filled with Burmese, on its way to give warning of our approach. Nothing could be got out of the crew save—"that it did not much matter whether news reached the Governor of Bassein or not, that a force was coming up against him, as everything was in a perfect state of readiness up there to blow us out of the water."

A good authority wrote :—"By four o'clock in the afternoon of the 19th of May the steamers were ranged opposite the fortifications of Bassein, having accomplished a voyage of sixty miles, without a pilot, up an unknown river, lined with stockades, without an accident, and without a shot having been fired. The Governor-General, in his Notification, thanking General Godwin and his force for their achievements, alludes to this circumstance as heightening in no small degree the difficulty, and therefore the *credit* of the exploit." We agree with the writer in considering that, in the capture of Bassein, General Godwin displayed some of the best qualities of an English general.

There is discrimination in the following remarks by another able authority :—

"We read of no errors, the results of misinformation, of no

losses proceeding from rash or ill-digested movements. The work marked out could hardly have been executed with greater despatch ; nor could the resistance of the enemy, strongly posted, confident and determined, have been subdued and overcome with less loss. It is pleasing to have to record a success, alloyed by no imprudence, unaccompanied by a numerous list of casualties, resulting either from blundering ignorance, or rash, ill-considered and unnecessary attacks."

The conduct of all the troops employed, particularly H. M.'s 51st, was truly admirable on this occasion.

There is something magnificently cool, too, about the gallant Captain Latter—parleying with the Burmese behind their own works, to the effect that if they would not fire at us, we would not fire on them. The reply of the enemy was, that if our force advanced one step further they would fire on us. Captain Latter rejoined, that in that case we would turn them out root and branch. At the same time a heavy discharge of musketry and jinjals and round shot was poured into us.*

Our troops then commenced work in right earnest. The non-commissioned officer accompanying Captain Latter was killed, and fell over that officer, who lay prostrate and stunned from the effects of a spent shot ; every one supposed him to have been killed. But, no !—he bore a charmed life ; and more glory was in store for him.

The noble Captain, in relating to us the story of this dangerous adventure, did not think the projectile fired at him was "a round shot."* He considered himself, however, to have had a very narrow escape ; and who will deny that he had ?

"The whole affair," wrote a describer of the scene, "occupied fifty minutes, and a gallant one it was ; 5,000 of the King of Ava's picked soldiers were there, and 2,000 men of Bassein." Of course, an Armenian, or European, was, as usual, seen on the works directing the Artillery. "The loss of the enemy was

* Despatch of Major Errington.

calculated at 800 ; the gunnery from the ships was terrific and most effectual." Considering our small numbers, the loss on the side of the British was not trifling.

The following officers were wounded:—Major Errington, Captains Darroch and Rice, and Lieutenant Carter—all of H. M.'s 51st Foot ; also, Lieutenant Ansley, of the 9th Madras Native Infantry, and Lieutenant Rice, R.N.

The grand total of guns and jinjals captured amounted to eighty-one. Immediately after the conquest, the Burmese evacuated the town ;—and thus Bassein fell !

The event is thus recorded in the Governor-General's Notification, and General Godwin's Despatch. From the latter all the important details concerning the capture of Bassein may be culled :—

“ NOTIFICATION.

“ Fort William, Foreign Department, 5th June 1852.

“ The Governor-General in Council has the gratification of announcing the capture of Bassein, and of publishing, for general information, the Despatches which report the combined operations of the Naval and Military Force by which this service has been executed.

“ In ascending for sixty miles a river still very imperfectly known, in effecting the landing of the troops and capturing the city, the fort, and the stockaded defences on both sides of the river, fully garrisoned and armed, and in accomplishing all this with very unequal numbers, and within the limits of a single day, the combined forces at Bassein performed a gallant and spirited service, which well deserves the approbation and applause of the Government of India. •

“ To Lieutenant-General Godwin, C.B., and to Commodore Lambert, the Governor-General in Council has again the satisfaction of offering his cordial acknowledgments of the ability and good-will with which they have united their exertions for ensuring success to the operations in which they were engaged.

"The Governor-General in Council begs to repeat his thanks to Major Boulderson, Deputy-Judge-Advocate General, to Captain Latter, to Captain Chads, A.D.C., and to Lieutenant Ford, of the Madras Sappers, for their conduct in the field on this occasion.

"His Lordship in Council desires especially to mark his sense of the services rendered by Major Errington, H. M.'s 51st Light Infantry, commanding the detachment of troops at Bassein, and to Commander Campbell, of the Indian Navy, by whom the stockade upon the right bank of the river was stormed and taken.

"To Captain Rice, Captain Darroch, and Lieutenant Carter, of H. M.'s 51st Light Infantry, to Lieutenant Ansley, 9th Madras Native Infantry, to Lieutenant Craster, Bengal Engineers, and to Dr. McCosh, of the Medical Department, the Governor-General in Council begs leave to convey his best thanks.

"Equal acknowledgments are due to Lieutenant Rice, R.N., to Lieutenant Elliot and Lieutenant Nightingale, R.M., to Commander Hewett, to Lieutenant Robinson and Lieutenant Lewis, Indian Navy, and to Captain Dicey, Captain Burbank and Mr. F. Duncan, of the Bengal Marine, whose services have been commended.

"The Governor-General in Council has particular satisfaction in adding the expression of his entire approbation of the gallantry and good conduct of the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of H. M.'s 51st Regiment, of 9th Regiment Madras Native Infantry, of the Madras Sappers and Miners, and of the seamen and marines employed in the capture of the City of Bassein.

"By order of the Most Noble the Governor-General of India in Council.

"C. ALLEN,

"Officiating Secretary to the Government
of India."

From Lieutenant-General H. GODWIN, C.B., Commanding the Forces in Ava, Arakan and Tenasserim Provinces.

"SIR,—The Governor-General having expressed some anxiety about the south part of Arakan, as being in the neighbourhood of Bassein, I resolved, as soon as I could conveniently leave Rangoon, to take a detachment, and personally visit the place. On expressing this opinion to Commodore Lambert, he, to my very great pleasure, said he would accompany me. I fixed on Monday the 17th of May, and had a detachment warned to be ready to embark on that morning, consisting of 400 of the 51st K. O. L. I., 300 of the 9th Madras Native Infantry, 67 Madras Sappers, and a sergeant and 6 gunners of the Bengal Artillery. The whole party was placed under the command of Major Errington of the 51st Light Infantry.

"The Commodore appointed three fine vessels to carry the troops—the H. C. S. F. 'Sesostris' and 'Moozuffer,' and the 'Tenasserim,' with a smaller steamer, the 'Pluto,' carrying the Naval Brigade and Marines of H. M.'s frigate 'Fox.'

"We cleared the Rangoon river on the afternoon of Monday the 17th, and on the next evening anchored off Negrais Island, leading into the Bassein river. At daybreak the next morning the flotilla weighed and we ascended that most beautiful stream for sixty miles, which at 4 o'clock brought us in view of the defences, of about a mile long, of the City of Bassein. We had passed some new stockades, one at and the other south of Naputa, a few miles below the town, which were not armed, but these consisted of one extensive stockade, with several hundred men in it, fully armed with cannon.

"The enemy looked at us, but did not show any disposition to molest. The flotilla arrived at the left of their position, a strong well-built mud fort, armed with cannon and men. This we passed within two hundred yards, and so in succession all their defences for nearly a mile, till the 'Tenasserim,' with the Commodore and myself on board, anchored opposite a

golden pagoda, centrally situated within the defences. The steamers anchored in succession without bringing down the fire of a single musket.

"The admirable position taken up by the steamers induced me to order the immediate landing of the troops. The enemy appeared so completely surprised and paralyzed by our approach, that I gave orders not to fire unless fired on, and to take possession of the pagoda. Nearly all the men of H. M.'s 51st Foot got on shore under the pagoda before a shot was fired. Captain Latter, my interpreter, accompanied Captain Darroch with a company of the 51st on shore, and landed on the extreme right of the works, opposite a traverse covering a gateway, and there a parley was held between Captain Latter and some Burmese on the walls, which brought on the first discharge of musketry, killing a sergeant and wounding two men. This fire was taken up and ran down the works, but soon ceased.

"At this time Major Errington made his advance on the pagoda and carried it in most gallant style, the 51st Light Infantry maintaining nobly the character they had ever commanded by their courage and distinguished conduct in the field.

"The contest that stamped the operations of this remarkable day with a brilliant conclusion, was the attack on the mud fort, most scientifically built, and of great extent, which could only have been constructed under a despotism that commanded the labour of its subjects, in the short time they had been about it. It was not entirely completed in its details within. The storming party under Major Errington proceeding to the left of the Burmese works, accompanied by Lieutenant Rice, of H. M.'s frigate 'Fox,' and Lieutenant Ford of the Madras Sappers, came upon this mud fort fully garrisoned and well armed. The attack was most determined, as was the defence obstinate. It was bravely stormed, but with the consequence of Major Errington and several officers and men being severely wounded; Lieutenant Ansley, with a small detachment of the

9th Madras Native Infantry shared in this contest, he was severely wounded, and the corps proved itself to be as good as it looks, and it is one of the nicest* corps I have ever seen; its gallantry and devotion on this occasion claiming the admiration of all who witnessed it. The whole affair was over a little after 6 o'clock.

"While these operations had been going on, the Commodore had claimed the services of Captain Campbell, of the 'Sesostris,' and his men, in destroying a stockade on the opposite bank of the river. They drove off the Burmese, fired the stockade, and took six guns.

"I am informed from several sources that the enemy suffered very severely in the contest in the mud fort.

"In having the honour, as well as the gratification of reporting to the Governor-General in Council the possession of this important station, I will observe that, from every indication of preparations going on, the Government of this country intended to make it a most powerful place and to repair the loss of Rangoon by establishing Bassein as their mart of communication with this country, as well as a powerful position to keep in subjection the Pegu population, so decidedly and ever our friends, and also to maintain a threatening attitude towards the south of Arakan.

"By leaving Bassein to itself, I should have been giving it back to the soldiery just driven out, as the defences had been built and put into the improved state I have described, by five thousand men from the Upper Country, commanded by a man of reputation. To secure it I have left a garrison of two companies (160 men) of the 51st Light Infantry, and 300 men of the Madras Native Infantry. These will be reinforced by an officer of artillery and half a company with two 9-pounder guns—the garrison now possessing two 12-inch howitzers.

* It will be seen from this curious expression, and the despatch generally, that our gallant and amiable Commander was not a master in the art of despatch-writing.

These, with two months' rations, will leave this on or about the 26th instant. Major Roberts, of the 9th Madras Native Infantry, will proceed in the same vessel to take command of Bassein; he is an experienced and excellent officer.

"I consider that in a few weeks the Burmese soldiery of the Upper Country will have returned to their homes, meeting with no sympathy from the Pegu population, and the Pegu soldiers themselves are already with their families, so that the garrison I have left could, in a military point of view, be withdrawn in six weeks; and it will then remain with the Government of India to decide whether it will hold during the war this very important place. If so, further arrangements will be very necessary. Major Fraser, the Commanding Engineer, should visit it. A very little expense will make it a sure position. The barrack houses the soldiery are now in are excellent, and well built of wood. Fresh meat can be had, as the population of the place are coming under our protection in great numbers.

"I may here remark, that that most admirable officer, and clear-seeing man, my most respected late Commander Sir A. Campbell, attached great importance to the holding of Bassein.

"After passing two clear days in arranging for the stability of the detachment to be left here, on the morning of the 22nd, the flotilla, with the exception of the 'Sesostris,' which remains, weighed at daybreak, and reached Rangoon on the 23rd of May, after an absence of only seven days.

"To Commodore Lambert, and to this combined expedition, the Governor-General in Council owes all that professional ability and unremitting exertion could accomplish towards success to which they so largely contributed. The Hon. Company's steamer 'Proserpine,' Commander Brooking, arrived twenty-four hours after the place was taken, but even so his activity was not lost, for he and his vessel went off the morning before we weighed and destroyed the stockade that I have mentioned to have passed on the way up to the river.

"Major Errington, of H. M.'s 51st Light Infantry, who

commanded the detachment of troops embarked for Bassein, who principally directed this detachment, and who fought this detachment, deserves the particular thanks of the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council. I have great pleasure in forwarding his report of the operations, for the perusal of his Lordship in Council.

"I beg the best consideration of Government for Captain Rice and Lieutenant Carter, of the 51st Light Infantry, and for Lieutenant Ansley, of the 9th Madras Native Infantry, all three severely wounded at the assault of the fort, and also for Lieutenant Ford; of the Sappers and Miners, on the same occasion, for Lieutenant Rice, 1st of H. M.'s frigate 'Fox,' who commanded the Naval Brigade, and who was severely wounded whilst particularly distinguishing himself in the attack of the fort.

"It has been brought to my notice that Mr. Duncan, the 2nd officer of the Hon. Company's steamer 'Tenasserim,' at the head of a party of men of his ship, behaved most gallantly upon the same occasion.

"To Captain Darroch, of the 51st Light Infantry, and to Captain Latter, my interpreter, thanks are due for their gallantry in forcing the traverse, and entering at the gate on the right of the enemy's position. Lieutenant Craster, of the Bengal Engineers, also merits thanks; and the plan of Bassein, which I enclose for the Governor-General's inspection, will prove his professional competency. To Lieutenants Elliot and Nightingale, with the Marines of H. M.'s frigate 'Fox,' and to Captain Campbell, of the Hon. Company's steam frigate 'Sesostris,' I beg your Lordship in Council's kind consideration. To Doctor McCosh and the officers of the Medical Department, thanks are particularly due.

"The naval part of the expedition, both sailors and marines, supported the character that has ever been theirs of undaunted courage.

"I have been considered wanting sometimes, in not more particularly naming corps or individuals, but in this peculiar

warfare of constant assaults on well armed and strong positions, often well defended, it has been the noble emulation of all to be first into the enemy's works. It was in such an effort of ambition that that fine and gallant young officer, Lieutenant Doran, of the 18th Royal Irish, fell pierced with four balls, far in advance of his proper post; indeed, I might fill my report with names, were all to be individualised.

"I now beg particularly to bring to the notice of the Governor-General in Council, Major Boulderson, of the Madras Army, the Deputy Judge-Advocate-General of the Force, who, on this occasion accompanied me and filled the two posts of Assistant-Adjutant and Assistant-Quartermaster-General to the expedition, as I could not move from their important duties at Rangoon Adjutant-General Mayhew nor Quartermaster-General Allan.

"The Major has been of much essential service to me in various ways; and the judicious manner in which he posted the picquets after the capture of Bassein, in that wilderness of houses and jungle, tended to the perfect security of the force. Captain Chads, my Aide-de-camp, never leaves me, and always makes himself particularly useful.

"Since my last report, nothing worthy of note has occurred at Rangoon. The town is increasing in importance by crowds of natives who daily come in with their families and goods; as is the case throughout the neighbourhood, but especially at Kemmendine, which is as large a place as Rangoon.

"The conduct of the troops is excellent, and their health is improving daily since the rain has set in.

"I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) "H. GODWIN, Lieutenant-General,

"Commanding the forces in Ava,
Arakan and Tenasserim Provinces.

"Head-Quarters, Rangoon, 24th May 1852.

"To CHARLES ALLEN, Esq.

"Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign
Department, Fort William.

On Monday, May 24th, the General returned from Bassein. The town of Pegu was said to be occupied by a Burmese chief, who had been victorious over the Peguese. In the morning there was a grand parade round the Shwé Dagon Pagoda, with all the customary honours, to celebrate her Majesty's birthday. The effect was very grand and impressive.

It was supposed that the unfortunate ex-Governor of Rangoon, who on a recent occasion was so nearly caught by Colonel Apthorp, had at length been captured and sent in chains to Ava. He was the same Mightiness who, at the commencement of operations, had put the Line-Myoothoon-Gee in irons for failing to re-capture the King's ship. What an example of the bitter bit!—Lieutenant Tayler, with a detachment of Artillery and two guns, proceeded to Bassein. Major Roberts, with the remainder of his regiment, likewise went to take command of the new position.—Such were a few of the small and great events which followed the capture.

On May 31st, intelligence arrived of an

Attack on Martaban.

At 6 o'clock on Wednesday morning (26th), a Burmese advanced force, consisting of about 600 men; under Moungh-Bwosh, the Governor of Martaban, marched over the hill from the western side, and made a sudden and unexpected rush upon the picquets guarding the heights. The alarm now being given, the troops were under arms and at their guns. Major Hall ordered the picquets at the northern pagoda into camp, and subsequently sent a strong party of sepoys, under the command of Lieutenant Holmes, to reconnoitre, under cover of the artillery guns. The Burmese, however, advanced; a party of about 1,000 kept near the small white pagoda below the hill; another of about 2,000 lay a mile away in reserve, while a smaller force kept up a smart fire on the troops at the distance

of about 150 yards north of the camp. The party under Lieutenant Holmes was placed in a very perilous situation; but that officer succeeded in returning to camp with, however, serious loss in three killed and eleven wounded, of whom eight were dangerously so, a subadar of the 40th Native Infantry being of the number of the latter. The Artillery now played with the most deadly effect, and the report of heavy guns at Martaban caused the alarm to be sounded in cantonments at Maulmain. The two companies of H. M.'s 51st Light Infantry and 26th Native Infantry got under arms; the former were marched off at once, embarked in boats, and proceeded to Martaban. The "Feroze," from her position opposite the office of Messrs. Graceman and Co., a distance of some two or three miles from the white pagoda on the hill, sent discharges of artillery which made the Burmese seek a more distant point of protection, and defaced the beauty of their pagoda. The strength of the Burmese was now seriously weakened, and the reserved forces obliged to be brought up to the rescue. These were also reduced in number, for the attack being in open day, and not as hitherto at night, their position and numbers were ascertained and dealt with accordingly. A body of men entrenched themselves behind a small white pagoda, near their former storehouse or magazine, and hoisted a flag on it, which, being observed by Lieutenants Steuart and Baird, became a mark at once. The flag on the first shot was sent down in tatters, the summit of the pagoda keeping it company. The Burmese now found themselves uncomfortably situated here, the guns being fired in this direction until the glacis of the hill was cleared. From this time until late in the evening shots were fired at intervals to clear the place of stragglers.

Commodore Lynch, on delivering his instructions to his second in command, manned his three cutters, and proceeded up the Salween to intercept the flight of the Burmese. He found them scattered at the third pagoda, now repairing, north

of the camp, and ordered his boats to open fire upon them with shell and canister, which made them retire. The Infantry met them in their flight, and opened a raking fire upon them. Captain Tapley, on the other hand, with his own cutter, and one from the "Medusa," manned by marines from the "Feroze," went in a south-westerly direction, but failed to meet the enemy. The boats returned on the same evening, and proceeded up again yesterday morning.

The Burmese force was commanded by the notorious Dacoit chief and robber Moungh Shoay-loang, who had been sent from Ava to retake Martaban, or forfeit his head in case of failure. Wednesday last was, according to the guardian angels of Moungh Shoay-loang, considered the lucky day for the exploit; but with what success has now been seen.

Burmese Games.

A few words about the games among Talaings and Burmese may now be interesting. The principal are cock-fighting, wrestling, buffalo-fighting, foot-ball, and boat-racing. They have likewise a sort of dice to aid their gambling propensities. At the buffalo-fights men sit on the beasts; these last rush at each other with tremendous fury. Frequently the horns become locked together, when a trial of strength ensues, each pushing his adversary as far back as possible. The buffaloes, after a short contest, generally become tired of the sport, and not unfrequently scamper away at a furious rate from their tormentors. The buffalo is seldom killed; but the rider is often thrown. The game is every bit as *rational* as the bull-fights so extensively patronised by the ladies of Spain, and to the Burmese ladies it is certainly quite as exciting. Football is played with a small ball of wicker-work—very light, of course. The players form a circle, and keep up the ball with remarkable skill: with knee or foot they send it flying in every direction, as if they were perfect masters in the

law of projectiles.* In boat-racing the Burmese shine considerably. Boats very long and very narrow, with some twenty rowers on a side, and paddled along at an incredible speed. Singing and a variety of gestures aid the effect of this exciting amusement. The Burmese posture of defiance is common in the pleasure as well as in the war boats. The latter are generally ornamented, and armed with some thirty men or so, carrying questionable muskets, but sharp dhás. A national game, of minor importance, is a sort of draughts. The players commence by drawing squares on the ground, and seated occasionally in a state of profound abstraction before a move, they play away with a gravity worthy of the great Gautama himself. The Burmese enjoy a game at cards quite as much as the old ladies of England. They are fond of music and very superstitious: many of them believe in fairies. The instrument of sound used is a sort of *harmonicon*, which discourses most eloquent music either to the adventurer on his rambles, or to the Burmese beauty as she sits, like many of those in our country, pensive and alone. Men and women, in every clime, are both poets and musicians by nature. In the melody or modulation of sound there is a wonderful power, which, "partly from nature, partly from habit and association, makes such pathetic impressions on the fancy, as delights even the most wild barbarians." The Burmese are likewise fond of dancing, when they frequently display their skill in the dress of devils. What the sensation drama is to the British public, the *Pooay* is to the Burman.

We shall conclude this chapter with the description† of a Burmese funeral.

* While revising this narrative (September 1879) the writer has just learned that English foot-ball has now become common among the Burmese. They use the leather cover, with bladder inside, and affect Rugby to a considerable extent! Lately, we understand, the Burmese beat the gallant 54th at foot-ball.

† From notes furnished us by Lieutenant Cadell, of the Bengal Artillery. This description is of the most humble Burmese funeral. In general, the last

Returning from Kemmendine in the evening, we saw a Burmese funeral-procession following the remains of an old woman. Women and children attended as well as men, and three priests brought up the rear. The corpse is placed in a coffin made of matting, and is carried by four men. Old women were howling in a most disconsolate manner. On reaching the burial-ground the poongis (or phongyees) came forward, and took up their position on a raised platform at the head of the grave. Before the priests were placed three large dishes of plantains, and dried fish. Pieces of wood were put across the grave, and the coffin rested on them. The men then kneeled round the priests, and the women and children formed an outer semi-circle. A poongi then repeated a few prayers, to which the men responded. Then a long prayer was said, and, while the priest was speaking, a man was pouring water slowly on the ground from a small earthenware vessel. This finished the ceremony, and the poongis, having had their provisions carefully collected, departed. The corpse was then taken from the coffin and buried. Buddhists, it must be remembered, *bury* as well as burn. Pouring the water from the earthen vessel is to signify the spirit departing from the body.

rites, even where no sign of great wealth is observable, are performed with extravagant splendour. The bier of the deceased, raised on high, and enclosed in the model of a Buddhist temple, borne along on the shoulders of some dozens of bearers, the glaring red and gilt and silvery ornaments of the grotesque machine, to which a grace is given by the white flags and umbrellas attached to it; the long train of followers, chiefly women, in rear, and poongis in front. Such is a faint outline of the richer Burmese funeral .

CHAPTER VI.

PEGU.—PROME.—THE GRAND QUESTION.—LORD DALHOUSIE
AT RANGOON.

DURING the first fortnight of May, the Peguese had risen in considerable strength against the Burmese, and had turned them out of their towns and villages. At the end of the same month we found the case reversed; and the town of Pegu again in the hands of a Burmese chieftain. Regarding the Peguese already in the light of allies, it was natural to expect that an expedition from our Force would shortly pay their ancient capital a visit. Pegu was reduced by Alompra, after his conquest of Burma's rival kingdom, to a state of comparative ruin and desolation.

The conqueror spared the temples, among others the magnificent *Shwé-madoo Praw*, or Temple of the Golden Supreme.*

Conciliation was attempted. But every endeavour to conciliate the Peguese by Burmese strategy signally failed. What

* See "Rangoon," Appendix No. IX. p. 276. The extreme height of this building, above the level of the country, is three hundred and sixty-one feet, or about forty feet higher than the Great Shwé Dagon.

they sought for was—either independence, or a good system of government by the people of a nation wiser and more civilised than themselves. With the former, in its strict sense, every half-civilised people must now go back in the scale; with the latter they must advance, and add their portion of lustre to the triumphant light which shall, sooner or later, dwell upon earth.

The town of Pegu is situated some seventy-five miles nearly north from Rangoon, to which it is far inferior as a commercial position. On the 2nd of June an expedition was ready to start for Pegu. The party consisted of two companies of H. M.'s 80th, and two companies of the 67th Bengal Native Infantry, the whole under Colonel Sturt, of the latter corps. As many as could be stowed were placed on board the "Phlegethon"; the remainder were put in country boats, to be towed. But it was soon discovered that the boats were not seaworthy. The troops could not proceed to Pegu that day; so all were marched back to quarters. On the following morning the expedition, considerably reduced in size, made a successful start. It now consisted of one company of H. M.'s 80th Foot,* the rifle company of the 67th Bengal Native Infantry, under Captain Hicks, and a detachment of Madras Sappers and Miners, under Lieutenant Macintosh, with Lieutenant Mayne as Field Engineer; the whole commanded by Brevet-Major Cotton, of the 67th Regiment. This force was accompanied by a small party of the marines and sailors from the "Fox," "Phlegethon," and "Medusa," under the command of Captain Niblett, of the "Phlegethon," and Commander Tarleton, of H.M.S. "Fox." All embarked on board the "Phlegethon" steamer, which took in tow the boats of the squadron.

Of course our "Chevalier Bayard,"† Captain Latter, accompanied the expedition. By nightfall the steamer had reached

* We believe commanded by Captain Ormsby.

† Sans peur et sans reproche.

within sixteen miles of Pegu, where she anchored. From the narrowness and shallowness of the river it was not considered safe to proceed farther. The only thing worth observing that took place on the passage was that several large villages, as the expedition came in view, assembled all their inhabitants on the banks of the river, and cheered and raised their hands towards Pegu! "Let the British standard be planted on the walls of Pegu!"

On anchoring for the night, information was brought off that a party of Peguese, on the right bank of the stream, under a chief named *Moungtah*, had risen and defeated, the day before, a detachment of the Burmese garrison, and that they had proceeded along the bank of the river, intending to co-operate with *us* in the attack on Pegu.

The allies were to be distinguished by wearing a small white flag in the cap.

Next morning the whole party took to the boats, and proceeded leisurely up to Pegu, a short distance from which *Moungtah* and his Peguese band made their appearance. These were directed, in case of accident, during our operations, to keep at a distance till required. However, as heavy firing was heard on the right bank of the river, between the Peguese and the Burmese, the troops immediately landed. A few of the enemy only were to be seen, retreating as fast as they could. The boats and naval party, under Commander Tarleton, were directed to proceed farther up the river, to cut off the retreat of the enemy who might attempt to pass across. However, seeing a party of the enemy on the left bank, on which the town of Pegu is situated, Commander Tarleton landed the whole of his party, except the boat-keepers, and proceeded to disperse them. Having advanced some distance, a body of Burmese, seeing the unguarded state of the boats, pounced upon them, and took possession. Fortunately the Burmese were more anxious to plunder than to destroy the boats.

As Commander Tarleton and his party were returning to their boats they were fired upon from jungle growing upon old and ruined walls. The little party gallantly turned to the assault, and entered the work by a large gap or gateway, which was not fortified. There were not more than forty shots fired by the enemy, who fled before the steady fire of the naval force with the utmost precipitation. Seven Burmese only were shot down. It was on entering this gap that a correct view of the future scene of operations was obtained. Within these ruined walls was an open area of about four miles in length; nearly in the centre a lofty pagoda, with much jungle at its base. The enemy also appeared in considerably larger force than was expected. Commander Tarleton, accordingly, prudently determined to hold the gap, and to send notice to the troops under Major Cotton, on the opposite bank. These were on their return, having heard that the boats were in the possession of the enemy. In the meantime Commander Tarleton likewise heard of the same circumstance; and that gallant officer immediately returned with his men to the scene of disembarkation. Thus, the sailors coming down on the one bank and the soldiers on the other, the boats were immediately recaptured with the loss of two riflemen wounded.

It being now about 10 o'clock A.M., the sun was very powerful; and the men having passed over a large extent of ground, Major Cotton prudently determined on postponing the attack on the pagoda till 3 P.M. By that time the men would have rested, and enjoyed their rations. The gallant Major took up an admirable position with the Rifles in front inside the ruined walls, sheltered by the jungle covering them, and commanding a clear view of any movements from the pagoda. The European portion of the force put up in the few huts that remained about one hundred yards in the rear on the bank of the river; the sailors occupied the boats. About 1 P.M., however, the enemy, apparently emboldened by what seemed to be inactivity, and perhaps by the *loot* (spoil) from the boats, which had been taken

to the pagoda, were seen coming down about fourteen hundred strong, in something like order, commanded by some thirty chiefs, on ponies. Another account said, there were one thousand two hundred men, some mounted, and carrying umbrellas over their chiefs, besides which there were regular horsemen, who, while they rode, sung a kind of vaunting song. The alarm being sounded, the Rifles immediately rushed out, and held the enemy in check. On the native troops being joined by the European soldiers and sailors the enemy immediately fled; and so precipitate was their retreat, that not a single Burman was touched even by the long shots of the rifles. The advance of our small and gallant party was now so rapid that they seemed as if by magic, in one instant, to rush up the west and south faces of the pagoda, killing a few of the enemy, and suffering no loss whatever themselves.

A stronger party, under Mr. Midshipman L——, was now left in the boats; and Captain Latter was directed to remain for their further safety with the Peguese on the banks. The next day was spent in destroying the granaries, and carrying off nine guns; and, on the following morning, the whole party returned to the steamer. The entire loss of the British on this occasion was one European sailor killed, and two wounded, in the occupation of the boats by the enemy. One sailor was wounded in the assault on the gap, under Commander Tarleton; and two riflemen were wounded on our recapture of the boats. The loss of the Burmese could scarcely be estimated, from the best information, at more than one score.

Thus was the old town of Pegu captured. It was not occupied by the British, but made over to the Talaings—a political step on which it was rather difficult to form an opinion, after an earnest request from the Peguese for the expulsion of their oppressors.* It was thought, however, they would defend

* The following was published about the middle of June:—"The British troops stormed the pagoda at Pegu, after some heavy skirmishing on the 4th,

their own persons, if they could not keep their towns, till Pegu came forth in greater beauty than ever, under an enlightened rule. The month of June in this narrative was also distinguished by the achievements of the Hon.^d Company's gallant little steamer "Proserpine," under Captain Brooking, in the Irawady. She was sent up the river, and made good her way, before the middle of the month, without serious opposition, to where the Irawady divides itself, like the two prongs of a fork; or, say eighty miles below Prome. All that portion of the river below this point was thus surveyed. At the point where the Irawady divides into two streams, and above which there is no other outlet, to the sea, we may be said to command the navigation of the great river. Captain Brooking, with the "Proserpine," succeeded immediately after in exploring the Irawady to within thirty miles of Prome, having thus penetrated into the very heart of the enemy's country, and, with the assistance of two well-armed boats of H.M.S. "Fox," having captured and destroyed eighty boats of grain, of thirty tons each. The rice in these boats was destined for the Burmese army assembling at Prome, and its loss at such a crisis was, of course, severely felt. An intelligent writer remarked:—"It was a proud thing to reflect upon this little English vessel alone, in the midst of enemies and of an enemy's country, performing its duties as unconcernedly as if it was on the Thames, and taking and destroying the Burmese Commissariat in their very teeth."

The "Proserpine," on her voyage, did not escape being fired

with a loss of one seaman killed; three seamen, two sepoy, and one camp-follower wounded. The force, after destroying the fortifications, returned to Rangoon on the 5th. Everything quiet round Bassein. The enemy had left the neighbourhood, and the inhabitants were coming in numbers to seek protection under our rule. The troops were all very healthy. Soon after our troops left the old town of Pegu, the Burmese came down in a body of three thousand or four thousand strong, and drove out the Peguese."

on; and, about the end of the month, intelligence reached us at Rangoon of a brilliant little affair against a stockade, which she silenced and destroyed, after expending all her ammunition. This position was, most probably, held by a strong band of dacoits, who roam like firebrands through the country, ready to espouse any successful side, but, until opportunity turns up, destroying everything that comes in their way. Similar lawless vagabonds infest the Nizam's dominions in the Deccan. But "Jolly June" had its peaceful as well as its warlike triumphs; the former, of course, at Rangoon. An elegant theatre was being erected for the entertainment of officers and men; and the Rev. Mr. Burney's reading and lecture room was very well attended. This excellent chaplain arrived from Calcutta early in May; and his frequent visits to the hospitals, combined with his admirable expositions of pious and homely truths to the men on a Sunday, effected immense good. His idea of getting up instructive lectures for the men, to be delivered once or twice on the week days, was a good one.* Large audiences of British soldiers were enlightened with a graphic sketch of the rise of European traffic in Burma to its decline, with various information regarding the country. They were likewise, we believe, favoured by Mr. Kincaid—before alluded to—with a lecture on Buddha, which one would imagine to have been rather above their comprehension. When the author of this work was at home on furlough a well-educated man took him into a corner one evening, and said, with a solemn face,—“Now tell me, what does Buddha mean? Who *was* Buddha?” A very natural question, and one of so puzzling a character, that we were obliged to leave it to such men as Colonel Sykes and Professor Wilson to fairly answer.

* In September 1864 Royal Artillery lectures and public readings for the Europeans were established at Rangoon. But these were got up under far more advantageous circumstances than in 1852, the year of the first lecture to British soldiers in Pegu.

Yes, with all their erudition and vast research, notwithstanding the immortal labours of Sir W. Jones, Vans Kennedy, Coleman, Colebrooke, Remusat, Manupied, and a host of others, men will be inquiring, in a generation yet to come,—Who *was* Buddha? *

Mr. Kincaid, on his return from Maulmain, recovered but a very small portion of his valuable books lost in the "Flight." Lexicons and dictionaries, letters and manuscripts, were nowhere to be found. This zealous missionary appeared to be a man of no ordinary stamp, judging by all we had heard of him from officers of the Force and others. Having resided some twenty years in Burma, he had amassed a vast quantity of information concerning the people and the country. His work of proselytism had been wonderfully successful. He twice visited the city of Ava; and on one or more occasions experienced ill-treatment. If the truth were known, we dare say this American missionary had really been, like many before him, and St. Paul his great exemplar, "in perils by the heathen, in perils in the city, in perils in the wilderness, in perils among false brethren." Thinking seriously on the matter, there is something to greatly admire in those devoted men and women who labour in a distant land, consecrating their whole lives to an obedience to the Divine mandate, published by the Great Captain of our Salvation—"Go and preach the Gospel to every creature!" There can be little doubt that the missionaries stand forth as the pioneers of civilisation in Burma. Regarding the missionary enterprise in a political point of view, two things are requisite, above all others, MODERATION AND PATIENCE! With these the grand cause must flourish—without them there can

* How true it is, that the very errors of the human mind form a part of its history! In China there are three systems of philosophic or religious belief—*Yu*, the doctrine of Confucius; *Fo*, or Buddhism; and the sect of *Taou*, or Rationalists. Buddhism, "the fairest branch of the religion of India," called also Samaneism, deserves the attentive study of every thinking man. For remarks on Gautama and Buddhism, see "Rangoon," chap. x. p. 129.

be no satisfactory result. And, musing carefully over the respective creeds of Brahmanism and Buddhism, very many may be apt to believe that the latter presents the easier field for missionary labour; and, consequently, the chance of success must be greater. On the plain Deism of the Karens, also, we know that missionaries do not find it difficult to engraft the valuable truths of Christianity; whereas, in the dark religion of Brahmanical polytheism, the difficulties are legion, and terribly disheartening to the Christian philanthropist.

Mr. Burney's father was the well-known Resident at the Court of Ava, Colonel Burney, who, when the Burmese Government would have a Resident no longer, was yet requested by the King to stay as a friend.

Captain Impey, of whom we briefly wrote in our first Narrative,* was now quietly residing at Bangkok, in Siam, under the assumed name of George Aylmer. At first he was reported to be drilling the King of Siam's troops; but he was really there in the peaceful capacity of a merchant. The adventurous Captain "hoped to be appointed agent to the Singapore merchants at the capital of Siam."

From the throne *Amarinwinichai-Mahaiswriyapheman*, great improvements were now expected in the government of Siam. The policy of exclusiveness was said to be, at length, abandoned; and the Siamese King had taken to free trade, after a fashion, which was as necessary to the welfare of his kingdom as to his own preservation. He had forbidden his own subjects the use of opium, and had made a vigorous effort to extend the commerce of his country.

Regarding that curious people, the Karens,† Deists, who

* See "Rangoon," p. 144.

† "Their traditions embody remembrances of the creation, the deluge, and the promise of a deliverer." They, in fact, embrace what may be styled the fossilized skeletons of the faith.

occupy the various mountainous and difficult tracts throughout Burma, Pegu, the Tenasserim coast, and parts of the Shan and Siamese countries, we read that the "second section of the great Karen tribe, which in Burma has embraced Christianity by themselves, and is rapidly being organized into a nation, resides in Siam" (1852).

There is evidently a great change operating in the Siamese character. The pride of this nation has been described by some author of note, as so excessive, that the lowest Siamese considered himself superior to the greatest subject of any other nation. In their literature, as with the Burmese, they have nothing to enforce upon them the folly of extreme pride.

In June, it may be mentioned, the Madras Artillery sustained a severe loss by the death of that excellent officer, Major Hugh Montgomery.* He had distinguished himself at the capture of the White House Stockade, and during the advance on the Great Pagoda.

By the commencement of July, Rangoon was a flourishing town, with some forty or fifty thousand inhabitants.† People to be seen of nearly every creed, and of every Asiatic nation. Of course, it was to be expected that among this numerous population lurked many men of questionable character. There was the slippery dacoit, who had come to try his hand, perhaps, upon a commissariat bullock; there was the wily gambler who had come to cheat those who had money about them; there were Burmese spies, who had just dropped in to look quietly at the state of affairs, and see whether our gallant General was on the *qui vive* or not; but the majority consisted of those who were driven by hunger to flee from Burmese oppression, and

* The lamented Major was brother to the late Sir Henry Montgomery, Bart., for many years a member of Her Majesty's Indian Council.

† This may not be quite correct, as, in 1857, the population of Rangoon did not much exceed forty thousand. For 1851, or shortly before the war, we have seen it printed as low as twenty thousand.

who now rejoiced to live in certain security, under British protection ! Was it not for this, Providence sent us here ? Was not the Indian Government working out its grand destiny ? Near the beach was an immense bazaar, where fish, fruit, meat, and vegetables were sold. The vendors were women, old and young. There were pine-apples, plantains, and mangoes in abundance, for sale ; also pumpkins and cucumbers. The bek-ties and mangoe fish were, generally speaking, very inferior to what we got in India.

And, in addition to the necessaries of life, many articles of luxury were now procurable in Rangoon. Justice breathed under the vigilant magistracy of Captain Latter ; and, on the whole, civilisation here seemed in a fair way of taking root.

From such a point of prosperity in our narrative we pass on to the middle of July, when the welcome intelligence arrived of the success of an expedition of steamers which had been despatched up the Irawady.

The flotilla was under Commander Tarleton, R.N. ; and the steamers employed were the " Proserpine," " Pluto," " Phlegethon," " Medusa," and " Mahanuddy."

Prome had been circumvented ; the enemy's war-boats had been destroyed, and the Burmese put to flight, with the loss of forty guns. " It is all up with the army," said many. " There will be no medal for Prome ! " said a few. The wise said nothing ; although it did certainly seem that James Watt had taken more than his share of the glory. The question of " Could not the General ere this have taken troops sufficient to Prome in the steamers and rafts ? " or, " Could he not have taken two thousand men, and at once have occupied Prome on this occasion ? " might have been answered in various ways ; one of them, perhaps, " It would certainly have been impolitic to have denuded Rangoon of troops, at such a period of the war, without the chance of immediate reinforcements." Another, " Why occupy Prome immediately, when the wishes of Government are not known on the subject of annexation ? " and another, " Why

should the men be exposed at such a season as this, with the chance of, on their arrival at Prome, finding all the houses burned to the ground, and the ancient boundary between Pegu and Burma utterly destroyed? "

The object of the expedition to Burma was described by Lord Derby, in the House of Lords,* as follows:—"To strike a blow against Rangoon and Martaban, which by striking terror into the minds of the Burmese, and by showing the efficiency of our forces, would induce them to make peace on terms honourable to the British Government." Far more than this had been done. Bassein had been captured, and various minor successes had attended our arms; and then the Burmese kept silence, while the Peguese seemed everywhere to desire our protection and government; yet Peace did not come from the Court of Ava! With the golden-footed King, or his vile and dissolute advisers, she did not dwell!

All this would naturally tend to place the British Commander in a difficult position. Be this as it may, many thought Commander Tarleton had done a very fine thing. The General, just returned from a tour of inspection, was astonished at the event which had humiliated Prome, for a time.

The following description of the affair was eventually delivered by electric telegraph in Calcutta, when the "Fire Queen" came within telegraphic range of the City of Palaces:—"Prome was occupied on the 9th July. Twenty-two guns, many of large calibre, taken from the enemy by the steam flotilla in the Irawady, under the command of J. W. Tarleton, R.N. Flotilla attacked on the 7th by a strong force of the enemy at Konongee. Silenced enemy's fire in an hour, and the steamers proceeded. On the 10th, fell in with the rear of General Bandoola's army, and, after an exchange of shots, the enemy fled in great confusion, leaving the General's state-barge,

* 5th of April, 1852.

standard, two gold umbrellas, several large war-canoes, and twenty prisoners in our possession." A few officers were wounded,* and, on the whole, twenty-eight guns were taken; twenty-nine by another account, and among them one 42 and one 54-pounder. Commander Tarleton, we believe, went through what may be styled the eastern channel, passing the Burmese who were drawn up in force, not on the island, but on the left bank of the river. This movement almost paralyzed the enemy; and as our steamers were returning, war-boats were sent out to intercept their progress. Then commenced the work of destruction and capture which terminated this brilliant little affair. Strange enough, in almost deserted Prome, some inhabitants who sought our protection assisted the men in finding the guns. A poor Peguese labourer, on being asked by one of our officers why he acted thus, replied, "Because we are perishing under this Government; no security for person, no security for property. If a man is possessed of five rupees to-day, and it becomes known, he is robbed of it by the greedy authorities to-morrow." No person in Burma, "ventures to exhibit his wealth by enjoying it, for means of extortion would soon be used to deprive him of it."

The people were fleeced by the governors, who were delegated by the King to rule over them for a high consideration. And of course the chief object was to drain the coffers of their helpless charge by a system of oppression.

Could it be otherwise, than that this people should wish the dynasty of Alompra at an end? The dog had had his day; he had earned a bad name; should we hang him? In an age of social progress and enlightenment, all such vile instruments of government must be swept away. What should such crea-

* According to this report, Lieutenant Elliot, Rl. M., Mr. J. Morgan, assist.-surgeon, H.M.S. "Fox," Mr. Hunter, I. N., and Mr. Brayer, mate, I. N.

tures as these do "crawling between earth and heaven?"* The grand question which now arose, was, "Would it be wise and politic in our Government to annex the country to our eastern domain?" We were inclined to answer in the affirmative. It would, we thought, be both wise and politic to absorb Burma, and place the worthless king on the list of pensioners. The country deserves care and trouble; let us dispense the blessings of security and civilisation, and ensure wealth and prosperity to a wide-spread and interesting people, whose domestic morals we may reform in the course of time, the vast and rich resources of whose country we shall be able to evolve for their own benefit as well as that of mankind at large. The Burmese would not require a great effort to be tamed under the paw of the British lion, and would form the most formidable barrier between our own and the Chinese Empire. Another view advocated the annexation of the kingdom of Pegu only to the British possessions in the East. This would humiliate the court of Ava, by taking away its best provinces, and would relieve the Peguese from tyranny and oppression. And many Burmese would soon come under our protection. At the close of the last war numbers of Burmese expatriated themselves; they availed themselves of a time and opportunity for emancipation from tyranny, flocked into the Tenasserim Provinces, "and formed the nucleus of their future prosperity."

The reader may now naturally inquire if any jealousy exists between the Talaings and Burmese? Not nearly so much as might be expected.

They are both of the Tartar race,† and each has been independent in its turn; neither of them is affected by caste; and

* Written in 1852. The author must have anticipated the reign of King Thebau in 1879. Hamlet's remark, in this case, becomes more striking, when we consider that Mandalay is held by the Burmese to be under the especial charge of Santama!

† This is, of course, an assumption; the people of further India are supposed by Mr. Crawford to be *radically distinct from any other Asiatic race*.

excepting a little jealousy which exists between the high phon-gyees, or rahans (priests, or monks), of the Burmese and Talaings—said simply to have reference to temporal dignity and position, without a tendency to produce schism—there is not more envy than we observe every day between any two men of a different trade or country. The question remains open whether “the independent sea-board power of Pegu or the comparatively land-locked kingdom of Ava was most likely to have first received the missionaries of Buddhism.” The Tenasserim Provinces had yielded no actual surplus revenue to British India. They had, on the contrary, cost us a few thousands a year. And why? Because at the close of the last war we occupied a country which could never be made to pay its expenses. We occupied this and the swamps of Arakan, while the once glorious kingdom of Pegu stretched out its arms to receive us! The Tenasserim Provinces had never paid their expenses; but, says an authority, taking his own view of the annexation question, “This is no reason why the rich province of Pegu, with its inexhaustible forests of teak, its fertile soil, its noble rivers, its mineral resources, and its industrious population, should not, under the impulse of improvement—which we shall not fail to impart to it—more than cover the whole expense of its occupation. Nor must we forget that we secure, at the same time, four or five millions of consumers of our manufactures—that is, according to the extent of territory we may appropriate—and open new marts of commerce.” Rangoon, at no very distant period, would become the Liverpool or Glasgow of further India. Immense traffic would naturally crown such an admirable commercial position, and the woods, grain, oils and minerals of Pegu, with its various other commodities, would be diffused throughout the civilised world.

And why should not this be brought about? The entire people of Southern Burma were seeking our rule; Rangoon and Kemmendine were filled with inhabitants; and the Peguese, according to General Godwin, “decidedly and ever our friends,”

what could we seek more? Or, it may be better to say, what could we wish more, after we had invested and occupied Prome by British troops? Such a consummation was, doubtless, near at hand. "From Prome to the Aeng Pass on one side," wrote an authority, "and to Martaban, taking the Sittang river as the boundary on the other, would give us the whole sea-board, and Pegu in its integrity, whilst it would still leave a noble territory to the Court of Ava, larger than, for the interests of the people, it ought to possess." So much confidence General Godwin appeared to have in the Peguese, that he once said at Rangoon, "if he had the authority to promise annexation, he would levy a militia of these fellows, and go with them and a portion of our force, to Prome at once."

The "Phlegethon," under Captain Niblett, took a trip to Donabew in May. No fortifications were found there, merely the town, and the remains of the work destroyed in the last war.

The General, Bandoola, whose name has appeared while narrating the temporary capture of Prome by Commander Tarleton, was the son of our gallant and determined enemy during the last war, who said, not long before his death at Donabew, that the English did not know how to fight! The report for some time had been rife at Rangoon that Bandoola junior was coming down to make a grand stand. He had forty thousand of the King of Ava's chosen troops with him, goodly men and true.

Probably the Golden Foot thought that the name of Bandoola would act like magic on the people. Such is well enough in Europe, perhaps, but it will not do in Asiatic countries. The master-mind was wanting. Bandoola proved himself, on the occasion referred to, to be a disgrace to his father's name; he fled bodily, probably to drown his misfortune in dissipation, to which, report said, the would-be Bandoola the Great was very much addicted.

Great Britain in the East—particularly at this time—appeared

to be working out a grand destiny. Providence seemed to have ordained that she should "go forth conquering and to conquer." To advance is life—to retire is death. Such assurances ably cheer the onward march of civilisation.

To review the affairs of a mighty Government there must be no prejudice, no party feelings of revenge; there must be amplitude of comprehension and an intimate acquaintance with the subject. Without these, a fair and candid judgment can never be passed on civil or military affairs. Thoughts like these were apt to crowd upon the mind at a time when India was about to occupy a greater share of public attention than ever; at a time when a natural desire existed among so many that justice might be done to India, and to the Honourable East India Company. It was highly pleasing to read the speech delivered by the First Minister of the Crown (the Earl of Derby) on Friday, the 2nd of April. Justice was then done to the Company, which, "from an humble origin, established in a comparatively short period, the mightiest empire under the sun, redeeming any errors of rapacity and lust in its early stages by the wise government and enlightened humanity by which, in later times, it had achieved a dominion absolute and uncontrolled, whether by the direct exercise of its authority, or by an influence not less absolute than actual authority, over a district of country extending from Cape Comorin on the south, to the borders of Burma, of Cashmere, Cabul, and Afghanistan on the north, and embracing, I think, something like 28° of latitude (cheers); a vast district inhabited by a population which I believe I am within the mark when I set down at 150,000,000 exercising its authority over a population of various races, and of various religions, who have been often in hostility to each other, but who now, conquerors and conquered, agree to submit to the jurisdiction of a comparatively small body of Europeans; a Company which has secured its power, not so much by the sword as by the wisdom of its councillors; which has seen succumb to it, one after another, the mightiest monarchies of

India, and which, without any attempt at conquest—nay, contrary to its wish—has seen the populations of those monarchies gradually freeing themselves, under the protection of its authority. It was not less extraordinary that this vast empire should be maintained by an army of 285,000 men, composed mainly of natives, every variety of religion and grades, equally loyal to their conquerors. It was a task of magnitude to investigate the machinery by which this great territory was superintended.”

With reference, again, to the grand question, whether Prome, or Amarapura, would be on the northern boundary of our grasp, a highly intelligent officer wrote, “Why, here is a country, the conquest of which would cost comparatively a small outlay of men and money, of much greater value to us than the Punjab, as a maritime and commercial people, from its geographical superiority and advantages, to say nothing of its productions which are of the most remarkable kind.” Thus was the matter looked upon in the light of a commercial necessity.

Some talked of Ava and Prome making “convenient appendages” to Calcutta, “rounding off” our possessions in the East. And once having moved inland, it would be difficult to stop short of the Sea of China.* “No fear of our Empire,” said a bold son of Progress, “falling to pieces from its own size, were it extended from the Caspian to the Wall of China, *so long as the country is rich enough to meet its own charges, and is possessed of a defensible frontier.*”

Including Arakan, the Burmese Empire was stated, many years ago, to contain seventeen millions of souls.† The popu-

* “The peninsular is scarcely a thousand miles across, and is penetrated by noble rivers, from north to south and from east to west—and we could advance from both shores were we so inclined.”

† Colonel Symes estimated the total number at seventeen millions, while Captain Cox, who succeeded him as ambassador, does not go beyond eight millions; but from subsequent information collected by Captain Canning, there was reason to believe that even this last number greatly exceeded the truth. In 1809 the country appeared half depopulated.

lation has since very much decreased. Should we become eventually possessed of the inheritance of the House of Alompra, the Indian Government would exercise authority over little less than one-fifth of the whole human family!

On Tuesday, the 27th of July, the Governor-General of India arrived at Rangoon, in the Company's steam-frigate "Feroze."

Welcome intelligence, at the same time, came from England that the fall of Rangoon and Martaban had drawn forth a feeling of unqualified admiration of the skill and courage of our troops. Soon after his arrival in the river, General Godwin and Commodore Lambert paid Lord Dalhousie a visit. The weather was by no means auspicious for such an important event as the arrival of the head of the Indian Government on these shores. The day was rainy, and dark, and dreary-looking, as if it were determined to repel the message of light to Burma. But, as usual at this season, it cleared up in the afternoon; and everything around seemed bright and beautiful. Next morning there was a grand parade, in honour of the Governor-General; the time he had appointed for landing was 7 o'clock. Punctual, as usual, the noble Marquis landed; and, entering the stockade, passed through the street, lined with troops, to the south gate of the Great Pagoda. H. M.'s 18th Royal Irish furnished the guard of honour below, and the Artillery, of course, furnished its guard of honour* above, on the upper terrace. What with the various salutes—the shipping having thundered away in the river, and the Artillery on the upper terrace—and the general excitement, there was a temporary relief from our rather monotonous life at Rangoon. Music, top, welcome music, was now to be heard. The Governor-General was accompanied on his visit by Major Banks, acting as Military Secretary,† Mr. Charles Allen, Foreign Secretary,

* Under Captain Cooke, Madras Artillery.

† This gallant officer afterwards fell at the Residency during the siege of Lucknow (1857).

his Aides-de-camp, Sir Edward Campbell, Captain D'Oyley, and others. He was received, on reaching the base of the Great Pagoda, by Colonel Foord, the Artillery Commandant, who introduced Major Back and Brigade-Major Scott to his lordship.

The illustrious party wandered round the Temple, of course wondering and admiring. "I am astonished how your men got in here, with such defences!" remarked the Governor-General, who was also pleased to express his high approbation of the soldier-like appearance of the Artillery guard of honour. The quaint-looking houses of some of the officers, on the upper terrace, must have excited the attention of the strange party; nor could they have been less astonished at the bells, huge, and now dumb, monsters of sound; they also enjoyed a splendid view of the country and river from the parapets.

While the Governor-General was residing at Rangoon, of course the curiosity of every one was excited to the utmost. What was going to be done? Would there be now an immediate advance on Prome, to follow up the recent successful achievement? If so, immediate annexation would doubtless follow.

On the arrival of reinforcements a force was to be sent through the Aeng Pass into the basin of the Irawady, to cut off all communication between Ava and Prome. A force would also proceed from Martaban up the Sittang river; and the principal force would start from Rangoon in the steamers. There would be no bullocks to destroy the efficiency of the Artillery, and delay the army in its onward progress. The rivers in October and November would have water sufficient for steamers of considerable size to proceed up with perfect safety. "There were steamers enough to take an army to Ava, without wetting the sole of a man's foot." Such lively remarks became current during the stay of the Governor-General at Rangoon.

But, with regard to *marching*, no one could pretend to give an exact opinion as to the intentions of General Godwin. To

conquer^{ed} a country thoroughly you must *march* through it; there must be no rebels hanging on your rear. This is a general view of the custom of war. With a river possessing such capabilities as the Irawady, much steaming, however, to save marching through an injurious and swampy soil, one would imagine to have every chance of greatly facilitating the operations, and of bringing the campaign to a brilliant and glorious termination. To use the steamers as much as possible may have been the intention of our gallant General. The "*Pluto*," in July, anchored off Prome, in eight fathoms water. Cox and Crawford both mention that the rise of the Irawady at Prome is from twenty to twenty-five feet, and that large vessels* have been built there.

* Our steamers gave us the entire command of the Irawady below Prome—"in fact, of the whole of the Lower Provinces." Steam would soon render Pegu truly British in character; and, with its auxiliary, the Press, it might form the nucleus of civilisation in a new land, which would be sure to flourish under a wise and liberal Government. After holding a levee the Governor-General left Rangoon on Sunday, the 1st of August, much pleased with his visit. It was believed he waited instructions from England, which could not be received before the end of September; so, on the great question, we were left in the dark as much as ever. It was not decided on whether we should take the entire Burmese Empire, or simply unite the two disjointed provinces of Arakan and Maulmain, by annexing the intermediate delta of the Irawady.

And now, to close this portion of our narrative, Rangoon was flourishing beyond all possibility of conception. In the first war Rangoon had but few tenants. It was peopled chiefly by the army and its followers. When we landed in April (1852) the town was almost deserted. The case soon became entirely

* Of from three hundred to five hundred tons burthen.

changed; the people placed confidence in us, and rushed to seek our protection. This time it was not probable that cunning Burmese diplomacy would be allowed to have a hand in the business. There would be no time for an interchange of *civilities*, or other "airy nothings."

Looking with a sort of prophetic eye into coming events, we remarked:—The Burmese are crafty; but the British are earnest in a good cause. There will be no Dr. Jonathan Price, excellent man as he was, rushing backwards and forwards to Ava, bringing doubtful intelligence, as well as bad rupees, and only a portion of the treasure at a time. There will be no deputations to the King, to present gifts of State. When we get to Prome, or beyond it, trifling must cease. There will be much business of vast importance to transact; and there can be little doubt of its being transacted in a manner highly creditable to the Government of British India.*

The following is Lord Dalhousie's concise and elegant farewell gift to the force at Rangoon:—

"The Major-General† commanding, has the highest gratification in publishing to the troops the following General Order by the Most Noble the Governor-General of India:—

"Rangoon, 1st August 1852.

"The Most Noble the Governor-General of India cannot forego the opportunity which is afforded to him by his visit to Rangoon,‡ for again offering the combined force his most cordial acknowledgment of the valuable and distinguished services they have rendered here. The gratification which

* It was said, that when reinforcements arrived from Bengal and Madras, General Godwin's army would number about eighteen thousand men. At no period of the war were there so many troops in Burma.

† By a recent order, the Brevet Lieutenant-General was in several cases cancelled, and our gallant Commander was among them.

‡ The next important visit to this rising commercial city in Chin-India was that of the much loved and afterwards lamented Earl of Mayo, in January 1870, when Colonel Fyche was Chief Commissioner.

the Governor-General experiences in thus congratulating the force on its success in the field, is greatly enhanced by his being able to add the expression of his unqualified approbation of its conduct in quarters.

"In every branch, whether Naval or Military, European or Native, the force has exhibited an orderly conduct and inoffensive demeanour towards the people of the country, and a spirit of sound discipline, which are as truly honourable to its character as the high distinction it has won in battle.

"Whatever may be the future course of this service, whatever may be the ultimate fate of this country, the Governor-General has the proud satisfaction of feeling that the people of Burma will hereafter associate with the presence of a British force among them no other recollections than those of its irresistible bravery in the field, of its order, forbearance, and obedience in the camp.

“(By command)

(Signed) “J. S. BANKS,.

“Assistant Military Secretary
to the Governor-General.”

The following account of Lord Dalhousie's reception of, and conversation with, the missionaries, from the graphic pen of Mr. Kincaid, is of too interesting a nature to be omitted from this narrative:—

“*Rangoon, Aug. 8, 1852.*”

“In my last, I mentioned that Lord Dalhousie and suite were here. The day after his arrival one of his secretaries called on me and spent more than an hour, asking a great number of questions relative to the Government, &c. of Burma. On Saturday last, before he left, a line from one of his aides-de-camp informed me that the Governor-General would see me and my associates at 3 o'clock. I went accordingly with Mr. Vinton and Dr. Dawson.

"His lordship received us in the kindest manner, and at once began conversing on Burman affairs in a way that indicated great familiarity with the subject. He inquired about the three races of Karens, Talaings, and Burmans, the peculiarities of each, the number of native Christians, whether the Government made no distinction between us and British subjects, whether I was acquainted with the present King, who were the leading spirits in the court of Ava, and what were the feelings of the people towards the English? He asked my opinion of the late Viceroy, whether he came down with peaceful or with hostile intentions. To this last I replied, 'Hostile, no doubt.'

"'How, then,' he inquired, 'do you account for the pacific tone of the King's letter to me?'

"'It was to blind Commodore Lambert, and give the Viceroy time to prepare for resistance.'

This interesting conversation, in its entirety, will be found in Mrs. Wyllie's work,* the eighth chapter of which—the "Annexation of Pegu"—is a very interesting one, and which may with advantage be referred to. With regard to annexation and "the well-being or otherwise of unborn millions depending very much on his decision," Lord Dalhousie said, "I feel it; those who have not the responsibility may act hastily. I HAVE COME TO A DECISION AFTER LONG AND CAREFUL EXAMINATION." On taking leave, his lordship said to the missionaries—"We may meet again!"

And thus the great Pro-consul courteously and gracefully closed his first visit to Rangoon.

* The "Gospel in Burma, 1859."

PART III.

FROM THE ADVANCE ON PROME, TO THE ENTIRE CONQUEST OF PEGU.

CHAPTER I.

THE ADVANCE ON PROME.—CAPTURE AND OCCUPATION OF PEGU.

Few events in Indian military history gave rise to so many remarks, grave, gay, lively, and severe, as General Godwin's advance on, and capture of, Prome. Some of the Indian journals almost exhausted their wit on the subject. That five octavo pages of a Gazette should have been occupied in detailing an engagement in which only one man was killed and a few wounded, was, in the opinion of one of them, quite dissimilar to the "*Veni, vidi, vici*," of the great Cæsar.* And again, the same writer held that Nelson's idea of having one day a Gazette "all to himself," was not "associated with such cheap results as the capture of Prome by the Army of Burma." It does certainly provoke a smile, while reading the graphic narratives by the Commadore and General, as set forth in their

Despatches,* pondering over the naval and military exploits, and the grand result. But we are a strange people in this respect. Had there been in human life a large "butcher's bill," there would have been more praise and less wit bestowed on the operations; so, however brilliant the wit may be on such occasions, the expression of it certainly does not say much in favour of British humanity. Looking at this failing in a purely professional point of view, it appears absurd in the extreme; since every one knows that it is the consummate art of war to do as much as possible with quickness, decision, and effect, at a small cost of life among the troops employed. Writing a few pages about doing the thing does not then become such a great crime after all; and no doubt the General as well as the Commodore were perfectly satisfied on this point.

Before briefly narrating the advance, with the view of giving a sort of continuous chain to the abstract of a separate narrative, a few events in August and September may be noted, with some remarks of general interest.

Rangoon, Martaban,† and Bassein were now in our possession, to the infinite delight of the Peguese, or former lords of Burma. The Irawady, that noble highway, or rather grand artery of the country, was in our hands, which had enabled us for some time to cut off the enemy's resources.

The Bay of Bengal continued to keep up an animated scene, and its billows rolled fresher than ever, as if they shared the joy of the Irawady, while steamers and transports dashed across its blue waters with brave reinforcements for the "Army of Ava." Who could deny that such vigour was highly creditable to the Indian Government? that such energy and such resources did

* See Appendix No. V., in "Pegu; a Narrative."

† For more information regarding the attack on Martaban, see "Pegu," chap. ii. p. 7.

infinite honour to our Indian Empire, which, although not a century since Clive won Plassey, was now the wonder and admiration of the world. But in the face of this hard-won glory there were still some good people in England—among them those who loved above all things to make a public “show”—who, as the great advocates of Free Trade put it, saw or read of “nothing but growth,” and for the most part talked of “nothing but decay”!

Among those who looked back with pride to the day they entered the old Company’s service, not the least important were the members of that army which, “originating in a few gunners’ crews and factory guards, had, in the course of not quite two centuries, swollen to that gigantic and well-disciplined host known as the Company’s Army.”*

This army had again sent forth a gallant portion of its sons on another grand enterprise, as pioneers to clear the way for justice and civilisation.

In the middle of August, the 1st Madras Native Infantry, under Colonel Goldsworthy, reached Maulmain, as the garrison there was sadly in want of reinforcement. It was truly considered that no little responsibility was attached to guarding a town, some three or four miles long, with cantonments, arsenal, and magazine. This important capital of the Tenasserim Provinces—so famous for its teak and timber trade†—is about thirty-seven miles from the sea. Martaban is on the right or north bank of the Salween river, nearly opposite Maulmain.

We now return to Rangoon, where an attack was made, on the night of the 14th, on the quiet village of Puzendoun—*lit.*, in Burmese, “the shrimp district”—under our very eyes. The chief object of attack was a house occupied by the ex-Governor of Pegu; and the attacking party consisted of fifty

* “Bagbie’s Services of the Madras Artillery.”

† For capabilities of Maulmain as a building yard for men-of-war, see “Pegu,” p. 30.

Burmese soldiers. Of course, their design was to carry him off; but the enemy were vigorously repulsed, the ex-Governor having fought bravely with his small band, defending himself in a manner, although severely wounded, worthy of the best days of Pegu chivalry.

The Burmese at Prome, it was affirmed, were now employed on an extensive stockade, or breastwork, in a commanding position, beyond the fire of the steamers. From ten thousand to fifteen thousand men were reported to be in and about Prome. There were seven thousand at Pegu, with a large body of Cassay (Munnipoor) horse; armed outposts between Pegu and Rangoon; and a large force at Beling, near Martaban. Ava was said to be filled with guns; and there were the two fierce brigades, headed by a Picton and an Uxbridge of the Burmese army, styled the Invulnerables and the Invincibles, who were certainly to cut all the English to pieces! The Burmese were not going to await attack; but they determined to attack us when the rains abated. There were accounts from the steamers up the river that Bandoola with the various expelled Woons, or ex-Governors, remained at Prome. The Dalla Woon sent a communication to Commander Tarleton proposing a conference on the subject of the war. Tarleton replied, "that he had no power to entertain the subject, but that if the Dalla Woon was duly authorised, he would guarantee him safe conduct to Rangoon in one of the steamers." The Woon did not accede to this proposal, but wished to know whether, in the event of his communicating with the Commodore, we would remain below Prome till matters might be settled. This ruse was so transparent as to indicate but an indifferent opinion of our penetration. His Dalla Woonship was informed in reply that nothing short of a treaty of peace between the two nations would stay our proceedings. The Woon would not trust himself to the mercy of the British General. At Ava his head would surely have gone for losing Dalla. But in such a case he should have been allowed to keep it on for his admirable

diplomacy and cunning! However, the nation that produced Lord Palmerston could hardly have been defeated by the tact of a Burmese Woon.

At the end of August, war-steamers were despatched from Rangoon to Madras, to bring troops for the approaching campaign. The Commodore had utilised the little passenger-steamer "Fire Queen," mounted her with some 12-pounders, and made a man-of-war of her. Captain Keighly, 49th Madras Native Infantry, and Mr. Chisholm—the former from Martaban and the latter from Maulmain—were also engaged in the preparation of a flotilla of boats for the conveyance of stores and baggage in the movement upwards. At Rangoon, too, the Artillery were usefully employed in attempting to effect a breach in a flank of the west face of the great stockade with two 24-pounders and two 8-inch howitzers, at ranges of from four hundred to six hundred yards. But it was found perfectly useless to attempt the breaching with such pieces in any reasonable time.* We carefully examined the construction of the dense, tough, timber wall, which, though lacking the beauty of a work issued from the hand of a Vauban or a Cormontaigne, nevertheless had been raised on simply natural principles of surpassing strength. With two hundred pounds of powder, or even with one hundred pounds, you can occasionally effect a fair breach in a strong part of a stockade. Engineers and Artillery are well acquainted with how to effect this often difficult and sometimes dangerous operation.

The boats of the Hon. Company's steam-frigate "Zenobia" were now doing some useful service about thirty miles above Martaban, reconnoitring various positions preparatory to an advance. They were frequently fired on by the determined enemy. The boats returned early in September to Maulmain, officers and men having suffered much from fatigue and ex-

* See "Fégu," p. 21.

posure. In this expedition, Mr. Bondville, with three boats of the river police, also joined, and gave great assistance. Eighteen canoes were captured in all. On the 1st of July the Queen had prorogued Parliament in person, when Her Majesty, for the first time in her reign, was pleased to allude to Burma. There had been "an interruption of friendly relations" with the King of Ava. The "promptness and vigour" of the Governor-General of India received "entire approbation"; and the valour "and discipline" of all "the naval and military forces, European and Indian," were causes of just satisfaction, having led to "signal successes," which, it was to be hoped, would lead "to an early and honourable peace."

Our English Cicero, Lord Derby, had said in the House of Lords on the 5th of April, with reference to the coming operations,—“If these steps” (striking a blow against Rangoon and Martaban) “should not be sufficient before the rainy season to induce the Burmese authorities to tender their submission and to enter into terms of peace, then it will be for the Governor-General to consider what steps it will be his duty to take in the arduous struggle which will be forced upon him.”*

On the same date (1852), in the House of Lords, Lord Ellenborough endeavoured to show that the Burmese war might prove “more serious than we contemplated.” Is it not so with nearly every war engaged in by any nation? The uncertainty of the issues of war is proverbial; and none knew this better than the great Duke of Wellington.† “In the last war with Ava,” said his lordship, “we employed no less than forty thousand men,” but he doubted whether “in the end ten thousand were left fit for duty.” But the noble Earl wisely

* For a detailed account of the “Army of Ava,” see “Pegu,” chap. iv. p. 38.

† See His Grace's remarks on the war at the end of this Abstract.

admitted that we had undoubtedly "some advantages now we did not possess then."

Early in September we became aware that there was an "inadvertent omission," regarding the 9th Madras Native Infantry, in General Godwin's despatch published after the capture of Bassein. When the orders for immediate landing were given, the gallant party of H. M.'s 51st K. O. L. I. were followed in a boat from the "Moozuffer" (*musáfir* (Arabic), "traveller") carrying some seventy grenadier and D company men of the 9th Regiment. The soldiers and sepoy, say four hundred and thirty, were formed up close to the river's edge, about eighty yards from the stockades which were manned by numbers of the enemy. No sooner had the "Hurrah!" of the British soldiers, and the "Deen, deen!"* of the Madras sepoy rent the air, than the Burmese became discomfited, and fled "like chaff before the wind." The original writer of this brave conduct of the 9th did not think our gallant General a master in the art of despatch writing, but asserted that our Chief had conducted the campaign hitherto "with a talent and energy worthy of a Soult." Whatever may have been said of the General's style, in conciseness of expression he was not to be excelled when he chose, as many officers who served with him will, doubtless, recollect. There was a good anecdote of him during the war, for the exact truth of which we will not vouch; but his expression, which makes the pith of it, is certainly true. Two rather "fast" medical functionaries arrived at Rangoon from Calcutta, at a time when, after the capture and during much cholera, medical aid was in great demand. It was reported that these two worthies were seldom sober. We were too busy for courts-martial in such cases; but the following order soon appeared from the General. "The undermentioned pair" ("*brace*," some said) "of *Chronic Inebriates* will return to Calcutta forth-

* Literally "the Faith," used by Mussulmans; equivalent to calling on Allah (God).

forthwith, per steamer, and report themselves to the Town Major, Fort William."

It may interest some to learn that the transports, of about four or five hundred tons, employed by the Government at Rangoon as store-ships, or stationed with the army on the Irawady, were paid at the rate of eight or nine rupees (at par, 18s.) per ton per month. In China the transports received twelve rupees per ton. During the first Burmese war the enormous sum of twenty-five rupees was given.

On the 5th of September news reached us that Bandoola was tired waiting at or near Prome, that he now intended to push on to Ava, where we must go if we wished to find him. The trick was not badly conceived, and deserved a better cause.

On the 6th it was announced in General Orders that active operations would be resumed on the 18th. No more welcome intelligence could have been given to the troops; for notwithstanding some comforts now enjoyed at Rangoon, they all hoped to see more service, or to have change of scene and an active life. The General's order on resuming operations was very concise, entering carefully into every particular. The regiments to embark on service were H. M.'s 18th, 51st, and 80th, with the 9th and 35th Madras Native Infantry, and the 40th Bengal Native Infantry.

There were two brigades, one under the command of Brigadier Elliot, K.H., and the other under Brigadier Reynolds, C.B. Bengal and Madras Artillery, with the ever useful 8-inch howitzers, and a light field battery, also a detail of Engineers and Sappers, were to form a strong part of the force, now quite ready to go to Ava or Peking at a moment's notice. The General hoped to embark the 2nd Division three weeks after the departure of the first.*

* See "Pegu," p. 52. For remarks on Horse Artillery, see page 52. The C. Troop, Madras Horse Artillery, arrived at Rangoon on the 7th of September, under Major Burgoyne.

We should have remarked that, at the end of August, Captain Shadwell, of H. M.'s steamer "Sphynx," proceeded up the river to relieve Commander Tarleton* in the command of the flotilla on the Irrawady. And now there was a pleasing anecdote of our fine old General to record. On first hearing of Captain Tarleton's dashing attack on Prome (already narrated), the veteran lost his temper for the moment, took off his wig and threw it at his aide-de-camp (so the story ran), exclaiming, "Dash it, C——, there's that fellow Tarleton again! he's gone and taken the wind out of my sails!" Such is the splendid emulation which, we trust, will ever exist in the Services while their members are fighting for their gracious Sovereign and for the glory of Old England!

We shall now try and entertain the general reader with a sketch of Burmese

Costume.—A Burmese Feast.

The long flowing robes, which give the females of India such a graceful and classical appearance, we look for in vain in Burma.

The lower orders simply wear a sort of jacket, white or any other colour—open in front; at the base or near the centre of this garment, a robe, reaching nearly to the feet, is fixed or tucked in round the body, just covering the lower portion of the bosom. This robe is composed of two pieces sewn together—the upper piece being of red cotton stuff, while the other is frequently of silk, or, if too poor to afford it, of some fantastically coloured substitute. The female petticoat is styled *hta-mein*. Small shoes, or sandals, are worn by the women, and these are extremely simple and primitive in construction. The wealthier females adorn themselves, but not so profusely as those of Hindustan, with jewellery. The poorer classes have the rose, jasmine, and other flowers of the country to adorn

* The present Sir J. W., K.C.B., who was a few years back a Lord of the Admiralty.

their jetty tresses. The men wear a rude cloth round the loins, with a muslin ring of turband only, displaying economy in its strictest sense; the higher classes wear the turband in full, flat and ungraceful in form, with a smart jacket and under *toga*,* in part tucked in like the dress of the women; shoes also, with a handsome dhát complete the costume, which in some instances is striking enough. The nob of hair, and ears bored, also the pendent lobes, like Gautama,—the ears boasting for the sake of ornament an unfinished cheroot or piece of wax candle, to ensure the safety of which the holes in these valuable organs are carefully distended,—are held in considerable importance by the men of this country; nor do the fair sex neglect the wax candle ornament, and smoking appears with them to be a favourite pastime, as it is also with their children. It was amusing one day to observe a fruit-woman, cheroot in mouth, attempting to bargain with an European soldier by means of sounds and signs perfectly unintelligible to him. Finding that she made no impression, she took up her basket, placed it on her head, and walked off, smoking as coolly as possible! Sterne could have moralised on the picture. The Burmese children appear to be smart and intelligent. On one occasion, while lounging down the principal street of Rangoon, we took particular notice of two sharp-looking Burmese *chokerahs*,† seated by the roadside, each with his little table, and the pice counted out upon it, ready to change money for the passers by. These juvenile money-changers, as they sat, gave a rupee an occasional ring, tossing it with the air of men well up to their business; they received one pice, or three pice—the fourth of an anna or of three halfpence—for changing a rupee.

* The *potso* of the men—of bright silk or cotton—reaches from the waist to the ankles.

† The universal weapon of Burma.

‡ Boys.

We now turn to a Burmese feast when the upper terrace of the great pagoda was crowded with Phongyees, and people, chiefly from Kemmendine, in every variety and shade of costume. By the base of a graceful banian curiosity—beside the old green walls of the building,—sat two Phongyees, as usual in the fashion of Gautama. One of them was praying fervently in a moderate tone of voice, whilst the congregation, seated around, repeated what he said* at the conclusion of each prayer or sentence, bowing to the ground three times. The greater portion of the audience appeared to be women; but several old men were there—patriarchal looking fellows, with their long staves. At the same time all around Gautama's Temple din and animation reigned to the utmost—gongs sounding, people talking, laughing, and praying. The sun, now beginning to shine from a bright blue sky, aided the fantastic beauty of the lively scene, causing also the sacred silvery posts to borrow beauty from its rays. Every colour for dress seemed to have been brought into operation. Some of the females, with Tartaric countenances not pleasant to look upon, wore elegant handkerchiefs or scarfs over the shoulder. Several of the small children were very fair in appearance, and were dressed in fancy style; one with a green silk boddice, turband of yellow and red, and silver ornament on the foot. At the conclusion of the Phongyee's oration, large red-painted dishes were filled with the boiled rice, which, as offerings, in smaller plates, had been placed before him; and a well-filled dish was set aside for each cluster of applicants, who immediately com-

* "In Ceylon, upon some of the festivals, one priest reads from the original Pali, and another interprets in the Vernacular Singhalese; but this method is not very frequently adopted. Whenever the name of Buddha is repeated by the officiating priest, the people call out simultaneously *Sadhu!* which gives them a participation in the proceedings, and prevents them from going to sleep."—"Calcutta Review," No. xxxii., Art. "Eastern Monachism."

menced their morning meal in good earnest. The women rendered the rice palatable by means of mango-fish, chili, prawns, and other savoury ingredients, proving themselves not unskilled in gastronomical science; added to this, tumblers of genuine glass, like our own, showed symptoms of coming civilisation; and that with more speed than in the land of Vishnu and Siva which we have held for nearly one hundred years.* And why is this? simply because the people here are not fettered by CASTE, nor are they subject, as the Hindus are, to a vile priestly dominion! Were it not so, the moral precepts of Buddhism could not be so much more pure and efficacious than those of Brahmanism. In Burma a woman is not her husband's slave but his helpmate; you could observe this even during the simple operation of an occasional feast. In the Great Pagoda, say the Phongyees, or gentlemen of the yellow robe, are deposited the hair and teeth of Gautama, in a large gold vessel: these relics of sanctity, of course, form a chief source of attraction to worshippers at this celebrated shrine. Ceylon is made sacred by the tooth of Buddha—the grand tusk, which is now under British protection. The mighty shrine of Jagannáth, in Orissa, is said to contain the bone of Krishna; and such is “hero-worship” in the East! The intelligent reader is well able to compare it with that of the West. Without the aid of Carlyle, he will surely find a likeness. We shall conclude our observations on the feast by remarking that the Burmese and Talaings of every class take off their shoes before entering on the upper terrace of the Shwé Dagon Pagoda, and that the circumference of the base of this temple is about five hundred yards. The height has been already given as three hundred and twenty-one feet.† With this splendid edifice upon it, also the smaller temples, the curious and beautiful trees, and the

* Written in 1853.

† See “Rangoon,” p. 112; also plan and section.

numerous relics and emblems of religion, the upper terrace cannot fail to command, from every diligent and inquiring traveller, genuine admiration.

A document was said to have been found at Meaday, intended as a report to the King of Ava, in which it was stated that more than one thousand Europeans were killed during the operations against Rangoon, "and that we set more than one thousand sentinels all round the camp to defend ourselves!" One thousand sentinels, with earnest eyes, keeping watch around the Great Shwé Dagon!—Heaven defend us!

Before the middle of September some two hundred boats were ready to assist in the transport to Prome. In every department activity reigned; and it must have been no small satisfaction to our gallant General, while these preparations for an advance were being carried on, to know that the health of the troops at Rangoon was highly satisfactory—forming, in this instance, a remarkable contrast with gloomy, deadly, destructive 1824. On the 13th, the "Sphinx" and "Moozuffer," each with a transport, arrived with Brigadier-General Steel, C.B.,* Brigadier McNeill (Madras Cavalry), and the whole of the 1st Madras Fusiliers,† under Lieutenant-Colonel (now General) Duke. On the 16th, the Artillery entertained General Godwin and Staff at dinner. The warm politicians at home, on festive occasions, never looked forward with more eagerness for a declaration of work *in esse*, in a political campaign, from the leading Minister, than did we on this social evening while expecting some important information as to "coming events" from our gallant and distinguished guest, the Chief of the Army in Burma. Our worthy Brigadier (Foord) proposed the health of the General, whom he hoped to hail, ere a few months

* Afterwards General Sir S. W. Steel, K.C.B.

† For remarks on this famous corps, incorporated, like the Madras Artillery, in 1756, see "Pegu," p. 65. The 39th Regiment—*Primis in Indis*—was then the only other complete European regiment in India.

had passed away, as "Conqueror of Ava." The General rose. In the course of his speech he said:—"With regard to Ava" (now it may be Mandalay), "political as well as other reasons had urged the necessity of staying in position at Rangoon till the present time; what had been already effected had been perhaps slow, but he was certain that it was sure. He hoped before six months were over to have the grand object of the expedition fully carried out. Without going to Ava no successful ultimatum could be accomplished so as to produce a lasting peace."

While the embarkation of the troops was going on, remarks like the following were current at Rangoon:—"The word *annexation* has only to be sounded, when the Peguers (and many Burmese resident among them) throughout the length and breadth of the land will rise as one man, and expel the Burmese soldiery and dacoits, and give peace and liberty to the oppressed ryots."

Wild flowers are numerous in Burma in September. The great beauty of the creeping fern is very striking during this month, of which plant there is a great variety at Rangoon. The *maidenhair*, a beautiful fern, is seen in the crevices of old ruins and walls. A very rainy day, succeeded by a dry and very warm one, may give an idea of the nature of the weather, which seemed highly favourable to rapid vegetation.

Through the astonishing energy of Major Fraser, of the Engineers, Grand Architect of Rangoon, and the labours of his assistants, a new city arose as if by magic. Ample shelter had been afforded to the troops, even while the reinforcements were gradually pouring in; and now as the city emptied itself of a portion of its defenders, there were almost palaces for some, and houses for all, until another stream of life came in to stop the gap, as it were, among a social throng.

On the 24th, the last detachment of H. M.'s 80th, also the head-quarters of the 35th Madras Native Infantry, with General Sir John Cheape (Bengal Engineers) and Staff, embarked

in the "Phlegethon." Meanwhile another attack on the village of Puzendoun was expected; so the surveying-brig "Krishna," with a party of marines and seamen from H.M.S. "Winchester," started to look after the creek. The ex-Governor of Pegu was again the object of Burmese vengeance.

The P. and O. Company's splendid steamer "Oriental" was now at Rangoon, and gave rise to not a few reflections. This fine vessel had, at the commencement of her career, carried poor Warburton, of "The Crescent and the Cross," which made us think that a graphic pen like his would have had an excellent field for display in the land of the Golden Foot. Sir David Wilkie also, the Scottish Teniers, we believe died at Malta, on board the "Oriental."

On the 25th, General Godwin and Staff, with Brigadier Foord and the Artillery, embarked on board the "Proserpine." And now the whole of the 1st Division had gone from Rangoon, and Brigadier-General Steel was left in command. Meanwhile there might be work to do in the southern portion of the delta of the Irawady. The General was well aware that before advancing with a force on Ava, if necessary, or even being able fairly to secure the province of Pegu, it would be necessary to clear the country up the Sittang river—say by taking a land column from Martaban to Sittang, thence to Shwé-gyeen, thence to the reported strong post of Toungoo, and next, perhaps, across the country to Prome. It might be politic for such a step to succeed the recapture of Pegu, the ancient kingdom's capital.

With regard to the advance, the following letter was received from Prome, at Rangoon, about the middle of October:—

"I have just sufficient time to give a detail of events as they occurred since leaving Rangoon. The voyage was marked by a few interruptions in our progress towards Prome. In the first place, the 'Fire Queen' and 'Enterprise' steamers grounded, thereby causing a detention of all the other steamers for three days. Again, there was the very melancholy event of the

Admiral's death, at the Island of 'Shouk Shay Khune.'* It appears he had been taken ill on the night of the 5th; the following day he became worse; and he died on the afternoon of the 7th on board the 'Pluto,' which left for Rangoon on the morning of the 8th. From this island, which is not more than ten miles from Prome, we weighed and started, in all eight steamers, at daybreak on the morning of the 9th. In two hours we were under the hill fortifications of Prome, which have a full command of the river. Fortunately only one shot was fired from the hill, on the second steamer sailing abreast of it. A few rounds of shell from the steamers soon silenced the enemy for a time; but on our advancing a short distance higher up the river, they fired on almost every steamer that passed, and annoyed us very much with jinjals and musketry. The two steamers in advance returned the firing with great precision and effect; in short, all the steamers had a share in replying to the ineffectual firing of the Burmese. During the greater part of the day the steamers were alternately bombarding, for the purpose of landing the troops. In the afternoon, at 5 P.M. (rather late to commence operations inland), H. M.'s 80th, the Sappers and Miners, and the Artillery landed, taking only two guns with us. Getting our guns ready took up a considerable time; so that while evening was closing upon us we had made but little progress. At length we were all busy in securing a resting position for the night. The 80th lost but one man, who was shot, and three were wounded that same evening. The following morning, with the 18th Royal Irish, and 35th Madras Native Infantry, we proceeded to the pagoda, where we expected a sharp contest; but on our arrival at the steps we found the Burmese had fled, so we quickly ascended and took possession of the citadel. It is a similar

* Also written "Shouk Shay Khenee." The Admiral was in his 74th year—too advanced an age for active service in Burma.

one to the Shwé Dagon, but apparently of recent finish. The Artillery are located in the north steps, far superior to those of Rangoon. Since our occupation of Prome we have had no fighting ; but now and then we hear a few stray shots between our skirmishers and the Burmese. On the night of the 9th, one of the 80th soldiers, whilst at his post as sentry, between the hours of 1 and 2, was attacked by a few Burmese, who cut off his head and left his body some distance from his post. The remains were not found until the relief went round. This happened actually within one hundred and fifty yards of where our guns were placed, at the north gate ; and two of our sentries were walking about at the time. It appears at this juncture, a few shots having been fired on the guard from another direction, the attention of the men was diverted, giving the Burmese ample time to accomplish their ends. They also carried away the sentry's musket and belts. Since this atrocious murder was committed, double sentries have been planted. Just as I am writing, the bugle sounds for the 'assembly' of the 18th Royal Irish, one of their picquets having been attacked a little way out by a body of Burmese.

"The country seems to have been entirely deserted for some time, judging from the total absence of food of any sort being found ; not even a grain of rice ; and also from the overgrown state of vegetation. Even the roads and paths are all green and covered with long grass. No accidents have occurred to any of our men ; nor has there been any sickness, save a few trifling cases, since leaving Rangoon. The hospital, an old Poongi house, is situated within a few yards of the steps, and is very convenient. The General and Staff, I believe, return to Rangoon this evening on board the "Proserpine." Brigadier Foord, and his Brigade-Major, Captain Scott, also go. We are to await the arrival of the 2nd Division ; until then, nothing further is to be done."

Intelligence of Admiral Austen's death reached Rangoon as early as the 8th of October. It is needless to say that it was

received by the Naval and Military there with a feeling of sorrow. The gallant Admiral had been "changed into clay"; but then he had died in harness, while serving his country, with his flag flying! Thus, it was neatly remarked, "it is the pride of British sailors and soldiers to die; and his memory will be honourably associated in history with the Second Burmese War."

The "Pluto," while reconnoitring off Prôme, had been fired upon by "two guns well mounted on the crest of a hill, a few jinjals, and several hundred muskets." Then, in the town itself, there were supposed not to be more than five hundred Burmese troops, but numbers were said to be strongly posted a few miles distant inland, at Eutháy-Mew. Major Brett had accompanied the Naval Commander-in-Chief to Prôme.

Just before the melancholy news of the Admiral's death arrived, the Artillery mess at Rangoon had the pleasure of entertaining the purser of one of Her Majesty's men-of-war—a fine old tar of the genuine old school, which is fast passing away, to make room, it is to be hoped, for a better. That very day he had completed forty-one years in the Royal Navy. The Service was now as much changed, he said, from what it was on his entering it, as if it were altogether a Foreign Service. He was very severe on the "young gentlemen." The young gentlemen were too fine now-a-days. In his time, a tumbler between three or four, or a tin pot, or a bottle wanting the neck, sufficed for a mess; but now each must have his cut glass, and he did not know what else besides. He was a promoter of "progress"; but, shaking his head as he pronounced the word, he could not help adhering to his opinion that the "young gentlemen" were too precocious now-a-days. The Yankees were evidently no favourites with him; and he considered their expedition against Japan* as "sheer humbug."

* Strange enough, in 1864 (July), we find a question in the British Senate about our sending troops to Japan. Thus, it would seem, does destiny impel us onward!

Altogether, there was the dry humour of the true British sailor about him which it will not be easy to forget. At this time also, as if by way of variety, the "Moozuffer" and "Feroze" arrived from Calcutta with the greater portion of the Bengal Fusiliers. On the 9th, the "Sphinx" came into port with the remainder. This distinguished corps had come from Meerut, and was under the command of Colonel Tudor.

On the 12th of October the "Pluto" left for Bassein with the body of the Admiral, for whom minute-guns were fired the same day. The "Pluto" was to relieve the "Rattler," which was ordered to proceed with the remains of the late Naval Commander in-Chief to Trincomallee.

Three most useful river steamers had now arrived at Rangoon, the "Lord William Bentinck," the "Nerbudda," and "Damooda." The former had been sent on the 5th to Pegu, "to see what the Burmese were about up there"; she left well provided with ammunition.

On the 6th the head-quarters and a detachment of Bengal Artillery, with about forty horses and numerous bullocks, and two light field-pieces, under Major Turton, embarked on board the steamers "Nerbudda" and "Damooda" for Prome. The subaltern officers who accompanied the light field battery were Lieutenants Willoughby, Dobbin, Ashe, and Lewes.

Some high Burman chief, who had been under the zealous and indefatigable Captain Latter's safe keeping, was now released, leaving, it was said, "his two sons as hostages." It was likewise asserted, with what degree of truth it was impossible to say, that the King of Ava had promised the Peguese that if they would "join in opposing and harassing us, and finally succeed in expelling us from the country, they should have a prince of their own to rule over them, and be again an independent nation!" But these people seemed rather inclined to say—"We *shall* have the British to rule over us!" As may be well imagined the Commissariat establishments had now sufficient work on their hands. It was pleasant enough to hear,

at a time when poor Madras was considered to be sadly in the background, some experienced Bengal officers declaring there could be little doubt that in two most important items we did excel the Bengallis—in the Commissariat and in the Medical Subordinates. However, in the former Department, Major Budd, Captain Simpson,* and their officers, were wisely too much occupied with the service of the State to think of rivalry; and there can be no doubt that in the face of many difficulties they did their work nobly in the Second Burmese War. Another company of Golundauze, under Captain Money, was now added to the Artillery.† On the 16th of October the General, Staff, and Commodore reached Rangoon from Prome. Brigadier Foord, Captains Scott and Robertson, and Dr. M'Cosh also arrived. And now we began to glean some fresh intelligence about Prome, the city which had fallen with so little loss to our troops. The scenery on the Irawady is for the most part flat and uninteresting. No palm-trees, no banyans, to be seen; but plantain trees numerous on the banks, with abundance of brushwood. It may here be remarked that the plantain fruit is as commonly used in Burma as the potato in England.

Near the Panlang Creek the river is so narrow that two steamers can hardly pass abreast. On nearing Prome the scenery improves, becoming picturesque, and not unlike the Rhine. At the city itself the river is more than a mile broad. Yen-benzeik, a pretty village, with richly-wooded hills, crested with pagodas, presents a beautiful distant view. Prome was described to us as boasting its few artificial as well as natural beauties, the wood-carving there especially being very fine. The golden pagoda likewise commanded its share of admiration. As at Rangoon, the Burmese had removed the old town from the beach, or rather from the bank of the river. Regarding the

* Chief of the Bengal Commissariat.

† The 5th Company, 9th Battalion, Bengal Artillery.

before-mentioned act of cutting off the European sentry's head, General Godwin had written to Bandoola, through Captain Smith, the Burmese interpreter, protesting against the barbarous murder,[§] and reminding the chief that on a treaty being concluded the act would be one of the first for which he should be called on to give an account. Although we imagine Bandoola had very little to say to the business, yet we believe that the General's excellent letter, which also remarked on the way in which we treated our prisoners, was not without a salutary effect. The four steamers* which had come down with the General and Commodore made the passage in forty-eight hours; they were just thirteen days in going up, including the time lost by the "Fire Queen" having stuck in her progress through the Irawady. The "Sesostris" now acted as a sort of troop and guard ship off Prome. The once noble war-steamer had of course been lightened considerably previous to her voyage up the river. Portions of the 2nd Division, including H. M.'s 51st, were now ordered to hold themselves in readiness to proceed to Prome at a moment's notice. Rangoon became once more a scene of bustle and preparation. By the 22nd of October the intelligence was generally spread that the King of Ava had sent down for Bandoola to come into the royal presence. He was ordered to appear before the Golden Foot in the dress of a woman, having disgraced himself by losing his army in July. Bandoola would not go, as he feared the King, or perhaps the loss of his head more. The wily chief therefore thought it wise to leave his stockade at or near Eutháy-Mew,† and come over to the English. He did so—delivered himself up to Sir John Cheape—and was now a prisoner on board the "Sesostris."

* The "Proserpine," "Phlegethon," "Mahanuddy," and "Fire Queen."

† Three thousand or four thousand men were reported to be at Eutháy-Mew.

On the 25th the Burmese had a grand ceremony on the upper terrace of the Great Rangoon Pagoda, which consisted in putting up an immense orange-coloured cloth round the bell end of the vast exterior of Gautama's Temple. They likewise put one up round the smaller pagoda near it. These cloths are sometimes sent by people to the Phongyees from distant parts, as substitutes for attending the sacred feasts and meetings at Rangoon, where it is considered all such assemblies are of vast importance.

On the following day there was another grand Gautamaic display, that of placing the drooping muslin pipe* encircled by orange-wreaths, in the foliage of the beautiful banian tree, in which it appeared to be blown about so gently as if simply intending to woo the air. To others must be left the pleasant task of informing the public on this ceremony, which, on the present occasion, was carried on during the striking of gongs and the clamour of a vast mixed Burmese assembly.† The pagoda at Prome, they say, is dedicated to the Hare; by no means an unimportant dedication in the religion of Gautama. It may not interrupt in any very serious manner the chain of this narrative if we here remark, to satisfy the curiosity of those interested, that Gautama—the fourth or last Buddha—is supposed to have been a hare in one of his previous transmigrations. A hare in Burmese is *yon*. Yong-meng signifies the Hare-Governor—that is in a measure among the Burmese the present ruler of the Universe. There are said to have been twenty-eight Buddhas originally in all; twenty-three have appeared in different successive worlds previous to the present world; of the remaining five four have appeared, the fifth is yet to come. The inferior celestial regions are said to be inhabited

* Some of the Burmese style this Tan-hgun. *Tan-hgun Deing*, according to Chase, means "flag-post."

† After twelve or fifteen days the cloths and ornaments are removed from the temples, trees, and sacred posts.

by the Nats or Fairies. At Rangoon, if we recollect aright, Mr. Kincaid said there were about sixteen hells in the Buddhist religion; but the number varied. During a journey to Ava he had seen 'some very curious infernal resemblances engraved on palm leaves. Time would not permit our waiting to hear the learned lecturer enter fully into his interesting subject, so we merely glean the following information,—that the four states of suffering or punishment in general use are hell—transmigration into insects, reptiles, and fish—transmigration into animals—and the abode of the fallen Nats under the Mayenmo hill. Then, again, the worshippers of Gautama entertain the hope of being numbered among those who by some miraculous change have become "raised above the common destinies, passions, and infirmities of human nature." The Pali word *Niebban*, already alluded to, means annihilation, or emancipation from all evil. By some it is believed to be a state of total annihilation, by others a state of perfect tranquillity and abstraction, like the quiet visage and demeanour of the wooden or alabaster Gautama. And now, after all this mixture of sublimity and absurdity, many Burmese think that the greatest glory of the present Phya (god), the fourth Gautama, on the appearance of the last or maistree (chief) Buddha incarnate, will be again to breathe in and assume the form of a hare! Perhaps in these wild beliefs it is not too much to trace the origin of such a remark as that put by Shakspeare into the mouth of Ophelia:—"They say the Owl was a baker's daughter; we know what we are, but know not what we may be."

The river steamers with any intelligence from Prome were always welcome to the *quid nunc* sojourners at Rangoon. At this time we learned that there had been several cases of cholera in the monastery at Prome, where the 80th had taken up their abode. A detachment of H. M.'s 51st had already left; the remainder was now in orders to proceed on the 27th. A portion of the 40th Bengal Native Infantry had embarked for Prome; and another portion of Major Reid's Horse Battery,

under Lieutenants Anderson and Fraser, was about to leave Rangoon for that important scene of rendezvous.

On the 26th of October the 10th Bengal Native Infantry, of the 2nd Bengal Brigade, arrived. The admirable state of discipline which, at a critical time, preparatory to crossing the *Kala Panee*—literally the dark water—distinguished this fine corps, was a subject of eulogium throughout Bengal. It was said that emissaries from certain malcontent corps in that Presidency had been trying to dissuade the 10th from crossing the water ; but like good soldiers they were true to the last to their honourable and liberal masters ; and the regiment arrived, after roughing it a little, in splendid condition at Rangoon. Colonel Dickenson, who had been appointed to command the 2nd Bengal Brigade, might well be proud of his corps, which now fell under the command of Major Welchman. No doubt the 10th* wondered at the idea of, for one moment, a soldier not going where he was ordered. The chief fault, however, in the case of any native corps, did not lie with the Bengal sepoy but in the Bengal system. We certainly have ordered these matters better in Madras ; and there can be no question but that the Bengal sepoys should be enlisted to go anywhere and do anything according to the call of duty.†

On the 27th it was announced that a chief recently captured was the adopted son of the late Rangoon governor. He said that his father would come in ; but having fired upon our flag of truce he was afraid to do so. A female, described as the wife of the adopted, likewise appeared as a warlike *Rosalind* in man's clothes. Gathering information from the Prome party was now not an unimportant occupation among the doings at Rangoon. We were not surprised to hear from one or more quarters that the General was annoyed at not having had a

* Not a General Service Corps.

† This was eventually well manifested by them in the call for Indian native troops during the late Russo-Turkish war.

decisive action at Prome. It was natural also that he should have been irritated by the navy during its previous progress on the river, having, after procuring wood and provisions, left the friendly villagers to the mercy of the Burmese soldiery. The naval officers present on these occasions, of course, were not to blame; they simply obeyed orders, but they never should have been there. Immediately after Captain Tarleton's operations on the Irawady, which few will now look upon in their originally intended light, that of a surveying expedition, the naval force under Captain Shadwell—finding, as it must have done, that it could only afford very inadequate protection to the friendly population in the important towns and villages on the river's banks—should have been withdrawn. Its presence only held out false hopes of protection to people who might have sought refuge elsewhere.* Some may therefore insist on the fact that the unsupported presence—there is no necessity to say advance—of the steam flotilla on the Irawady was the cause of much misery to the friendly people of the country. It doubled Burmese vengeance against our allies. Had there been none of this naval meandering before the regular advance of the army in the steamers, the General might have found a determined and powerful enemy to resist his occupying a position at Prome. A blow might then have been struck at the ancient city itself which might have annihilated the Burmese army, and at once have forced the Golden Foot to any terms we might have chosen to dictate. Numbers of course will dissent from these opinions; it is utterly impossible to argue on such a subject with satisfaction to all parties; but there is one thing certain, that all concerned were interested in serving the State faithfully and well!

* The indefatigable exertions of Captain Shadwell, R.N., and of Major Brett, in defending Shouk Shay Khenee, with Her Majesty's allies, against numbers of *Burmese*, were worthy of the highest praise.

On the 30th of October the report of an attack by the Burmese on Henzada reached Rangoon. It was simply a "brush" with the enemy at that important position, beside the junction of the Bassein river with the Irawady. Captain A. Becher, of the 40th Bengal Native Infantry, with only one company of his regiment, highly distinguished himself on this occasion by his promptitude and gallantry in repelling the Burmese, for which he received the thanks of General Godwin.

By the end of the month nearly the whole of H. M.'s 51st and the 40th Bengal Native Infantry had embarked for Prome. On the arrival of the 9th Madras Native Infantry, either there or at minor posts on the river, the whole of the 2nd Division would have left Rangoon. On the 29th, H.M.S. "Hastings" had left for Madras, homeward bound.

On the 1st of November a terrific explosion took place, which few will forget during their lives if they were at the time on the upper terrace of the Great Dagon Pagoda,—the discharge of heavy artillery, the rattling peals of thunder, will not describe it. It was like some demon inside the earth growling for a considerable length of time with a terrible power, certainly not of this world; the noise wound up by the fury of Jupiter in full play, hurling about the bolts which Vulcan is reputed to have forged for Jove! It turned out to be the explosion of a small magazine near the theatre, to the southward, where there were many boxes and barrels of ammunition and some powder. The explosion set fire to the temple of Thalia, which soon appeared in one huge and dangerous blaze.* The large magazine on the west was immediately occupied by men with buckets. Through the exertions of the troops this important building was saved; if it had not been, few of us would have been left alive to tell the tale. The casualties amounted to three Burmese and two or three of the native lascars killed and wounded. Pieces of

* This pleasant place of amusement, with all its excellent scenery, was entirely destroyed.

wood, fiery gun-wads, and musket balls,* were sent into the air with terrific force; and an artillery European gunner, who was sentry over the upper magazine at the time, was lifted some feet off the ground! A committee of three field officers assembled at the Artillery Mess-house to inquire into the cause of the explosion, and to report on the extent of damage done; and the impression at length became general that it was accidental.

Akouk-toung,† it was now said, had been occupied by the Burmese with two guns. On the 8th of November five dacoits were caught by the *Thoogyee* (Judge) of Dalla. One of them was described to be the leader of five hundred men of the King's army; the titles given him by Royalty were engraved on palm leaves; these were carried by his servant.

On the 11th a company of the 9th Madras Native Infantry, and one from the Bengal Fusiliers were sent to Puzendoun and Dalla, respectively, as a guard to the friendly inhabitants in these near positions to Rangoon. Attacks by the Burmese had rendered such measures necessary.

On the 12th, the melancholy news reached us of the death of Britain's greatest warrior—Wellington! The "Times" was magnificent in its eulogium on the departed hero who had "EXHAUSTED NATURE AND EXHAUSTED GLORY." But indeed all the leading journals seemed to vie with each other in doing honour to his memory. We do not believe that on any previous occasion so much graphic, elegant, and impressive writing had been poured forth by the Press.‡

The 4th Regiment of Local Sikh Infantry arrived on the 12th at Rangoon. Major Armstrong's corps was regarded as quite a curiosity in Calcutta, and its appearance here was con-

* Some of these actually came through the thatch of the author's house, though some hundred yards away from, and about forty feet above, the magazine.

† On the right bank of the river, some fifteen miles below Prome.

‡ His Grace's valuable opinion on the Second Burmese War was probably the last given by the "Iron Duke" on the familiar subject of a campaign.

sidered to be an event of no ordinary importance.* The Ramghur Cavalry also arrived. On the 15th news reached us from Prome that a force had proceeded to Akouk-toung, and had captured four guns. Another had landed at the stockade opposite Prome. The enemy were completely surprised by the tars and troops. Landing at different places, the gallant sailors and marines drove the Burmese into the hands of our soldiers, who made quick work of a large number of them, with little loss on our side. Upwards of ninety Burmese were said to have been killed.

News of a sad nature from Prome informed us of the death of Captain Rundall of the Madras Engineers, commanding the corps of Madras Sappers and Miners in Burma. This excellent officer had served with distinction in the Chinese war. His gallantry on the field in Burma has already been alluded to in the second part of this Abstract. He was a zealous soldier, of high talent, and of the most exemplary character; and he died in the prime of life beloved and regretted by all. In him another had been added to the list of worthy men who had fallen by a stronger hand than that of the enemy.

It may be recollected by the reader of the former narrative that early in June 1852 a force of between two hundred and three hundred men, under Major Cotton, left Rangoon to attack the city of Pegu. The troops did their work in what may be called dashing style, while exposed to the fierce rays of a burning sun. The enemy were driven out, but did not suffer very great loss. It was then much to be

* The following is an analysis of the men then composing the 4th Sikh Infantry :—

" Sikhs	500
Afghans	150
Punjabees	100
Goorkhas and Hindustanis	150—200."

The Governor-General, it was said, had paid the Sikhs the high compliment of visiting them; and the regiment had been furnished with percussion arms, which, at Rangoon, with the British bayonet, they seemed to carry with as much pride as the British soldier.

regretted that General Godwin could not afford troops for the permanent occupation of Pegu. 'The real capture and occupation were now to come.

By the middle of November four river steamers were under orders for Pegu, to convey a force consisting of three hundred of the Bengal Fusiliers, three hundred of the Madras Fusiliers, four hundred of the 5th Madras Native Infantry, with small detachments of Artillery and Sappers, and two guns. Brigadier M'Neill of the 2nd Madras Brigade was appointed to command. The Bengal Fusiliers were under Colonel Tudor, the Madras under Major Hill, the 5th companies under Major Shubrick, and the Artillery under Captain Malloch of the Bengal army. The Sappers were under Lieutenants Shortland and Harris. General Godwin was to accompany the force, when it was to be expected with his accustomed energy he would superintend operations. The troops embarked on Friday morning, the 19th of November, at daybreak, and anchored the next day at sunset, a little below Pegu. In consequence of the shallowness of the river the steamers were not engaged. The force landed on the morning of Sunday the 21st, amidst a dense fog. The fatigue endured by the troops was very great, and the casualties in this gallant affair were considerable. The Grenadiers and Rifle companies of the 5th Madras Native Infantry, under Captain Wyndham, were on board the "Mahanuddy." The following notes may be selected as containing at least a faithful account of the capture and occupation of Pegu:—


"My detachment (5th M. N. I.), all ranks included, was 400 strong; 280 were with me in the foremost steamer, the 'Bentinck,' the remainder with General Godwin in the 'Mahanuddy.' At noon, on the 19th, we first sighted armed Burmese; that night we were aground about seven miles below Pegu. I was requested to furnish strong picquets on the eastern bank for the protection of the steamers. Captains Watts and Nicholls were sent with their companies. I visited all the sentries, who were in a jungle so dense they could not

be seen at a distance of 20 yards one from the other. On the afternoon of this day I had accompanied Captains Lambert and Seymour, R.N., who attended the expedition—the former in charge of all the gun-boats, the latter as an ‘amateur’—and Captain Digby of the ‘Bentinck,’ in an armed cutter up the river, which we found staked, but of sufficient depth. We rowed till the noise of shouting from a vast multitude, about 150 yards ahead of us, told us we were discovered. The town proved to be Pegu, and the people its inhabitants. I concluded those armed among them were not there, but at their respective posts awaiting the arrival of our force, of which the smoke of the steamers and the guns we had been compelled to fire had given them notice, for we were not interfered with. At 10 P.M. our picquets were attacked, and a sharp fire poured upon them, which was as promptly returned.

“On the 20th, at daybreak, we advanced about a mile or so, the tide having fallen. I was requested to furnish companies on either bank, for the clearance of the jungle. Captain Watts and Lieutenant Whitlock performed this duty, aided by all spare hands from the steamer, and several men of H. M.’s ship ‘Fox,’ under Mr. Daws, who all worked with right good will. In the course of the day we exchanged many shots with the Burmese, who, before and after the return of the working parties, came boldly down and delivered their fire on the steamer. At 5 P.M. the remaining steamers appeared in sight; we weighed and proceeded about two or three miles, and dropped anchor. I was again called on for a strong picquet—this time on the western bank—which I accompanied and placed in person, under Lieutenants Maud and Cloeté. About 7 P.M. General Godwin arrived, and directed me to have my detachment drawn up on the Pegu bank, at 6 A.M. the next morning. The Sappers also came with the Artillery, and remained on board for the night, the former under Captain Elliot, Bengal Engineers, being engaged for a couple of hours during the night scarping the bank for the easier ascent of the

two 24-pounder howitzers the next morning. The river is very narrow where the landing took place, but the banks are very steep. The scene on board that night, so crowded as we were by the new arrivals, beggars all description.

“ At 4 A.M. (November 21st) the 5th got under arms, and about a quarter to 5 the landing began. We were soon formed up, as ordered, occupying a grove of plantains. The Rifles and Grenadier companies shortly joined me; and by 6 A.M. General Godwin in person came and gave me his orders; they were, in the advance on Pegu, or any other movement which might take place, to keep up with the Madras Fusiliers, and not lose sight of them. Supposing the following to be a rough sketch of Pegu, the position of the troops will be clearer to you:—



1. Gateway. 2. Gun-boats. 3. 'Bentinck' and other steamers.
4. M. F.—Madras Fusiliers. 5. B. F.—Bengal Fusiliers.

“At a quarter past 6 A.M. the firing began from the jungle, close round and about the troops. Four or five casualties immediately occurred. General Godwin, who was ever in the front, was reconnoitring. The advance was first contemplated through the jungle, between the river and the wall, and the Bengal and Madras Fusiliers, feelers from both, were pushing in that direction; but the severity of the fire proved the Burmese were there in a strong position, and a flank movement parallel with the south wall, and distant about one hundred and fifty yards from it, was begun and continued for nearly two miles through breast-high grass and a dense—most dense—jungle. Before the movement a working party, covered by the Rifles of the 5th, was sent forward to clear a track, and nobly they did their work, the whole force following as they best could, scattered here and there in single and double files over the whole way, a heavy fire pouring upon them for four hours and a half. The guns and Sappers, the former covered by the Grenadiers of the 5th, had been hurried meanwhile to the front. Advantage was taken, wherever it could be had, of a good bank to pour in volley after volley; but of course the whole force was greatly scattered. The sun was fearful, and the fatigue very great. By the time General Godwin had arrived with the working party, Rifles, and hindmost portion of the Bengal Fusiliers opposite the gateway which was to be stormed, it was discovered that most were dead beat, and that some time must elapse before anything like proper columns could be formed. By dint of great exertions the best part of the Bengal, and about half of the Madras, Fusiliers were at last got together, allowed breathing time,—the Rifles forming a line of skirmishers in their front,—then nobly harangued by General Godwin, and, with a British cheer, let loose on the gate and the crumbling wall, the ditch here having little water in it. The fire while the columns were being formed was very severe, and opposite the gate and at the south-west portion of the wall, where the 5th were first formed up, was the severest expe-

rienced. Captain Seymour, a gallant sailor (the amateur), was first of all the assailants, and conspicuous throughout the day. Passing the gateway, the storming parties drove the Burmese, now flying to the westward, fast before them, and then retracing their steps, made as rapidly as they could for the pagoda, about a short mile distant. Here some volleys were exchanged, and Pegu was in our possession. This was about noon.

"All this time the 5th, that is the remaining portion of them, with the remaining half or so of the Madras Fusiliers, were returning the severe fire at extended order, as they best could, along the south face of the wall, but collected within three-fourths of a mile or so of the river, knowing nothing of what was going on ahead, the firing permitting no sounds of any kind to reach them. Once only a staff officer, Captain Darroch, came down, and noticing the heaviness of the fire, directed me, in my flank march, not to lose sight of the possibility of the Burmese occupying the intervening space between the left of my line and the field hospital, which had been formed on the spot where the 5th landed. At noon, another staff officer came down and hurried the Madras Fusiliers on my right, and the 5th, up to the pagoda. Our fire, doubtless, kept the Burmese from passing along the whole length of the south wall, as General Godwin moved in that direction, and in fact quite disconcerted their plans, for they were not prepared for an assault where it was made; and keeping up a steady and rapid fire, they were so held in check between the two points. The Rifle company had one officer wounded severely, Lieutenant Whitlock; two privates killed, and five wounded; the Grenadiers none. About the centre, between the south-west angle and the place of assault, the fire was far less severe *at times*, and in my remaining detachment I lost one officer; Lieutenant Cloeté severely wounded; one havildar killed; and two privates wounded."

By the 24th the General, with the greater portion of the

troops, had returned to Rangoon, having left a force at Pegu under Major Hill. He was, on the whole, pleased with the gallant affair, though he had to lament the loss of several brave officers and men. About to storm the pagoda, our gallant Chief "nobly harangued the troops," in a practical style seldom surpassed. "Now," he said to the Fusiliers, "*you* are Bengallis, and *you* are Madrassis; let us see who are the best men!" A deafening cheer—a rush—and all was over! Pegu had fallen; but, we trusted, only to rise in greater beauty than ever! Our loss was three officers wounded; one, Lieutenant Cook, of the Commissariat, mortally; and from thirty-five to forty of the men, Europeans and sepoys, were killed and wounded. Two or three officers were disabled by the sun, among them the worthy Brigadier, Malcolm M'Neill.* They were fighting from 7 A.M. till 1 P.M.

All zealous soldiers should, we thought, come to this country and learn what fatigue is, fighting with the enemy in ambush, under a Burmese sun! Had there been carriage, it is highly probable that the General would have gone on to Sittang and Beling.

Brigadier Elliott, commanding the 1st Madras Brigade, with Captain Manners and Lieutenant Pilmer, Staff, had now left for Prome. Intelligence had arrived at Rangoon of the death of Captain Gardner,* of the 40th Bengal Native Infantry, at Akouk-toung. One story went that he was out patrolling—the "Enterprise" lying off Akouk-toung, high and dry the while—and going rather far into the jungle, he suddenly came upon a work of the enemy; a jinjal was fired at him, and he

* General Godwin bestowed his thanks on the following officers in his Despatch:—Brigadier M'Neill, Commander Shadwell, Lieutenant-Colonel Tudor, Majors Hill and Shubrick, Majors Mayhew and Boulderson, Captains Malloch, Brown, Hamilton, Darroch, Burne, Renaud, Latter, and Chads, A.D.C. The enemy was stated to have amounted to upwards of five thousand men.

† Killed on the 19th November.

fell, shot through the head; a havildar, in trying to recover the body, was shot also. He was, we were informed, a son of the Honourable Lieutenant-General Gardner of the Royal Artillery, and had just been appointed a brigade-major on the permanent establishment. He was a man of considerable ability, and his kindly disposition could not fail to strike one immediately on coming in contact with him.

Sixteen iron 9-pounders having arrived, chiefly for the defence of the second terrace of the Great Pagoda, Colonel Anstruther, with his usual practical knowledge and zeal in all matters relating to Artillery,—on the efficiency of which, there cannot be the shadow of a doubt, the security, offensive as well as defensive, of all nations chiefly depends,—allowed several officers to peruse an excellent paper he had written on the expediency of having all iron 9-pounder guns reamed out to 12-pounders, so as to throw a 12-pounder shot.* The 24-pounder was the favourite breaching gun in the Peninsula—at Badajoz and at St. Sebastian. But the weight of the iron 9-pounder reamed to a 12 is more than half the weight of a 24-pounder gun. Weight should be dispensed with on land service as much as possible. It is a terrible drawback, especially in such countries as Burma. With the Navy weight is of little or no consequence. Robins' rule—"the strength of iron is as the quantity of metal"—fully sanctions the general introduction of all 9-pounders (iron) being reamed out to 12's. Again, Colonel Anstruther proved by experiment that a 12-pounder reamed up to an 18, with carronade windage, is superior to all 18-pounders now in use for land service. Those who uphold the use of weighty guns on land forget the vast amount of toil and trouble necessary to bring them along. Reaming, such as pro-

* It must be kept in mind that these remarks were written a good many years ago, before the improvements of Armstrong, Whitworth, and others, astonished the world.

posed, improves the windage, and diminishes the weight of our Indian train.

The country about Pegu was described to be in an uncultivated state; the Peguese had, on account of the war and its effects, neglected to till the ground.* It seemed for the time as if a beautiful and fertile province were on the verge of ruin.

Major Reid, with two guns of his horse battery, embarked for Prome on the 26th of November. A company of the 9th Madras Native Infantry also left for Yangain-chainya.

On the 27th we received intelligence that the chief who had so distinguished himself at Puzendoun had managed to destroy some three hundred or four hundred of the enemy who were escorting rice to various posts. This, with the fact of an attack having already been made on the newly captured city of Pegu, showed very plainly that there were some desperate characters about. The news of this latter affair was not unexpected by many, and the receipt of it was considered to be of little importance.

On the 6th of December poor Walter Cook was no more. A finer young officer than this (of the 22nd Madras Native Infantry) never stepped. The author had served with him in the field among the jungle regions of Orissa (in 1848), where his ardent temperament and zeal for the public service were conspicuous in a remarkable degree.

Pegu had been attacked a second time by the Burmese, on which occasion it was said a large party of the enemy went to an old house where we had formerly lodged a picquet, and fired away for about two hours. The quarters had been vacated some days before this act of gallantry on their part; some two

* It is during the months of June, July and August, that the Burmese plough, sow, and harrow the ground after their own fashion.

thousand people were said to have come into Pegu the next day seeking Major Hill's protection.

It is now time to turn our entire attention for a while to this important quarter; but it may be well to chronicle a few events before leaving Rangoon. The headquarters of Artillery left for Prome on the 9th of December. A French officer,* who had established himself as a favourite, appeared on the morning of packing up, and gave a few suggestions as an old campaigner. In June he had come over in the "Emperor" from Calcutta, and was then said to have been employed by the Golden Foot. He struck not a few of us as being a sensible and well-spoken man. He had done everything and had been everywhere. He had served in the Brazils, in Africa, in Spain, and in Portugal. "The Burmese," said the Adventurer, "were very brave behind a stockade or a breastwork, but they knew nothing of regular warfare." He had a particular horror at Royalist France being turned into the country of a republic. General Godwin now cared little about what the French officer did, although he considered himself on parole and under surveillance. But things were very different in June, when it was thought necessary to send the "Fire Queen" and "Berenice," on her voyage from Calcutta, to bring the "Emperor" in sight of the Commodore, and our Adventurer before the General.—The evening before the departure of the Prome party (8th) was saddened by the death of Brigadier M'Neill, already mentioned as having been disabled by the sun, in the operations against Pegu. He never recovered from the fatigue and exposure attending the capture. He was of the old school, an excellent and gallant officer, and a great favourite in the army.

On the afternoon of the 9th intelligence arrived that Pegu

* D'Orgoni, afterwards the famous "general," of Ava celebrity.

was surrounded or besieged. Two hundred Fusiliers and quantities of ammunition were ordered to be shipped immediately "To the rescue!" was the thought of every officer and soldier in Rangoon.

CHAPTER II.

THE BURMESE INVESTMENT OF PEGU.—CRITICAL POSITION
OF MAJOR HILL AND HIS TROOPS.—SUMMARY OF MILI-
TARY TRANSACTIONS.

It seemed to be General Godwin's policy to retain Pegu as a most important military position. He had won it after a rather severe conflict, but yet the fact appeared to have escaped him that the Burmese set any great value upon it. Might there not be a combination among the hostile villages of the Sittang Valley to recapture it? On the 22nd of November all the troops, with the exception of two hundred Madras Fusiliers under Major Hill, two hundred of the 5th Madras Native Infantry under Captain Wyndham, two guns, with a small detachment of European Artillery, and some Madras Sappers, were ordered to return to Rangoon. The news that a small garrison was left to defend the ancient fortress and all the inhabitants of the country who chose to come under our protection, was not long in reaching the Burmese camp. Perhaps at this time it was thought by the enemy that they could stand a defeat, but could not bear to be despised. It certainly does seem strange that our Military Commander did not calculate on a speedy

attempt at recapture by the Burmese, who knew tolerably well that on the General's return to Rangoon there was every chance of his proceeding as soon as possible to take the field at Prome. Rangoon was now in a position to have afforded a considerably greater military force, at Pegu than what was left there. Very different was it from the month of June when the first capture took place. The plans of the campaign were then, it appeared, in a slow and uncertain state of development, and it was probably prudent at such a time not to draw away troops from our chief conquest. But now, through the unceasing exertions of the Engineers and Sappers, much had been done to the fortifications of Rangoon, and numerous pieces of ordnance had arrived to strengthen that noble fortress. Allowing for the absence of a division of the army at Prome, and troops elsewhere, some three hundred or four hundred men more, one hundred and fifty of these at least Europeans, could have been left with ease to garrison Pegu.

As soon as the night of the 24th of November the enemy made an attack upon our gun-boats, but were immediately repulsed. Late in the evening of the 27th they made a most daring attack on all sides of the pagoda, but as the garrison turned out in a few minutes, they were at once vigorously repelled. The troops remained on the alert till morning, when on examining the ground several dead Burmese were seen. A most desperate attack had likewise been made upon the gun-boats in the river and the Commissariat Guard.

About 8.o'clock on the morning of December 6th, the enemy—infantry and cavalry—surrounded the pagoda, and attacked us in great force. They continued to annoy us with jinjals and musketry all that day and during a great part of the night, and succeeded in driving off a large herd of the Pegu buffaloes.

From the 7th till the 13th inclusive, the enemy, according to one of the besieged, were firing jinjals and musketry day and night. On the 11th two gun-boats arrived from Rangoon with stores and ammunition: but these were driven back after

losing several men.* The gallant besieged were now doing their utmost, animated during their unceasing toil with the hope of a speedy reinforcement. Major Hill had sent in three or four bold messengers to Rangoon. The foe seemed determined to drive the small band from Pegu; in addition to their rude iron and leaden balls, small brass representations of Gautama, pieces of iron, necks of bottles, even stones, or round lumps of granite brought hither for the purpose, were fired on our troops from every quarter. Truly the position of Major Hill was at this time hardly less critical than that of the immortal Clive at the famous defence of Arcot. The Burmese had managed to bring a gun of considerable size into a commanding position, which dealt forth several deadly missiles. According to another of the besieged, spent balls hit some one or other very frequently; several of our men were thus wounded at night and not discovered till the morning.

Before turning to the Relief of Pegu, it may be well to give a summary of military transactions in November and December 1852, and January 1853, at this bravely manned post.

The sketch is from the manuscript notes of a distinguished officer present throughout this arduous service:—"The besieging chief Mounk-Kyouk-Loung's entire force consisted of eleven thousand men, disposed as follows:—two thousand men at

* See Appendix No. VIII., "Pegu," p. 469. On the 10th, Captain Shadwell proceeded with the war-boats to Pegu, also the "Nerbudda" with the Fusiliers. Some seventy-five rounds per gun had been shipped on the evening of the 9th with the greatest speed, through the energy of Captains Voyle and Robertson. At 3 P.M. of December 11th, we received the disastrous intelligence that the boats under Captain Shadwell and the steamer had been compelled to return. The enemy being in vast numbers and more determined than ever, he wisely returned for reinforcements; but not without the war-boats—containing also Captain Malloch and a small party of European Bengal Artillerymen—having had an affair with the Burmese, in which our loss was a sergeant and two men of the Artillery killed, and two or three wounded; also several marines and sailors killed, and many wounded. It was a serious affair, and the whole required and received immediate attention.

Shwé-gyeen, ninety-seven miles north of Pegu; one thousand men at Sittang, thirty-two miles east of Pegu; and eight thousand at Pegu,* which latter force opposed the British troops on the 21st of November 1852. In addition to the small body left to garrison the pagoda—which post was under the command of Major W. Hill of the 1st Madras Fusiliers—to keep the river clear of the enemy's boats passing by, two gun-boats were also left at Pegu under the command of Lieutenant Mason, R.N., of H.M.S. "Fox." Each boat carried a 12-pounder howitzer and 12-pounder rockets. The boats were completely hidden from the pagoda by thick belts of bamboo jungle, which grew up to within one hundred yards of the great temple.

General Godwin had left the once famous capital of an independent kingdom, assured that no force would again assemble in that part of the province. So little did he think of the enemy daring to attack the garrison of Pegu, that he left a Peguese chief, by name MOUNG-LOUNG, with about fifty followers, to induce the families of the inhabitants to come in, settle themselves quietly in their houses, and re-people the then almost ruined and deserted city. But this glorious consummation was not in the order of things; and, as has been seen, was not destined to be accomplished. It was too much, after losing the Shwé Dagon—the stronghold of Gautama—to lose also the Shwé-madoo PRAW, which for so many centuries had towered in sublime magnificence to the skies. Some idea of what the troops had to defend may be gained from the following particulars:—The pagoda stands upon three terraces; the upper one contained the troops of the garrison and the commissariat stores; the upper platform was nearly a square, each side of which measured from two hundred and ten to two

* Under MOUNG-GYEE, the Commander-in-Chief's brother-in-law.

hundred and twenty yards.* A low brick wall, three feet high, had formerly enclosed the upper platform. The dilapidation of the walls was on every side apparent, and on the north-east and west sides scarcely any wall remained, but high reedy grass had sprung up—vegetation, as usual, rapid amid the scene of neglect and ruin. A range of low buildings ran along each face in a line with the walls, which no troops occupied. There was a Phongyee house on each side, and adjoining the base of the pagoda itself. In these sanctuaries the officers were quartered, one only being reserved for a magazine. There were four large entrances on the top platform, open, and about thirty feet wide: to join these entrances from below there were between thirty and forty flights of steps. The second terrace was twelve feet below the upper, and extended about forty feet on all sides from the wall. There was then another descent of six feet, when a third terrace also ran about forty feet. The second and third terraces, respectively, were three hundred and twenty and four hundred and fifty yards in length on each side of the pagoda.† The high grass which had grown up all round prevented our posted sentries in many places from seeing each other. Those who are acquainted with Burmese warfare will readily understand how very much exposed our troops were to a sudden surprise, when Burmese are so skilful in preserving silence when creeping through grass to cut down sentries. There were a great many small pagodas on the east and west sides, a little way beyond the lower terrace. These were so close to each other that on the east face, about one hundred and twenty yards off, they formed a complete wall forty yards in length, behind which the enemy were in perfect safety.

* The terrace on which the Shwé Dagon at Rangoon stands is nine hundred feet long and six hundred and eighty-five broad.

† Each side of the base of the temple measures one hundred and sixty-two feet. The shape is octagonal at the base.

Numerous other pagodas were dotted about at distances from one hundred to six hundred yards, and these became formidable barricades when jinjals and matchlocks were fired from behind them. The remaining very important advantage on the side of the enemy was, that the north and east sides of the country being higher than the platform, caused every man to be observed passing to and fro. The gallant defenders, it will now be fully seen, were thus placed in a very critical position, with only four hundred and thirty-five men to defend what required at least one thousand two hundred to maintain, without harassing the soldiery.

But, not at all strange in this contrary world of ours, the very fact of a small band being left to garrison Pegu, this military blunder on the part of the General, was the means of achieving a decided political success. The prowess of the British arms was here displayed to its full extent, which must have struck terror into the hearts of the Burmese assailants, whose tale would run rapidly through the neighbouring hostile soldiery—all tending to bring about the conclusion of the war.

Major Hill commenced his work of defence by barricading the upper platform. Three of the four large entrances to the pagoda were the first places to be looked to. The enemy were in the neighbourhood, and work became the order of the day. Parties from the Europeans and Natives were ordered out. The Peguese were employed in cutting down the high grass with their dhás,—their expertness in the use of which we frequently noticed. All seemed determined to render the citadel as strong as possible. Two brass 4-pounders and a 3-pounder, captured on the 21st of November, were placed in position at the gateways, which were built up the whole breadth of the entrance with timbers, about twelve feet high, leaving just a sufficient opening for the gun.

The following is a detailed account of the attack on the river-picquet and boats on the night of the 27th of November.

These did not escape the attention of the enemy ; for though we heard but a few shots in that direction whilst the pagoda was attacked, yet as soon as they drew off from us they made a desperate assault in that quarter, and we could tell from the firing increasing at intervals more than at others, that the attacks were being resumed ; but the blue jackets, with their marine artillery, made such excellent use of their 12-pounder howitzers and rockets, that, with the support of the picquet on shore, they proved too strong for the Burmese. This was a very unequal contest. There were houses within thirty yards of where the picquet was posted, besides having brushwood all round, which enabled the enemy to conceal themselves, whilst our men were exposed on the bank of the river. Lieutenant P. A. Brown of the Fusiliers commanded on this occasion. Having commissariat stores to protect, that officer with his men had taken the precaution before dark to pile up the bags of rice, tobacco, barrels, and other articles which were lying about, so as to have everything as compact as possible, and then make his post secure in case of an attack. Some of the bags caught fire during the night from the rockets, which encouraged the enemy to approach nearer, when some of our men dashed forward, charged them, and compelled them to retire. After continued assaults had been made upon this little post, British blood, as it always does, proved too much for them, and they withdrew, leaving the picquet quiet for the rest of the night. On this, as on several other occasions during the war, the rocket practice of the boats' crews of Her Majesty's Navy was very good ; and the effect of such practice, added to the untiring efforts of the gallant infantry, plainly showed what a small body of men can do against a large number. It is on such outpost affairs generally that the sharpest firing is seen. General Godwin complimented Major Hill and his force for their steady gallantry in this dashing business, and he trusted that the severe lesson which had been given the enemy would teach the Burmese respect for our new position and the vigil-

ance of its garrison, so as to prevent any future molestation ! The loss sustained in the boats was four seamen and one marine artilleryman wounded. Three men of the Fusiliers were wounded. Lieutenant Mason, R.N., narrowly escaped with his life, a shot having cut through his neck-tie. It was singular that our loss on the 27th was not greater, as the enemy attacked also from the other side of the river, which is about one hundred yards wide where the boats were in position.

In consequence of the Burmese having attempted to escalate on three sides of the pagoda on the night of the 27th, Major Hill found it necessary to appoint a captain to command each face of the pagoda, with instructions that if any one face was pressed by the enemy, the captain on the side attacked was to concentrate his men at the given point of attack until support was given. This admirable arrangement gave a responsibility to the officer commanding each face, and enabled him to act on a sudden without waiting for orders. The commandants of faces appointed were Captains Stephenson and Nicolay of the Fusiliers, to the north and east faces respectively ; and Captains Brown and Wyndham of the 5th Native Infantry, to the west and south. This plan allowed Major Hill to have a general supervision over the whole of the operations, and enabled him to move about and give directions where his presence was most required.

It was soon learned from the manner of this night attack by the Burmese, that they had regularly trained troops opposed to us. Chosen crafty ones had doubtless found their way from the "city of the immortals" to assist Moung-Kyouk-Loung ! Now our men might be seen climbing up the splendid pagoda to take a *coup d'œil* of the surrounding country, and then would appear a cluster of officers talking earnestly over the number of troops and the defences. Uncertainty hovered in the atmosphere. But this, with the British character, only tends to make the nerves firmer, and to raise expectation the higher. It is difficult to say what were the feelings of the de-

tachment of the Native Infantry. They were ready, at a moment's warning, to fight or die by the side of British soldiers!

On the 29th, parties of the enemy were seen moving in various directions to the north of the pagoda; Cassay* horsemen were among them. Next were seen elephants moving about, bearing officers of rank, all apparently determined on another plan of attack. All this, of course, tended to increase the vigilance of the garrison. Major Hill very prudently withdrew the picquet of fifty men on the open bank of the river, a mile away from the pagoda; and Lieutenant Mason, with his boats, was desired to repair to Rangoon. Upwards of forty men of the force were now sick in hospital, and the withdrawal of the river picquet brought additional aid for the defence. It was signally providential that the Burmese did not come on, for Moung-Loung, the Pegu chief, reported to Major Hill during the forenoon of the 1st of Décembre, that a very large train of carts with Talaing families was then making its way to the southward, and that some of their goungs (chiefs) had come in advance to know whether they might claim protection from the garrison. At about 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day two hundred and sixteen carts, laden with the goods and chattels of two thousand persons, chiefly women and children, came in for protection. These poor creatures had taken refuge in the jungles, and had wandered about from place to place, with of course no settled residence while the royal troops remained in the province. "Pity and protect the slave!" was never uttered by the swarthy African with more intense feeling than now marked the desires of those Asiatics—whose ancestors had had a king of their own to rule over them

* "The Muniporeans, or people of Cassay in particular, abound in great numbers, and they are much prized as clever workmen. Owing to their superior skill in the management of the horse, the Burmese cavalry is almost exclusively composed of them; and they are distinguished by the national appellation of 'the Cassay Horse.'"—Major Snodgrass's "Narrative of the First Burmese War."

--as their eyes were directed to the British for protection! The ground covered by their carts occupied several acres, for it must be recollected the Pegu carts and buffaloes are of a prodigious size. It was now a matter of anxiety to afford protection to the families as well as to their property, whilst they lay scattered about, and the enemy were nigh at hand. The infirm, as well as all the women and children, were allowed to remain on the upper platform of the pagoda during the night, while the others remained below to look after the cattle and goods. Reader, just picture to yourself the upper platform of the Pegu Pagoda! It is night, and the troops are wearied after the preparation and arrangements of the day. Sleep for the weary watchers would fain "knit up the ravelled sleeve of care!" Suddenly bursts forth the clamorous noise of children; the sentries cannot hear beyond the walls. There are sick children, and others wanting food; and behold! several officers, up a great portion of the night, feeding the weary and destitute with biscuit, to quiet the Peguese vociferation! The helpless now feel assured that Gautama, through the influence of the fairies dwelling in the golden *tee* above, has sent guardian angels to protect them! As this arrangement inconvenienced the troops, it only lasted three nights. Major Hill determined on destroying all the houses in the street below, as they could only give cover to the enemy; and orders were thereupon issued to stockade in the Peguese under the walls of the pagoda. This severe work was performed in a manner truly admirable—officers and men, every one assisting to fortify the oppressed, after their own national fashion! There was the European working with almost gigantic strength, felling down many a noble tree, working with a right good will; there the skilful and active sapper; and there the sepoy, having stopped work for a time, grinning with a benevolent countenance! The husbands of those we had to protect only a few miles off, and forced to fight against us, were little dreaming of British humanity being exercised towards their kindred under the

walls of Pegu. The stockade, covering about two acres of ground, was soon done. The carts and buffaloes were all systematically arranged, and took up their position in line and column in a manner quite worthy of the "Artillery Exercise." All were stockaded in by nightfall. The women and children were placed in the carts nearest to the walls, so as to shelter them as much as possible from the shot. The men were stationed in front, with their spears, matchlocks, and sharp dhás, to fight for their families—which they did, fearlessly and well. Dr. Beaufleur, the zealous surgeon in charge of the stockaded allies, had several severe cases brought to him for treatment. Spies had been loitering about; and on the morning of the 5th, we could discover, from the elevations of the pagoda, that the movements of the enemy were more extensive than usual, and that they mustered in greater force. The Cassay horsemen did not now conceal their numbers from our view, and were seen galloping about in larger bodies. Towards the evening of that day faint sounds of firing were heard at intervals, as if from a long distance down the river. Night had set in, when a shot was fired from the jungle, which was immediately returned by the sentry who was fired at. Shortly before this it had been reported to Major Hill that a low sound of voices was heard, as of troops moving about in the jungle. Firing soon became the order of the night, and a discharge of canister from a 24-pounder howitzer, in the direction of the voices, roused every one into action. Before 9 o'clock Major Hill was called away from the defences to two sepoys of the 5th Madras Native Infantry, who had hailed the picquet from the jungle—the south picquet—the sergeant of which had brought them in. Fortunately for these men, the firing, which was commenced at the pagoda just before they arrived, was on the east face, whereas they came from the south.* Their object was to-

* Firing was kept up round the pagoda, and did not cease until after midnight, when the moon rose.

report the sad fate of a jemadar and his men, the former of whom, with three or four sepoy, while conveying supplies in a boat from Rangoon, had been killed by the Burmese.

The officers were sitting quietly at breakfast, discussing the deeds of night and morning, when the well-known cry of "Turn out!" raised a stir among all hands; at the same time the Burmese shout of attack was heard at the south-west angle of the pagoda. While the firing at the south-west angle summoned the men to the walls, a very singular and guerilla-like scene was exhibited. In an instant heights, mounds, and pagodas were crowned with men, who opened a sharp but ill-directed fire against our troops. The little curling smoke was now to be seen issuing from the place where was perched each wily matchlock-man; the sky was beautifully clear; every object came to view; and the whole had the effect of a gorgeous panorama. It was soon discovered—from the Burmese balls coming among us from such elevated positions—that our enemies were likely to have the best of it. It was, however, highly ludicrous, in the midst of danger, to hear the men joking with each other as they brought down a man or two from the high pinnacle on which the Burmese had so proudly perched themselves. The surprise having failed, the enemy were no doubt astonished to find that the Peguese were sheltered in a well-made stockade; there was the reality bristling up before their eyes! It was now evident, from the enemy taking possession of the elevations, that they did not intend going away; and so decided an advantage did the heights give them of sweeping the platform with their shot, that nearly fifty rounds of ammunition per man were expended that day in keeping down their fire. To save life it was now requisite to barricade the pagoda as strongly as possible. Lieutenant Campbell, the officer of Engineers, had had no sand-bags supplied him to make a temporary defence; it was, therefore, necessary to apply to the Commissariat for all the empty bags and barrels they could give, and these being found inade-

quate, bags of rice, and barrels of pork and biscuit were also called for. As soon as it became dark the Sappers were set to work. At night gongs were heard in various parts of the jungle, as if the Burmese were assembling their troops. The firing was not so heavy during the night as it had been that day, still there was little cessation of it, while the working parties were heard about the walls. It was of importance to get the Peguese into military order in the event of an attack. Some two hundred and ninety had enrolled themselves as fighting men, but out of that number only fifty had muskets—our old flint-locks—while the remainder were armed with spears and swords. Major Hill visited the stockade, and, with the assistance of a Burmese interpreter, pointed out to Moungr-Loung the way in which he wished his men to be disposed of should an assault take place. The men with fire-arms were placed at short distances between the spearmen, so as to give a greater appearance of strength in that particular arm; a certain number were told off as sentinels on duty, to be regularly relieved. The gongs were placed so as to give orders, and to overlook their own men. Major Hill visited the stockade of the allies every night, to give them confidence, and to see that they were all on the alert. To show how much our troops were exposed on the platform notwithstanding all that had been done, the officers' servants were obliged to erect some kind of protection for the beds of their masters and themselves when they lay down to rest. Several days and nights were passed without any cessation of firing. With all the fatigue of mind and body was excessive, particularly so with the indefatigable commander of the garrison. The chance of being able to eat one's dinner without being shot at seemed remote indeed. An officer of the Fusiliers received a severe contusion while seated at the mess-table; several servants were wounded, and one was killed while waiting upon his master. A Peguer also received a mortal wound while at work inside the mess-house. On the 8th the men began to feel the incessant work. Every man

was daily on duty ten hours out of the twenty-four. The exposure and fatigue increasing, Major Hill at length deemed it absolutely necessary to inform General Godwin of the determined nature of the enemy. All ammunition expended, we would then be compelled to evacuate the pagoda, and force a way back to Rangoon at the point of the bayonet. Four goodly men and true, for fifty rupees a head, came forth from Moung-Loung's detachment and volunteered to carry a letter to General Godwin. Three copies were sent with the original, so that each man had his letter. The Major did not ask for any more men, but added, "All I want is ammunition." As soon as it was dark, the messengers started on their hazardous enterprise. There was a Burmese force on all sides of the pagoda of at least six thousand men, and had the carriers fallen into their hands, they would probably have been decapitated or crucified, according to Burmese custom.

On the morning of the 12th the joyful sound of firing from British war-boats ran like an electric shock through the weary garrison. But despair soon followed, our forebodings were indeed verified,—the naval party had failed in their attempt to communicate with us. From the crowded state of the stockade, together with the cold damp nights and the scanty supply of food they had, cholera broke out among our Peguese allies. Fortunately, the scourge did not extend to the troops. The sudden withdrawal of the gun-boats, with relief so near at hand, quickly became the all-absorbing topic. But the assurance that General Godwin was now aware of our difficulties, served to rouse us to increased effort.

After this event the enemy's fire gradually ceased. Those only who have watched night after night can form an idea of how much a temporary calm is appreciated. But yet it is difficult to reconcile oneself to the change. On the present occasion the whistling of the bullets—the rattling of the boards—the speedy movement—the sound from a cluster of voices,—the want of all this seemed to create a vacancy in the state of

affairs quite unintelligible ! The reply of " All right, sir ! " to the officers on duty passing along their beat, could not disturb well-earned repose. But in the morning, yelling from the Burmese—the firing of canister from our howitzers—and clearing the platform for action, soon destroyed the peaceful delusion. The Burmese having made a determined attempt to force their way into the Peguese stockade, came to a hand-to-hand contest with the allies, who received some severe wounds from spears and matchlocks ; and it was not until they tasted the cold steel from some of our Rifle sepoy's that they drew off.* Another night had closed upon us, when again the welcome sound of a British gun was heard down the river. The Artillery officer reported his hearing guns ; he had also observed a rocket fired perpendicularly. Wellington's remark at Waterloo, " There goes old Blucher at last ! " could scarcely have been uttered with more heartfelt pleasure than " There's old Godwin at last ! " by the garrison of Pegu.

At 11 o'clock on the morning of the 14th the first firing of General Godwin's relieving force was heard. As the troops were seen nearing the pagoda, cheering became general throughout the garrison, and continued until Lieutenant Elliott, who commanded the advanced guard, entered the small aperture—made as an embrasure for one of our small guns—on the eastern entrance of the pagoda.

On the 4th of January, although no troops had been observed moving about, a sudden discharge of musketry issued from the opening of the jungle, which had been cut down. A 12-pounder howitzer, loaded with canister, was ready pointed in the direction, to the north, where it was supposed the

* The loss of the Burmese must have been very great, as they had not before ventured to cross a piece of clear ground. One man of immense stature was found dead, supposed to be a chief. The Peguese hung him up to a tree in triumph, but his body was cut down at sunset, and thrown into a dry well.

enemy might appear, and it was discharged with the happiest effect. Firing now commenced, and at sunset the picquet was increased to one hundred Europeans and fifty sepoy. By that time several men had been wounded.

On the 5th, 6th, and 7th, the working parties were increased and uprights were fixed in the ground, about ten feet from each other, and planks were nailed upon them, as being the most expeditious way of keeping the men out of sight of the enemy. Their attacks were now directed against the north face; and notwithstanding our men had been for some time worried and fired on—in spit of shot flying about—the Europeans were quite observable outside, coolly nailing on the planks, while others sat on the top of the beams, assisting in the work, under a heavy fire all day. The Burmese must have set them down as at least possessing a charmed life; but it was nothing more than British courage and working with a hearty good-will—qualities which had for nearly a century distinguished the Madras Fusiliers. The picquet was obliged to act as a covering party to keep down the fire, otherwise we might have lost many men. The enemy had now taken up a position on the opposite bank of the river with the number of their force increased, and where an irregular brick building was turned into a battery by them. It has not been recorded that on the departure of General Godwin a stockade had been erected, according to his orders, at the landing-place on the bank of the river. The enemy's battery was about one hundred and twenty yards from this stockade, and was a great annoyance to it. The gun-boats, under Captain Tarleton, R.N., having been withdrawn, we could not cross the river to dislodge the enemy from the strong position they had taken up, who, finding that we had no boats, at length rendered the stockade, from its unfinished condition, almost untenable. Up to the 7th one captain was mortally wounded (Captain Nicolay of the Fusiliers), one artilleryman was killed, and thirteen men were wounded. On the morning of the 8th, for some strange

reason difficult to understand, the enemy were seen from the heights of the pagoda marching in two confused columns, in full retreat. They went northward, and never again appeared to oppose us. And thus ended the protracted transactions at Pegu!

In consequence of the "very gallant and distinguished conduct" of Major Hill throughout these stirring events, the Most Noble the Governor-General of India in Council bestowed upon him a special mark of favour.* Previous to this the thanks of the Supreme Government of India were sent him by General Godwin, as well as to the garrison under his orders, for the gallant defence of Pegu:—

"Fort William, 4th January 1853.

* * * * * * *

"4th. The Governor-General in Council requests that you will convey to Major Hill of the Madras Fusiliers, and to the officers and men under his command, the marked acknowledgments of the Government of India, for the bravery and steadiness with which they met and repulsed the continuous and harassing attacks of a large body of the enemy for many days, before reinforcements arrived at Pegu."

* Command of the Gwalior Contingent, with about 2,000 Rs. a month. We had the pleasure of reading the courteous letter from Lord Dalhousie by which this noble gift was conveyed.

CHAPTER III.*

RELIEF OF PEGU, AND OTHER OPERATIONS.—THE
PROCLAMATION.

THE most energetic measures were now taken at Rangoon by General Godwin to answer with all possible speed the needy call for relief which came from the Pegu garrison. Rangoon had not been in such a state of excitement since its capture by the British in April. Had the tide of fortune at length turned against us? Had the mine of Burmese vengeance at length been sprung, to tell us that the dynasty of Alompra was not yet in danger, and rouse us into action? In any way a great event had taken place. The wonted energy of our chief when anything like danger was to be encountered proved him to be the man for this emergency. But General Godwin unfortunately had much difficulty in providing transports for the troops for the relief of Pegu. Two hundred and fifty Madras Fusiliers under Captain Renaud had been obliged to return to Rangoon in consequence of the disabled state of the river steamer "Nerbudda,"

* A melancholy interest is attached to this chapter, it being chiefly written from notes furnished to the author by General Neill—the "avenging angel" of the great Sepoy mutiny—the hero who fell, in 1857, at Lucknow.

in which they had embarked. These troops were transhipped to the "Mahanuddy," a vessel whose boilers had seen rather too much service. It was not, therefore, until both these steamers had been repaired that the head-quarters in the "Nerbudda," and the Madras Fusiliers in the "Mahanuddy," were enabled to leave Rangoon. At noon of the 12th of December both vessels steamed on until sunset, the "Nerbudda" leading. At daylight next morning, which was very foggy, all the boats conveying the other troops, under convoy of Captain Tarleton, R.N., proceeded with the "Nerbudda" up the river; the other steamer was supposed to be following not far astern. They approached the village of Lomen Seedeē as the mist was rising, which was found, as expected, occupied by the enemy, and the river staked, abreast of it. We were quite prepared for the foe; guns loaded, and a party of twenty-five men on each paddle-box—the starboard furnished by the Madras, the larboard by the Bengal Fusiliers. We had evidently taken the Burmese by surprise; some of them were seen about the village, also a large party with some horsemen moving about on the plain. The left bank near where the steamer was anchored was an open plain; higher up and out of shot, stood the village. The troops were soon landed; and it was speedily determined to occupy the village, as affording shelter—it having been taken for granted that the enemy had retreated. The Bengal Fusiliers were, therefore, moved up to some of the nearest houses, when about twenty shots were fired into them from the high grass and jungle adjoining. One man was slightly wounded; the Burmese escaped without either being seen or fired upon. The village was then occupied, the Madras Fusiliers being on picquet in advance. The "Mahanuddy" not having yet arrived with the remainder of the Fusiliers, the other steamer was therefore sent down to bring the men up. The day wore on, and there being no appearance of the steamer, arrangements were made to pass the night in the village, and picquets were thrown out; but no attempt was made to drive

the enemy further away, or out of the village of Upper Seedee, about a mile distant. This village had on several occasions—particularly the last, when the boats were obliged to retire—annoyed the navy considerably; and the occupation of it might have been attended with little or no loss had its entrenchments been turned by a small party, and the enemy there, about three hundred or four hundred men, driven off, and perhaps intercepted.

About midnight a volley was fired into some of the houses, by which one Bengal Fusilier was killed and another was mortally wounded; a sailor was also mortally wounded. Irregular firing now commenced, and the sentries at other points of the line also giving the alarm, some firing—which was fortunately put a stop to in time—had nearly caused considerable confusion, to which the increasing consternation of the servants and few camp-followers would have materially added. Two hours after this disturbance the bamboo flooring of one of the houses occupied by the followers falling in, caused great alarm; the troops of course, without inquiring into the cause, stood to their arms and behaved steadily. The steamer returned during the night with Captain Renaud's party, their detention having been caused by the "Mahanuddy" unfortunately grounding. The troops were landed early in the morning, and by 7 A.M. the whole force advanced in the following order:—Two ship guns dragged by sailors of the Royal Navy, under Captain Shadwell, R.N.; two hundred and fifty Madras Fusiliers under Captain Renaud; one hundred and fifty Bengal Fusiliers under Major Gerrard, and three hundred Sikhs under Major Armstrong, formed the advance of seven hundred men, General Godwin commanding, with Brigadier Dickenson. Two hundred of the 10th Bengal Native Infantry under Captain Monro; four hundred and fifty Bengal Fusiliers under Colonel Tudor—six hundred and fifty men—formed the reserve under Brigadier-General Steel, C.B. The force moved off, marching away from the river so as to avoid Seedee; and on

nearing a small village came upon the high road leading to the south-west gateway of the mound or old wall round the ancient city of Pegu. In the outskirts of the village about three hundred of the enemy were posted, and on the plain about one hundred Cassay horse. On the approach of our advanced troops the enemy cheered and came on towards us, their infantry flanked by their cavalry. Our skirmishers pushed on, answering their cheers; firing commenced, and the Burmese retired, the infantry into the jungle in our front, the cavalry keeping to the plain on our flank. As the head of the column was entering the jungle near the south-west angle of the mound, a short halt took place; the guides had evidently been leading the column in the wrong direction for that point. Counsel was now taken of an excellent guide in Captain Renaud's service, who, having urgently represented that the defences at the west point were particularly strong—as was subsequently seen—and that the proper way, which he offered to show, was by the east side, he was at once directed to lead the column. The force continued its march, and after a very fatiguing morning's work, reached the gateway in the eastern bund.* Here the head of the column first came in contact with the enemy. Captain Renaud's party quickly pushed over the bund. The Burmese came down through the jungle on the flanks of the column, and opened fire on the reserve; their fire was speedily answered, and they were compelled to retire. All then pushed forward and got within the bund. Firing had, up to the time of the column entering the bund, been heard near the pagoda. Telescopes were now in requisition, but nothing could be seen of the garrison. A man was at last discovered on the pagoda; he was made out to be a Burmese soldier; he was immediately afterwards declared to be a Madras lascar. General Godwin, who had been in a state of intense

* An artificial mound of earth.

anxiety, was at once relieved. The force now pushed on to the east gateway of the pagoda; and it was not until a very short distance from it that we observed the garrison, and then learned that the line of bund and old pagodas from which it was commanded, had been occupied by the Burmese until within a few minutes of our entering the fortress, that we had taken them in reverse, and that had we been aware of it, by detaching a party to our right on entering the first bund, we might have cut many, if not all, off. The troops were now "dead beat"; and quietly rising with terrific glow, shone forth the fierce Burmese sun—than which the heat is nowhere more intense, except perhaps occasionally in China. Few out of the whole force were equal to more exertion during the heat of that day. It had been a long and fatiguing march, but not yet was there to be a rest of any duration. All the troops crowded into the pagoda and completely covered its area. Then commenced cordial greetings of welcome; tales of adventure experienced within the last few days; and the frequent remark of the soldier to his comrade on the careworn and fagged appearance of some of the relieved. The men were lying about taking their rest when, about 4 P.M., a fire was opened upon them from the old commanding ground which the enemy had again occupied; in a few minutes several men were hit, and it became necessary to dislodge and drive them out of the defences along the river bank, and south and west faces of the bund. These services were performed in a very brilliant manner by the troops employed; and this being the first time we had an opportunity of beholding the Sikhs acting by themselves, their progress was attentively observed. Nothing could have exceeded their enthusiasm, and their forward propensities were beyond a doubt. They advanced steadily and coolly across a piece of open ground fully exposed to the fire of the Burmese, who, posted on the mound, were completely covered by the jungle; they pushed on, however, without answering the fire, and when sufficiently near, ran in on the enemy and gallantly

drove them from their position. The same men whose bravery had given Lords Hardinge and Gough their peerages, who had proved themselves to be one of the most formidable foes the British ever had to encounter in India, were now nobly acting on our side in defence of order and a just government, nearly three thousand miles from the land of their birth, from the land where the pride of the Khalsa army but yesterday became mutinous, disorganised, and fallen ! The Bengal Fusiliers had been directed to clear the works to the south and west, which they soon did in an effective style, destroying the stockades and defences, out of which they expelled the enemy. All the troops returned after dusk to the pagoda, well tired out ; they slept under what cover they could get ; many, being without great-coats, suffered much during the night from the cold damp and dew, which, no doubt, laid the foundation of much of the subsequent sickness and mortality.

From what we saw of the Cassay horse, and the activity of the enemy in evading us on the plain, we all looked forward to the arrival of Colonel Sturt's land column,* with a portion of Burgoyne's Troop of Madras Horse Artillery, Sappers, Ramghur Cavalry, and 67th Bengal Native Infantry, feeling assured the mounted men would give a good account of the cunning Burmese soldiery on the plains over which they had to pass to reach Shwé-gyeen or Sittang ; and more particularly on the following morning, when the whole Burmese army of about nine thousand or ten thousand men were observed from the pagoda taking up a position and entrenching themselves on the plains about the village of Kully, between four and five miles distant, on the Shwé-gyeen road.

It was now but natural to believe that General Godwin would not venture an attack upon the enemy in such force without aid from the expected land column in the shape of cavalry and artillery. In the first place he could have no guns with him,

* Of some seven hundred men, which General Godwin had despatched to co-operate with his other force.

for he had "no means of drawing them"; and in the second, without cavalry, in any fortunate movement made by our infantry, he had not the means of following up and cutting off the enemy. But no doubt the General's presence was urgently required at Prome. To him time was everything. He would not be content with the glorious achievement of having relieved Pegu, but he was determined also to free that garrison from the near position of the Burmese army! It is difficult to say whether others, similarly situated, would not have been inclined to act likewise; but we think that the majority, under the circumstances, would have waited for the land column. As to time, there was Brigadier-General Steel, a distinguished Company's officer, who could have waited to disperse the enemy with effect, while the senior general was steaming to Rangoon or to Prome, ready to gain any amount of glory that might be in store for him. But it was ordained otherwise.

On the 15th, orders were issued for the force to march on the following morning. During the day this was countermanded in consequence of the commissariat supplies not being brought up. The Burmese were still observed entrenching themselves about the village of Kully, and showed no intention of retiring.

On the 16th nothing was heard from Colonel Sturt's column. According to orders issued on that day the force—composed of five hundred and seventy Bengal Fusiliers, one hundred and eighty-two 10th Bengal Native Infantry, three hundred and thirty Sikhs, one hundred and fifty Madras Fusiliers, and thirty Sappers; total, one thousand two hundred and thirty men—was warned to be prepared to move on the following morning. The men were directed to carry their great-coats, and one day's cooked provisions in their haversacks. A memorandum was also required from the commandants of corps of the positive requirements of their men in the way of shirts and trowsers, with a view to their being procured from Rangoon; men and officers having left Rangoon for this service with the least possible quantity of clothing. None of the officers had horses, Gene-

als Godwin and Steel excepted ; and the rations for the force were carried on in carts drawn by buffaloes.

The force moved out of the pagoda, following Captain Latter's guides. We wound slowly through the jungle to the north of Pegu, and emerged on the plain about half-past 9 A.M. So little were the enemy expecting us that the garrison of Pegu saw from the pagoda their elephants feeding in the jungle near us, and had we been aware of it we might have captured them all. On our column reaching the plain signal guns were fired from the enemy's lines, evidently to collect their people. On reconnoitring their position, it appeared to be three lines of entrenchments, the right on the river, and extending across the Shwé-gyeen road, far into the plain ; on the left of the road, which was the centre of their position, ran a jungly nullah, which we subsequently found had been so spiked and entrenched that had we advanced by that route our loss would have been very considerable from a foe *who outmarched us and fought under cover*.* General Godwin determined to turn the left of their position, and moved to the right. The Cassay horse approached and kept pace with our column, moving on our right flank. After the force had turned the left of the first line of entrenchments it was halted, and dispositions made for attacking in two columns ; one—the left—under General Steel, the other under General Godwin. The left column was soon in its place, impatiently waiting the signal to advance ; it was not given ; the enemy were seen moving in huge masses from their left, and it is the opinion of some that had the left column been permitted it could have cut them off. An aide-de-camp was sent off to General Godwin to inform him of what was going on in front, and returned with an order that the

* This is a grand difficulty we have to contend with in Burmese warfare. Should, unfortunately, any rupture hereafter take place in this quarter, light guns and plenty of irregular cavalry will be an invaluable addition to European infantry ; also howitzers for boat service.—*Note in 1864.* ●

attack of the left column was not to take place, but was to stand firm and cover his flank when he attacked. At this order considerable disappointment was felt by the left column. General Steel rode back to join our Chief on the right; and Major Seaton, of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers, and his men, had to remain inactive, seeing an enemy they could by a rapid dash get in among and severely punish, walk leisurely off. When the advance by General Godwin at last took place, the enemy were in full retreat; a few only remained on our front; and although the attacking party, European and Native, more particularly the Sikhs, were exceedingly forward and energetic, our men were never able to approach sufficiently near to do the execution they would have done had they been permitted to attack at the proper time. While the column was thus halted, the Cassay horse on our right were emboldened to make a charge. They rode down with some spirit, but none of our infantry field officers being mounted they had not sufficient command over their men, some of whom in the hurry and excitement fired too soon, and were followed by the rest of the line; a few saddles only were emptied, and the Cassay horse got out of shot at the quickest possible pace. The Burmese retreated by the Shwé-gyeen road, and the column was halted in a tope of trees which had formed their head-quarters. After more than an hour's halt the men stood to their arms, and formed upon a road leading nearly west. Hopes were now entertained of again speedily beholding the enemy. Although not a vestige or trace of any number of men was observed along the road, yet on the repeated assurance of the guides the march in that direction unfortunately was persisted in, which ended in our reaching the village of Lephandoon before sunset. With the exception of a broken-down buffalo cart and an old woman—there are no patriots in Burma so staunch as the old women, come friend or foe—the post was found abandoned. The old woman stated in a lively manner that the enemy had not been there that day. General Godwin, it is

said, expressed his extreme displeasure at the conduct of the guides. Many now thought that instead of halting in the tope the enemy should have been at once followed up along the Shwé-gyeen road ; as the men had not marched far, and their blood was up, they could have kept up a hot pursuit for many miles, and perhaps, although unaided by cavalry, they would have captured some guns and baggage, also carts and other carriage, which we much required. The guides on this occasion seemed to have taken us off the proper line of pursuit, which was the more provoking when it was considered that they were under the charge of one who possessed a vast knowledge of the Burmese language and character.

For the night the force occupied the houses on the left bank of the river at Lephandoon, and after sunrise on the 18th moved off in a north-easterly direction. After proceeding some distance we came upon the Shwé-gyeen road, about two miles north of the tope where we had unfortunately halted the day before, and proceeded along it. Every yard showed the traces of a multitude having crowded along it in great confusion. The road was narrow, through thick grass and paddy, and in some places tall elephant grass, all sufficiently thick to impede the march of infantry except on the road. Approaching the village of Montsanganoo there was a thick belt of jungle, but it was found unoccupied. The force passed through it and found shelter in huts and sheds. A vast plain extended to the front and our right. The guides declared that the enemy had pushed on, and were at least twenty miles off. Under such belief all ranks got under such cover as the place afforded, and it was determined to return on the following day to Pegu Lomen. About 1 o'clock P.M. it was reported that two of the Cassay horse had appeared in front of the position occupied by the detachment of the Madras Fusiliers. A Staff and two other officers, accompanied by two men, went out along the northern road to reconnoitre ; and the Burmese being within long rifle range, two shots from a Minié were fired

at them ; the first, at about four hundred and sixty yards,* went sufficiently close to one to make him bow his head ; another, at about double the distance, also fell close. The horsemen making off at their utmost speed, the party moved on to a wooden bridge, from which they had retired, and where a better view of the country in our front was expected. From this nothing could at the time be seen except a village and some large houses to our left, some Phongyee houses on the road, about a mile in advance of the bridge, and a large village some distance to the right ; in many places it was thought a line of newly turned-up earth could be distinguished, as if extending from the houses on the road, on both sides, towards the villages on the right and left. Not a sawár was to be seen except the two horsemen above noticed, who, observing the party stationary at the bridge, began to approach slowly. It was at this time that Captain Travers, General Steel's aide-de-camp, rode up on his brave little Arab *Selim*, and galloping past the party, the Cassay horse wheeled about. The gallant aide-de-camp dashed on after them, and had gained within one hundred yards of the last, when many more men suddenly rode out to meet him, and numbers of the enemy showing themselves about the houses, the energetic Captain† was compelled to pull up. As he walked quietly back, the Burmese horsemen following at a respectful distance, the whole

* The old percussion musket, Lovell's Brunswick rifle, with belted ball, and the old light artillery guns, had all been in use during these Pegu operations. Since then, the Enfield rifle, with a range of nine hundred yards and upwards, has been introduced into the Indian service.—*Note of 1858-59.*

† This excellent officer, of the Adjutant-General's Department, Madras, was afterwards Colonel Travers, Assistant Adjutant-General for India at the Horse Guards, London, which appointment he held for some years. He was subsequently promoted to the command of a brigade in his own presidency ; but, health failing, Brigadier-General E. A. B. Travers died at Coonoor (Neilgherries), 16th of June 1879. He was one of the most promising officers in the Service ; and the present writer thought him the best adapted for command in the event of a Third Burmese War !

extent, from village to village, became alive with men. A long line rose up from their entrenchments, where they had been lying concealed, and the houses and villages were soon filled. A peremptory order at this time arrived for the party to return to their lines, upon which our opponents fell back on theirs. The presence of the whole enemy within two miles of his head-quarters thus by chance became known to General Godwin from the unauthorised act of two or three officers and men going out beyond the outposts to reconnoitre. The position occupied by the British was better adapted for affording shelter to the troops than for defence; a few huts on the right, a shady tope, and some sheds on the left; the rear close on a jungle, and a nullah which turned up round our left flank and extended nearly to the right centre of the enemy's position, would have enabled him at any time, day or night, to have brought his whole force unperceived into our rear and left flanks, and to have occupied the thick jungle within half-musket shot of us. There was certainly something wrong in the present state of affairs. The guides asserted that it was all a mistake; there was no enemy near. However, an old ruined pagoda in the jungle, in rear of our head-quarters, and which had been used by the Burmese as a look-out, enabled others to see them as they had been reported; and a body of their infantry moving down into the belt of jungle in front of their right centre, an officer with a small party again went towards the bridge to reconnoitre, when the enemy attempted to cut off their retreat. More of their troops pushed forward; but our party was brought slowly back, keeping clear of the jungle which was now occupied by our adversaries, and bringing down, following them at a respectable distance, considerable numbers of their infantry, with a few horse. The bugles in camp now sounded; the men stood to their arms in a few minutes, and the force moved on to meet the foe, who, on seeing our troops advance, fell gradually back on his entrenchments, our skirmishers dialodging those who had entered the belt of jungle on our left. After

crossing the bridge, two columns of attack were formed ; the right intended for General Godwin, the left given to General Steel. The right had some little farther distance to march ; General Godwin did not accompany it, and the next senior officer lost no time in getting into motion. The left column was halted and held back by General Godwin's personal order. Thus, in the opinion of some, was a chance of fairly and successfully closing with the enemy lost, who, as on the previous day, retreated slowly and surely. There can be little doubt that a steady active advance would have brought our troops into action, but apparently General Godwin was not desirous of risking such a contact. The skirmishers of the left column only were engaged ; the right carried the village on the enemy's left. Night closed in, and the force marched back to their former ground, where they found that the sheds they had protected themselves in during the day had been set fire to. The following morning we left Montsanganoo after sunrise, and reached Pegu about 1 o'clock P.M.

The operations on the 17th and 18th showed that had Colonel Sturt's column been waited for, the army of the enemy would in all probability have been entirely destroyed. No country could have been more favourable for cavalry, and the few patches of jungle their infantry might have found refuge in could have been cleared by our own. But between Kully and Montsanganoo there was a sufficient space of open ground for the destruction of the force. A blow might have been struck at Kully on the 18th or 19th which would have paralysed them with terror, and compelled them to submit to our power ; and from the carriage the enemy's camp would have supplied, a rapid movement on Shwé-gyeen would have obtained us possession of that town, and the almost certain annihilation of that boasting Burmese army. It is a humane wish to be lenient with the actions of men. We must relate, however, that this grand opportunity was lost by not waiting for a most efficient column which marched from and back to Rangoon without once coming

into action.* The exposure and fatigue the troops underwent on the 17th and 18th caused much sickness from cholera; the Bengal Fusiliers in a few days lost upwards of twenty men. The natives also suffered considerably. General Godwin, as was ever the case, showed the greatest coolness under fire, and an entire disregard of self; and nothing could have been better than the relief of Pegu and the plans of attack on the 17th and 18th. These were admirably conducted until it came to the moment for acting, when it appeared as if the veteran Chief lacked decision, and seemed to be unconscious of the enemy passing away before him. Whatever may have been General Godwin's motives for not attacking his enemy with vigour on the 17th and 18th—and he had shown himself quite capable of vigorous and successful attacks even during the Second Burmese War—whatever may have been his motives for not waiting for Colonel Sturt's column, or leaving General Steel to follow up the enemy when the Horse Artillery and the Cavalry arrived—he relieved Pegu and turned the enemy's position on the 17th with little or no loss to his own troops.

The three days' work on the 14th, 17th, and 18th of December tried the stoutest and hardiest of the force. Some old campaigners declared the "Punjab" was a joke to it as far as fatigue went. None displayed greater endurance than General Godwin himself, and several of the oldest officers who accompanied him.

The General embarked at Pegu on the 20th, and arrived at Rangoon on the morning of the 22nd, after leaving a reinforcement with the garrison at Pegu,† and strengthening their party of Sappers as a temporary measure, to allow of their putting themselves in a perfect state of defence. The British Commander in his despatch bestowed no small share of praise

* See Colonel Sturt's Despatch, dated Pegu, December 19, 1852, "Pegu," Appendix No. VIII.

† Amounting now to some seven hundred men, including four hundred and fifty Europeans. On the 31st inst. a detachment of the 19th M. N. I. marched up to the Pegu Pagoda; it consisted of two hundred and fifty men, and was sent to relieve the detachment of the 5th M. N. I. ordered to Rangoon.

on the officers and men employed in the harassing and arduous duties we have just been relating; and we are assured that never was praise better deserved. We shall now give the General Order issued by General Godwin in honour of Major Hill's gallant defence of Pegu :—"Major-General Godwin is most proud to express his admiration of the noble defence of the Pegu Pagoda (against a host of enemies) made by Major Hill and the brave handful of officers and soldiers under his command for so many days and anxious nights, cut off as they were from the succour of their comrades by the works of the enemy on the river as well as by the distant communication with the head-quarters of the army. It is a fine example to this army of what bravery under the direction of cool courage can do, giving, as Major Hill has done, confidence to all, by which alone the Pegu garrison has gained so much honour."—[Dated Pegu, 17th December 1852.]

The Land Column under Colonel Sturt had left Rangoon on the 13th of December. Attacks on the great fortress had been openly spoken of; but Brigadier Duke had taken every precaution. It certainly was an excellent opportunity for the Burmese to commit some daring act; for never before had Rangoon been so denuded of troops. Any attempt on the citadel itself would have met with a repulse rarely equalled for its terrible effects. The artillery was all in capital position—a gun at every vulnerable point on the terraces of the pagoda—a 24-pounder howitzer ready to sweep the north steps, where it was said a rush might be made to regain possession of Gautama's most famous temple. We may be said to have prevented an attack by being ready for it. And this, after all, may be considered the most valuable lesson to be learned in the great art of War.

In January 1853, Captain Phayre,* who had been appointed

* For a sketch of this distinguished administrative officer, who had been Commissioner of Arakan, see the writer's little work, "Sketches of some Distinguished Anglo-Indians," p. 135.

Commissioner of Pegu, arrived at Rangoon with the Governor-General's Proclamation annexing Pegu to the British territories in the East. This act had been forced on the Government of India. A Second Burmese War, it is useless to repeat, was in the last degree repugnant to the feelings of that Government. Lord Dalhousie did everything that man could do to avoid it. He wished no addition to our territories; but the force of circumstances willed it, as they have done since the days of Clive, and as they will do till the end of time or England's glory. "We cannot stop here!" said Clive on the plains of Bengal. Why should we stop "here" if Providence means us to go *there*? Seventy years ago when they talked of schemes of conquest in India, and the British Senate declared that the pursuit of them was "contrary to the wish, policy, and interest of the British Nation," the zealous speakers little knew how the force of circumstances would produce much rightful conquest, ending even in the annexation of such kingdoms as the Punjab, Sind, and Pegu.

The following is the Proclamation, so exactly adapted to the meridian of Ava, and to the comprehension of its subjects :—

NOTIFICATION.

Fort William, Foreign Department,
the 30th December 1852.

The Most Noble the Governor-General in Council is pleased to direct that the following Proclamation, whereby the Province of Pegu has been declared to be a portion of the British Territories in the East, shall be published for general information.

His Lordship in Council directs that, in honour of this event, a Royal Salute shall be fired at every principal Station of the Army in the several Presidencies of India.

By order of the Most Noble the Governor-General of
India in Council,

C. ALLEN,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

PROCLAMATION.

THE COURT OF AVA having refused to make amends for the injuries and insults which British subjects had suffered at the hands of its servants, the Governor-General of India in Council resolved to exact reparation by force of arms.

The Forts and Cities upon the coast were forthwith attacked and captured ; the Burmese forces have been dispersed wherever they have been met ; and the Province of PEGU is now in the occupation of British troops.

The just and moderate demands of the Government of India have been rejected by the King ; the ample opportunity that has been afforded him for repairing the injury that was done has been disregarded ; and the timely submission which alone could have been effectual to prevent the dismemberment of his kingdom, is still withheld.

Wherefore, in compensation for the past, and for better security in the future, the Governor-General in Council has resolved, and hereby Proclaims, that the Province of PEGU is now, and shall be henceforth, a portion of the British territories in the East.

Such Burman troops as may still remain within the Province shall be driven out ; Civil Government shall immediately be established ; and officers shall be appointed to administer the affairs of the several districts.

The Governor-General in Council hereby calls on the inhabitants of PEGU to submit themselves to the authority, and to confide securely in the protection of the British Government, whose power they have seen to be irresistible, and whose rule is marked by justice and beneficence.

The Governor-General in Council having exacted the reparation he deems sufficient, desires no further conquest in Burma, and is willing to consent that hostilities should cease.

But if the King of Ava shall fail to renew his former relations of friendship with the British Government, and if he

shall recklessly seek to dispute its quiet possession of the Province it has now declared to be its own, the Governor-General in Council will again put forth the power he holds, and will visit with full retribution aggressions which, if they be persisted in, must of necessity lead to the total subversion of the Burman State, and to the ruin and exile of the King and his race.

By Order of the Most Noble the Governor-General of
India in Council,

C. ALLEN,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

20th December 1852.

ORDERS BY THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

Foreign Department, Fort William,
the 30th December 1852.

The Most Noble the Governor-General in Council is pleased to make the following appointments :—

Lieutenant-Colonel A. Bogle to be Commissioner of the Tenasserim and Martaban Provinces.

Captain H. T. Berdmore, Madras Artillery, to be Deputy Commissioner in the Province of Martaban.

Lieutenant D. A. Chase, 64th Native Infantry, to be Assistant ditto.

Captain A. P. Phayre to be Commissioner of the Province of Pegu.*

* Consequent on this appointment, Captain Hopkinson succeeded to Arakan. In 1864, Pegu, Arakan, and Tenasserim were all under the Chief Commissioner of British Burma, Agent to the Viceroy and Governor-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Phayre, C.B. It is probable that the three great provinces which comprise British Burma will one day be ruled over by a Lieutenant-Governor!

Deputy Commissioners.

Captain T. P. Sparks, 7th Madras Native Infantry, at Rangoon.

Lieutenant A. Fytche,* 70th Native Infantry, at Bassein.

Captain T. Latter, 67th Native Infantry, at Prome.

Captain J. Smith, 13th Madras Native Infantry, at Sarawa.

Lieutenant R. D. Ardagh, Magistrate of the Town of Rangoon.

Lieutenant E. J. Spilsbury, 67th Native Infantry, Assistant ditto.

Assistant Commissioners.

Lieutenant C. D. Grant, 11th Madras Native Infantry, at Bassein.

Lieutenant G. Dangerfield, Madras Artillery, at Sarawa.

Lieutenant J. S. Baird, Madras Artillery, at Prome.

Dr. J. McClelland to be Officiating Superintendent of Forests, Pegu.

Mr. R. S. Edwards, Collector of Customs, Prome.

Mr. T. J. Fallon, Collector of Sea Customs, Bassein.

C. ALLEN,

Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

At Rangoon, on the morning of the 20th, the annexation of Pegu was proclaimed on board H.M.S. "Fox," amid the roaring of cannon from the navy. On the 21st it was proclaimed to the army, and a grand parade was ordered for the occasion. The Proclamation was read to the troops in the various languages; and a detachment of Horse Artillery on the right

* For a sketch of this able and energetic officer (afterwards Chief Commissioner), see "Sketches of some Distinguished Anglo-Indians," p. 119.

fired a Royal Salute. Brigadier Duke then marched the troops home, when another salute was fired from the upper terrace of the great pagoda. Pegu had become British !*

"The Proclamation" would be read at the Courts of Siam and Cochin China, and even at Pekin itself. A blow had been struck which would no doubt vibrate throughout Eastern Asia; and exclusive nations would learn henceforth that they need not think of attempting to insult or oppress British subjects with impunity. In 1752 we were in possession of three factories and twenty square miles of territory; at the close of 1852, we were the sovereigns of all India, and not a shot was fired in it without our permission: we ruled over six hundred and fifty thousand square miles, and a population of more than two hundred millions. A new province had just been annexed, at a rough calculation two hundred miles in length by nearly two hundred in breadth, of some forty thousand square miles, said to contain between three and four millions of inhabitants. It was thought that the administrative talents of Captain Phayre, who had been "one of the chief means of turning the swamps of Arakan into the granary of the bay, and whose *forte* lies in making a little kingdom a great one," would soon render Pegu a most important and valuable British possession in what Malte Brun styles *Chin-India*, which title has certainly more meaning in it than "India beyond the Ganges."

General Godwin had received a copy of the Proclamation while busily employed at Pegu. The General having concluded operations in that quarter, and having given orders regarding

* "The annexation of Pegu included the district of Bassein, and united in one continuous sea-board of British possession, Arakan, Pegu, and Tenasserim, commanding the entire outlets and deltas of the Irawady, the Sittang, and the Salween. The British territory ran northward up the Irawady to Meaday, and in addition to former stations, Toungoo, Shwé-gyeen, Henzada, and Prome, were occupied by missions."—"Gospel in Burmah" (1859), p. 237.

an admirable flank movement to be made by a land column from Martaban to Shwé-gyeen, he left Rangoon with his Staff for Prome on the 29th of December.*

* On the 8th of December the Burmese had made a most daring night-attack on Prome, narrated in "Pegu," chap. xi. p. 148. On this occasion their file-firing on Her Majesty's 51st was remarked as admirable. Reminding us of the first war, the chiefs, distinguished by their gilt helmets, rode boldly in the advance and fearlessly arranged their posts. At length they fell back on Eutháy-Mew. On the 9th, Sir John Cheape (of Mooltan and Goojerat celebrity) followed up the attack, when all became quiet for a time. There was to be no more severe work at Prome. The march of the Martaban Land Column, under Brigadier-General Sir S. W. Steel (with which force the writer had the honour to serve), arranged in order to carry out that emphatic part of the proclamation, "SUCH BURMAN TROOPS AS MAY STILL REMAIN WITHIN THE PROVINCE SHALL BE DRIVEN OUT!" was now the most important undertaking of the army. The force left Rangoon early in January 1853, and was highly successful in all its operations, reaching Toungoo (Tan-Hoon) on the 22nd of February. The march will be found duly recorded, in all its details, in the twelfth, thirteenth, and fourteenth chapters of "Pegu." Suffice it to say, that the column had forced its way in thirty-four days from Martaban through two hundred and forty miles of unknown forest, with a long and heavy train of artillery, surmounting difficulties which few land marches on record ever had to encounter. The ancient province of Toungoo extended eighty miles beyond this once famous capital. Bassein, one of the most important places captured from the King of Ava (see "Pegu," p. 218), had now attained importance through the administrative and military energy of the Deputy Commissioner (a future Chief), Captain Fytche. He raised a small local army, and cleared the entire district of Dacoits, with little or no expense to the State. It is a strange coincidence that in his first expedition in this district, Fytche employed the "Nemesis"; and twenty-four years after was also in a "Nemesis," when, as Chief Commissioner, he went to make a treaty with the King of Burma! Thus, it would seem, although Fytche's was a peaceful mission, must Revenge in the East be a sort of guiding-star for politicals! (See also "Pegu," p. 385.) For "the disaster near Donabew," in which the brave Captain Loch, C.B., of the Navy, lost his life (in February), and both naval and military officers distinguished themselves while operating against the notorious robber chieftain, Myat-htoon, who had won for himself an all-powerful name in Donabew and its vicinity, see "Pegu," chap. xvi. p. 226. As the English never like to hear of disaster, it will be of more interest to proceed at once to Sir John Cheape's brilliant operations.

CHAPTER IV.*

SIR JOHN CHEAPE'S OPERATIONS AGAINST MYAT-HTOON.

THE Robber Chieftain of Donabew had, to all appearance, become the Soult of the war. Like the great opponent to our immortal Wellington on more than one occasion in the Peninsula, he kept his ground—as a matter of course contemplated gigantic enterprises—and was certainly not to be despised. Were it possible in India or the East to meet with a hostile leader possessing the “firmness, activity, vigour, foresight, grand conceptions, and admirable arrangement”† of Soult, the Indian army would better deserve the title which has been so graciously bestowed upon it, that of the fighting army of

* An especial interest will be attached to this chapter when it is known that in the operations narrated Ensign Wolseley, who led the storming party, is now General Sir G. Wolseley, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., a High Commissioner at the Cape. Such has been the rise, after much good service, of this promising general and able administrator. While writing this, we read (Sept. 1879) the telegram by His Excellency :—“Ulundi, August 29. Cetawayo captured yesterday in the heart of Ngome Forest by patrol under command of Major Marter, King's Dragoon Guards.”—Such heroism and perseverance in the chase, displayed also by Lord Gifford, V.C., and his men, remind us of one or more similar incidents during the Burmese War.

† Napier's “Peninsular War,” vol. iii. p. 322.

the world! There certainly is no army which has acted with more strictness up to the great Napoleon's maxim, that "an army should always be in a condition to fight," than ours. But not to diverge from the strange comparison brought forward, Myat-htoon, in spite of the want of civilisation, and consequent want of development of intellectual power, really seemed to possess some of the attributes of Soult. He was determined to remain in his strong jungly position, to force which had proved so fatal to poor Loch and his companions; and perhaps his "grand conception" was, like the chivalrous Bandoola in the last war, that of eventually carrying our General in chains to Ava! Of course the news of the recent disaster speedily reached the palace of the Golden Foot, and filled the Golden Ears with a rare delight. Donabew was the dreaded name which would at length strike terror into the hearts of the English; and Myat-htoon had been deputed by the authorities in the Buddhistical celestial regions to drive the British "barbarians" into the sea, and prop up the falling Burmese Empire!

With regard to the former proceeding, it was confidently asserted that the chief did, before the conclusion of Sir John Cheape's operations, send the Commodore a letter saying that if the gallant sailor did not immediately quit the river he would blow him out of the water! On the other hand, our allies the Karens entertained the serious prospect of soon being enabled to forward Myat-htoon's head in salt to the Commissioner or to the General! But he had yet to be driven from his stronghold; and before relating the Brigadier-General's operations it may be interesting to take a slight retrospect, in which will be found a few events not yet mentioned.

At a time (May 1852) when Captains Niblett and Brooking, of the "Phlegethon" and "Proserpine" steamers, were probably burning—like some of Her Majesty's Navy—with the ambitious desire of bringing the war to a speedy termination by what has been humorously styled "doing a little of 'Lord

Cochrane,''' or simply shelling the Golden Emperor in his palace from the river off Ava, the former vessel during her trip up the river went twenty miles above Donabew. No fortifications were found at the position so celebrated in the military narratives; there was merely the town and the remains of the work destroyed in the last war.* The science of Burmese warfare which here, under Maha-Bandoola, had been of no despicable nature, had given place to the more profitable glories of dacoity. During the trips of the "Phlegethon" dacoits were roving about, plundering and murdering, shooting men, women, and children; in short, whoever came in their way. Many of the inhabitants who were friendly to us and anxious to know if the country was to be annexed, came down with the steamer, but during their progress were fired on from the banks of the river. Three women were shot. The chief of the party, it was said, went to Captain Niblett, and begged he would lend him a dozen muskets or so, and they would land and capture these terrible marauders. The fire-arms were lent; the allies landed, killed four or five of the dacoits, and captured the Rob Roy of the party, "whom they tied to a tree and shot through the head."

Towards the end of the year it was generally known that the notorious bandit chief Myat-htoon, also another, by name Shway-Ban, were but thirty or forty miles distant, in the vicinities of Rangoon and Dalla. Myat-htoon had burned down Donabew and Zaloon, and many other villages. Two other chiefs, it was believed, were along with him; and he ruled over a desperate army of seven thousand men. Shway-Ban had a smaller force of two thousand. For the last six months these skilful Sivas had been rushing forth like fiery torrents on the country, destroying everything in their course. Myat-za, a Karen chieftain, came into Rangoon about the middle of November and asked assistance to repel Shway-Ban, who hovered about to the west of Dalla, but he was told very properly that he must protect himself; so collecting about seven hundred

men of his tribe, he armed them after the fashion of the country, and soon captured upwards of thirty robbers, three of whom he executed on the spot, and sent in the rest to Rangoon. It is pleasant to record such energy on the part of a Karen chief! It is just probable that soon after these proceedings Myat-htoon retired to his village and the various fastnesses near Donabew, on the right bank of the Irawady.*

We do not read of any defeat of Myat-htoon by Karen chiefs or others; he seems to have been regarded as *Fra Diavolo* of his vicinity, striking terror into the hearts of innocent men and helpless women. He was doubtless thus employed, in addition to having dethroned a governor who had been elected by the people at Donabew, when the steamer "Phlegethon," with gunboats, and a party of seamen and marines, arrived to attack him and his band. A boat expedition was made up a creek, where we met with a repulse, the particulars of which may here be given. First, it may be stated, however, that in December 1852 Captain Hewett, I.N., of the "Moozuffer," with the steam-frigate's boats and those of H.M.S. "Fox," had surprised a party of three thousand Burmese at Pantanno (Pantanau), killing numbers, and among the rest a chief's son, or some such person of distinction. For anything we know to the contrary the party then defeated belonged to Myat-htoon. There could be little doubt who was the directing chief on the present occasion of our repulse.

On the 16th of January an attack was made on Pantanno, and the place as formerly—when Hewett commanded—carried with little loss.

On the morning of the 17th, the advance was made up the

* It is curious to note that the principal towns of Burma (including the capitals) are on the left bank of the river. This pretty clearly demonstrates that when the exodus from the north, or north-west, took place, the people chose their dwellings on the left bank—especially those from the north—as more convenient.

very creek into which Captain Hewett had thought it rashness to venture. Two boats could not pull abreast in it; the banks were low and covered with jungle, with stakes driven into the river, and trees across to "bar the passage." The boats had only proceeded a few miles when from each bank came a volley of musketry; several men fell; the fire became "hotter and hotter," till at length the boats were driven back with the loss of twelve killed and wounded, including among the latter one officer of the "Moozuffer," Lieutenant Mitcheson, I.N., severely. On this occasion the expedition was about one hundred and eighty strong.*

Having thus finished an imperfect retrospect of events connected with Myat-htoon previous to the disaster near Donabew, let us proceed to relate more decisive and satisfactory operations, yet those darkened by the ever-floating shadows of disease and death!

On the 18th of February Brigadier-General Sir John Cheape, K.C.B., left Prome to proceed against the robber chief Myat-htoon, near Donabew. He took with him the following detachments composed of the most healthy men of the different regiments:—two hundred of H. M.'s 18th Royal Irish under Major Wigston; two hundred of H. M.'s 51st K. O. L. I. under Captain Irby; the Rifle company of the 67th Bengal Native Infantry under Captain Hicks; two hundred of the 4th Sikh Locals under Major Armstrong; some seventy Sappers and Miners under Lieutenants Mullins and Trevor; and two guns—a 24-pounder howitzer and a 9-pounder of the light field battery—under Major Reid, with Lieutenants Ashe and Dobbin, all three of the Bengal Artillery; there were also some rocket-tubes, served by a small party of dismounted Madras Horse Artillerymen, with Conductor Lesby, under Lieutenant Magrath of the latter arm.

* For Note on operations of the Indian Navy under Captain Rennie, 'Pegu,' p. 256.

Sir John landed and collected his force at Henzada on the Irawady, a position some thirty-five miles north of Donabew—determining to start against Myat-htoon's stronghold from this quarter. Henzada is large and populous, and here a vast number of hackeries (carts) were procurable. From information gained through the Commissioner, Sir John was led to expect that he could reach Myat-htoon's position in three or four days, then march into Donabew, and embark again in the steamers. The force, having been joined by Captain Singleton, H. M.'s 51st, and all sickly men left behind, started on the evening of the 22nd, taking seven or eight days' provisions with them. On the 26th the General found himself, as he believed, still at a considerable distance from the chief's stronghold. Provisions running short, and without any knowledge of the country between, save a nullah reported unfordable, Sir John determined to regain the river; he accordingly made a flank movement to Zaloon, where the force arrived on the afternoon of the 28th, after a very tedious and harassing march. The enemy had only shown themselves twice, on one of which occasions they fired from the opposite side of a nullah and wounded two men of the 51st K. O. L. I. The steamers having been warned, they came up to Zaloon and received the greater part of the troops on board. On the morning of the 1st March the force was joined by a small detachment of the Ramghur Irregular Cavalry under Lieutenant Graham, which body had followed Sir John from Prome, but did not arrive at Henzada till after the General had started. The steamers left about 11 A.M. for Donabew. The empty carts and the horses of the battery were escorted down to Donabew by one hundred of the Royal Irish, one hundred Sikhs, and the detachment of Irregular Cavalry, the convoy being under charge of Captain Armstrong, 18th Royal Irish. It arrived safely at its destination on the morning of the 3rd of March.

About two miles before reaching Donabew Captain Smith, the Deputy Commissioner, was told by a Phongyee that there

was a Burmese picquet in a house which he pointed out. Captain Smith, in consequence, took three or four sawárs and sepoy along with him, surrounded the house, and succeeded in capturing three men. These prisoners afterwards acted as guides to the expedition. The pagoda of Donabew stands on the river side, and with the exception of three or four Phongyee houses some three-quarters of a mile distant, not a house, not even an inhabitant of any description was to be seen. The town, as has been already observed, had been burned down by Myat-htoon and his destructive band, who had probably determined that while the English remained in the country "Stormy Donabew," as a town or military position, should not stand. Here Sir John Cheape resolved to wait for the reinforcements which were expected from Rangoon. The Europeans lived in the flats and steamers, and the native troops inside the pagoda. This prudent delay on the part of the General was, no doubt, occasioned by the reflection that Myat-htoon's position was an exceedingly strong one. He was by no means to be despised; nor was his stronghold to be assailed in an incautious and hasty manner. He had the discipline and power of Mother Nature on his side against the regular training of a British force! Coolness and judgment were consequently required at this juncture against such an enemy as the chief Myat-htoon.

During Massena's invasion of Portugal, when Lord Wellington was endeavouring to drive sense into the heads of the Portuguese Government, he said to them, "I have little doubt of final success, but I have fought a sufficient number of battles to know that the result of any is not certain even with the best arrangements."* In like manner, probably, argued Sir John on the present minor occasion.

On the 6th a party of recruits, one hundred and thirty strong,

of H. M.'s 80th, under the command of Major Holdich, three hundred men of the 67th Bengal Native Infantry under Colonel Sturt, two mortars under Lieutenant Percival, B.A., and a large supply of commissariat stores under the charge of Lieutenant Mackellar, Madras Commissariat, arrived.

Everything being now ready,^o including two rafts prepared by the Sappers—the barrels composing them having been brought from Rangoon—the General issued an order for the force to start at 2 P.M. on the 7th instant. All the sick being left at Donabew, and some few men to garrison the place, the party now consisted of about five hundred Europeans, five hundred Natives, two guns of the light field battery, three rocket-tubes, and two mortars, with the detachment of Irregular Horse, and seventy Sappers. Being now assured that three days would bring them in front of Myat-htoon's stronghold, they started, as ordered, at 2 P.M. on the 7th, taking six or seven days' provisions with them. The right wing under Major Wigston, consisting of the detachments of H. M.'s 18th and 80th regiments, with the 4th Sikhs in front; then came the guns, followed by the Irregular Cavalry, rocket-tubes, and mortars. The left wing, consisting of detachments of H. M.'s 51st and the 67th Bengal Native Infantry, was under the command of Colonel Sturt. The direction taken by the force was almost due west. After proceeding three miles the advanced guard surprised a small picquet, and shot two of the enemy. About 5 P.M. the column reached Akyo and the bank of a broad nullah, at least one hundred and thirty yards wide. This was seven miles from Donabew. Here the enemy opened a fire of jinjals and musketry, but our guns came to the front and silenced them for a time. The troops passed the night behind a belt of jungle parallel to the nullah; and, although the Burmese dropped in shots all night, occasionally replied to by our rockets, only two men were slightly wounded. On the 8th, about 9 A.M., the rafts having been put together by the Sappers, and the fog clearing off, a party of the 51st and

Rifles were thrown across the nullah. A little firing took place, but no casualties occurred. All this day was occupied in crossing the guns and baggage, which operation was not concluded till late at night. The fogs being particularly heavy at this season in this part of the country, and not clearing up till near 9 A.M., the force generally breakfasted before starting. On the 9th they left at the above hour, when a few shots were fired in front. At mid-day our troops came opposite a few houses; the Burmese were said to be in them. Guns drawn up and all ready, a party was sent forward to make them show themselves; but not a vestige of either friend or foe was to be seen there! It was now said to be the wrong road; the guide was flogged, sent to the rear, and another one called up to take his place. The new guide turned to the left, and after a most tedious round, under a glaring sun, brought the wearied troops back to the identical spot from which they had started! Here was provocation enough to try the temper of the most forbearing. While dwelling on this incident one is apt to recall to memory a story related by Admiral Sir Charles Napier in his "Travels in Syria," of a guide who would not do his duty. Seizing hold of the miscreant, he declared, if he did not proceed on his way forthwith, "by the beard of the Prophet!" he would send a bullet through his head; after which the guide sullenly took the lead. On the present occasion the first guide should have been under the charge of the gallant Admiral, and probably there would have been no occasion for a second. To proceed—a halt was made in the village for two hours; but Major Cotton was sent on with two hundred men to the nullah where the force intended to encamp at Kyomtano. It was about a mile farther on; and on his arrival he succeeded in surprising a party of Burmese, drove them across the nullah, followed them in dashing style, and killed eight of them without losing a man. On the arrival of the troops in the evening, a small party of Burmese showed themselves from the jungles on the left; the guns opened on

them, and they soon disappeared. These men came down next morning, under cover of the fog, and fired into the camp. The nullah here was about fifty yards wide: A sort of bridge was made by connecting the rafts with planks, and, with the assistance of an old boat found in the nullah, the greater part of the troops and all the baggage passed over. The bridge was then broken up, and the guns taken across on the rafts; the empty hackeries were driven into the water and swam over beautifully. Everything was across and the rafts packed again by 5 P.M.

On the 11th the force started at the usual hour. Every one now expected to reach Myat-htoon's position that day. They had not proceeded two miles when Lieutenant Clarke, of the 67th Native Infantry, and one of the Rifles were wounded on a small patch of cleared ground, and the rear-guard were attacked by a strong party in the long grass. Lieutenant Johnson commanding the guard, seeing that firing was useless, charged into the jungle and dispersed the Burmese. The rear-guard on this occasion lost one sepoy killed, and one private and six sepoy wounded. From the spot where Clarke was wounded the road entered the thick forest; the Burmese had only to throw down a tree or two with their usual tact in such matters, and a completely new road would have to be cut round the obstacle. This they had done in several places; there was consequently very hard work, particularly for the Sappers, and the advance was very slow. Shortly after entering the forest a small breastwork was taken, where one man was wounded; another breastwork was passed, but it was undefended. About 2 P.M. the Burmese disappeared from the front, and the road was unobstructed. The force crossed a piece of water about 4 P.M. and shortly after the advance found that the road turned into a foot-path. Every one was now tired out,—man and beast thoroughly fatigued from this wearisome pursuit of the crafty chief; the Artillery horses were staggering in their harness. Sir John determined to encamp on the spot, there being water a short

distance ahead. The hackeries as they came up were either pushed right and left into the jungle or remained on the road. The troops lay down on each side, and it was dark long before the whole of the carriage was up. Not a fire was lighted, and the night passed away quietly. Cholera made its first appearance in camp this night, and one of the wounded Sikhs died. Myat-htoon's place was said to be only two miles to the left, but there was no road between. The guide who had committed himself on the 9th, and who was now with the rear-guard, had pointed out a spot shortly after passing the first breastwork where he declared the road to Myat-htoon's position diverged to the left. Unfortunately there was no one to take advantage of this information, and his statement might not have found credit, though it was afterwards proved to be correct. We believe the Commissioner, Captain Smith, informed Sir John this same morning that he did not know the road, and had no means of gaining information. A feeling of despondency, a despair of success, with one or more, began to arise! But Sir John tempered his energy to the occasion, and was determined to persevere! Myat-htoon was not the man to keep back the Engineer of Moultan and the Artilleryman of Goojerat! The force retraced its steps on the morning of the 12th without rations having been served out, the rear of yesterday moving in front to-day. On passing the spot where the road branched off, there were serious thoughts of still advancing on Myat-htoon; but provisions were failing again, so it was thought prudent to return to Kyomtano and wait for a supply. Several cases of cholera occurred on the road. On the 13th Colonel Sturt, with all the hackeries and some three hundred men, went into Donabew for provisions.* Meanwhile the troops were put on half-rations. This was a sad day in camp, no less than thirteen deaths from cholera having taken place.

* The sick and wounded were sent in along with him.

The force remained here until the 16th, when Colonel Sturt returned with ten or twelve days' provisions. The Burmese had fired a few shots into camp every night, but fortunately without hitting any one. At 2 P.M. on the 17th, the right wing under Major Wigston, 18th Royal Irish, were sent on the old road, and again captured the breastwork, which had been much strengthened, with the loss of one officer and five men wounded. A prisoner and two brass jinjals were taken on this occasion. This prisoner was of some use in the further advance of the force in describing and pointing out the enemy's position.* On the 18th, at daybreak, the rest of the force started, leaving the sick and surplus provisions with a detachment under Lieutenant Dickson of the 51st, in a small stockade at Kyomtano. The party joined the right wing at the breastwork, and the sick and wounded of Major Wigston's party were sent back to Kyomtano; the column continued their march, the left wing, under Colonel Sturt, in front, till they came to another breastwork about 4 P.M. This work was gallantly carried by H. M.'s 51st K. O. L. I. and the 67th Bengal Native Infantry, Captain Singleton of the former regiment leading the advance. Ensign Boileau of the 67th fell while gallantly attacking the enemy on the left bank. On this occasion our loss was one officer and one sepoy of the 67th killed, and one ensign of the 51st and six sepoy of the 67th wounded. At 5 P.M. the force encamped by a piece of water about a mile farther on, cholera raging in camp. At 7 A.M. on the 19th, the General was advancing with his troops, the right wing in front. Having gone a mile out, the enemy were found in a breastwork on the opposite side of the nullah, or at the head of the piece of water on the right, along the edge of

* For Sir John Cheape's Despatch, dated Donabew, 25th March 1853, see 'Pegu,' Appendix No. XIII., p. 516.

which the road lay.* Under the circumstances Sir John deemed it the safest plan to get at the enemy as speedily as possible.

The Action of the 19th.

Supported by the guns and rockets, the General now resolved to carry the breastwork on the right. H. M.'s 80th formed the advanced guard, followed by the Sappers clearing the road.

On coming opposite the enemy's left flank the firing commenced. The rockets were advanced and opened fire. The Sikhs were sent on to support the 80th; and the 18th Royal Irish in support of them.

The Sappers worked admirably, and the guns were shortly got into position and opened a well directed fire, which gradually became very heavy on both sides, and it was reported to Sir John that Major Wigston was wounded. On reaching the front he found also that Major Armstrong of the Sikh Corps was wounded, and many other officers and men. The fire of the enemy on the path leading up to the breastwork was so heavy that "the advanced party had not succeeded in carrying it." Lieutenant Johnson, the only remaining officer of the 4th Sikh Regiment, persevered most bravely, which only increased the loss. H. M.'s 80th and the Sikhs now hoped to get round the extreme right of the enemy, but thick jungle and strong abattis prevented the men from making their way through. At this point the 18th Royal Irish came up. The fire of musketry and grape was so heavy that they got scattered, and sustained great loss. Lieutenant Cockburn of this distinguished corps was severely wounded. Major Holdich of H. M.'s 80th was now in command of the right wing. Dense smoke, a very heavy fire, and the deadly breastwork yet to be

* See Despatch.

assailed, there was some difficulty in Sir John acting up to Napoleon's advice to Massena before the battle of Busaco : "*Attack vigorously after having observed well where to strike !*" At length the General did ascertain what was between our men and the breastwork. He discovered that there was no water, and no obstacle of any importance to be encountered, provided the troops could pass through the enemy's fire, a distance of some thirty yards. Now the resolution to attack vigorously was at its full height. The "assembly" brought as many of the right wing together as possible. In the meantime Major Reid of the Bengal Artillery gallantly brought up a 24-pounder howitzer—the men of the 51st assisting to drag the gun along—and opened an effectual fire on the enemy at a range of not more than twenty-five yards. Being in a much exposed position, as was to be expected the gallant Major was almost immediately wounded, after which Lieutenant Ashe kept up the fire of the gun in the most spirited manner. This was dangerous firing for our Artillery, but the canister from that gem of field-pieces, at such a range, must have been terribly effective ! At this crisis, while the Burmese were doing sad havoc with their musketry, and working their masked battery with decided effect, it is highly probable that no other means available could have been nearly so instrumental in striking terror into the determined hearts of the enemy as this artillery fire ! It came as a splendid harbinger of the final charge which, in spite of all resistance, was to drive the chieftain from his stronghold ! The right wing being much weakened from the loss they had sustained, and on account of the number of men required as skirmishers, Sir John ordered a reinforcement from the left. These were joined by the men of the right wing that had been collected by Major Holdich, and were led by Ensign Wolseley of H. M.'s 80th. To use the General's own words, "the whole advanced in a manner that nothing could check." The fire was severe, and Lieutenant Taylor, 9th Madras Native Infantry, doing duty with H. M.'s 51st, fell mortally wounded ;

Ensign Wolseley was also struck down, and many other gallant soldiers. The breastwork was immediately carried; the enemy fled in confusion, except those who stood to be shot or bayoneted by the men. British courage had now overcome in the midst of dense forest and jungle all natural difficulties, as in more civilised countries it had so often gloriously conquered all artificial ones, and the entire defeat of the chieftain Myat-htoon was now to be ranked among the most important events of the war! Our loss was severe. Eleven bodies were buried on the spot, and nine officers and seventy-five men were wounded in this well-fought action of the 19th of March, which lasted about two hours. "Lieutenant Trevor of the Engineers, with Corporal Livingstone and Private Preston, of H. M.'s 51st K. O. L. I., first entered the enemy's breastwork, the two former each shooting down one of the enemy opposing their entrance. The lead devolved on them and on Sergeant Preston of H. M.'s 51st, and Sergeant-Major Quin of H. M.'s 80th, when Lieutenant Taylor, Ensign Wolseley, and Colour-Sergeant Donnahoe fell in the advance."* Two guns, which had been lost by the unfortunate expedition at the beginning of February, were now recaptured. The Burmese had been firing with them at our troops with deadly effect. In the opinion of the General and others they were well served to the last. In attempting to carry off one of them twelve of the enemy were killed by a discharge from our 9-pounder gun. The enemy sustained a heavy loss in killed and wounded; the only drawback to Sir John's complete triumph was the escape of the chief with a few followers. It was improbable that he would go to Ava after such a defeat, or out of his own vicinity be again able to collect forces to resist our power. "His whole force and means," wrote Sir John, "were concentrated on this

* Sir John Cheape's Despatch.

position, and I imagine he must have had about 4,000 men in these breastworks, which extended 1,200 yards in length."

After the action a party was sent on immediately to Kyoukazeen (or Kun-ka-zeen), Myat-htoon's own village. Neither in this, nor in a village passed on the road to it, was a single person to be seen. Both villages, situated on the Pantanno creek, might be distant three quarters of a mile from each other. Colonel Sturt, with part of the 67th, and all the commissariat, remained in the first village; the rest of the force, with all the wounded, proceeded to Kyoukazeen. Captain Fytche, Deputy Commissioner of the Bassein district, joined about mid-day at the first village.

On the 20th Captain Tarleton arrived with some gun-boats, having with his accustomed energy and perseverance cut through the obstructions thrown into the creek for a distance of fifteen miles. Some nine hundred boats, crowded with people who had been kept in subjection by Myat-htoon, passed down the creek! In this affecting incident alone was to be found an argument against those who, be it just or unjust, affect to shudder at the very name of war! Some thousands of our fellow-creatures were now relieved from captivity and oppression; and it may be doubted whether all the wordy speeches of the Peace Societies will ever do as much! War, we all know, is an evil, but it is a necessary one; and, as in the above incident, out of it does come good; Providence, it would seem, has placed it amongst the machinery which governs this wonderful world of ours, and it cannot be removed altogether to suit the selfishness of a party. Were our life not what Byron styles "a false nature," it might be otherwise. It certainly "is not in the harmony of things, this hard decree!" But as long as there are opposing interests in the world, as long as there are countries to bring within the pale of enlightenment and civilisation, there must and will be war! Governments, therefore, should always be prepared for it, which preparation may either promote a nation's glory, or secure a nation's peace.

On the 21st Lieutenant Cockburn, 18th Royal Irish, was buried, having died of his wounds the previous evening. All the sick and wounded, with the guns, were sent down in boats to the steamers lying in the creek. Lieutenant Williams, Adjutant of the 67th Bengal Native Infantry, who had been seized with cholera on the 19th, died on board. The bad cases of this terrible scourge were sent to Rangoon direct, the others to Donabew and Prome. On the 22nd the force was ordered to return. Four P.M. was the appointed hour to march; but at two the village (Kun-ka-zeen*), extending nearly three-quarters of a mile on the side where the troops were encamped, caught fire. Sir John, who lived on the opposite side, was enabled to cross with difficulty, and not without being scorched. The fire spread with the utmost rapidity, burning even the boats on the nullah. Captain Garden, Assistant Quartermaster-General, and one or two others, were obliged to swim across. It was most fortunate that the sick, the guns, and ammunition, as also the Commissariat in the other village, had been sent away. Great confusion reigned for some time, the calamity of fire always producing "confusion worse confounded," but eventually all were collected in Colonel Sturt's camp. The force marched to Kyomtano the same evening.

On the 23rd a nullah was crossed, and into Akyo. On the 24th another nullah was crossed, and into Donabew. The troops were embarked and returned to Prome, leaving a detachment in the pagoda of Donabew.

In these operations against Myat-htoon upwards of one hundred and forty of our troops were killed and wounded (including three officers, one killed and two severely wounded), and upwards of one hundred died of cholera, making the total of casualties up to nearly two hundred and fifty. This was severe work, every one will admit, but only those who have had some

* Probably Kyou Kazeen is the correct spelling, although the above mode is in the sketch, which has also Kun-ta-ni, and not Kyomtano.

experience in jungle warfare can know of the sufferings frequently to be endured, and the vast difficulties to be overcome. No soldier likes to be shot at without a chance of immediately returning it; he raises his piece at trees and jungle, and perhaps another shot tells him to desist. Then may come want of provisions, want of rest, and, worse than all, pestilence, too often not to be avoided on such expeditions,—and such in jungle warfare are the shadows of a soldier's life! A glorious light of it had now been shared by many in the final charge at the enemy in the breastwork, with the irresistible British bayonet! In the operations just related two wants appear to have been predominant,—the want of correct information regarding the whereabouts of the enemy, and the want of a proper quantity of provisions at the required time. Why not more provisions? Simply because, even had sufficient carriage been available, it would not have been prudent in a General to have started in an unknown forest with a long line of commissariat hackeries, which, had the enemy sent thieves or skirmishers into the jungle, it would have taken half his force to defend. It was, therefore, sufficient to take a fair quantity of provisions, relying, as the distances could not be great, on the talents of his guides, who appear to have been arrant knaves and honest men by turns. Apparently, there is no fault to find with the conduct of this expedition against Myat-htoon; on the contrary, Sir John Cheape is to be praised for the manner in which it was conducted. Throughout the operations he appears to have displayed coolness, energy, and prudence, with compassion for his wounded and suffering soldiers; and these are qualities which must be found in an eminent degree, *under all circumstances*, in him who would be a great general.

CHAPTER V.

LORD DALHOUSIE'S POLICY IN THE SECOND BURMESE WAR.
VARIOUS REMARKS.

ABOUT the middle of June 1853 the official documents containing the policy of the Governor-General of India regarding Burma, reached us at Toungoo. No feast could have been more welcome to the poor author of a narrative than these numerous columns of type at such a time. Novelty was sadly wanting among us. Even those who had a taste for reading and writing had exhausted books, and had nearly exhausted paper. Of "news" there was none, save the old story of the treaty which was never to be signed; and of excitement, being on the frontier station, there was an occasional little, caused by the rumour of a Burmese attacking force being not far distant, and the probability of, while writing a letter homewards about the treaty of peace, your being visited by a swift messenger in the shape of a 4-pounder shot or a jinjal ball right through the mat-wall of your airy picturesque cottage! The reality of soldier-life at Toungoo had arrived at this pitch among us when the various documents of correspondence between the Governor-General of India and the Secret Committee, relative to hostilities with Burma, presented some new

food for the mind to dwell upon. The first thought that struck the present writer was, How did it all tally with what he had already written? Had he been, without sufficient data, rash in any of the important assertions he had ventured? Conscience having brought forward no very serious accusations, he determined on making a few notes from, and remarks on, the important papers which had now arrived, and the following are presented to our readers accordingly.

In the first place, few will now be bold enough to deny that "hostilities with Burma had become unavoidable," and these few probably belong to the Peace Society, a great gun of which was let fly at Manchester against our Burmese policy; but what signified the futile discharge, when common sense held firmly to the opinion that, "of all our justifiable wars, none was more obviously and thoroughly justifiable than the Second Burmese War."

The Governor-General, in a Minute dated June 30, 1852, says—after remarking that the whole sea-board of Burma was in our possession—"But, for all that, the Court of Ava has made no sign of submission, and a final result has not yet been obtained. . . . I had the honour (Minute, February 12) to declare my opinion that 'the Government of India cannot, consistently with its own safety, appear for one day in an attitude of inferiority, or hope to maintain peace and submission among the numberless princes and people embraced within the vast circuit of the Empire, if, for one day, it give countenance to a doubt of the absolute superiority of its arms, and of its continued resolution to assert it.'" The wisdom of these remarks is at once apparent. "This maxim," continues his Lordship, "applies with especial force to any matter of dispute or conflict with the Burman Kingdom. . . . There is no Power which ventures to assert the same pretensions to superiority in strength and dignity, and none so ready to support those pretensions by force of arms." The Governor-General is next of opinion that "after the events of the last

three months we ought not to concede to them terms so light as General Godwin, in his instructions, was authorised to grant. . . . If overtures should be made before large additional charges have been incurred by the Government of India, in the preparation of an army to take the field in November, the Court of Ava should be required to pay down, promptly, 15 lakhs of rupees, to cede the Negrais and Diamond Islands, and the district of Martaban, to a point upon the Sittang river near to Shwé-gyeen." In this Minute the Governor-General thus ably defends himself and the Government of India against the vulgar charge of "insatiable lust of territorial aggrandisement":—

"In the earliest stage of the present dispute I avowed my opinion that conquest in Burma would be a calamity second only to the calamity of war; that opinion remains unchanged. . . . If conquest is contemplated by me now, it is not as a positive good, but solely as the least of those evils before us, from which we must of necessity select one." With reference to the necessity which compelled us in 1826 to deprive the Burmese of the provinces of Tenasserim, Arakan, and Assam, the Governor-General asserts—"Now, for stronger reasons and with better effect, the occupation of the province of Pegu appears to me to be unavoidably demanded by sound views of general policy." In short, what should have been done twenty-six years before was in contemplation now.

On the 6th of September the Secret Committee replied to the Governor-General of India in Council, acknowledging, in addition to the above Minute of the 30th of June, the receipt of a very important despatch, dated the 2nd of July. The reply of the Secret Committee reveals the policy of the Home Government. They seem entirely to concur with the Governor-General in his opinions regarding the annexation of Pegu; but they see "material difficulties opposed to the retaining possession of the district without bringing the war to a conclusion either by a treaty with the King of Ava, of which that

cession should be the basis (*sine qua non*), or by the entire subjugation of that Power." These "material difficulties" appeared to the Secret Committee from the Governor-General, after presenting to them five alternatives, having remarked, chiefly with reference to the disposition of the inhabitants of Pegu, "that it may be well worthy of consideration whether, in the event of the King of Ava evading submission, and of the occupation of Pegu being finally resolved upon, we should not confine our military operations to driving the Burmese before us out of every part of that province, and then occupying it, with the declared intention of holding it permanently, without proceeding onward to the capital." The Secret Committee consider that, simultaneously with General Godwin's advance on Prome, or earlier if thought expedient, the King of Ava should be informed of our being prepared to adopt the cession of the province of Pegu as the measure of compensation by which a farther advance into his kingdom may be stayed, and to conclude a treaty of peace with him accordingly, "accompanied by the necessary stipulations for the future maintenance of a friendly intercourse between the two nations; but that, in the event of his refusing, or delaying to accede to that proposal, he must be prepared for all the consequences which he will bring upon himself by the further prosecution of the war in his dominions." With regard to the additional force required by General Godwin for his operations, the Committee consider that this force would be required under any of the contingencies contemplated by the Governor-General in Council, except the very improbable one of a timely submission by the Burmese; and they doubt not "the preparations for the despatch of it will have been completed in due time to take advantage of the favourable season for its employment." The Secret Committee observe, with intense satisfaction, the friendly disposition of the inhabitants of Pegu; and they express their admiration of the policy of the Governor-General in not yielding to the desire of the Peguese, or Talaings, to

place themselves formally under our protection while an uncertainty remained as to the final annexation to our territories of their once independent kingdom. "Now," write the Committee, "that uncertainty will be removed by the present despatch, which is intended to convey to you our authority, under the sanction of the Queen's Government, to consider the permanent occupation of Pegu, and its final annexation to the East Indian Dominions of Her Majesty, as the just and necessary result of those military operations which you have been driven to direct against the Burmese Empire. . . . You will, therefore, consider yourselves authorised to proclaim the annexation of Pegu to the British Empire in the East as soon as the forces under General Godwin shall be in possession of the whole of it by the capture of Prome." The precise limits of the cession to be insisted upon were those which would secure a well-defined military line of defence. It is curious to remark, in the above instructions by the Secret Committee, the great importance attached to the capture and occupation of the city of Prome. Perhaps, in common with many at home and in India, they thought that not a shot to the southward would be fired after our securing the ancient boundary between the two kingdoms.

We now turn to the Governor-General's Minute, dated August 10, 1852, written after his Lordship's return from Rangoon. He passes in review the present position of our affairs in Burmah, our preparations, our means, and our future prospects. He is delighted at the health of the troops, their excellent state of discipline, and everything seems to secure Lord Dalhousie's admiration at the great commercial capital of the Burmese Empire. But his hands are tied—

"Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown!"

"The Government of India," he writes to the Secret Committee, "is at present incompetent to determine the question of policy. No reply can be expected to their application for instructions for some time to come."

Particular attention is requested to the following remarks, as bearing on what the author ventured to put forward in a former chapter. "The absence of definite orders now, upon the ultimate policy to be adopted, is so far to be regretted that it necessarily hampers the Government in some degree as to present measures. For, so long as it continues doubtful whether the permanent occupation of Pegu will be permitted, I feel reluctant to direct an advance of the army, even as far as Prome; because I am most unwilling to expose the people (who would be led by our advance to commit themselves still more deeply to us than they have yet done) to all the horrors which would be the certain consequence to them of any subsequent retirement by us." The question now to be solved was—Whether the ensuing campaign should include a march upon Ava, or should be restricted to an advance to Prome and an occupation of Pegu? The Governor-General discovered, from the best information he could obtain at Rangoon, that an advance to Ava could not be made wholly by water; in his opinion a heavy land column would be "unavoidable for some part of the way." And with regard to the carriage resources of Burma, Lord Dalhousie truly says—"Greatly as everything in that country has changed for the better, compared with what it was in 1824, I apprehend that the difficulty of obtaining land-carriage would be hardly less now than then." But notwithstanding all these disadvantages, "everything of that sort is practicable if one is resolved to do it; but it could be effected only at an enormous cost, which nothing but a proved indispensable necessity would justify the Government in incurring." On the other hand, should it be resolved to limit the advance "to the ground which it is proposed to occupy permanently," expense would be vastly diminished, life would be saved, and time would be economised. Only half the amount of troops would then be required by the General. The flotilla might be able to convey the force for the occupation of Prome. Then, says the Governor-General, "the whole of the cold season will

be before us, in which to confirm our position and to provide against the future; and if the decision of the authorities in England shall confirm the proposals of the Government of India, the war may be declared at an end in November, and the annexation of the province proclaimed. The treaty relations which have been violated by the Burmese will not be renewed. Doubts and uncertainties both in Pegu and among ourselves will be removed, and thenceforward we shall have only to defend our frontier against attack." Lord Dalhousie is firmly of opinion that the conquest of the upper provinces of the Burmese Empire "would be for no good end after all." It was now decided that the advance should be limited to Prome.

We now come to a very important point, the discussion of which drew down much unjust abuse on General Godwin—unjust, because information and impartiality were not apparent in the majority of opinions—regarding the time when the advance on Prome should be made. The Governor-General adverts to the subject of an immediate advance to Prome having been officially discussed by General Godwin shortly after the conclusion of operations at Rangoon. The General stated strong military objections to the movement; "he pointed out that his force was comparatively small, and that no reinforcements could be obtained at that season; he showed that we were totally ignorant of the plans and movements of the enemy. Hence he argued, that if he should take his force to Prome it would be placed there in the heart of an enemy's country, wholly without support if attacked (which was an event at least as possible then as in 1825), and with his sole communication by the river insecure; and, consequently, that he would be altogether in a weak and false position." These reasons appeared to the Governor-General—as they would, doubtless, have appeared to all reasonable men—to be unanswerable. Then, again, General Godwin was strongly urged by many to advance during the rains. On—on—to Ava—"Sesostris," "Pluto," "Proserpine"! throw shells into the Palace of the

Golden Foot, astonish the inhabitants of the "City of the Immortals"! "Another turn-a-head," to Amarapura, and bring the "Golden Supreme" to terms! Steam on the Irawady, there is no limit to your progress! shoals are nothing; tonnage is nothing; rocks not laid down in the chart are nothing; nothing whatever is impossible! General Godwin informed Lord Dalhousie at Rangoon that he had declined to advance during the rains. Though some of his previous objections were removed by the command obtained over the river by the flotilla, he would still, in the absence of reinforcements, have been wholly without support; and he alleged as an additional reason for declining to advance, that while no object of importance had been pointed out as likely to be secured by the early occupation of Prome, it would have been unwise and culpable to remove the troops, without positive necessity, from the barracks which had been provided for them, and where they were enjoying comparatively good health, in order to expose them at Prome to effects of climate and the season, from which they were likely to suffer severely. "I consider," says Lord Dalhousie, "that these reasons of General Godwin for refusing to advance hitherto, during the rains, to Prome, were sound and good." Thus approved of by his Lordship to the Secret Committee, nevertheless, General Godwin had the rare distinction of being one of the best abused generals of the day! Yes, it was a distinction to be abused by those utterly ignorant of the facts of each case—ignorant alike of local as well as of military affairs—whose ignorance and presumption now became apparent in the most glaring form from the papers before us. At a more advanced period a letter appeared in an Indian journal*—which journal in India, with two others well known to fame in London, formed the grand literary triumvirate of sarcasm and abuse—in defence of the General's conduct, the publication of which evinced a decided liberality on the part of the editor:—

* December 30, 1852.

“General Godwin formed one opinion, Commodore Lambert another. Had Commodore Lambert's views been as easy of accomplishment as the editors of so many journals declare, surely Lord Dalhousie would have over-ruled the General, ordered him to furnish 1,000 soldiers to the Commodore, and have directed the gallant sailor to advance up the Irawady and blow the King's Court and Capital to ‘immortal smash.’ It is but reasonable, however, to conclude that the Governor-General did not coincide with this dashing proposal, but preferred the plan of campaign submitted by the General.”

Let us next turn to the all-important Minutes of November 1852, forwarded by the Governor-General of India in Council to the Secret Committee:—

Fort William, November 6, 1852. (No. 53.) In reply to your despatch of the 6th of September last, we have the honour to forward for your information, copies of Minutes recorded by us on the affairs of Burma, from which it will be seen that we are unanimous in deprecating an occupation of Burma, and that we further deprecate an advance to Ava (with the exception of Sir John Littler, who advocates an advance, but without an occupation). We have, &c.

(Signed)	“ DALHOUSIE.	F. CURRIE.
	“ J. LITTLER.	J. LOWIS.”

Lord Dalhousie's Minute is dated November 3, 1852. It contains so much valuable information that one is almost led to wonder how, in the midst of a Governor-General's multifarious duties, so much knowledge should have been brought together in a despatch, a large portion of which, it is presumed, must have been written from memory. Here we have the Governor-General's full views, and the policy he urged upon the Secret Committee at home. It is a reply to the despatch of the Secret Committee, dated the 6th of September. It is regretted that the Committee does not coincide with the Governor-General in Council “regarding the manner in which the

formal termination of the war is to be effected. . . . The orders of the Committee are, that on the occupation of Pegu being completed, the King of Burma shall be called upon to conclude a treaty of peace, of which the cession of Pegu shall be the basis; and threatened, if he refuses, with all the consequences that continued war will bring upon him Although it now appears that the objections felt by the Committee to the larger occupation are not insuperable, I still adhere to the policy originally recommended; and still strongly urge that the army should not advance to Ava, excepting under a more cogent necessity than that contemplated by the Committee in their present despatch." Now we have a piece of statesmanship, as if its author, like a political Theophrastus, had penetrated into the inmost core of the Burmese character:—"The Committee," says Lord Dalhousie, "regard the treaty as of great importance. I regret to feel myself compelled to differ from it so widely, that I regard a treaty with this Burman Power as an evil to be avoided. . . . Eastern nations set little store by such instruments. Their opinion of any attempted violation of treaty by Burma would certainly not be calculated to deter the Court of Ava from prosecuting its unfaithful projects; and the British Government would obtain neither moral nor physical aid from them in enforcement of its rights, either by their opinion or by their action. In truth, the conclusion of such a treaty serves only to impose obligations upon the British Government in proportion as it confers rights. A general stipulation for peace and friendship, and for the mutual security of the subjects of both States, is not open to so much objection; but when clauses are multiplied, as in the Treaty of Yandaboo, and in the consequent commercial treaty with Burma, giving to the British Government many rights specified in detail, points of contact, and consequently of conflict, are multiplied in the same proportion. The British Government is thereby reduced to the necessity either of interfering upon every occasion on which a faithless and over-

bearing Power disregards the stipulated rights of our subjects, or of avoiding the perpetual risk of quarrel by overlooking such disregard of its subjects' rights, and neglecting to enforce them. Such was the course pursued through many years in regard to our treaties with Burma."

It is, then, the opinion of the Governor-General that this undecided policy "did unquestionably encourage the Burmese in their arrogance, and presumptuous violation of public rights, which led at last to the present war, and to their refusal of any reparation for the purpose of averting it." With reference to the fact of our Envoys having been "actually hunted out of the country," the Rev. Mr. Burney—son of Colonel Burney—informed the author of this narrative that while his father was resident at Ava, on the eve of the Colonel's departure from the presence of the Golden Foot, the King said he would allow him to remain with him as a friend, but not as a Resident.* Colonel Burney's knowledge of the Burmese language and people even endeared him to the Court of Ava.

Lord Dalhousie is convinced that treaties formed on the Yandaboo model would lead either to an early quarrel or to a repetition of the same process as before, with a similar result; and such are the reasons for which the Governor-General regards "the negotiations of a formal treaty with Burma as productive of evil." The Governor-General in Council at length arrives at the conclusion "that a treaty with Burma is of no more value than the reed with which it is written—that, as a barrier against hostility, it is as flimsy as the paper on which it is traced." But, as the Committee express an opinion that a treaty should be formed, "its injunctions shall be obeyed." Lord Dalhousie regards it in the last degree improbable that the King will consent to sign a treaty ceding Pegu. "That province was the first and best of the conquests of Burma, and is the last that it has retained. To cede it

* See also p. 165.

would be to cut off a right hand and pluck out a right eye. National pride would struggle bitterly against the open humiliation of a formal surrender"; but yet the King's refusal to sign does not deter the Governor-General from urging on the Secret Committee the fact that the consequences of an entire subjugation of Burma would be "most injurious to the interests of the British Government." With regard to the entire subjugation of the Burman power, the Committee had not before it the full information that (in the Minute of the 10th of August) "must subsequently have made it acquainted with the great difficulties by which the execution of such an enterprise would be obstructed." Lord Dalhousie then proceeds to show how, with reference to the much entertained opinion of the propriety of an immediate despatch of a force upon the steam flotilla to Ava, thus striking at the heart of the capital, and terminating the war at once, such a movement is impossible. "The Government of India has not at its disposal the means of effecting it."

We have already stated in this Abstract that a fleet of very light steamers was required to proceed above Prome, so it will be useless here to give any of the Governor-General's details on these matters, admirably set forth as they are in his "splendid Despatch." In the narrative, the "Enterprise," drawing twelve feet of water, has been seen lying high and dry even between Rangoon and Prome. We are not quite so sure of having mentioned the "Sesostris" having struck upon a rock coming down the broad and deep Bassein river. However, the frigate, through a miracle, came safe to port, was lightened, put into the Irawady while the water was yet high, and accompanied the advance to Prome. "The river has already fallen fifteen feet since the 9th of October." * There were nine steam-vessels employed on the advance to Prome, including store-boats, gun-boats, and other craft. "Although 2,300

* Minute, November 8, 1852.

men were recently brought to Prome," says the Governor-General, "the voyage was comparatively short and the weather was fine. Even then the men suffered from the crowding and confinement. If they are to be moved in the rains for some hundred miles farther, the ships must be covered in, and the ships' boats could not give the same aid as of late. Unless it was desired to invite the decimation of cholera, the numbers embarked in each ship must be greatly less than on the advance to Prome. I give a wide estimate when I say that the whole steam flotilla could not, in the rains, convey more than 1,500 men," and this flotilla could not be increased. In the Minute of the 10th of August the Governor-General held that an advance to Ava could not be made wholly by water. "I greatly doubt," said he, "whether the steamers which during this autumn would go to Prome, could in the ensuing winter mount the stream to Ava." Since the date of that Minute it is now asserted that no time had been lost, nor any exertions spared, to collect carriage for the army. Elephants had likewise been despatched from Bengal, all with a view to enabling the army "to move against any force that might be in its neighbourhood." This was politic; but Lord Dalhousie thinks it in the highest degree the reverse, with the Cabul disaster fresh on our memory, to conquer and occupy Ava, and thus "expose a handful of men isolated in the midst of enemies." *

We now proceed to the financial remark put forward by the Governor-General, that "heretofore the charges of the war have been light indeed, compared with the cost of the previous war." It has been already stated that the Campbell Expedition, during Lord Amherst's administration, cost nearly twelve million pounds sterling, or say ten crores of rupees, in less than twenty-four months. From what has been publicly set forth regarding the expense of the present war, it would appear to have cost

* These remarks become of especial interest in 1879, during our occupation of Afghanistan.

considerably less than a million sterling in the twelve months. In the House of Lords, February 24, 1853, the Earl of Ellenborough said that the war had cost from the commencement not less than one hundred and thirty thousand pounds a month. On the following day, in the House of Commons, Sir James Weir Hogg exposed what he termed the preposterous exaggerations respecting the cost of the expedition. Taking up a good authority*—a sort of finance minister in his way—it is there said that the war will have scarcely cost more than sixty lakhs of rupees in a twelvemonth! The London "Times" had the cost of the expedition, up to the first of July 1852, reckoned at about half a million sterling: at a later date the "leading journal" calculated it at the rate of two hundred and fifty thousand pounds a month (twenty-five lakhs of rupees), or three million pounds sterling a year. Our Indian financial authority, writing in November 1852, says—"Lord Dalhousie began the Burmese war not merely with £12,000,000 sterling of cash balance in the treasury, but with £2,000,000 sterling in excess of the sum which was in hand when the Second Punjab War commenced in 1848, and it is doubtless to this circumstance we are to attribute the fact of his having been able to meet the heavy expenses of a maritime war like that we are now engaged in, with so much ease and freedom, and to disappoint the expectations of those who were looking for a new five per cent. loan. Even if the war should therefore cost £2,000,000 sterling, the treasury will only be reduced to the same position in which it stood on the 30th of April 1848."

Returning to the Governor-General's Minute, he assures the Committee that if it "requires this Government to protract the war, to continue the advance to Ava, and to seize a vast and unprofitable region, they must be prepared to hear of exhausted cash balances and re-opened loans." Even should "Amarapura be captured," the task would be but half done.

* "Friend of India," January 13th, 1853.

The Committee are referred to the map of Burma, where it will find that "six degrees of latitude must still be traversed before the sujugation of the Burman power will be effected. That tract of country is mountainous, jungly, and peopled with wild tribes. The difficulties of subduing this tract cannot be stated, because they cannot be calculated. . . . Territory, 800 miles in length, from the sea to Assam, and varying in breadth from Arakan to the borders of China, will have been added to the British possessions in the East. Once taken it must be held. . . . No hill people is contemptible among its own hills." Lord Dalhousie alludes to an attempt to coerce the Nágas round Assam some two years ago, which was attended with no very brilliant results; the same might be the case with the Shans* and other hill tribes with whom we would now come in contact. On every principle his Lordship seems to deprecate the entire subjugation of the Burmese Empire; he thinks it neither worth the trouble nor the expense. The King of Ava's crown is one of tinsel, and will secure its own downfall. The glory of the dynasty of Alompra, come what may, is on the eve of departing for ever. We may some day be solicited by numerous unknown tribes to go forth and spread the light of civilisation among them. Such thoughts are apt to strike one in the perusal of the Minute now under consideration. The Governor-General is satisfied, from all the information within his reach, "that the revenues of Burma would not be sufficient to meet the extra expense which the possession of Burma would impose upon us." Again, "the

* In 1864, although the Burmese Empire had lost some of its most valuable possessions, still the centralising power of Burma, beyond our conquest, was strongly felt. The Shans, extending from China to Bangkok, were becoming their prey, either by conquest or coercion; and, although Lord Dalhousie wisely said "No hill tribe is contemptible among its own hills," might we not in some measure prevent such a scattered race as the Shans, who might be so useful to us in many ways, from falling a prey to the powers that still reign in Chin-India?—In 1879 public attention has been much called to the Nágas and other tribes.

policy which would fix the frontier near to Ava would assuredly leave us still without a treaty of peace, and with the prospect of an indefinite continuance of hostilities between the two States. My own conviction remains, as I have already expressed it, that the King would make no overtures and no submission. On our approach to Ava he would retire into his highlands, as was their declared policy before, and as recent intelligence, received through Armenian merchants at Ava, shows to be the King's intention now." About the same time as these words were written another opinion was entertained as to the probability of the King's flight into the jungles on the capture and occupation of Ava. It was said that those well informed on the subject had declared that such a contingency could never arise. The King could not leave his capital; if he did, his flight would be followed by immediate destruction. So much for opinion, well defined by Dean Swift as "light of foot and headstrong, yet giddy and perpetually turning!" And we cannot help thinking that, notwithstanding the golden immortal charm that is ever said to hover around the dignity of Ava, His Majesty would retire on our approach at an unquestionable speed to the jungle regions. Were he to get among that strange and mysterious race, the Shans, they might deliver him up any day to us for five thousand pieces of silver; or, owing him a grudge for past injuries received, they might seek to annihilate the dynasty of Alompra in destroying him and all his followers. Siam would rejoice at the annihilation; and this, in some way or other, at no very distant period must take place. We shall, no doubt, be quite ready for the *coup d'etat*! for we shall have been prepared for it by the prudent policy of the Governor-General of India in the Second Burmese War.

But even if the King should forego the intention of flight, there is, in the opinion of Lord Dalhousie, "no hope whatever of his signing such a treaty as the Committee has required." Even at Ava he would not consent to "cede the fairest portion

of his kingdom to us, and confine himself for the future to forest and barren hills." No peace, therefore, will have been concluded; and why, at the present time, should we be "encumbered with four hundred miles of additional territory, with enhanced expenses and disproportionate returns"? With regard to what was stated by the Secret Committee, that with the mere annexation and occupation of Pegu the Government would be under the necessity of constantly maintaining a force upon a war footing in that district for its defence, the Governor-General remarks—"I hold a treaty of any kind with the Burmese to be so valueless, that the conclusion of one would not induce me to keep one regiment less in Pegu than if there were no treaty.* . . . Nor would the force be kept on a 'war footing' if there were no treaty, any more than if it were negotiated. . . . By long-established practice all troops crossing the sea receive the higher allowances; wherefore, for the present at least, and until a great change be made, the higher allowances could not be withheld from the troops in Pegu."

Lord Dalhousie brings forward the case of the Ameer Dost Mahommed Khan in 1849, when he entered the Punjaub in arms against the British Government, and occupied Peshawur. After the surrender of the Sikhs, the Dost was chased out of the country, and the province was occupied by the British. The Governor-General's policy not to enter into any treaty with him was approved of by the Committee. The people of the Punjab, or elsewhere, did not consider our power one whit the less paramount because a treaty was not concluded with the wily Dost.

But to proceed:—"The occupation of Pegu does, in my judgment," writes his Lordship, "afford reparation for the past, and will give effectual security for the future. The physical and commercial advantages that would accompany the

* These remarks of his Lordship are of great political importance at the present time (1879).

possession of Pegu by the British Government were set forth in the Minute of the 30th of June. The enquiries which have been sedulously made since that time tend, as far as they go, to confirm the safe and moderate estimate which stated the revenues of Pegu at 25 lakhs a year. The annexation of a territory in perpetuity, producing the revenue above named, and susceptible of great and various improvement, will certainly pay for all the cost of its occupation and government, and fully reimburse the State for all the charges of the present war."

With respect to security for peace in the future, the loss of Pegu deprives the Burmese of the sinews of war, for it impoverishes the treasury of the Court of Ava, and takes the means of raising many soldiers on the "conscript" system out of their hands. "If the Burmese should, nevertheless," says the Governor-General, "collect an army for attack, after the declared annexation of Pegu, we could desire nothing better. The frontier of Prome is not extensive. Its central portion is filled by the Galadzet mountains, covered with jungle and destitute of water, which are as impassable to the Burmese army as to us. The valley of Prome and the valley of Toungoo are the only points of attack. . . . If the Burmese should attempt to attack with an army, its destruction, if it will stand, or its total dispersion if it breaks, would be the certain consequence. . . . Still, for some time, they may harass the border by guerilla inroads." But, with the aid of a friendly population, this frontier skirmishing would very soon cease. It would die away. The Court of Ava would silently acquiesce in its loss, "though it would not openly assent to a cession."

Having arrived at this point—and writing from Toungoo (or Tonghoo),—it may here be remarked, that we believe the difficulty of crossing the Galadzet mountains to be greatly exaggerated, as far as a British force is concerned. We think if a Baron Humboldt were asked his opinion, he would say that where there were mountains and jungles there must be water. The passage across, of course, would take time. And was it

now to be regretted that when General Steel arrived at this station he did not urge an endeavour to reach Prome. With fifty elephants, the Irregular Cavalry, two light guns, and one company of European Infantry, the General, an excellent horseman, might have rivalled Napoleon crossing the Alps. The feat would have astonished General Godwin, who would probably have resolved on walking a considerable part of the distance; for although some seven or eight years older than our Madras General, the pedestrian agility of the Chief of the Army of Burma had often astonished far younger men!

Asking pardon for this digression, let us now attend to the Governor-General's assertion, that "if my anticipations should not be fulfilled,—and if, notwithstanding the superiority, which they cannot deny, and the risk, which they cannot fail to recognise, the Burmese should really dispute our possession, still I earnestly contend that an onward territorial movement should be avoided to the last. . . . Though I am strongly opposed to an advance on Ava, followed by a retirement to Prome, I would advise that even that costly military operation should be undertaken before Burma be made and declared a British possession." And now comes what, in our humble opinion, is the finest passage in the despatch:—"But if, after all, peace cannot be procured by any thing short of the conquest of Burma; if the lapse of time and the course of events shall establish a real necessity for advance, then let us advance,—let us fulfil the destiny which there, as elsewhere, will have compelled us forward in spite of our own wishes, and let us reconcile ourselves to a course which will then have no alternative. Having made every honest exertion to stand fast, we shall go on with a clear conscience—with motives unimpeached; and we may rest tranquil as to the ultimate result." The Minute then proceeds to consider matter already set forth in the "Proclamation" chapter of this Abstract. A letter should be addressed to the King of Burma, "reciting more fully the object and the results of the war." According to the

desire of the Committee, or with the object of giving effect to their orders, the conclusion of a treaty of peace between the States is to be proposed to the King. "If the Court of Ava desires to secure itself from further assaults by the Power which it has found itself wholly unable to resist, it will cause the proper officers, duly accredited on its part, to repair to Prome, within one month from the dispatch of the letter to the King from that place, there to sign a treaty by which the province of Pegu shall be ceded to the British Government, and relations of friendship shall be renewed." The probability of the letter in question not reaching the King now occurs to the mind of the Governor-General. European officers would, perhaps, meet with immediate death on its delivery. No Burman would undertake to be the bearer. The Lord of the White Elephant holds heads but cheap in Ava! But, through the wise measure of distributing large numbers of copies of the Proclamation over the country, the King will hear of annexation "though the letter should never reach him." The Secret Committee are then informed that the Governor-General in Council has selected Captain Phayre, the present Commissioner of Arakan, to be Commissioner of Pegu; that everything is in preparation for the establishment of a civil government in the new province; and that all will come into operation as soon as the Proclamation of Annexation "shall have been publicly promulgated."

We have now endeavoured to set before the reader the leading points of Lord Dalhousie's policy, in as brief a space as was compatible with doing justice to his Minutes and the last extraordinary despatch. This document of November 8, 1852, is distinguished by three leading qualities—decision of character, a desire of economy, and the wish to show that a paramount Power can afford wisely to act with moderation under very difficult circumstances. The difficulties for a statesman to contend with in this Burmese war were indeed great. Who will deny that the pilot weathered the storm well, as

he did before in other quarters in troublous times? Who will deny him a place beside such Governors-General as the Marquis Wellesley, Lord William Bentinck, and Lord Hardinge?

On the 23rd of December 1852, the Secret Committee replied to the Governor-General in Council. They approve of the course the Governor-General proposes to pursue. "We should deplore," say they, "the necessity of further conquest, and we strongly feel the very serious objections to the annexation of any other portion of the Burman Empire." The Committee "see with satisfaction, by the Minute of Sir John Littler, whose military experience entitles his opinion to great consideration, that he does not estimate the difficulties of an advance upon Ava as being of so grave a character as to present a material obstacle to the adoption of that course, if it should be rendered necessary by the persevering hostility of the Burmese." Sir John advocated an advance on Ava without an occupation. It is probable that General Godwin entertained the same idea in September 1852, when he made his speech at the Artillery dinner. And none could be more natural for a military man to entertain, who, from the very nature of his profession, is calculated to look more at the immediate effect and glory of a thing than at the after consequences. Yet, for anything we know, the two Generals may have well considered the future, after planting the British standard on the battlements of Ava!

The Governor-General's letter to His Majesty the King of Ava is dated November 16, 1852. It is simply the Proclamation in detail; but there is important matter regarding the treaty by which the conquered province of Pegu was to be ceded to the Government of India. Should His Majesty's accredited officers sign, then the Government of India, on its part, "will bind itself to renew relations of friendship with your Majesty, and to grant liberty to trade in security within the British territories to your Majesty's subjects, permitting the usual trade and supplies of your kingdom to pass its frontier in Pegu, on

the payment of such moderate duties as it may fix." The following is the

DRAFT OF TREATY.

Treaty of Peace between the Honourable East India Company, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of Ava, on the other; settled by His Excellency Commodore G. R. Lambert, Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's Naval Force in the East Indies, Major-General Henry Godwin, C.B., commanding the British Forces in Ava, and Captain Arthur Purves Phayre, Commissioner of Pegu, on the part of the Honourable Company; and by _____, on the part of the King of Ava; who have each communicated to the other their full powers.

ARTICLE I.

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the Honourable East India Company, on the one part, and His Majesty the King of Ava, on the other.

ARTICLE II.

His Majesty the King of Ava cedes to the Honourable East India Company, in perpetual sovereignty, the Province of Pegu, being the territories to the southward of the boundary hereinafter described, namely:—

ARTICLE III.

The Honourable East India Company, and His Majesty the King of Ava, will each permit the subjects of the other to carry on trade within their respective dominions, and they will give to such traders full protection and security.

ARTICLE IV.

This Treaty shall be ratified by His Majesty the King of Ava within one month; the British Commissioner engaging that it

shall be ratified by the Governor-General in Council, and delivered to the Burmese Commissioners, within one month, at Prome.

Done at , this
day of 185 .

(1853.)

Having now related the annexation of a new province to our dominions in the East, and holding the opinion that it is highly politic to increase those dominions when we can do so with a due regard to our own interests and to those of others, we are led, at a time when the government of India forms one of the prominent objects of public attention, to muse over the progress we have made during a wonderful century of government. If even a Frenchman—remembering the scenes of the glory of Dupleix, Labourdonnais, Lally, and Bussy—styled the government of the East India Company “one of the most glorious works of civilisation,” why should any of our own countrymen, without having weighed the matter, be prone to condemn, or simply to wish for change? In the little city of Pondicherry—the Niobe of the French possessions in India—the traveller of the present day will probably hear, as the writer has heard before him, the intelligent circles of the Paris of the East expressing their wonder and admiration on the subject of the government of India—“the result of circumstances rather than of design”—a piece of machinery surpassing all that could be devised by the most cunning legislator—a system which could not wisely be replaced by any other. It is pleasant to know that the country in which so many of our destinies are cast has made considerable progress under the East India Company. This government, it has been well expressed, “is extraordinary in its design, singular in its conduct”;* it is a system pursued among a strange people who like not sudden

* “History of the British Conquests in India,” by Horace St. John,

innovations, millions of whom seem to persist in remaining "unchangeable in the midst of change!" Who that knows aught concerning India and her people will not agree with the remark * that "Europe and South America, if not India, have had quite enough of governments by design—of governments not the results of circumstances, but of theories; and we should be sorry were India the prey of constitution-makers!" Modify and correct if you will, but do not attack in order to destroy. The attempt carries failure in the face of it, as sure as ever failure was, or ever will be! †

It is to be hoped that even in a quarter of a century hence a decided progress will be observable among the inhabitants of Pegu. As has been said before, there is easier and better material to work upon here; and the Talaings, seeing that we have been the means of rescuing them from tyranny and oppression, will no doubt aid us in the general cause of improvement, when our system of government has fairly begun to work, buoyed up with the hope of seeing Pegu rise in its beauty again, and themselves, although not an independent, at least a peaceful and happy nation!

Upon our occupation of the Tenasserim provinces after the first war, we are informed that our rule commenced very properly, "by disturbing as little as possible the systems of revenue, police, and justice, to which the people had been accustomed under their Burmese rulers." By the Burmese the chief portion of the State revenue derived from land, was levied in kind; and one-fourth of the crop of rice was nominally the share claimed by the Government.‡ But, on account of the distance of the southern provinces from Ava, the Burmese

* "Economist."

† No sensible man will venture to deny to Her Majesty's Government, during the last twenty years, building on the foundation laid by the East India Company, the exercise of extreme moderation, and an ardent desire to benefit the people of India. (1879.)

‡ "Calcutta Review," No. xv. p. 90. That branch of revenue derived from teak forests was unknown to the Burmese.

governors and their subordinates had a large field for the exercise of tyranny and exaction. Garden produce, fruit trees, the farming of fisheries, town dues, and other modes of raising money, likewise yielded revenue for the State as well as for the governors. [The officers appointed by our Government are the Commissioner, his assistants, the Tseekays, and the Goung Gyouks.] With the exception of taking revenue from the land in kind, the above fiscal system was adopted by us; from which period the revenue system of the Tenasserim provinces, apparently for some years, went through so many fluctuations and errors as to impress us with the idea that a Colonel Read, with his assistant Munro (afterwards the great Sir Thomas) were much wanted in this corner of our dominions in the East. There is no saying what these lords of the Ryotwari system, and masters in all relating to land revenue, would have done under the circumstances; but, doubtless, they would have done something—have invented some mode of raising a just revenue which should at least bring the territory nearer paying its civil and military expenses than has hitherto been attained.* It would now appear, notwithstanding a similar drawback to these provinces—that of a scanty population—reasonable to expect that Pegu, with all its natural advantages, will not eventually disappoint the Government; there is every chance of a speedy increase of population; and even in a few years, with judicious management, guided by experience, which qualities distinguish the head of Pegu's Government, this once ancient kingdom may furnish a fair and sufficient revenue for every purpose. The Commissioner of

* Major Broadfoot, the hero who fell at Moodkee, altered the whole fiscal system of the provinces, "substituting a fixed money payment in lieu of the levy of one fourth of the grain in kind or commuted in money; he abolished taxes on trees and garden produce, and those on turtle-banks and fisheries; in place of the latter he established a species of poll-tax, so regulated that a cultivator paid about one-third of what was exacted from a non-cultivator."—"Calcutta Review."

the Tenasserim and Martaban provinces, whose jurisdiction now includes a portion of Pegu to the eastward, as far as Shwé-gyeen, will also have an admirable field for the development of his talents in the endeavour to bring his now extensive territory into a prosperous and paying condition. As regards the commercial capital of Pegu, the ground-rent of Rangoon alone, it was said, would furnish no inconsiderable source of income. Captain Phayre had already begun to lay the foundation of a healthy and wealthy metropolis of Eastern Asia. And now, towards the close of this narrative, it comes as a sort of duty to notice a fallacy recently put forth in England,—nothing less than the assertion that “each new acquisition had added to our debt, and has impoverished India.”

In the account of the revenues and charges of the Punjab and Trans-Indus territory for 1840–1850, and the succeeding year, we find a surplus of upwards of sixty lakhs of rupees. If we deduct from this what is styled “an extra military expenditure” of thirty lakhs—much of which would have been expended had annexation never taken place—there is then a clear surplus of thirty lakhs! The last accounts of the same territory give a surplus of about half a million sterling, subject to the same deductions. Should very minute statisticians give no weight to the fact that had we not annexed the Punjab we would have had to watch it, consequently a large army to pay, without deriving any revenue from that territory? Supposing that Government, in the case of Pegu, had not annexed—had simply been contented with striking a blow; allowing that Burmese arrogance always goes on in an increasing arithmetical progression, would not Maulmain and Arakan have remained constant themes of anxiety and expense? There could be nothing so effective as taking away the “sinews of war” from a country like Ava! And this could only be done by annexation! Had the resources of Ava, by such a stroke of policy, been crippled in 1826, it is highly probable there would have been no Second Burmese War in 1852.

Again, a popular writer advised, shortly after we were settled at Rangoon, that the army should be withdrawn from Burma, and that we should retire to Calcutta "with as little loss of time as possible"; thus attempting to destroy the prestige of the power of that very Empire which he afterwards so elegantly styled "the most splendid dominion under the sun!"

We are thankful to have some writers in India able and willing to expose such absurdities as have just been alluded to; and it is only to be regretted that these are not more universally read in England. But we are not always perfect in our views of matters, even in the Eastern quarter of the universe. Our esteemed Indian Quarterly* put forth a fallacy or two which were commented on by one of the Calcutta journals. The annexation of Pegu, thought the reviewer, would be followed "by the rapid establishment of an Eastern Empire." This was all very well—Who did not hope it might? But after giving England new possessions, in addition to Pegu, such as the Shan States and the Gulf of Siam, and having established his empire, he was of opinion that such acquisitions would not pay. It was sufficient to assert that we did not see why an "Eastern Empire" should speedily follow the annexation of Pegu; but if such should take place, we maintained that the said "Empire" would not only pay, if properly managed, but afford a considerable surplus to the future Emperors! †

On the 20th of June a letter arrived, having been brought across the Galadzet mountains from Prome in six days, a distance of at least one hundred and twenty miles, making the runner's trip at the rate of twenty miles a day. General Godwin was about to start for Meaday, and then move southward and complete his tour of inspection at the various military posts—which steps seemed to augur, on our part, a decided termination to the war.

* "Calcutta Review," September 1852.

† Pegu has partly fulfilled this prophecy in the funds she has already furnished to the Imperial exchequer. (*Note* in 1879.)—See notes in 'Papers,' No. III.

But all doubt on the latter point was put an end to by the arrival of news at the end of June, to the effect that an Ambassador had arrived at Prome with a message from the King of Ava, stating that although he would not sign away any of his territory he would nevertheless allow us to remain in the country, and would give orders to his generals not to molest us;—and that he wished the blockade on the Irawady withdrawn, and a free trade to be established between the two nations! We should have been inclined to consider this a piece of consummate craft, had it not been a well-known fact that the unfortunate people to the northward were starving—that traffic had almost ceased—that taxes of course could not be paid,—and that if such a state of things continued, the remnant of the glory of Ava's kingdom must soon depart without the necessity of our moving one mile from Meaday.

We deem it necessary to make special mention here of the admirable measures adopted for enabling us to defeat any attempt of the Burmese to recover a position in the Aeng Pass or its vicinity. Captain Nuthall's gallant surprise of the Aeng stockade * was followed up by a garrison there. The Toungoo Pass being also garrisoned, British communication *viâ* Arakan, was brought to within three days' journey from Prome. "From the crest of the Nareghain Pass," writes an officer, "the valley and course of the Irawady are distinctly visible, and present a very beautiful and interesting sight." Two officers were employed to survey these Passes, which were to become "the main line of communication between Prome, the upper part of Pegu, and Calcutta." And, in a few years, we hoped to see the Governor-General of India, by means of electric telegraph, in communication with Prome and Meaday! Truly, what might we soon expect to see the wizard—Science—leave undone?

* See "Pegu," chap. xiv. p. 207. On this occasion Captain Nuthall and two sepoy were wounded.

The magic wires will speak,—announce a kingdom's fall, or utter forth a kingdom's prosperity,—tell from Europe of an Emperor's ambitious views, or herald forth an approaching revolution ; all these things were likely enough to be telegraphed in Eastern Asia ! How different from the time when Sir A. Campbell showed his foresight by ordering a body of men to Aeng under Captain Ross, to pioneer the way for any future force, as the Aeng road over the Arakan mountains had not been explored by any officer of Général Morrison's unfortunate army ! However, we should even be grateful to that army, for through it the Burmese lost Arakan on the 1st of April 1825. It was now declared that there was not a single stockade to be seen all the way from Meaday to Ava !

Among the Christian prisoners who had been liberated by Prince Mengdoon in his struggle for the throne of the Golden Foot, were two Catholic priests ; a Mr. Spiers, formerly captain of a vessel at Rangoon ; and Mr. Conductor Quinn, attached to the Bengal Ordnance Department. The last was an extraordinary man. There is always something to create a vast interest in the mind about the circumstance of a prisoner of war. Here was a man who strayed beyond the safe boundary at Prome, probably "whistling as he went for want of thought," who believed the presence of an enemy to be a fable. Behold him coolly ascending a tree, then employed in getting a spy-glass to the proper focus, then surveying the surrounding country in the most consummate self-confidence ! The Burmese observe him—he is surrounded—becomes a prisoner of war—and is led off in triumph to Ava. He refuses food—even kicks away the proffered meal—he is but a poor prisoner—his heart is sick—he is about to die. He reaches Ava. As a stroke of conciliation with the British, the successful Prince releases the conductor, and once more the hitherto unfortunate man is a child of the glorious goddess Liberty ! Who would not be a prisoner of war for such a brilliant consummation ?

Having thus remarked concerning prisoners of war, one is led to think of a concluding event of the former campaigns, just before the Treaty of Yandaboo was signed and sealed. The reader will probably recollect the arrival of a deputation and treasure from Ava, also of Dr. Price, with the Judsons and other prisoners. The British camp at Yandaboo boasted one tent containing Mr. and Mrs. Judson. While Mr. Judson's life was in the power of a cruel and sanguinary Court, the amiable wife was debarred from seeing her husband. While he remained in prison she supplied him with food, "occasionally contriving to communicate with him by hiding a slip of paper in the spout of a teapot; and at one period, the prisoners having been moved to a place of confinement several miles from Ava, she followed, and took up her abode in a miserable hut, where to escape insult, she assumed the Burman attire."* We have no "romance" like this to write about in the Second War; and perhaps it is as well.

As Sir Archibald Campbell and General Godwin are the only two British Generals to whose lot it has yet fallen to conduct a war in these regions, it may not be deemed uninteresting, in conclusion, to note a few circumstances regarding each, with respect to their high command.

Sir A. Campbell, having distinguished himself in the Peninsula, where he commanded a division of the Portuguese army, was appointed to the Army of Ava some twelve or fourteen years after he had won his European laurels. General Godwin, who, as Lieutenant-Colonel of a Queen's regiment, had served under him in the East, having distinguished himself in the Ava campaigns, was appointed to a similar command about twenty-six years after that war which has been so vividly narrated by Trant and Havelock, and so correctly by Professor Wilson.†

* "Two Years in Ava."

† Captain Doveton's "Reminiscences of the Burmese War in 1824-5-6," is another work of interest.

With Sir A. Campbell there was European military experience to guide the war, which could not possibly include a practical knowledge of how to work Europeans and sepoys together; and the latter not having been supported by European infantry and a well-directed fire of artillery was the cause, every one knows, of such decided and bloody repulses as our troops met with at Kykloo and Wattedgaum (Watty-goon). With his European regiments there was much to admire in Sir A. Campbell as a soldier, but he knew nothing of Native Infantry. And putting the qualifications of the sepoy out of the question—even as a political stroke of wisdom never to give our native troops in the East a chance of being shown off to disadvantage—this want of knowledge was of serious consequence. General Godwin, although a Queen's officer, throughout the operations of the Second War, proved himself well aware of the advantages to be derived from using the sepoy. In no instance did he allow the natives to advance ineffectively supported by Europeans; and thus supported, they really did admirably at Rangoon, Bassein, and Pegu, to say nothing of Donabew, and several minor affairs. Even in his greatest error—that of leaving Pegu with too small a garrison after its capture—more than half of that small but gallant band was composed of Europeans. The sepoy could not have been better supported; and no doubt he would have aided in slaying the Burmese wholesale, by the side of the European, had an opportunity offered, even against the thousands of infuriated warriors who surrounded the pagoda.

Before Sir A. Campbell's army was sent to Rangoon, a supposition was entertained that should an advance on Ava be necessary it might be accomplished by embarking the troops in Burmese boats, which would reach the city of Ava* in three or four months. It never occurred to those who dictated this

* A distance of about 500 miles.

line of operations that the Burmese might have the means of withholding from us the resources of the country, on which it would be necessary in such a movement to place great dependence. Having selected Rangoon as the chief point of attack, it was also thought that the Burmese would submit on hearing of the fall of the famous city built by Alompra.

Twenty-eight years after, on General Godwin's arrival with a splendid array of steamers and comparatively few transports, subsequent to the "brilliant feat of arms" which placed Rangoon in our possession, a speedy advance on the capital was declared by many to be the only mode of bringing matters to a conclusion. Again, little thought was given to the probability of the Burmese cutting off our supplies, or withholding the resources of the country, or to the fact that but very few of the steamers were suitable for such an advance. In the case of both generals public expectation was filled with the idea of a brilliant and speedy termination to the war. The distinguished Peninsula officer was expected to bring about all this in the first war, and all-powerful steam was to do everything that was needful in the second. We say all-powerful steam, for it was believed by many, from no knowledge of the Commander, but from sheer assumption on the score of years, that General Godwin, in spite of his Burmese experience, would be fit for nothing—that he would be "simply in the way." Age is a personal business with which the public have nothing whatever to do. For no other crime than that of having lived a little longer than most men through the changing scenes of life, volleys of abuse were discharged in England against our gallant General, and that, too, before he was put to the test. Even the philanthropic spirit of "a noble and learned lord" opposed to the war, was roused to give utterance to the liberal sentiment that the General's appointment to command the expedition was a very proper one. He was acquainted practically and personally with Burma, he had already obtained distinction there, and it was therefore likely that he would

carry on the war with greater advantage than any other officer. Who among us would object to a command, should he have the good fortune to enjoy what Dryden styles "a green old age"—a youth renewed like the eagle's? We do not advocate the employment of old generals as a safe rule in the army*; they do not always boast that matured judgment for which they get credit; but when strong recommendations in their favour appear, it is very hard and unfair that, without having been weighed in the balance, they should be declaimed as wanting! Sir A. Campbell had the good fortune to steer clear of all such calumny at the period of his appointment. Then public feeling in England against war was not so violent as it is at present. The national advantages obtained by Waterloo were being reaped in abundance. In India the Mahratta Power had only a few years before been subdued; and in the case of a Burmese war it was merely turning the course from the west to the extreme east. When the Burmese authorities had written to the Marquis of Hastings, asserting their right to the Province of Bengal, we had no Punjab—no Sind—under our government. Altogether, the times were more favourable to the First Burmese War than the Second. Far less shackled, if shackled at all, than General Godwin, and with a new and determined enemy, Sir A. Campbell had also frequent opportunities of displaying that persevering enterprise which the British always admire, and than which, when discreetly used, nothing can be more worthy of admiration. General Godwin had not so many opportunities. The efficiency of steam aided in rendering the opening campaign of the Second Burmese War truly brilliant. It would seem, therefore, that no satisfactory comparison can be instituted between the two commanders, under the circumstances. The health of the troops,

* Nor of old admirals in the Navy, as has been already remarked regarding Admiral Austin.

in comparison with the former campaigns, shows to great advantage. We behold no army perishing in the swamps of Arakan from the want of the commander's experience of the climate. As far as hardships and the want of supplies are concerned, we are not too proud to yield the palm to the former Army of Ava. The first war was a far longer and more tedious one than the second; and it was declared to end "in a manner highly honourable to the British Government." As regards the expenditure of life and treasure, "look on this picture and on this!" As regards energy and military capacity, it is pleasant to turn to pictures of the two chiefs,—to the one with the eye of the past, when we behold him busy at work preparing to retrieve what we had lost by the repulse at Donabew,* and again at the final action of Pagahm Mew, a city of former splendour, where he directed the column in person against the Infernal King†; to the other with the eye of the present, when we behold him in his general's cap and plume, while so many were suffering from the terrific heat of the sun, as active as the younger men on the field on the 12th of April, while fighting our way towards the great pagoda,—in all his prompt energy during the bustle and preparation for the relief of Pegu,—and again, when directing the assault against that capital's noble temple. In both cases we have true soldiers anxious to serve their country faithfully and well. The result of the Second Burmese War is infinitely more satisfactory than that of the First. Great Britain, for the first time, secured a firm footing in Eastern Asia. The link between our posses-

* The news of this was forwarded by Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin, H. M.'s 41st, in a quill, to headquarters.

† "The King of Hell," as he was styled, the Golden Foot's last resource as a commander. The battle of Pagahm Mew was fought on the 9th of February 1826. It was nearly bloodless on our side, and fifty-five pieces of artillery were captured. This was the last action of the First Burmese War.—See Part I., p. 55.

sions on the Ganges and the vast Hindu-Chinese regions had been rendered complete. A mighty work was done—a great political triumph had been accomplished! Should destiny impel us forward, a few years in Pegu would make us quite ready for the service. Before that time arrived it was probable the King of Ava would be in every sense a strenuous advocate for free trade. Some enterprising members of the British Senate may even travel this way, and expound some new and unheard of principles of political economy to His Majesty of the Golden Foot and the Golden Ear! * (1853.)

* It must, with regret, be affirmed that, as regards free trade, our sanguine hopes have not been realised (October 1879). For continuation of narrative to the month of February 1854, see "Pegu," p. 380.—Keeping to the order of events, we shall here make a few remarks to render our Abstract as complete as possible. At Toungoo—where for some time the writer was the only artillery officer in command—Mr. Mason, of the American Baptist Mission, paid us a visit. He thought well of the annexation of the country. It was of no common interest to talk with the author of the "Fauna, Flora, and Minerals of Burma," perhaps, after Judson, the most distinguished missionary that ever came to the land of the Golden Foot. In his famous work he thus describes the *Amherstia*, which he first saw in all its native grace and beauty at Maulmain, and which is considered the finest indigenous tree of Chin-India. "It is of low stature, with slender pendulous branches clustered under its tufted summit of lively green, and draperied with large pea-blossom shaped flowers of brilliant red and yellow, which hang down from its graceful branches in tassels more than a yard long. It was discovered by Dr. Wallich, on the Salween, near Trockla, and named by him 'after the Governor-General's lady, 'the noble Amherstia.' " We notice in his work on Burma that General Fyche, following the doctor's example, has named a beautiful Burmese creeper after himself—*Dendrobium Fytchianum*—a fine illustration of which will be found at page 297, vol. i. In Burma there is scarcely a tree without its attendant creeper.—On the 14th of December (1853), the Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, paid his second visit to Rangoon. He found the city prosperous, and happiness and prosperity everywhere; also that articles paying duty in November and December, amounted in value to eleven lakhs of rupees (one hundred and ten thousand pounds sterling)—a good return from exports and imports in such a short space of time. His lordship next steamed up the Irawady to Prome and Meaday, on his mission of peace. At the latter place he made a pithy speech, and was the chief actor in the settlement of the boundary of the new Province. The pillar, he said, was to be a mark of the British possessions for ever and ever! Our Toungoo boundary was to be in a

NOTIFICATION.

FORT-WILLIAM, FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,
the 30th June 1853.

IN the Proclamation by which the Province of Pegu was annexed to the British dominions in the East, the Governor-General in Council declared that he desired no further conquest in Burma, and was willing to consent that hostilities should cease. Thereafter the Burman troops were everywhere withdrawn. The King was dethroned by his brother, the Mengdoon Prince, and an Envoy was sent from Ava to sue for peace. The Burman Envoy—confessing their inability to resist the power of the British Government, and submissively soliciting its forbearance—announced his willingness to sign a Treaty in accordance with the Proclamation, objecting only to the frontier being placed at Meaday. The Government of India, while it maintained its undoubted right to fix the frontier where it had been placed, at the same time gave signal proof of the sincerity of its desire for the renewal of friendly relations between the States; for, in the hope of at once concluding a treaty of peace, the Governor-General in Council consented to withdraw the frontier from Meaday, and to place it, in strict conformity to the most literal wording of the Proclamation, immediately to the northward of Prome and Toungoo,—cities which have been described at all times as within the northern limits of Pegu, in the official records of transactions between the two States.

But when this concession was offered, the Burman Envoy,

straight line with the point chosen six miles north of Meaday.—Our march to Myo-Khla—forty-two miles north of Toungoo—has been alluded to elsewhere. At this time it looked as if a Third Burmese War were about to commence—although the Burmese knew we had now a direct land movement on Ava in our power on one side, and a water movement by means of light craft on the Irawady on the other. With such means we could circumvent the Empire!

wholly receding from his previous declarations, refused to assent to any Treaty by which a cession of territory should be made. Hereupon the negotiations were at once broken off. The frontier of the British territories was finally fixed to the northward of Meaday and Toungoo, and the Envoy was directed to quit the camp. •

The Envoy proceeded to the capital, whence he has now conveyed to the Government of India the sentiments and proposals of the Court of Ava. •

The King expresses his desire for the cessation of war. The King announces that "orders have been issued to the governors of districts not to allow the Burmese troops to attack the territories of Meaday and Toungoo, in which the British Government has placed its garrisons." Furthermore, the King has set at liberty the British subjects who had been carried prisoners to Ava; and he has expressed his wish that "the merchants and people of both countries should be allowed, in accordance with former friendship, to pass up and down the river for the purpose of trading." Mindful of the assurance he gave that hostilities would not be resumed so long as the Court of Ava refrained from disputing our quiet possession of the Province of Pegu, the Governor-General in Council is willing to accept these pacific declarations and acts of the King as a substantial proof of his acquiescence in the proposed conditions of peace, although a formal Treaty has not been concluded: Wherefore the Governor-General in Council permits the raising of the river blockade, consenting to the renewal of former intercourse with Ava, and now proclaims the restoration of peace. The Army of Ava will no longer be maintained on a war establishment. At the same time, a force will be permanently retained in Pegu amply adequate for its defence and fully prepared for the event of war. The Governor-General in Council, while he announced the successive events of the war, has gladly seized each fitting occasion for bestowing promptly on the several officers whose services were mentioned

with distinction, the cordial thanks and approbation of the Government of India. His Lordship in Council deems it unnecessary now to repeat in detail acknowledgments of individual merit that are still so recent; but he cannot close the record of this war without again conveying to the Services generally an assurance of the admiration with which he has viewed the combined exertions, whereby, under God's good providence, the supremacy of our power in the East has once more been asserted and upheld: [Then follow thanks, naming the higher officers.]

In testimony of the sense that is entertained of the services and conduct of the combined Force, the Governor-General in Council is pleased to direct that a donation of six months' batta shall be issued to all the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the several Naval and Military Forces that have been employed during the progress of the war with Burma. And it shall be the further care of the Governor-General in Council to bring their services and conduct under the special notice, and to commend them to the most favourable consideration, of Her Majesty's Government and of the Honourable Court of Directors.

By Order of the Most Noble the Governor-General in Council,

(Signed) J. P. GRANT,
Officiating Secretary to the Government of India.

At the termination of hostilities (1853) the troops were quartered at the following stations and out-posts:—

RANGOON.	SHWE-GYEEN.	SHWE DOUNG.
YANDOON.	TOUNGOO.	PADOUNG-MEW.
BASSEIN.	MAULMAIN.	TOMBOO.
PEGU.	PROME.	HENZADA.
SITTANG.	MEADAY.	DONABEW.

Grand total actually present,—346 European officers; 177 Native officers; 4,334 European non-commissioned officers and

men; 8,242 Native non-commissioned officers and men,—in all 18,099.

The army was divided into two divisional commands, held by Brigadier-General Sir John Cheape at Prome, and by Brigadier-General Steel at Rangoon. The Staff of each Division was to remain—a highly prudent arrangement—until the new territory became perfectly secure on the frontier. The army being now distributed over Pegu, recalled the memorable words of the Governor-General in his Despatch of 3rd November:—"By the annexation of Pegu we hold in the easy grasp of our hand the kernel of the Burman Empire. Why should we, by the occupation of Ava, encumber ourselves with an armful of worthless rind? But if, after all, peace cannot be procured by anything short of the conquest of Burma; IF THE LAPSE OF TIME AND THE COURSE OF EVENTS SHALL ESTABLISH A REAL NECESSITY for advance, THEN LET US ADVANCE." Meanwhile we hoped that our new possession—extending beyond the 19th parallel of latitude—a fertile country more than twice the size of Holland, with a friendly and unwarlike people—would rise to a high state of prosperity, without "encumbering ourselves with an armful of worthless rind!"

TROOPS IN PEGU, &c.

1864.

Head-quarters :—RANGOON—No. 1 Battery, 20th Brigade, Royal Artillery; H. M.'s 60th Rifles (3rd Battalion); 28th Regiment Madras Native Infantry. THAYET-MYOO—G Battery, 23rd Brigade, Royal Artillery; H. M.'s 19th Regiment of Foot; 5th Regiment Madras Native Infantry. TOUNGOO—No. 5 Battery, 20th Brigade, Royal Artillery; 3rd Regiment Madras Light Infantry. SHWE-GYEEN—Two companies 3rd Regiment Light Infantry. MAULMAIN—9th Regiment Madras Native Infantry. PORT BLAIR, ANDAMANS—One company Sappers and Miners; one company Madras Native Infantry. (The Arakan Battalion had been abolished, and Police substituted.)

AN ACCOUNT OF THE GROSS REVENUES FROM THE TERRITORY CEDED BY THE BURMESE, INCLUDING THE ANNEXED PROVINCES OF PEGU AND MARTABAN, FOR THE YEAR 1855-56, WITH THE CHARGES OF COLLECTION AND OTHER PAYMENTS OUT OF THOSE REVENUES; THE NET RECEIPTS INTO THE GOVERNMENT TREASURIES, AND THE RATES PER CENT. FOR WHICH THE GROSS RECEIPTS WERE COLLECTED:—

Territory ceded by the Burmese.	1 Gross Receipts.	2 Repay- ments. Allowances, Refunds, and Drawbacks.	3 Net Receipts within the Year after deducting Repay- ments.	Payments out of the Income.			7 Net Receipts.	8 Rate per cent. for which the Gross Re- ceipt was collected.
				4 Charges of Collection.	5 Other Payments.	6 Total Payments out of the Income.		
	£	£	£	£	£	£	£	£
Revenues and receipts:								
Land revenue	189,735	267	189,468					
Sayer ditto	50,597	...	50,597					
Abkarry ditto	22,106	...	22,106					
Miscellaneous receipts in the Revenue Depart- ment	230	...	230					
Customs at Akyat:— On imports, £10,028; on exports, £18,819	242,668	267	242,401	42,362	3,057	45,419	196,982	17 4/5
Judicial receipts (fees, fines, &c.)	23,847	...	23,847	2,094	...	2,094	26,753	7 2/5
Stamp duties	119	...	119	10,132	11 1/2
Total ceded territory	281,766	267	281,499	44,456	3,057	47,513	233,986	.
Pegu and Martaban (annexed by proclamation of the Government of India, dated 20th December 1852):								
Land revenue	170,590	...	170,590					
Sayer ditto	23,750	...	23,750					
Abkarry ditto	17,322	...	17,322					
Miscellaneous receipts in the Revenue Depart- ment	268	...	268					
Customs:— On imports, £28,556; on exports, £29,257	216,930	...	216,930	63,332	168	63,500	153,980	29 2/5
	52,443	...	52,443	4,334	...	4,334	48,109	8 3/4

Post-office collections	2,184	...	2,184	5,944	...	5,944	Excess of payments.
Marine receipts	534	...	534	3,780
Judicial receipts (fees, fines, &c.)	8,295	...	8,295	534
Ferry collections	144	...	144	8,235
Miscellaneous receipts (including £36,311 sale of lands)	36,550	...	36,550	144
Amount included with "charges of collection" in former years recredited	73,680	...	73,680	36,550
Total, Pegu and Martaban	317,010	...	317,010	166,789	...	166,789	243,132
Total, Burmese Provinces	598,776	267	598,509	Excess recredited, 83,129	168	Excess recredited, 92,961	166,789
Abstract account of the revenues and receipts from the Burmese Provinces :				Excess recredited, 48,673	3,225	Excess recredited, 45,448	409,971
Land revenue	340,325	267	340,058	643,957
Sayer ditto	79,347	...	79,347
Abkarry ditto	39,428	...	39,428
Miscellaneous receipts in the Revenue Department	498	...	498
Customs	459,598	267	459,331	108,744	3,225	108,969	350,362
	81,250	...	81,250	6,425	...	6,425	74,962
Post-office collections	2,184	...	2,184	5,944	...	5,944	Excess of payments.
Judicial receipts (fees, fines, &c.)	18,357	...	18,357	3,780
Stamp duties	119	...	119	18,357
Marine receipts	534	...	534	119
Ferry collections	144	...	144	534
Miscellaneous receipts	36,550	...	36,550	144
Charges recredited as above stated	118,116	...	121,341	36,550
Total, Burmese Provinces	598,776	267	598,509	166,789	3,225	166,789	477,168
				Excess recredited, 48,673	...	Excess recredited, 45,448	166,789
				643,957

*Lord Dalhousie's Autograph Letter to Major Hill, on the
Defence of Pegu.*

THE author thinks it a fitting conclusion to a chapter containing remarks on Lord Dalhousie's policy to present his readers with a copy of the original letter forwarded by the Governor-General to Major Hill, after the gallant defence of Pegu.* This epistle by the great Pro-consul and ready writer has never before been published; and it will be of additional interest at a time when "Isandula" and "Roorke's Drift" are fresh in the memories of all true Britons—showing that the British arms are always gallantly displayed, in all ages. Such a letter also enhances the great importance Government attached to the defence :—

Government House, July 19, 1853.

SIR,—It afforded me much satisfaction some months ago to offer to you, on the part of the Government of India, an expression of the approbation with which it regarded your gallant defence of your post at Pegu, against an overwhelming Burman force. I have still greater satisfaction now, in having the means of proving the sincerity of the admiration which was expressed, by rewarding the services which called it forth.

The command of the Gwalior Contingent is vacant. It comprises two regiments of Cavalry, seven regiments of Infantry, and four Field Batteries; its allowances are to be 2000 rupees a month; the climate is excellent, and the position is altogether more coveted than any other which the Governor-General has to bestow.

If it should suit your views to accept this command, I shall feel

* The above letter has been alluded to at page 235, after the "Investment of Pegu." Major Hill, we may here note, had served in the First Burmese War; and, as Ensign in the Madras European Regiment, was present at the fall and occupation of Rangoon, 1824, and at the assault of stockades at Kemmendine in the same year. He served also at the escalade of Panlang, in 1825, and was engaged in the first assault on, and the second attack of, Donabew. The gallant young subaltern, therefore, had been taught in a good yet severe school to prepare him for his future grand achievement.

a great and real pleasure in bestowing it upon you: and I beg you to regard the act as being at once a testimony to your distinguished personal merit, and a compliment to the gallant force you led so well, and a mark of respect to the army of the Presidency to which you belong.

I would beg that if you should accept my offer, you will, nevertheless, remain in command of your corps, until final arrangements shall be made for the distribution of forces in Pegu after the monsoon.

Let me add that my selection of you for this command has not prevented my soliciting the consideration of the Honourable Court, and of Her Majesty's Government, for the services of yourself and others at Pegu, in marked and special terms.

I have the honor to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

(Signed) DALHOUSIE.

Major Hill, 1st Madras Fusiliers, Tonghoo.

PART IV.

VARIOUS PAPERS ON BURMA.

I.

VIEW OF THE CONDITION OF BURMA IN 1854-55.

"Peace is that harmony in the state, that health is in the body."

LORD CLARENDON'S "Essays."

TOWARDS the close of the year 1854, it became generally known in Rangoon that the Burmese were about to gild anew the great Shwé Dagoung (Dagon) Pagoda.* This momentous event in the annals of the Golden Land, it naturally struck us, would be no inconsiderable proof of Burmese prosperity under British rule. And while among the men, women, and children of this interesting land, the news became rife that the grand temple dedicated to Gautama was to shine forth in full splendour again, a royal salute was fired by British soldiers from the upper terrace of that very temple, in honour of the great victory gained by the allied forces on the banks of the Alma—the first, as it seemed, of a series of blows about to be aimed

* We have heard "Dagoung" translated "world's end"; Pagoda is from the Persian "but-kada," "idol temple"; hence "pagoda" is an easy transition.

at Russian despotism. The Burmese, as usual, wondered at the cause of the firing. Could there be any analogy between Artillery and Religion? The salute could not be in honour of Gautama? At length some were told, and others divined, that a victory was the cause of the firing. The old Phongyee (priest), with yellow garb, turned a wistful glance to the great pagoda, as the smoke vanished from the landscape: the little Phongyee, clinging to his garments, would surely see some great change in his native land, before he attained the age of his sacred sire; at present, they had the first or great change, security under a new and liberal government. Everything breathed of security; and the contemplative Phongyee even began to forget that he might have, without our conquest, become a miserable victim of feudal days, while he gained from the Rangoon authorities, on the asking, permission to place, with a view to gilding, the unique and highly ingenious scaffolding of his country around the exterior of the vast and solemn pile.* Thus, in a matter of considerable moment, did we humour the Burmese people; although some short-sighted reformers would infinitely have preferred our pulling down the noble edifice and selling the bricks! Such people have never yet aided, and never will aid, the cause of Civilisation or Christianity in the East by too hasty action. Conciliation must ever form the basis of our Eastern policy.

In February 1855, the writer, after nearly three years residence in the country, left Burma†; and the Burmese people,

* See note at the end of this Paper.

† He returned again in 1864, when he had the honour, on the recommendation of the Chief Commissioner, Colonel Phayre, C.B. (now Sir A. P. Phayre, K.C.S.I.), of being appointed the first Inspector of Civil Schools in British Burma. As superintendent of army schools, Madras Presidency, the writer again visited Burma in 1868, when he inspected the school of H.M.'s 24th Regiment, giving the men a lecture on Charles XII. of Sweden; and many of the gallant fellows afterwards displayed the true courage of the "Iron King" in the eventful Cape War (1879).

With reference to Education in Pegu, Sir Arthur Phayre did his utmost to give the inhabitants a national system, founded on the best principles.

there is every reason to believe, were then greatly pleased at the change of masters. Discontented growlers there were, as there are everywhere; but there was, in the opinion of many a close observer, no general discontent in the country. Among other peaceful events in the East, 1854 was remarkable as the year in which Indian and Burmese specimens of art and industry were procured for the Paris Exhibition of 1855. Peace had indeed begun to assert her triumphant reign—Peace, the greatest ornament and comfort that can be conferred upon states.

We shall now proceed to take a very brief view of the condition of Burma shortly after the conquest of Pegu, which condition, as Macchiavelli said is occasionally the case with a man, it is easier to understand than to define. It may aid our purpose if we commence by condensing some facts, at the time well known, relative to an embassy from Ava. We should like to possess the discerning powers of some moral philosophers who have in days gone by dissected for you, on paper, a coquette's head, or given you a lecture on the probable position or quantity of a fop's brain,—that we might penetrate into, or examine, the heads of the Burmese Envoys on their arrival in Calcutta.

Not having the graphic powers of a Theophrastus or an Addison, we must simply content ourselves with beholding in the "mind's eye" the mental machinery of the Burmese Envoys on their landing at Baboo's Ghát,* under a salute, and while they proceeded in the Governor-General of India's carriage to the fort.

"With such a splendid city, such a 'residence of Merchant Kings,' what can the British possibly want with Pegu? Let us exceed the bounds of our mission and ask back the Province. The 'strangers' having taken our territory, how can friendship

* Tuesday, November 28th, 1854.

exist between us? If they wish for peace, they must give us back Pegu. This, is Burman custom." So, perhaps, whispered the principal Envoy * to the most astute and clever of his five companions when they became fairly settled in their strange abode.

Some amusing anecdotes regarding the Burmese Envoys were current in Rangoon, one of which was that the Dalla Woon (Minister) believed the greater portion of the guns of Fort William to be *wooden*, until the sound of the metal proved them to be genuine iron. Again, with regard to the Envoys, it was said that the rooms of the Government House in which they were located, furnished with many necessary European comforts, did not at all meet with their approbation. The rooms were too large, and the walls too white; and they longed for the real Burman house, and the close curtain to half suffocate themselves in, and dream of Pyá (Gautama). So much for what some Orientals think of the civilisation of the West. In Pegu, however, we found it amusing to meet with people of the country using English washing-basins, tumblers, bowls, and even decanters, for wrong purposes—proving, at least, that they hold our manufactures in great esteem.

On Monday, the 11th December, Calcutta was enlivened by the brilliant spectacle of the reception of the Burmese Envoys in the marble hall of Government House. Everything was done to render the scene as impressive as possible. The Governor-General was there, and all the grand dignitaries of the City of Palaces. The Chief Envoy advanced to the throne with his own credentials and the royal letter from the Golden Foot of Ava.

Then there was a conversation, through Major Phayre, the Commissioner of Pegu, who acted as interpreter. Gifts, curious and valuable, were then presented and received by our Government and the Ambassadors. After a short time, passed in

* The old Dalla Woon, who was ruler of Dalla at the commencement of the war in April 1852.

conversation, the Envoys returned to their carriages; and, under the shade of many umbrellas, were soon conveyed to their mansion in the fort, and again secluded from the curious gaze of a motley Calcutta world.

To cultivate friendship with the paramount power now naturally seemed to all to be the grand object of the Embassy.

At night, the *nāts* (fairies) of the Golden Land appeared to one of the Envoys in a dream, while, disdaining the sumptuous couch prepared for him, he lay comfortably on the floor.* These Glendoveers (good spirits) of the Gautamaic creed, who

“In sportive flight were floating round and round,”†

prompted him to take advantage of British good nature, and ask back the Province of Pegu.—On Saturday, the 23rd of December, the parting interview took place. It was a business interview of the most important nature. The Burmese Envoy at length boldly proclaimed that *he had come, by command of the King of Ava*, to seek restitution of the whole of the captured provinces in Burma! The political gun had exploded; but with no deleterious effect. The Governor-General, as was his wont, stood calm and collected; and his answer, through the interpreter (Major Phayre), to this cool request was—“TELL THEM, THAT AS LONG AS THE SUN SHINES IN THE HEAVENS, THE BRITISH FLAG SHALL WAVE OVER THOSE POSSESSIONS.”—Lord Dalhousie’s reply was considered by a few gentle diplomatists to partake rather too much of the “Cambyses vein”; but this was a complete mistake. Nothing could have been milder with the slightest pretension to decision of character,

* Ludicrous as it must appear, this position may easily have been realised, if we are to believe the assertion of a writer who evidently knew something about the matter, “They (the Envoys) passed much of their time shivering in the morning, looking wretched during the day, and (disdaining the bed) building themselves up on the floor at night.” Goldsmith’s “Chinese Philosopher” was infinitely more in his element in London.

† Southey’s “Curse of Kehama.”

or upholding the dignity of the British Government. And when, in after ages, men will search in Burma's history for aught "to point a moral, or adorn a tale," they will say, as we do now, and as other candid actors in the Burmese theatre of past events must be compelled to say, it would be difficult to imagine any reply more dignified or suitable than such an irrevocable, immutable, and final decision of the Governor-General.—On Thursday, the 28th December, the Burmese Woongees, with their suite and accompanied by Major Phayre, took their departure in the Hon. Company's steamer "Sesostris" for Rangoon and Ava.

After this important visit, a return Mission from our Government proceeded to Ava* (sometimes styled the Golden City), the results of which, doubtless, under the able conduct of Major Phayre, were highly beneficial to the Eastern world. We can imagine the feelings of regret with which, at the close of the First Burmese War, the British soldier turned his back upon the capital of Alompra, when only three marches from the city. But notwithstanding the patched-up and unsatisfactory treaty of peace concluded at Yandaboo,† it is perhaps as well we did not advance on and destroy the capital; for Ava is as dear to the Burman as London is to the Briton. And our noble forbearance then, as in the Second Burmese War, must have taught the people that even an Oriental despot might be permitted to govern his subjects, if he could govern them well. Under the reigning king it seemed possible that this good government might be secured. He appeared to manifest a friendly disposition towards the British, although we had deprived him of Pegu; and, while sorely feeling the loss of such a fine province, it was now generally believed that he did not authorise the Envoys from his Court to ask its cession. ‡ It was

* See Captain H. Yule's "Narrative of a Mission to Ava in 1855."

† February 1826.

‡ It was believed by many, on the Mission departing for Calcutta, that the Envoy would ask back the port of Bassein, and Meng-don, a principality of

a Mission to cement friendship, and it was nothing more. This was the brightest and most satisfactory side of the question, although there was nothing extraordinary in a Burmese king asking back from strangers, since he declared that *he* was not the erring party, the glorious conquest of his ancestors. He was soon said to be improving his kingdom of Ava in trade and in agriculture; the best thing he could do, since the decision had gone forth, "irrevocable, immutable, and final," that Pegu was ours for ever!

It may now be well to state that the condition of our new conquest in Eastern Asia, in 1854, was, considering the time Pegu had been ours, truly marvellous. The sudden rise of Rangoon, from a dirty town, to a flourishing commercial capital, well laid out,—with its picturesque military cantonments, adorned with so many neat houses and excellent roads; its newly erected assembly rooms, with the general look of comfort the town was beginning to wear,—seemed, as it were, a transition from darkness into light. Let us turn to Rangoon at the end of 1854, and, comparing it with what the town was nearly three years before, we may well say, "Look on this picture, and on this." Before, misery and starvation were to be seen in many a countenance, while the small army of "men and boys, the matron and the maid," proceeded to pay their devotions to the god of their ancestors at his celebrated shrine. Now, well dressed crowds, in holiday attire,—the Burmese ladies, fresh from Vanity Fair, shining forth, as Goldsmith has it, "in all the glaring *trickery* of dress," proud rather than otherwise to be gazed at by the English strangers,—wend their way to Gautama's temple. And silently working for the conversion of our new subjects, behold the amiable Protestant missionary, with

Ava.—To this note we may add (1879) that the present King takes his name from Thee-bau—some seventy or eighty miles to the east of Mandalay—the same way as the late King did from Meng-don. It is the custom to name the princes of the Royal House after Principalities, the revenues of which are generally given them "to eat"—in some cases also, we presume, to drink!

his not less amiable wife, surrounded by Karens, Talaings, and other tribes, paving the way, should peace continue, for the exclamation of delighted surprise from the charmed and arrested traveller, when he shall hear throughout Pegu the "hum of missionary schools," and regale himself with the "lovely spectacle of peaceful and Christian villages."

And again, silently working, behold the disciples of the Church of Rome—the Church, as Lord Macaulay says, "with the principle of life still strong within her." There she is with her funds and her chapels, her persuasive priests, and her wonderful management, silently working in Burma, as she has long done in China; causing us more than ever to say, "When we reflect on the tremendous assaults which she has survived, we find it difficult to conceive in what way she is to perish."*

And silently working in the region of Science, now comes forth that wonder of wonders, which is now fast progressing in Pegu—the Electric Telegraph. Through this mighty agent the Governor of Bengal will eventually receive intelligence from Pegu in two or three hours. May we hope that the telegraphic message may never be an announcement of the Russians pouring down in Northern Burma! With good roads, and the electric telegraph, if they do come, what need we care if the Indian Army be kept up to the requisite European strength? Then, to the three Presidencies it is simply

"A word—and the impulse is given;
A touch—and the mission has sped:—
Hurrah! 'tis the best conjuration
That Science, the wizard, has done!
Through me nation speaks unto nation,
Till all are united in one."

* Macaulay's "Essays"—Ranke's History of the Popes.—"During the reign of Louis XIV. several splendid attempts were made to propagate the doctrines of the Church of Rome, and advance the interests of the French nation in the kingdom of Siam; but little is related of Ava or Pegu."

Campbell declares, in his "Pleasures of Hope,"—

"The world was sad!—the garden was a wild!
And man, the hermit, sigh'd—till woman smiled!"

And not the least important light in the picture of civilisation was now the appearance of so many European ladies in Pegu. The resources of the new province were in course of development, regarding which the Mission to Ava would probably furnish us with more information. Coal, it was said, had been discovered on the Irawady, of excellent quality,—a discovery of infinite importance to the Government and steam navigation. Of course, in a few years, Pegu will have its railway. Then there is the new port at the mouth of the Bassein river, new Bassein,* which would do an immense grain trade. Turn what way we wished, the condition of Burma in 1854, more particularly Pegu, was highly gratifying. If dacoits were severely and summarily dealt with, dacoity would soon be rare in the land. But it must ever be remembered that this crime is, like Thuggism in India, indigenous to the country. Many persons hoped for an abrogation of the frontier duties; but the security of a new conquest must be maintained with money, and taxation is the order of the day throughout the world. So much, then, for the condition of Burma, at a time when Government began wisely to think, in the words of Plutarch, that it sufficed not to conquer alone—"Victory must be made profitable."—[The frontier duties were abrogated in 1863.]

NOTES.

GILDING THE GREAT PAGODA.

The Burmese mode of erecting the scaffolding around the Great Pagoda struck us as being most ingenious. Every one assisted in bringing material for the huge frame-work. Even the women, in

* Or Dalhousie, so styled, of course, after the celebrated Marquis. [It is situated some sixty miles below Bassein, near the mouth of the river; but, on account of extensive flowing a few years since, was ruined, and is now (1864) abandoned as a station.]

holiday attire—with the glittering *nadoun*g (ear-ring) and the gold chain—came forth to assist in the religious duty. Many females and young children were to be seen wandering from Kেমendine; first with bamboos, and eventually with chatties of water, requisite for cleaning the temple before the operation of gilding. A strong foundation being made, the bamboo framework gradually ascended to a height of more than three hundred feet, to the astonishment of the inhabitants of Rangoon. The huge pile then resembled a temple of wicker-work, admirably preserving the bell-like form of a portion of the structure, beside which the colossal human images used by the Druids of old in their sacrifices would have made an appropriate ornament. The exterior of the temple was not touched by the general framework, allowing space sufficient for a man to perform the operation of gilding, which, from the curious arrangement of the bamboo, he could do in perfect safety. The scaffolding was brought to the base of the *tee* (umbrella); and through a telescope it was interesting to observe what might form a striking picture of the huge pile. First, you beheld the parapet, then the dark fan-like palms, then the old dark base rings of the pagoda, then the bamboo-work (which was eventually covered with mats), then the gorgeous *tee* of Gautama, for the time divested of its gold and silver bells. In the great *tee*, we heard, there were about six hundred silver bells, twenty of pinchbeck, and fifteen of gold. One of the gold bells was found to be six pounds in weight, with a golden leaf,* as usual, attached to the tongue, a present from the late King Tharawadi's daughter. Some of the silver bells weighed seventeen pounds and a half. Each bell was inscribed with the name of the donor, and some of the small gold bells were adorned with jewels. Each bell was attached to the rich gilt *tee* by a hook; and no difficulty was experienced in handing down the bells, which was done by arranging a string of men from the *tee* to the base, a select few who were allowed to touch the precious offerings. On the completion of the gilding, the bells were to be restored to their former position.

The gilding, which was only to extend to the upper portion of the pagoda, was just commencing when the writer left Burma,

* "Waving golden leaves attached to tinkling bells, rich gold work, all so strictly protected by the golden 'tee,' draw forth admiration."—Narrative.

and the expense, defrayed by a Burmese subscription, was estimated at between forty thousand and fifty thousand rupees (four thousand five hundred pounds). According to Havelock, the glittering coating of the temple was last renewed in 1817, if we recollect right, at a much less cost. [The height of the pagoda, as before remarked, is upwards of three hundred and twenty-one feet. The terrace on which it stands is about nine hundred feet long, and six hundred and eighty-five feet broad; it is elevated above the inferior terrace by a wall fifteen feet high. Shwé Dagon is encircled, at some distance, by smaller pagodas, all possessing more or less beauty. The scene from the upper terrace is most imposing; either by moonlight, with huge grotesque faces peering out upon you; or in the broad day, when the golden summits of the temples are glittering in the fiery sun.]

II.

SPARSENESS OF POPULATION AND HEALTH OF THE INDIGENOUS RACES.*

SPARSENESS of population anywhere is a serious subject. It suggests various trains of thought to the mind. Emigration, caused by bitter want and local distress,—emigration, caused by cruel wars and oppression; increase of mortality from neglect of women and children (the latter in early infancy)—may turn us at once, with regard to emigrants or people forced to leave their homes, to think of the “Deserted Village” of Goldsmith; and again, in the realms of poetry, to “Evangeline,

* This paper is a portion of a review of Reports on the Health and Population of the Indigenous Races of British Burma, ordered by Colonel (Sir Arthur) Phayre. The writer received the following kind note, when the Chief Commissioner had done him the honour to peruse his paper:—“Accept my best thanks for your very interesting chapter on the Health of the Indigenous Peoples of British Burma. I feel assured that your work will be read with deep interest, and have no doubt will cause the country to be known and appreciated in quarters where otherwise it never would have been heard of.”—Under the title of “The Conquest of Pegu,” the author had intended to publish his two Narratives in one volume, while at Rangoon, in 1864.

a Tale of Arcadie"; while, with reference to the management of infancy, we turn, in prose to where a chief evil existing in Burma has the remedy at once suggested, by simply going back eighty years to wise old Benjamin Franklin, who wrote on early marriages, holding forth their advantages in a rising country to his "Dear Jack":—"By these early marriages we are blessed with more children; and *from the mode among us, founded by nature, of every mother suckling and nursing her own child, more of them are raised.* Thence the swift progress of population among us, unparalleled in Europe." Such was an opinion on the cause of a large population in America by a philosopher, whose penetrating eye nothing could escape, the best informed man of his time. Turning from Franklin, who could write an essay on a whistle, teach the city of Paris, by statistics, the economy of using "sunshine instead of candles"; who could ascertain the nature of lightning by the most simple means, and then treat the subject of population—all with equal facility—we arrive at the second page of the interesting brochure on which we now intend to make a few brief remarks, furnishing also a portion of what is valuable therein, and thus forming what may be considered a fitting chapter in the history of the "Conquest of Pegu."

From the "Report by the Medical Officer of Ramree"* (Mr. Thomas), we learn, with reference to Burmese women and children, that "there is a pernicious practice prevalent among the people of giving unnatural food to infants at a very early age. The natural aliment of the child is the mother's milk, but scarcely is a Burmese child a week old, when boiled rice is taken into the mouth by the mother, or by any other female relative, and is chewed into a pulp, and with this pulp the poor little creature is daily fed."

Another evil is now noticed—want of clothing. "A dis-

* District of Ramree is in Arakan.

regard to cleanliness is an evil also, and the want of proper ventilation in the houses is no less so. Burmese medicine, I may add, is very rude, and all these combined operate with deleterious influence on human life; and although the people of British Burma may have fine houses and plenty of grain food with numerous children born to them, still will the numerical bulk of the nation be affected as long as the people cleave to this" (alluding also to the absurd treatment of the woman and child on the occasion of a birth) "barbarous mode of treating their women and children."

Few people will deny the truth of the remark, that a greater number of children all over the world do not annually die at birth, is in itself a wonder. We read, in one of Dr. Combe's treatises, of the care required in Great Britain to rear even a healthy infant.* We should like to know what he of the present, or Dr. Hunter of the last century would have said to the indiscriminate use of the cold bath, followed up by quick firing, or the "roasting plan," for the mother, and "pulpy chewed rice" for the small particle of humanity just appeared on the stage! Hunter would have called his man John (this was the name of his favourite servant) immediately, and, doubtless, would have said to him, "Hang at every Burmese threshold my three rules for the rearing of healthy children,—PLENTY OF MILK, PLENTY OF SLEEP, AND PLENTY OF FLANNEL!" These the celebrated John Hunter has handed down to posterity. With the observation of such rules, our wonder would no longer increase at the fewness of deaths among Burmese and other children of the East. Colonel Phayre inquires† why the people of British Burma, possessing all those circumstances which are considered favourable to increase of population, are

* Combe says that "between a third and a half of all the children ushered into the world die within the first five years after birth."

† In his "Memorandum on the Sparseness of Population in British Burma."

not more numerous than we now find them? among the circumstances considered favourable, enumerating "natural fertility of soil, general healthiness of climate, the use of rice as the chief article of food, the non-oppressive character of the Government under which the people reside, and their descent from the same stock as the prolific Chinese." In the Chief Commissioner's opinion, "the following appear to be the most obvious remedies against disease and the number of early deaths, which there is reason to conclude occur among the indigenous races of Burma. These are vaccination, improved sanitary arrangements, the establishment of dispensaries, and instruction of natives of the country in the science of medicine"; and, since the Reports now under consideration were written, "measures have been adopted for commencing the above plan." In fact, the famous saying of the American essayist,* "To think is to act!" has been wisely carried out during our British policy in Burma. And we all know that the grand requisite for a political officer in the East is decision of character, of that nature which the eloquent pen of John Foster has described, without which he is nothing, or, locally speaking, worse than nothing! In the "Report" from the pen of Colonel Fytche,† he writes to the Chief Commissioner:—"In a beautiful and fertile country like Burma, and inhabited by such a robust race, the sparseness of its population must strike the most indifferent person with surprise. The most generally received idea regarding this scarcity of population is, I believe, the great mortality of children between five and fifteen years of age. This, however, I imagine to be a popular error, for since we have taken possession of Tenasserim and Arakan, the country being freed from either internecine or foreign wars, and the people allowed to settle quietly down in towns and villages, the population has increased much more than two-fold;

* Emerson.

† Commissioner of Tenasserim.

the official returns showing a term of about thirty years as the period within which the population has doubled itself, and which does not by any means compare unfavourably with the increase of either any European or Asiatic race we are acquainted with."

According to this Commissioner, then, devastating hostilities or remorseless wars appear as the chief causes of a scarcity of population for the past, while, from a practical knowledge of the subject, gained by many years residence in Burma, he holds out great hopes for the present, or for the country under British rule. Regarding the "chronic state of internecine warfare" in Burma, one or two facts may be here brought forward. The oppression of the Talaings (or Peguers) by the Burmese is known to the reader of history. The Talaings, long oppressed after their conquest by the Burmese, became special objects of hatred when the British forces unhappily withdrew from Pegu in 1826, leaving the Peguers, our friends during the First Burmese War, to Burman vengeance and cruelty. The subsequent years, till British annexation in 1853, witnessed increasing severities; "and the race is now greatly diminished." But, prior to our first war with Burma, not only cruelty, and oppression, and murder thinned the fertile provinces of the Delta, but emigration did its work in a very considerable degree. This, of course, was caused by cruelties practised. Deing Woon, who delighted in the sight of gibbeted or crucified bodies, it is said, caused the emigration of some twenty thousand families of Peguese into Siam, which, although enduring far better treatment, they feel to this day is not the land of their fathers. It is little more than fifty years since that the condition of the interior of Ava became equally deplorable with that of the river banks. Villages and towns were everywhere deserted; robbers and insurgents ranged about the country, and "many of the harassed inhabitants, at the risk of their lives, openly expressed their wishes that the English would either take the country or allow them to migrate to

Bengal." These facts alone, which we have derived from various sources, prove how much reason upholds Colonel Fytche's argument regarding the sparseness of population in Burma. Turning to the history of British colonisation also, we find a reduction of population from various significant causes. In Virginia, for instance, the first colony in which we settled in America, the tribes were originally strong enough so destroy three separate and powerful bodies of colonists, who acted like brutal invaders, after being received with a welcome. But their thousands of warriors of 1607 were reduced two-thirds in sixty-two years "by our spirituous liquors, by our diseases, by our wars, and by an abridgment of territory, fatal to a people who lived much on the spontaneous productions of nature." In twenty years more they were quite weakened; and, at the end of the next century, nearly all had perished. Wars and a consequent abridgment of territory here producing sparseness of population, again support the views of Colonel Fytche; while it is curious to remark that, by the invasion of Virginia we ruined the population, through the conquest of Pegu we have increased, and are going on steadily increasing it!

Doubtless, we have made vast improvement in the way of ordering matters in a new country. This becomes evident from simply reading about Virginia—a country "purchased," in "unexceptionable form," to use the words of Jefferson,* by the English, whose *reserved* districts were "kept from encroachment by the authority of the laws, and who usually had white protectors to watch over their interests." We ponder and inquire, How could almost extinction be the fate of a people who were so cherished? We know of no other answer to this question but that of an improved system of colonisation,

* "Notes on Virginia," quoted by S. Bannister in his "British Colonisation," &c.

or of our manner of conduct after conquest ; and this has been admirably exemplified in the conquest of Pegu.

Causes of the decay in numbers in Burma, before we annexed Pegu, now become susceptible of a simple solution :—the whole made clear from the “interesting and useful reports” furnished to the Chief Commissioner—Colonel Fytche believing “that mortality is not greater amongst the people of British Burma than in other Asiatic countries” ; and he has no doubt that “the establishment of dispensaries throughout the country, with properly educated practitioners, would considerably decrease the mortality now existing.” True enough, he considers that time and civilisation alone must teach the people.

Dr. Donnelly, Civil Surgeon of Mergui, furnishes a very interesting report. He is the grand advocate for properly educated practitioners in the science of medicine. The best of the Burmese students who have passed the prescribed examination, in the opinion of Dr. Donnelly, should be selected to fill all those hospital appointments at present held by natives of India,—who, having few feelings or sympathies in common with the Burmese, never obtain their respect or their confidence,—to take charge of village dispensaries and to act as vaccinators throughout the district. With a few and inexpensive changes, the doctor thinks, we could do much towards lessening the present rate of mortality.

Dr. Marr, Civil Surgeon of Maulmain, likewise strongly advocates the extension of vaccination, and the establishment of dispensaries throughout the country, in charge of properly educated practitioners. Alluding to the mortality of Burmese infants, from causes similar to those we have before alluded to, this medical officer brings forth a curious fact, which we believe may be applied to the children of all Asiatic nations, that they get through the process of dentition with greater facility than European children.

Dr. A. J. Cowie, Civil Surgeon of Rangoon, furnishes a most elaborate and valuable report on the sparseness of population

in British Burma. The learned surgeon takes a very comprehensive view of the subject, worthy of one holding such a situation as his at the great commercial capital. But, on one or two points, we either do not quite understand him, or his opinion appears to be rather sudden. For instance, he cites wars and bad governments as one of the given chief causes for a sparseness of population, the truth of which he proceeds to examine. "Could we attribute sparseness of population," he says, "to successive and great wars, then surely we could expect to find a great preponderance of women over men, which is not the case." Now we are of opinion that men, women, and children, in countries without the light of civilisation, suffer nearly equally by war—internecine wars especially producing the desire of mutual extermination. Warlike gentlemen such as Messrs. Deing Woon, Generals ROUNG-ROUNG and BANDOOLA in the first, and such as MYAT-HTOON in the second Burmese war, would think little of sparing woman and child in their tiger-like thirst for blood. Doubtless, they frequently thought how much sooner the cause would be won by taking "*all the little chickens and their dam at one fell swoop!*"

No finer touch of human nature is to be found in literature than when Macduff, hearing of the murder of his wife and children, inquires of the messenger—"Did you say *all*?" Nature is nearly the same in all countries; and this pathetic question from the genius of Shakspeare has often rung through the Burman vales and forests!

In 1812, we read, the Viceroy of Pegu "monopolised the supply of coffins"; and very well he might have done so if his cruelty was nearly equal to that of the Viceroy, two years before, who was ordered up to the Court of Ava with a chain round his neck. Opium smoked and spirits drank by the troops, and being too lenient, were the charges against him. He had taken off too few heads since his arrival in Rangoon. A very short time before, this "mild person" had ordered twelve men, women, and children, who had deserted from him

to an obnoxious rival, to be murdered in a manner that we dare not put on paper. The execution of the sentence, however, was prevented by the "urgent entreaties of the British Envoy." Being murdered or starved were too frequently the fate of the poor women and children, during peace as well as war. Children of various ages, were frequently brought to Captain Canning (whose mission took place in 1809) whose fathers had been driven to the wars, and whom their mothers entreated him to accept, "*in hopes of procuring for their wretched offspring that sustenance which they were unable to get for themselves.*" We have no doubt, if we could collect records of the oppressive mode of recruiting the Burman armies and of the conduct of the opposing nations* during the wars, quite enough evidence would appear to show that, during at least a century, men, women, and children have suffered dreadfully; especially in Pegu, when the star of Alompra, the hunter, became lord of the ascendant!

Again, the Civil Surgeon commences his report by remarking that "Colonel Phayre has shown us, that the population of British Burma was never more numerous than it is at present." The Chief Commissioner also commences the section, Population, in his Administrative Report for 1862-63, by stating, what deserves the consideration of all rulers, that "the population of British Burma increases rapidly; partly from immigration, and partly, it is to be hoped, from natural causes. The causes of the *paucity* of population in Chin-India remain to be ascertained. Increase appears to be an established fact." Captain Harrison (Deputy Commissioner) writes, regarding the Mergui district:—"There is a fair annual increase to the population, and when more accurate statistics have been collected I think it will be found that the increase amounts to about twenty or twenty-two per thousand per annum, and at

* Burmese, Chinese, Siamese, and Peguese.

this rate the population would, double itself in about thirty-three years." Colonel Fytche also mentions increase. We have had the Tenasserim Provinces about forty years—Pegu not yet twelve; surely, then, on the same principles, there is hope for the new conquest! It appears difficult, therefore, to see cause for remarking, after allusion to "wars and bad governments":—"enough, whether the people increased or not, before the advent of British rule, is not to the point—what is now keeping the increase of the population in check is the difficulty to be solved, for wars can have nothing to say in the matter, and the country can boast of a good and just Government."* If by increase kept in check, non-increase be meant, then the author of the report in question has the authority of Colonel Brown, Deputy Commissioner, Prome, to support him,—“I am of opinion that the *non-increase of the population* of the country is not solely the effect of any one special cause, but that of a combination of influences which are in operation at the same time.”† The population of British Burma, however, does not appear to be stationary, but increasing, as already asserted in two cases with statistical proof!

Dr. Cowie informs us that small-pox in Burma is a much milder and far less fatal disease than it is in Great Britain. Regarding this disease, Dr. Marr asserts that “epidemics of small-pox exercise a considerable influence on the population. . . . To children unprotected by either vaccination or inoculation, the disease proves very fatal.” For not being vaccinated, while we write, at least in Rangoon, no one can have any excuse; for all are invited to come to the dispensary by the Civil Surgeon, and receive what the genius of Jenner provided for them; and this is announced in Burmese as well as in English, in the public journals. Referring to inoculation,

* Page 37.

† Page 74.

Dr. Cowie brings forward an interesting remark which will be new to many readers :—"Our greatest living Physician says of Lady Mary Wortley Montague—"We owe the actual introduction of the practice of inoculation"—a wise and justifiable measure in the absence of vaccination—into Great Britain to the good sense and courage of an English lady."

Cholera in Burma is only "an occasional visitant," and seldom severe in its outbreaks. It is not endemic, as in many parts of India; and, writes Dr. Marr, "visits Burma at long intervals." Of this destroyer, we have thus two valuable medical opinions, in addition to that of the Chief Commissioner (as regarding its destructiveness), justly coinciding.

Fevers of the country, opium smoking and eating, housing, food, ardent spirits, and a variety of other topics, are all touched on by the fertile pen of Dr. Cowie. Regarding "Ardent Spirits"—to all military officers a most important subject as regards discipline—the Civil Surgeon of Rangoon asserts what should shame many a European who boasts of enlightenment and civilisation! "I have not yet, in all my experience, met with a case of 'delirium tremens' among the Burmese; and I will venture to say, that no other medical man who has resided in this country ever has either. The Burmese are not at all given to drunkenness." Dr. Cowie concludes a most interesting report, extending to fifty-three sections, with the remark, which has been so often applied to advocate the cause of Female Education in India:—"It is through the women that we must expect to reform the Burmese, and they are under the influence of the Phonyees!"

Valuable papers from Major Ardagh (Officiating Commissioner of Pegu), Mr. E. O'Riley, Rev. Mr. Beecher, Dr. Davis, Captain M. Lloyd, and others, also throw light on the sparseness of population in British Burma, forming a valuable collection of statistics, from which also a good idea of the health of the indigenous peoples of the country may be gained.—The Andaman Islands (which came under the Government of British

Burma about March 1864), although extensive, have a population of less than three thousand original inhabitants. These are a singular race, resembling a degenerate race of negroes—five feet in height, eyes small and red, and skin of a deep dull black. They are *not* cannibals, as has been supposed. How they came there is not yet decided. They belong, we believe, to the same race as the inhabitants of the Nicobar Islands—not a hundred miles distant. But the affinity between the people of the Andamans and Nicobars is yet to be established by fact.

The story of the advent of the Andamanites is, that of a ship being wrecked while conveying pilgrims to or from Mecca, and depositing its strange “cargo” on these islands. But this would appear to be more possible than probable. Facts regarding the health and population of these curious people are required. Recently a party of officers from Rangoon visited the Andamans, and brought away several items of information, as well as a few specimens of fish and fossils, interesting to the naturalist. Dr. Smith examined some peculiarity about the teeth of an Andamanite.* The scenery of the Islands was considered to be very beautiful in parts; the hospitality of the Superintendent, Major Ford, was great; and the party left the islands for Rangoon, justly reckoning among the “green spots” in memory’s waste their visit to the “Cannibal Islands”!—But, to return to the land of Burma.

After receipt of the Reports on health and population, a

* On inquiring from our learned and obliging friend, the Deputy Inspector-General of Hospitals, what this peculiarity was, he sent us the following note:—“The peculiarity is this:—The Eye-tooth (*Dens Canina*) is placed outside, and on a level with the first *Bicuspid*. Tops of molars worn flat, as in all tribes that feed on roots.” Inquiring, also, regarding some skulls he had brought from the Andamans, Dr. Smith informed us, that the skull is well-developed—belonging, most likely, to “Negrello,” or Dwarf Negroes. Another esteemed traveller to the Andamans mentions the absence of the receding or monkey forehead!

valuable little pamphlet—"Queries respecting the Human Race, Addressed to Travellers, By a Committee of the British Association for the Advancement of Science," fell into our hands. We believe that it was printed by order of the Chief Commissioner, in order to obtain reports on the various subjects from officers in the province. One set of answers, some months ago, had been received from Dr. Mason, which were considered to be "exceedingly interesting"; and which we trust may be laid before that learned body, the Asiatic Society. Regarding this Society, the prophecy of Sir William Jones—the motto of their Calcutta journal—has been well fulfilled:—"The bounds of its investigation will be the geographical limits of Asia; and within these limits its inquiries will be extended to whatever is performed by man or produced by nature." In their museum in Calcutta (thanks to Mr. Bligh), we saw beasts and birds from Burma; and now, through the researches and energy of the Chief Commissioner and others, they have a flood of light thrown on the various interesting races of the country!

We shall now enrich this rather discursive paper with some already published matter on the sparseness of population, and other statistical information, commencing with Dr. Mason, who has furnished a critique on the Reports. If there be one man more qualified than another, not in the medical profession, to give an opinion on the health of and sparseness of population among the indigenous peoples of British Burma, that man, perhaps, is Dr. Mason, of Toungoo. His valuable statistics cause us regret, when we read (what would support, regarding one race, the views of Dr. Cowie) that the Karens, under the most favourable circumstances, are not increasing. But we think it will interest many to insert the learned Doctor's critical notice entire:—

"It was a happy thought in the Chief Commissioner to propose the inquiries which have produced these Reports. We have thus brought together the knowledge of all the men best acquainted

with the subject, from every part of the country. The Reports contain a miscellaneous mass of information that may be divided into:—

1. Statistics. These all adding to our knowledge of the country, are all valuable.

2. Plans for obtaining more accurate statistics. These are of mixed value: some not being quite practicable.

3. Causes of the sparseness of population. These are somewhat contradictory. Those that are valid are exaggerated. A European does not suffer by exposing his face to the weather, and the body of a native is all face.

4. Proposals to Government to take measures to preserve the population. Perhaps all is here proposed that Government can do; and it is satisfactory to know, from the Chief Commissioner's introduction, that arrangements have been made to carry out the plans proposed.

Still it can scarcely be said that THE cause of the sparseness has been revealed, for most of the causes to which it is attributed exist in Hindustan and China, where the population abounds. We need in the first instance, accurate and extensive statistics, as a basis on which to ascertain the exact state of the question. Since the reports pertain principally to the Burmese, we will contribute an item to the statistics of the Karens in this district.

In 1859 we took the census of nearly one hundred and fifty Christian villages, and found in them about twenty-six thousand inhabitants. In 1860 we required the native Assistants to note the births and deaths in their villages, and to report annually to the Associations.

This they have done ever since, but, as from one cause or another, the Reports have never been complete, we prefer to call the population reported on, in round numbers, twenty-five thousand. The births and deaths for the last four years were reported:—

1860, Births, 496, rt. 1.90.	Deaths, 700, rt. 2.8.
1861, „ 763, „ 3.05.	„ 891, „ 3.56.
1862, „ 801, „ 3.20.	„ 518, „ 2.07.
1863, „ 659, „ 2.63.	„ 644, „ 2.57.

Average, Birth-rate 2.69.	Death-rate 2.75.
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The churches report also annually the number of baptized Christians that have died during the year, and as few are baptized under

fifteen years of age, we thus obtain the death-rate of a class of the population, exclusive of children. The returns for the last nine years are:—

1855	Of 2,010	baptized,	64	died.	Rate	3·1.
1856	„ 2,660	„	93	„	„	3·1.
1857	„ 2,706	„	66	„	„	2·4.
1858	„ 3,739	„	108	„	„	2·8.
1859	„ 4,142	„	190	„	„	4·5.
1860	„ 4,531	„	146	„	„	3·2.
1861	„ 4,307	„	174	„	„	3·5.
1862	„ 5,307	„	120	„	„	2·2.
1863	„ 5,085	„	157	„	„	3·0.

Average of nine years, Death-rate 2·9.

The great difference that is seen in the numbers of different years is not to be attributed to the inaccuracy of the reports. We know that such differences often occur.

These statistics prove very conclusively that the Karens, under the most favourable circumstances, in this district are not increasing.

The high death-rate among the Church members may arise from a large proportion of elderly people being baptized. But it seems to indicate that the deaths in infancy are not disproportionate.”

(From the “*Toungoo News Sheet*,” October 1864, an interesting little journal—*pro deo et ecclesia*—edited by Dr. Mason.)

For the sake of variety, we now give a portion of a rather able letter, contributed to the “*Rangoon Times*,” and headed

SPARSENESS OF POPULATION IN BRITISH BURMA.

“**SIR,**—

I have of late seen several articles treating on the sparse-ness of population in British Burma, among the rest a very able one by Captain Fitzroy, in the “*Gazette*” of 27th September 1864.

Granting that he has used the subject with skill, ability, and much information, I would oppose my arguments to his, on the ground that he has been led by appearances and not by facts. For instance, in his first deduction he comes to the conclusion that countries are populous in proportion to the facilities with which

they can produce or acquire food. I would oppose this position, by stating that rather, as land is cultivated in proportion to the number of its inhabitants, and that when the population is contrasted, that seven hundred and seventy-seven Chinese cultivate one square mile, whilst seven hundred and ninety-three Burmese are required to do the same work : it necessarily follows, that the Chinese are more efficient in that work by sixteen. This, of course, is owing to the superiority of the one over the indolence of the other.

Men are social creatures, and in consequence are always found together, so if a settlement is formed of ten families, the houses will be found together, as the centre of their industry ; but if the number be increased, then the radii of their industry become so elongated that some are obliged to emigrate to some other centres, and thus another and another sphere of industry follows, yet all will keep together, as close as possible, the one only being separated from the other by his requirements. Thus, if we say that ten is sufficient for one house, then four houses might be set together, at the point where the four houses meet, or they may be the centres of each square, or they may be centres of the side of those squares ; and thus we find that each house that is established forms its own area of industry, which separates it from the rest, whilst the general wants of all are supplied at a central position, which forms the town or city, and this town or city will be large in proportion to the number of cultivators. Thus, if fifty cultivators require two blacksmiths, four carpenters, three shoemakers, three tailors, one butcher, one doctor, &c. &c., then a hundred will require twice as many. The land is cultivated because there were men to cultivate it, and not because the land was good. In proof of this, look to the fertile wilds of Australia, America, and Africa, also of our colony of Burma—hence so much land is cultivated in China because there are so many men in the country, and so little is cultivated in Burma because the population is so small. Compare the population of England to its extent, and we find three hundred and thirty-six souls to each square mile, whilst for real purposes of cultivation sixteen men and their families are quite enough to cultivate a square mile ; and allowing that four acres are enough for meat and bread to a family for a year, sixteen men and their families, by cultivation, provide food for one hundred and fifty-eight families. Again, allowing the requirements of sixteen

families demand the assistance of sixteen families more, we yet have the food of one hundred and twenty-six families to spare. Now to confine one hundred and fifty-eight families, or say five hundred souls, on one square mile of land, not allowing them any other resources, would of necessity reduce them to idleness, though they would find sufficient food; consequently when seven hundred and seventy-seven men are counted to a square mile, it is not for the extent of cultivation, but from the concentration of trade and other industry among them."

[The writer now is off to China, England, and Bengal; turns to the book of Genesis; lays a great stress on love displayed to parents as a cause of increase, and the breach of the Divine command to "honour thy father and thy mother" as certainly producing a decrease of population in a country. He touches also on early destruction of children in Burma, and great mortality among mothers in child-birth.]

He sums up the reasons for the sparseness of the population in British Burma, which are, he says,—

"1st. The father and mother do not want children.

2nd. Many mothers die from unskilled treatment during child-birth.

3rd. Children die from want and neglect.

4th. Epidemics carry off large numbers, in which the native physicians give great help.

We may before long add that no small number will be carried off by drink. Drunkenness is a well-known hindrance to increase.

I would propose two points of inquiry to the Government.

1st. Is the population of Bengal greater now than it was ten, twenty, thirty, forty, and fifty years ago?

2nd. Why are there so few children in Rangoon between the ages of ten and fourteen years?

Yours truly,

WITNESS."

In concluding the subject, it may be remarked that we do not go along with the above writer in all he has advanced; but,

doubtless, there is *reason* in him ; and as, in this enlightened age, the opinion of every well-wisher of a country meets, or should meet, with respect, so we value what he has written, in addition to the various reports so briefly touched on in this paper. Since these were written, measures of a remedial nature have been adopted and commenced, at the instigation of the Chief Commissioner. Throughout the country, doubtless, everything beneficial to the native races will soon be in train for increased health, and consequent increase of population, as has for many years been the case, with reference to peace and commercial prosperity, among Europeans and others in British Burma.

STATISTICAL NOTE.

The total population of Rangoon, according to the census taken on December 24th, 1869, is set down at 96,942, or an increase of 24,267 in three years, the population at the last enumeration being 72,675. These comprise—Burmese, 52,732; Talaings, 9,183; Shans, 2,219; Chinese, 3,440; Natives of India, 28,946; Malays, 103; Arakanese, 139; Armenians, 162; Europeans and East Indians, 1,619; other races, 128; total males, 61,978; females, 34,964; grand total, 96,942. It was in 1872 considerably upwards of 100,000. The following are the principal towns having a population of 10,000:—Rangoon, 100,000; Maulmain, 53,653; Prome, 24,682; Bassein, 19,577; Akyab, 15,281; Henzada, 15,285; Tavoy, 14,467; Shwé DOUNG, 12,411. In 1871–72 there were only 6,058 police employed in British Burma = 1 policeman to every 423 persons, and to upwards of fifteen square miles of country!*

* This fact says much for the peaceful character of a population of over three millions. The increase of population in Arakan and Tenasserim has been wonderful. In 1826 they were annexed, with populations respectively of one hundred thousand and seventy thousand. In 1855 Arakan increased to three hundred and fifty thousand, and Tenasserim to more than two hundred and ten thousand. "Within thirty years," says General Fyfe, "the population of both provinces had trebled under British rule." The maritime population of British Burma has been reckoned at a million.

III.

A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE PROGRESS OF TRADE, AND SKETCH OF THE PROSPECTS OF PEGU.*

Commerce.

To this the present prosperity of Pegu is entirely due; and it will, no doubt, prove interesting to review briefly the progress of trade in this province, during the brief period it has enjoyed the privilege of being under the British rule, and the probable future, in a commercial point of view, of this most rapidly flourishing of Her Majesty's dependencies in the East.

There are, at present, only two places of export by sea in Pegu—Rangoon and Bassein. The following is an abstract of the exports and imports from Rangoon for the past nine years, from which it will be seen that the tonnage of the vessels has been nearly doubled, that the value of the exports has been nearly five times increased, and that the import and export duties have likewise been increased from one hundred and fifty-six thousand to eight hundred and forty-eight thousand rupees within that period. The only check to the further progress of the country is the obstructiveness of the Burmese Court.

Official Year.	Import Tonnage.	Export Tonnage.	Merchandise Imported.	Merchandise Exported.	Import Duty.	Export Duty.	Total Duty.
	Tons.	Tons.	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.	Rupees.
1855-56	188,881	131,546	10,692,024	3,704,487	110,186	46,490	156,676
1856-57	133,745	133,059	11,154,255	5,354,791	122,353	52,604	174,957
1857-58	217,884	195,606	13,514,981	8,318,317	143,004	110,427	253,431
1858-59	167,378	174,428	12,743,744	8,566,817	178,240	96,456	274,696
1859-60	116,879	133,062	12,532,845	7,210,536	293,704	124,357	418,061
1860-61	131,029	126,616	13,231,628	7,830,281	365,354	223,212	588,566
1861-62	172,663	169,916	14,026,757	12,387,682	402,029	408,616	810,645
1862-63	167,096	172,983	14,668,775	13,305,236	290,156	399,439	689,595
1863-64	252,813	226,252	16,901,034	17,343,437	272,737	575,309	848,046

* From Notes received October 4th, 1864, from a "merchant king" at Rangoon, who, at the author's request, furnished the information.

The exports of rice from Bassein have increased in much the same proportion, but the imports at that port are but trifling.

Rangoon, by its position—being only about twenty miles from the entrance of the eastern branch of the Irawady, which is deep and broad enough, to enable ships of almost any size to sail up to the town,—is particularly well placed for commercial purposes; and, even to a stranger, it is apparent that no site could be better adapted for an almost endless increase of traffic, with hardly any other assistance than what Nature has so liberally provided. Several ships, drawing over twenty-five feet of water, have sailed safely to sea without steam; but one or two powerful boats are much wanted, to prevent detention to the vessels by contrary winds, and such, doubtless will soon be forthcoming.

Rangoon is behind in facilities for repairing vessels, such having either to go on a rather rough gridiron, exposed to the tide-way, or to go on a slip dock without gates in the Government dockyard, on both of which the ships have either to be scuttled, or float with every tide. A new patent slip is, however, projected, and, when finished, will prove of much use to vessels requiring repairs,—the river being so convenient for vessels in distress to run to, from any part of the bay.

The Bassein river is also a very safe one; but the town being situated about seventy miles up, and there being no steamer on the river, renders it more tedious to the navigation when the winds are adverse. A tug steamer is, however, expected soon to be stationed there.

The communication between Rangoon and Upper Burma being open at all seasons by river, its trade must necessarily increase in a far greater proportion than Bassein, which can only be supplied with produce from the western part of Pegu, the direct river communication with the upper country being only open during the rains.

The principal articles of export from Rangoon are rice,* timber, cutch, cotton, and petroleum; and from Bassein, rice only; but the qualities of the land are such, both in Pegu and Upper Burma (but more particularly in the latter), that tea, indigo, and coffee could, in addition, easily be grown to advantage,—the want of labour, and the greater want even than labour, for that can be supplied, though it may be at considerable cost—the want of a class of men with sufficient skill and energy to superintend such cultivation—being the only causes why so much rich land has been left untilled.

The condition of the natives engaged in agricultural pursuits in Pegu has so much improved during the past ten years, that numbers of Burmese, Karens, &c., are yearly coming from beyond the frontier; but those from the Burmese territories can only bring their families by stealth; and nothing would be more acceptable to the natives of Upper Burma, except to those actually in power, than to see the British Government extend as far as the Irawady is navigable; for, notwithstanding the extremely heavy taxes with which Pegu is burdened, the condition of all classes is fast improving, and forms a striking contrast with the poor cultivators of Upper Burma, who are kept in poverty by the cruel exactions of each petty governor, and from the King's monopolies compelling them to sell their produce at a low fixed rate, whatever the market value may be. Under the British rule, it is truly difficult to fortell to what extent the productions of the country would grow, rich as it is in every source of prosperity, both mineral and agricultural.

Of the present exports the rice is entirely grown in Pegu; the petroleum produced in Upper Burma; and the timber, cutch, and cotton found in both places.

* In March, 1870, we learned that the memorial forwarded to Lord Mayo by the mercantile community of Rangoon, on the subject of the rice duty, had been translated into Burmese.—During the late terrible famines in Bengal and Madras (1875-76-77) a very large quantity of rice was exported from British Burma.

The treaty of 1862 with the Court of Ava, has had no results, except in the sacrifice of the British frontier duties to the Burmese, and the general opinion is, that the King will not reduce any duties, or give up any monopoly, it having been left optional with him to do so.

Any improvement in the means of bringing produce from China, or the independent Shan States, would give an immense impulse to the trade of Pegu, the only regular communication as present being by trains of laden mules and oxen, the principal route for which is from Western China to Bamo and Mandalay. A railway is proposed from China to some point on the Irawady, from which steamers would ply to Rangoon, and the King of Ava has granted a concession of ground, &c., for such; but great fears are entertained that the obstructiveness of the Burmese character, when in power, will prevent the object being carried out by the only apparently possible routes, which are through Upper Burma. It is indeed a great pity such a fine country, with such great prospects, is saddled with a Government like that of Ava; and, [with a willing people, it is to be hoped the protection of the British flag will soon be given to the whole of Burma.

The Government have sold the Irawady flotilla to a private firm, but the steamers only ply to the frontier, and are all old-fashioned vessels. The trade with Mandalay is, therefore, left to one steamer belonging to the King, and to native boats. There are two new steamers for the King, of large size, now about ready, however, and a few more would pay well, as the delay and risk of transit in native craft are very great.

The Government Dockyard has lately been leased for one year to a private firm for two thousand rupees per mensem, after the expiry of which term it will probably be advertised for sale or lease for a long period. The cost of it to Government, however, is far above its present value, either to themselves or to a private company.

[Since the above was written, important changes in Pegu have taken place, into which there is no intention of entering here. Disturbances in Upper Burma,* bringing forth the energetic action of the Chief Commissioner, and of Major Sladen, the Resident at Mandalay, cast shadow and sunshine over the country,—the whole of which, sooner or later, must become British. When our forbearance has become sufficiently tried,—and that it would be sorely tried Lord Dalhousie seemed to prophesy,—then necessity and the welfare of millions must impel us onward—NOT THE LOVE OF ANNEXATION !]

NOTE (October 1879).

REVENUE AND COMMERCE.

Probably the finances of British Burma are far more pliable than those of any other Asiatic country; certainly infinitely more so than those of India, where the tremendous wants—local, military, and political—are continually eating up the finances, without any apparent further development of resources for imperial or commercial profit. The success which has hitherto attended our Chin-Indian possessions in finance as well as in commerce, as has been repeatedly urged in these pages, would be tenfold were the resources of the country fully developed, a larger population secured, and all monopolies, instead of harmless princes and princesses, massacred in Upper Burma. Liberal commercial relations with that golden region are now all that we require to make Pegu a wealthy "Princess among the Provinces," when she could stretch forth a helping hand to her ever needy Indian sister. China owes her religion to India; Pegu owes her deliverance to us who possess India; therefore, both China and British Burma—or say Pegu—are bound to assist India!

About six months ago we read some remarks on the development of a provincial system in British Burma, to the effect that provincial contracts with that country (and Assam) had been revised and greatly expanded with effect from the beginning of 1878-79. A

* Middle of August 1866, the following telegram was received in Calcutta :—
 "King of Burma's brother killed. The King in prison. Rebels in possession of country surrounding Mandalay, and Mandalay itself. Europeans safe."
 Thus runs the world away in Upper Burma, when we least expect it.

new feature in the arrangement was that, in place of a fixed allotment, a share of the net reserved imperial revenues had been assigned, so that the provincial finances would participate in any improvement of those revenues. With the exception of the army, the wholly imperial portion is not important. The salt and customs revenue levied in Bombay, Calcutta, and Upper India "cannot be divided among the several provinces from whose consumption those revenues are obtained. But in Burma there is no such obstacle. Consequently, the Government of India has been able to make with that province the most complete provincial contract yet existing." Only a few items were retained as wholly imperial. The greater portion of the revenue and expenditure were made "wholly provincial." It was believed that some judicious public expenditure in Burma would yield especially valuable financial results. With an increase of provincial resources, we might now look for these to the Chief Commissioner. And, doubtless, ere long, when the question of Upper Burma is settled, great financial improvement will be observable.

A comparison of the Local Estimates, which were prepared upon the old basis with the estimates recast by the Government of India upon the new basis, may be of interest to Indian financiers:-

	BRITISH BURMA.			
	LOCAL ESTIMATES.		REVISED BY GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.	
	1878-79.	1879-80.	1878-79.	1879-80.
	£	£	£	£
Revenue . . .	401,300	407,800	945,900	967,300
Expenditure . . .	416,900	511,100	892,600	1,019,900
Surplus	53,300	...
Deficit . . .	15,600	103,300	...	52,600
Closing Balance . .	87,300	16,100	156,200	143,600

This table shows the addition of £159,600 to the provincial and local revenues of British Burma—"the effect of the measure in two years." In a few years, under able management, the country, no doubt, in both finance and commerce, will do credit to its original benefactor, SIR ARTHUR PHAYRE, WHO MAY BE SAID TO HAVE CREATED PEGU AND CONSOLIDATED BRITISH BURMA! Some months ago, his successor, General Fytche, wrote, with reference to Lord Dalhousie's famous remark, that we held "in

the easy grasp of our hand the kernel of the Burmese Empire":—"And this kernel (Pegu), I may remark, with its extraordinary commercial and producing activity, pays more than double the amount of revenue, rated on population, of that provided by any province or presidency of India, and, after all provincial expenses are paid, yields a handsome surplus to the Imperial exchequer." And, again—Its line of frontier with Burma, "though far from being a 'scientific' or theoretically perfect one, has its outposts connected by electric telegraph, and is easily accessible from its base both by rail and river." The General did not advise our passing this frontier, in case we might be led into the expense of annexing the whole country up to the borders of China; but at the time he wrote King Theebau had not, through his bad conduct, brought about the portentous event of our Resident being obliged to quit Mandalay! We really think the Chinese and the surrounding tribes would aid us in any attempts to better the trade and condition of Upper Burma. China knows how ill her young tributary or vassal has behaved; and the Chinese, with the hope of mutual advantage, would soon surrender their natural "extreme jealousy" to rapid commercial gains! The net revenue of British Burma for 1877-78 amounted to 160,14,328 Rs., being an increase of 3,18,801 Rs. over that of 1876-77.* In the Revenue Report, the steady and progressive increase in the prosperity of the province was considered satisfactory. The great want was also said to be "a larger" population, and until this is secured, it is clear that the resources of the province can never be properly developed, or the full amount of revenue obtained which it is capable of yielding. Instead of a total net revenue of 176,17,351 Rs., there might easily be double that amount. The population of British Burma already being over three millions, if we could only get two or three more millions under our rule, Burma would have nearly as large a commerce as a fourth of that of the whole of India; for, with a small population of three millions, we have exports and imports amounting to nearly thirteen millions and a half sterling,† more than four times the population. "If the commerce of India," says

* In 1875-76, according to General Fytche, the gross revenue and receipts, imperial, provincial, and municipal, amounted to £2,004,813, giving an incidence of taxation of 13s. 3½d. per head.

† For trade of British Burma 1878-79, the total value of which had risen to sixteen crores of rupees (sixteen millions sterling); see *Addenda*.

General Fytche, in his excellent work on "Burma," bore the same proportion to population, it would be ten times greater than it is; that is to say, it would be about nine hundred and fifty millions instead of ninety-five!"—Again, British Burma contrasts favourably with India in "the value of the imports being much nearer to that of the exports."

IV.

FROM MANDALAY TO MOMIEN.*

[THE following paper, on Dr. Anderson's interesting book, appeared in the "Academy," April 8, 1876; and as the matter contained therein is so intimately connected with remarks made in the present work, the writer deems it unnecessary to make any apology for its insertion here.]

The Royal visit to our Indian Empire has of late drawn so much attention from the British public that we now trust some study and thought may be given to Chin-India, or at least that portion of it styled Burma Proper or Independent, the comparatively new capital of which is Mandalay, where reigns one of the shrewdest, best-informed, and most whimsical kings in Eastern Asia—the King of the Golden Feet and the Golden Ears, who has recently ordered, according to Burmese custom, the courts and public offices in his capital to be closed for forty days, during the all-important ceremony of "boring holes in the ears of the princesses."

Even the two expeditions to Western China, of 1868 and 1875, from "Mandalay to Momien" forming the grand base of operations, and, though unsuccessful, displaying so much energy and bravery on the part of our countrymen, have been well-nigh cast into the shade; the hearts of wealth-seeking British merchants have become sick and weary with disappointment; but we trust that all such clouds may be looked on as of insignificant result in a prospect bright and advancing. Dr.

* "Mandalay to Momien: A Narrative of the two Expeditions to Western China, of 1868 and 1875, under Colonel Edward B. Sladen and Colonel Horace Browne," by John Anderson, M.D., &c. London: 1876.

Anderson, by his handsome, well-timed, entertaining and instructive volume, has done much to renew the interest felt not long since in the destinies of Upper Burma, and the chance of British progress in Western China. Before proceeding briefly to examine the work of the ever-zealous medical officer and naturalist, it may be remarked that our position in *Burma*—the only correct way of spelling the word—is a very remarkable one; and this fact has not been sufficiently brought home to the British nation, for on its proper consideration our success in the land of the Golden Foot, and in lands beyond, greatly depends. It is just fifty years since Mr. Crawford, in his “Embassy to Ava,” informed us that he suggested the policy of keeping possession of Rangoon; thus shutting out the Burmese from the navigation of that grand artery the Irawady, and placing us in a commanding military attitude, which would have relieved us from all apprehension of annoyance from the power of these people. One of the ambassador’s shrewdest reviewers could not agree with him on this point, and was disposed to think that we had done much better. Hemmed in as they then were between Arakan and Martaban, we had little to fear from any annoyance they could give us. Indeed, the reviewer was rather surprised at such a proposal from Mr. Crawford, who, in the same breath almost, said that “the conditions of a convention with them ought to be strictly reciprocal; and the letter and spirit of the engagement such as would tend to develop the resources of both countries.” We cannot think that to stop them up “like rats within their holes,” as the critic said, would be the most likely mode of producing this desirable reciprocity, or of developing the resources of the Burmese. When we conquered and annexed Pegu, nearly four-and-twenty years ago, our ideas of the vast resources of the upper region of Burma were very vague indeed. We knew, from reading, that it boasted gold, silver, and copper, and that it was rich in precious stones; facts since entirely corroborated by Captain

Strover's "Memorandum on the Metals and Minerals of Burma (1873)";* but, for every practical purpose, Upper Burma was, and seemed likely to remain, almost an undiscovered country. Even the great master of annexation, Lord Dalhousie, talked and wrote of it as "a worthless rind." Having secured Pegu, and consequently the entire delta of the mighty Irawady, why should we increase our responsibility and expenditure by annexing what can be of no advantage to us *at present*? But, should "the force of circumstances" ever compel us to do so, then, said the Governor-General, in one of his brilliant despatches—"Let us advance!"

Lord Dalhousie knew little or nothing of the most convenient road to Western China being through Upper Burma, and that through Bhamo (or Bamo) the richest side of the "celestial" regions could be tapped. The romantic dreams of the most sanguine have never come up to the reality which we may reasonably expect when there is a clear passage from Yunnan to Rangoon. But even had such knowledge been then available, it did not occur to many who were interested in Burmese affairs, that our having secured possession of Rangoon—which future Liverpool of Chin-India, or Bombay of the Chinese and Burman Empires, Crawford so ardently desired—would prove the grand obstacle in the way of opening commerce with Western China. We had taken up, in the opinion of the king, one trade-monopolising position; and so the Golden Foot naturally seemed determined to take up the other. And thus began the difficulties which have been encountered by fearless and enterprising travellers and explorers, who deserve all honour for having, through the "impassable," endeavoured to pave a road.

In the preface to his goodly volume, Dr. Anderson informs us that public interest in the subject of "the overland route from Burma to China," called forth by the repulse of the recent mission and the well-known tragedy which attended it, suggested its publication. He hopes that his account of the

expedition of 1868, in which he bore an important part, will be acceptable to clear the way for the simple narrative of the mission of 1875, commanded by Colonel Horace Browne. The difficulties in both cases were very great, and such a concise and authoritative statement of them will assuredly do much good by putting us on our guard for the future. We may say that the two expeditions to Western China were most fortunate in the selection of the accomplished writer to whom were entrusted the scientific duties of medical officer and naturalist. An excellent map of the routes traversed, and another of South-Western China, showing routes traversed and proposed, followed up by a plan of Momien (Teng-Yue-Chow), confront the reader as he turns to the first chapter of the narrative, "Mandalay to Bhamo," which abounds with interesting, if not altogether new information. Rangoon is here most appropriately mentioned as the port of the great water highway of the Irawady, boasting a trade which, during fifteen years, had increased in annual value to two million five hundred thousand pounds. The commercial community of British Burma's capital had long directed their attention to the prospect of an overland trade with Western China, so as to avoid the long and dangerous voyage by the Straits and Indian Archipelago, with a view to a direct and easy interchange of our manufactures for the products of rich and fertile provinces like Yunnan and Sz-Chuen. There was, and is, no better way, in Dr. Anderson's opinion, than by the river Irawady and the royal city of Mandalay. And here it is important to note that—

"Although before 1867 but four English steamers with freight had ascended the river to the capital, harbingers of the numerous flotilla now plying in the Irawady, it was known that a regular traffic existed between Mandalay and China, especially in the supply of cotton to the interior, which was reserved as a royal monopoly."

General Albert Fytche, in his "Four Years' Administration of British Burma," informs us that when he was entrusted with

the chief commissionership, as successor to Sir Arthur Phayre, in the early part of 1867, one of his chief objects was to open up "a friendly intercourse with the king," and endeavour, through Major Sladen his assistant at the Court of Mandalay, to remove all suspicions, and convince the Burmese Government that our only object was to promote the material interests of the two states by mutual concessions. At that time so little had been accomplished in the way of developing the trade with Upper Burma that we need not wonder at only four merchant steamers having made their way to Mandalay. There was evidently something wrong in the framing of the Burmese treaty of 1862, in which the Government of India desired Sir Arthur Phayre to include, if possible, the re-opening of the old caravan route from Western China by the town of Bhamo, and other important concessions. The first object was to be effected by the king's sanction to a joint Burmese and British mission to China. But this proposal, on which the success of our enterprise then and hereafter appears to have rested, was not accepted. A direct trade with China might be carried on by us through Upper Burma, subject to certain conditions; and, in 1863, Dr. Williams—our former Resident at the Court of Mandalay—after a journey of twenty-two days, reached Bhamo, with the object of testing the practicability of a trade route. The Bhamo routes were considered by this other distinguished "political" medical officer and traveller as politically, physically, and commercially, the most advantageous. Dr. Anderson informs us that for twelve years, from 1855, the Burmo-Chinese trade in Bhamo, which represented five hundred thousand pounds per annum, had almost entirely ceased—perhaps owing to the effects of the Mohammedan rebellion in Yunnan. To solve the question of such ruin in a grand local trade, the Chief Commissioner, General Fytche, projected the expedition, which brings forth the suggestive, pleasing remark from the writer of the present volume, that "the enterprise might be deemed one of hereditary interest to the descendant of that

enterprising merchant-traveller, Mr. Fitch, who has left an account of his visit to Pegu in 1586." This, on reference to a narrative, we find to be the same Ralph Fitch who with John Newberry in 1583 led a great scheme of English adventure, which had for its object the reaching of the Persian Gulf (by way of Aleppo and Bagdad), and sailing thence by Ormus, in order to reach the shores of Malabar; and who narrates, with excusable ignorance of the wonders of Hindu mythology and archæology, that, on beholding the numberless temples and idols, some were "like a cow, some like a monkey, and some like the devil!" The proposed expedition was sanctioned by the Government of India in September 1867; and it was arranged that the departure of the mission, in which Dr. Anderson took so conspicuous and interesting a part, should take place from Mandalay in January 1868. This laudable enterprise, under Colonel B. Sladen, may be justly considered the first important step in carrying out the views of the merchants of England in a quarter where it was considered new fields of commerce for manufactures and produce might be obtained, thus helping to maintain the "commercial status" of their country.

Mandalay reached, the minute description of this Burmese city and its suburbs will well repay perusal; for we see at once that it is the work of a graphic writer and attentive observer. In fact, through the aid of this volume we may consider ourselves in the land of the Golden Foot for a time—the land of remarkable *fauna*, of gorgeous and fairy-garden-like *Flora*, and of valuable minerals, and with various productions to be utilised but barely yet discovered. It is also the land of a curious, lazy, but ingenious people, whose contemplative deity, Gautama—the Burmese incarnation of Buddha—governs their daily actions.

The fortunes of this now famous expedition were pretty well known to many readers long before the appearance of the book now under notice. They may be briefly summarised in the

following manner; but it may be well at first to state, in the words of the author, that—

“the city properly called Mandalay, with its palace and countless pagodas, lies about three miles from the Irawady, on a rising ground below the hill Mandalé. It was founded, on his accession in 1853, by the present king; and one of his motives for quitting Ava, and selecting the new site, was to remove his palace from the sight and sound of British steamers.”

The old capital has been admirably described by Colonel Yule, and other writers before him, such as Colonel Symes, Major Canning, Captain Cox, and Drs. Leyden and Buchanan, who have contributed towards throwing a light on our knowledge of the Burman Empire. Dr. Anderson's “Report on the Expedition to Western Yunan, *viâ* Bhamô,” was first published at Calcutta in 1871, and the greater portion of the present Narrative is devoted to a detailed account of matters set forth in that most interesting document. First, there was the departure from Mandalay, in the middle of January 1868, of Major Sladen, Captain Williams, and the author in the King of Burma's steamer, which also had on board representatives of the commercial community of Rangoon. Notwithstanding the public declaration of the Burmese Government that no steamer could possibly ascend the Irawady so far north as Bhamo, Bhamo was reached with a steamer of only three feet draught without any difficulty in the river navigation, and the expedition was thus brought nine hundred miles from their starting-point at Rangoon, and three hundred miles above Mandalay. On January 22nd they had left the beautiful scenery “through which the Irawady threads its course,” and came in sight of the town of Bhamo, situated in latitude $24^{\circ} 16' N.$, and longitude $96^{\circ} 53' 47'' E.$ on the left bank of the river, two or three miles below the mouth of the Tapeng. The region between the borders of Yunnan and the Irawady at Bhamo had next to be crossed, which region—the former battle-ground of Burma and China—is said to be the site of the nine Shan States mentioned by Du Halde. The treachery of the Bur-

mese soon became apparent, which the fearless Sladen was resolved to defeat by securing the aid of the Kakhyen chiefs, and—it was the period of the Panthay insurrection in Western China—by opening communications with the Panthay (Mohammedan) commander at the Yunnan frontier city of Momien. This was a most important movement on the part of Sladen, as the very object of the expedition was to find out the exact position held by the Kakhyens, Shans, and Panthays, with reference to the former traffic between Bhamo and Yunnan. Notwithstanding that the Burmese and Chinese (friends and enemies by turns, and neither long) were opposed to the farther advance of the party, they came after a variety of adventures, on May 26, in sight of the walled city of Momien, distant from Bhamo about one hundred and twenty miles, and the nearest frontier city in Yunnan. The town was being continually harassed by forays of Chinese partisan bands in the neighbourhood, which compelled Major Sladen to think of a return, as he could not proceed with any safety in the direction of the Panthay capital of Talifoo. Then came the adventurous return, commenced on July 13; and the result of the expedition was a vast deal of information gained, but no commercial or political effect. As another attempt to explore the trade routes to Western China, in 1868, we may here mention that the enterprising and intelligent explorer, Mr. T. T. Cooper, endeavoured “to pass from the head-waters of the Yang-tsze-Kiang to the northern frontier of Assam,” but without success.*

* He got nearly as far as Sudya. This excellent and affable public servant eventually, after proceeding in 1876 to India from England, in connection with the Grand Delhi Durbar, was murdered in April 1878, while Political Agent at Bhamo, by a Burman; but no political importance was attached to the deed. Regarding the Assam route, General Sir George Balfour, M.P., informed the writer that he preferred the one from Assam (Sudya) to Sz-Chaen, in his opinion the province of S.W. China of greatest importance. Referring to the adventurous Chin-Indian traveller, Mr. Cooper, Sir George said he little knew how close he was to our settlement. “I cannot vouch for the fact that the Chinese thought he had come from India.” It is to be hoped some other enterprising explorer will soon arise to emulate Cooper! The mountain difficulty *must* be overcome!

Among the excellent illustrations in Dr. Anderson's detailed Narrative will be found one of "Kakhyen Women," very truthful and life-like, from a photograph by Major Williams; an excellent view of Mandalay, furnished by Colonel Sladen; and various well-executed sketches, with the photograph of "a posturing girl" at Mandalay, by the author—evidently a man of various and useful attainments. His book—which we cordially recommend as the best yet published on the subjects treated—also contains the invaluable addition of an index, with appendices including a Note by Professor Douglas on the deities in a Shan temple, and a vocabulary, English, Kakhyen, and Shan, which will amuse as well as instruct. It is curious to observe that, although the words "oily," "pretty," and "beautiful," are nearly all alike in the Kakhyen and Shan dialects, there is no word for "ugly" to be found therein, although it appears in the wilder vocabulary of the Hotha, Shan, Leesaw, and Poloung. Once more turning to Bhamo, where Captain Strover, in 1869, was assistant political agent, we have been informed by a high authority that the importance of this town has been somewhat over-rated as a trade-mart—even in its most palmy days, when a Shan queen reigned one hundred and forty years ago, the annual revenue of the district not exceeding fourteen lakhs of rupees (one hundred and forty thousand pounds). Here, where a well-informed writer states "Burmese and Chinese influences commingle," we hope yet to see an exchange-mart for the silk, copper, gold, drugs, and textile fabrics of Western China, and for British and Burmese staples.

Regarding the second ill-fated expedition, the narrative of which will be found in the last five chapters of the present volume, Dr. Anderson writes that, in 1874,—

"Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for India, decided to send a second expedition to penetrate China from Burma, and pass through, if practicable, to Shanghai. To avoid possible misunderstandings, and to make it plain to the Western Chinese mandarins

that the foreign visitors were of the same nation as the English who lived and traded in the treaty-ports, her Majesty's Minister at Pekin was instructed to send a consular official, duly furnished with imperial passports, to meet the mission on the frontiers of China."

Mr. Ney Elias, gold-medallist of the Royal Geographical Society, was geographer. The fate of the young, brave, and most promising member of the consular service, Mr. Margary, is too well known to be repeated here; but many details of this second British mission—subsequently followed by Mr. Grosvenor's to Yunnan, under a British escort—are given by the author in a manner which must commend itself to all well-wishers of the commercial enterprise and of the glory of England.

NOTES.

TRADE ROUTES FROM BURMA TO WESTERN CHINA.

No better signs of a growing British interest in the golden and flowery lands could have been evinced than the public meeting held in February 1870, in Westminster, to vote a resolution on Captain Sprye's project for opening up trade with the "west of China and intermediate Shan States of Burma by the direct land route from Rangoon to Kiang-Hung"; and trade with China (in connection with Major Sladen's official report of his expedition to explore the trade routes to China *viâ* Bhamo, in February 1868, printed at the British Burmese Press in 1869) forming the subject of a clear and exhaustive leading article in one of the London daily journals.* The latter authority, with reference to "the recent discussion as to the mode in which commerce should be conducted between England and the highest population on earth's surface," considers that such "has lent peculiar interest to a report of recent exploration, which is in itself most fascinating." The report, it was believed, would be shortly laid before Parliament. The easiest way to

* The "Daily Telegraph," April 21st, 1870.

the great markets of China may yet form a leading subject of debate. "The object of the movement," says the journalist, "was to ascertain the practicability of a route which would place fifty millions of the most flourishing and active inhabitants of the Celestial Empire within a fortnight or three weeks' reach of the Bengal Gulf, and thus diminish by one-fifth the time and labour consumed in bringing Chinese products by the eastern sea-board." The expedition started from Bhamo, a town nine hundred miles from the mouth of the Irawady, "which is navigable for ships of average burthen all the way." The Dutch and English had trading stations at Bhamo just three centuries ago. "The old tracks of commerce have been obliterated simply because the King of Burma's Ministers have sought to feed their own public and private revenue by forcing trade to follow the long land route from Yunnan to Mandalay, that they might extort ample protection fees from the caravans." From the western frontier of China the distance by caravan to Bhamo is but five or six days; thence down the Irawady by steamer, twelve days more, which "immensely greater facilities of conveyance" Major Sladen is said to have "practically opened." In parting with the explorers, the London journalist highly eulogises Major Sladen, to "whose undaunted courage and exhaustless invention of tactics, science and commerce owe so much," and Dr. Anderson and Lieutenant Bowers, his "loyal and able assistants." It was to Colonel Fytche (Chief Commissioner) that the arrangements for the above expedition were entrusted, and he persuaded the King, during his mission to Mandalay, to take considerable interest in it. "On the return of the mission from Momien," the General writes in his new work, "with a view to strengthen the belief in the reality of our intentions to endeavour to resuscitate trade, and to maintain communication with the Kakhyen and Shan chiefs, and the Panthay Government, an English political agent was at once appointed to Bhamo; which contingency had been provided for in my treaty of 1867 with

the King of Burma." We must not omit to mention in connection with the trade routes to South-west China, the visit of the Burmese Embassy to England in 1871-72. The Burmese Envoy Extraordinary made a special visit to Halifax, famed for its Chamber of Commerce. The council presented him with an address, alluding to the fertile lands of Burma as affording great inducements for the spread of commerce and agriculture. They now wished the Golden Foot to open up a commercial highway to the unlimited resources of Western China. The Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary from His Majesty the King of Burma replied :—"In reference to the question of trade routes through Burma to Western China, I need merely repeat what I have said in other places, that His Majesty the King of Burma is most anxious to promote, by every means in his power, any matured and feasible plan which has this object in view. But in regard to the route to which you advert, commonly known as Captain Sprye's route, I would remark that as the line passes through an insignificant portion of the King of Burma's territory, the responsibility of opening it out cannot fairly be laid upon His Majesty." *

It may here be interesting to say a few words regarding

THE SHAN TRIBES.

The Shans, or Shyans, are divided into many tribes. The population used to be little short of three millions, of which vast number a considerable portion owed allegiance to the King of Ava. They are considered to be the parent stock of both Assamese and Siamese.

A Shan camp appeared not far distant from the ancient walls

* On February 28th, 1873, a deputation from the Associated Chambers of Commerce waited on the Secretary of State for India (His Grace the Duke of Argyll), to urge the completion of the survey of a line of railway from Rangoon to the frontier of China. The deputation was introduced by Mr. Whitwell, M.P.; Mr. Baines, M.P., explained. Mr. Haigh, of the Huddersfield Chamber, and Mr. T. T. Ormerod and Mr. John Crossley, of the Halifax Chamber, also spoke. The Duke was not averse to the survey, but was bound to object to the expense of it "falling on Indian revenues."

of Toungoo. These descendants of Magog—it is presumed they are such—originally from Chinese Tartary,* or, it may be, leaving the country of Japheth and proceeding to the more southern possessions of Shem;—the descendants of Shem who inhabited the mighty region of Thibet, from whose mountains the Burmese are said eventually to have poured down—these descendants of what Patriarch you will, who flourished after the flood when “the whole earth was of one language and of one speech,” are apt to strike one as carrying a strange interest along with them, retaining as they do much of that simplicity in habits which was peculiar to the elder world. They had some very fine bullocks, with other merchandise, which they were about to expose for sale in the Maulmain market. The import trade from the Shan States—which lie along the eastern frontier of Northern Burma—into the capital of the Tenasserim Provinces, not long ago consisted of cattle (cows and bullocks), elephants, ponies, gold leaf, lacquered boxes, cotton cloth, and other valuable articles of traffic, amounting annually to little less than three hundred and twenty thousand rupees (thirty-two thousand pounds), while about a lakh of rupees worth (ten thousand pounds) of our manufactures found their way to them. There are Siamese Shans and Burmese Shans, the former having no affection for the latter; but both we believe to be equally hostile to the throne of Ava. Independence seems to be the ruling principle of all the Shans. We read, not long ago, a sensible opinion, that a good understanding should exist between the British Indian Government and the Shan States with regard to reciprocal acts of accommodation and courtesy. Zimmay had thrown off its allegiance to Ava and boasted a considerable army, including two hundred and fifty elephants; the writer, therefore, thought the political connection between us and the Shan States should be placed on some sure footing.

* The Tartars to this day are a wild and wandering race, living in encampments of moveable tents, which they carry from place to place. The Shans may have been a more civilised tribe, fond of traffic.

PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF THE SHAN COUNTRIES.

Town of Bamo, and Trade.

WITH a view to strengthening the commercial interests of England in Chin-India, the author of this work thinks a few notes regarding the Shan Countries, north and east of Ava, will be of use at the present time. They are from an excellent paper by Lieutenant-Colonel S. F. Hannay, published in the Records of the Bengal Government, 1857.

The productive capacities of the regions inhabited by the Shan tribes are great, particularly Siam and the territories east and north of it. In Siam proper, great impulse has been given to industry by the Chinese settlers on the rich delta of the Menam river, and sugar, cotton, with rice and pepper of a superior quality, form most important items in the extensive export trade between Bangkok and some of the maritime Chinese ports, and more particularly the island of Hainan.

Vegetable Productions.—The lower ranges of the hills bounding the Menam, Cambodia, and their tributary streams, are covered with forests, with valuable timber such as teak and rose-wood; besides various drugs, spices, dye-woods and gums. Among the latter may be reckoned gamboge, cardamums, saffron, red-wood, and sandal-wood. Large quantities of stic-lac are produced, both in the lower Laos and the Shan States, west of the Salween river, under Burma, which find their way to Rangoon and Moulmein (Maulmain). The tea-plant is extensively cultivated by the Polongs, in the hilly region of the Moongmeet and Senvec Province, under Burma; and it may here be worthy of notice that the tea-plant of the Polongs is identical with that of Assam, both being distinct from that of China. The Polongs are the manufacturers of leing or lepek, a preparation of the tea-leaf which is much esteemed by the Burmans and eaten on all occasions as a condiment, sometimes fried in oil. It is the young twigs and leaves of the tea-tree subjected in large masses to a half state of fermentation; and

when the process is complete, it is packed into large bamboo baskets and taken to Burma proper (Upper Burma), where it is exposed for sale in every bazaar, from Ava to Rangoon, and is thus visible in masses about the size of half-a-dozen bricks, lying generally on a board, being of sufficient compactness to allow of the vendor cutting off with a dhá or large knife as much as may be purchased. Tea also, of a coarse Bohea kind, is manufactured by the Polongs; this is brought in round hard balls cemented together, by paddy starch-water, and also in a loose state in large baskets, the latter principally by land on ponies or mules, and both are sold at a very cheap rate.

To the above vegetable productions may be added fibres of the most useful kind to the people themselves, amongst which is the pan, identical with the grass cloth plant of China and rehea of Assam. Silk is also produced by the Shans, though the best kinds come from China.

Minerals.—The Shan territories are rich in mineral. In Siam proper and the tributary states of the Laos there are ores of tin, antimony, lead, and abundance of iron. In the north-east corner of the Province of Moongmeet is situated the celebrated Bandwen, or silver mine, which belongs to the King of Ava, but it appears to be worked by the Chinese, who probably rent it either from that monarch or from the dependent Shan Toobwa (Chobwa), or Prince, in whose territory it lies. Of its productiveness little can be said, as the Burmese are jealous of foreigners knowing about their supplies of this metal.

About twenty-five miles south of the town of Moongmeet, and sixty north and east of the Burmese capital (Ava), are situated the celebrated ruby and sapphire localities, called Mogaut and Kyatpen, and not *Capellan* as hitherto written, and supposed to be in the kingdom of Pegu. In Colonel Hannay we have another witness to the fact that the mineral resources of the Shan territories immediately north of Ava are not so well known, little being done by the Burmese to bring to light the natural riches of their country in this respect. [It has

been already mentioned that eighty miles nearly east of Mandalay, about fifty miles south-west of Theinnee, is THEEBO, with hilly spots, and that from the latter place the present Golden Foot takes his name, probably inheriting his extravagant notions from the wealthy nats (evil spirits), from a country so rich in minerals, continually surrounding him !]

The situation of the Chinese Mart of BAMO, on the Upper Irawady, is thus described :—It is also styled Manmo, and is in lat. $24^{\circ} 12'$ and 97° of E. long., on the left bank of the river. It is the modern capital of the old Shan province of that name, extending north as far as lat. 25° , bounded on the east by the great black mountains of the Chinese, which separate the Burmese territories from Yunnan. It is interesting to note that this residence of a Burmese governor and his under officers appears to have had a double influence—the district and its land revenue having been (1857) in the hands of one of the Queens of the King of Ava, a sister of the Tapan Rajah of Assam. The amount of revenue, including the duties at the principal and inferior marts, used to be three lakhs of rupees (thirty thousand pounds). Bamo was thus described in 1836 :—“ I find that this is a modern town, erected on the banks of the Irawady, for the convenience of water carriage between it and Ava. The old Shan town of Manmo, or Bamno, is situated two days' journey up the Tipan river, which falls into the Irawady, about a mile above the new town of Bamo or Zee-theet Zeit, or new mart landing place. This modern town is situated on high unequal ground, and the bank toward the river is from forty to fifty feet in height and composed of clay. With the exception of Ava and Rangoon it is the largest place I have seen in Burma, and not excepting these places I certainly think it the most interesting. . . . I felt as if I were almost in a civilised land again, when I found myself amongst fair-complexioned people, wearing jackets and trowsers, after being accustomed to the harsh features and parti-coloured dress of the Burmans. The people I saw were Chinese from

the province of Yunnan, and Shans from the Shan provinces subject to China. Bamo is said to contain one thousand five hundred houses, but including several villages which join it, I should say it contained two thousand, at least two hundred of which are inhabited by Chinese. Besides the permanent population of Bamo, there are always a great number of strangers there, Chinese, Shans, Polongs, and Khykhyens (Kakhyens), who either come to make purchases, or to be hired as workmen. There are also a great number of Assamese, both in the town and the villages, amongst whom are several members of the Tapan or Assam Rajah's family."—The Chinese import trade with Bamo is great in the month of December. Save for the floods, there might be constant intercourse with Yunnan. Among the articles imported into Burma are raw silk, rich China silks, velvets, and gold, all of which are taken to the capital. The transit of cotton is periodical, and large boats are employed in it.

V.

THE VALUE OF UPPER BURMA.

IN a country—the old Burmese Empire—where all rank was official, a royal monopoly of riches was only considered natural. To the northward of Ava, there were (and, doubtless, are still) mines of gold, silver, and precious stones—rubies and sapphires of the finest description—but, as all mines throughout the kingdom formed one of the numerous royal monopolies, and were only worked at particular times, by special order from the Golden Foot (one of whose titles is—"Proprietor of the Mines of Rubies, Gold, and Silver"), the nation derived little benefit from their existence. No specie, however plentiful it might be, was permitted to be exported; and this formed one great drawback to the trade with Ava. "The merchants, unable to carry off all their profits or returns in produce, were often under the necessity of suspending their sales, even when

the demand was greatest, and the native merchants ready to pay for their goods in silver or gold, or to smuggle the money into vessels, at a great risk of seizure and consequent forfeiture."

—Vast sums were annually expended in building and gilding pagodas, in which images of Gautama, made of solid gold, were frequently buried. It was difficult, after the capture of Rangoon, and our occupation of other strongholds, to keep the Europeans from breaking into the pagodas to discover this treasure. In the large gilt wooden images—some of them not unlike those of Assyria—frequently splendid rubies were found. If this were the case in Lower, what might we not find in Upper Burma? Truly the mineralogy of the country is rich, abundant, and various; and, if properly worked under British protection and enterprise, would pay off at least half of the whole debt of India within the present century!

*Gold.**

It has been generally supposed that Upper Burma is not rich in itself as regards this metal, but there would seem to be good grounds for supposing that it exists very extensively. In former years the gold used in the country was imported from China to the extent of some four hundred or five hundred viss annually, but the imports have considerably decreased since the commencement of the Mahomedan rebellion in Yunnan, and now do not exceed two hundred viss per annum, the deficiency being imported from Rangoon. It is an article that is greatly used in the decorative art, and appears to be generally plentiful.

In the Mogoung district there would seem to be a gold-field

* From a valuable Memorandum by Captain G. A. Strover, Political Agent, Mandalay, on the Metals and Minerals of Upper Burma. The Chief Commissioner had called for a Report on the mineral resources of the country, April 1878.

that, if properly worked, would prove very productive. Some years ago, a Mr. Golding, of Australian experience, contracted with the King to work one square mile of this field for a sum of twenty-five thousand rupees annually, for ten years, but unfortunately the district proved to be malarious and Mr. Golding succumbed to fever; he, however, pronounced the fields to be equal to any in Australia, if not better. I am not aware that he succeeded in procuring much gold. Since then no attempt has been made on the part of the Burmese Government to work the mines.

To the north-east of Mandalay, in the Shan States, there is another field of gold. My information tends to show that here again, with energy and enterprise, considerable quantities of gold could be extracted, and the mines prove very productive; but the locality at present is malarious, and but little gold is procured.

At Thayet-pein-yua, near the Myit-Nyay, on the road to Pyongshoo, to the south-east of Mandalay, the gold quartz is found in abundance, the reefs cropping up from the ground, and there is reason to believe that very valuable gold-mines are in existence, and could be worked and developed with little trouble. A Shan lately procured from here a piece of quartz, three and a half pounds in weight, that produced exactly two and a half ticals of gold.

In the Yaw district, to the south-west of Mandalay, gold is obtained in fair quantities in the alluvial deposits; it exists at Sagaing, Kannee, Sein-joo, and is also obtained from the Kyeend-ween river, and, indeed, it is procurable from the sands of most of the streams between Mandalay and Mogoung. The natural conclusion from this profusion of gold in the rivers and streams of Upper Burma is that it exists in large quantities *in situ* somewhere, and, as I have explained, this is the case, and doubtless there are more deposits that have not been discovered.

Silver

Is found in many localities in the Shan States to the east of the Irawady river, but the most prolific mines are those situated at Bawvine, Kyouktch and TOUNG-bYNE, near Theebau, to the north-east of Mandalay. It is mixed with lead, and is, in fact, a rich argentiferous galena. One mine, the Kampanee, will yield as much as forty ticals of silver and twenty-five viss of lead from one basket of the ore, while the poorest mine gives four ticals of silver and thirty viss* of lead. Other mines exist, such as the Bandween, Bandweengyee, and Sagaing. The metal is also found in other towns unmixed with lead. The supply of silver obtained hitherto has been sufficient for the requirements of the country in conjunction with the imports from Yunnan.

Copper.

This metal is found in the Shan States, but is not worked. It is also found at Kolen-myo and Sagaing; at Bawvine and Kolen-myo the malachite appears to be of a rich description. The copper resources of the Shan States do not appear to have been ever utilised to any extent, and the deposits, which seem to be abundant, remain as nature placed them. The Sagaing mines were worked in former times by Chinese, but many years have elapsed since they were abandoned. The surface ore is not promising. Most of the copper used in Upper Burma is imported from China. It is plentiful in the province of Yunnan.

Iron.

Iron abounds in the Shan States, and the district of Pagan, to the south of Mandalay, is noted for it. A manufactory exists on a rough and ready scale in this district at Pohpah-TOUNG, but the out-turn is inconsiderable. To the west of Sagaing, for miles up the Irawady river, the ore abounds—a

* The *Ticcal* is a Chinese weight, of about $4\frac{1}{4}$ ounces, and the *viss* an Indian, of about $8\frac{1}{4}$ lbs. ! (Note, 1879.)

rich hematite. His Majesty is now procuring iron-works from England, and will before long have a large foundry, with all the requisite machinery, erected and at work at Sagaing. The surface hematite alone will feed it for years to come, if worked.

Two mining engineers are now awaiting the arrival of the works, and expect to proceed to Sagaing soon to commence operations.

Lead

Is found in abundance in the Shan States, and is extracted from galena. Considerable quantities of this metal could be obtained if such were desired. At present moderate supplies are procured, sufficient for the requirements of the land. It is also imported from Yunnan.

Tin.

This metal exists in the Shan States to the south-east of Mandalay, but the mines have never been worked. The tin consumed in the country now is all imported.

Platinum

Is said to exist in the Shan States, and it seems probable that it does exist, but I have no reliable information on this point.

Graphite

Is found to the east of Nat-taik in large quantities on a low range of hills near the village Nyoke-toke. It is not utilised.

Coal.

This mineral is known to exist at Thingadaw, about seventy miles above Mandalay, on the western bank of the Irawady; at Shuaygoo below Bamo; at Meimbaloung in the Shan States east of Mandalay; to the south-west of Mandalay in the Yaw

district, at Yaignaw, east of Nat-taik. It is found at Pagan and Shimpagah, and it is probable that it exists near Menhla and Yeynaugyoung. At Thingadaw the coal has been extracted, but it is of an inferior description, and more resembles lignite than the true mineral coal. An attempt was lately made here to ascertain the productiveness of the coal-beds. It is nearly certain that plenty of coal exists in the locality, and a few more borings would probably prove this. The coal-bed in the Shan States, at Meimbaloung, contains the true mineral coal, and consequently a valuable coal. It has been inspected by an experienced mining engineer, and highly approved of as equal to the best English coal. There is little doubt that the beds are extensive, but unfortunately the distance inland is great, and no easy means are available for transporting the coal to the low lands; indeed, the only method at present is by floating it down mountain streams and rapids on rafts, which entails considerable risk and loss of coal. European skill and enterprise would soon make a safe route of one description or another if really required by the Government; *it remains at present, with neighbouring wealth, where nature placed it, awaiting "development in times to come."*—May the time for such development soon arrive!*

VI.

SUMMARY OF EVENTS FROM 1826 TO 1879, WITH A SKETCH OF KING THEEBAU'S PROGRESS.

THE royal house of Burma has long been distinguished for surprises as well as monopolies. From the golden capital of the "Lord of Earth and Air," wondrous tales have proceeded; and within it, all of a sudden, changes and "deeds of dreadful note," from time to time, have taken place, excelling in inten-

* Jade and amber, sulphur, saltpetre, rubies, sapphires, garnets, &c., salt, and petroleum (the valuable and useful mineral oil), nearly complete Captain Strover's interesting list. Six years ago the total supply of earth-oil in Upper Burma was nearly 11,000 tons per annum. On the whole, Upper Burma would seem to have "a grand future" in store for it!

sity all that we have read of in the history of other Asiatic kingdoms. Kind British advice has always been thrown away on such absolute and arrogant monarchs. Alompra, upwards of a century ago, although hard pressed during the conquest of Pegu, despised our assistance, and would have nothing to say to us; and the great founder of the reigning dynasty died, destined to have successors under whom there would be frequent revolts and massacres, and who would some day give us much anxiety and trouble.

A French writer of celebrity has well and truly said, that we preserve the memory of bad princes, as we record fires, plagues, and inundations. Shakspeare, in "King John," alluding to the evil purposes of kings, deems it their curse to be surrounded by slaves who servilely execute their orders, even to breaking into "the bloody house of life"—

"And, on the winking of authority,
To understand a law, to know the meaning
Of dangerous majesty" . . .

when it has resulted from the king's humour rather than from deliberate consideration. To be thus charitable at the commencement of a rapid sketch of a genuine Burman monarch's progress, and give King Theebau* the full benefit of the word "humour," is all that can be advanced in his behalf; while even that vanishes when we think, with regard to this King, of the poet's truthful lines:—

"How oft the sight of means to do ill-deeds
Makes ill-deeds done!"

We then pause, and ponder on one who has for some months traded in cruelty—a creature without a shadow of remorse—till at length we feel a natural anxiety to behold the spirit of some murdered innocent rush forward, as a Nemesis from the unseen world, to avenge the foul massacre!

If we are wrong, and it be true that, but for the effects of

* Or Thebaw, or Theebaw; but the above is probably the most correct spelling, as nearest to the Burmese *Theebo*, the principality.

drinking, and evil counsellors or agents being by, the murders "had not come into his mind," then we may be too severe; but still we have been enabled to bring forth from Chin-India—what well-meaning but not generally practical temperance philanthropists should make capital of—the important fact of murder and drinking being combined in lands other than our own!

"More massacres!"—"The King still drinking!"—Such, from the beginning of '1879, has been an occasional burden of the telegrams and letters which have arrived from Mandalay. The thirst for blood and gin appeared to be equally unquenchable; and the proverbial wish of the Dutchman, in the old song, regarding his depth of draught of the national spirit, had at length found a counterpart in that of King Thebau. The progress of such a man is worth recording.

Hogarth's "Rake's Progress," with all the terrible ideas which surround it, is, perhaps, about the mildest edition of this king that could be conceived. Allowing for the difference of civilisation of the two countries, we mourn over the dissipated and cruel Asiatic, with so many grand opportunities—legion in comparison with those of Hogarth's rake—and think what good he might have done—what firm and profitable relations he might have established with the British Government—how, in short, he might have become a noble character, with all the "divinity"—in Burma the kings are intimately related to Gautama! *—"which doth hedge a king!" Before chronicling such a progress, let us give a brief summary of various important events. It will suffice for our present purpose to commence with Phagyi-dau, one of Thebau's ancestors, a haughty and overbearing king, whose arrogant conduct forced on the First Burmese War. The influence possessed over him

* The head of the Burmese religion—an incarnation of *Buddha*, which signifies "wisdom," "enlightened." Strange enough, Gautama is a saint in the Roman calendar. Pity that the King is sometimes so unworthy of his patron!

by his queen has been attributed to sorcery ; and, in the latter years of his reign, he suffered much from hypochondria, and at length became insane.*

It is important to remark at the present time that the " vital clause " in the Yandaboo Treaty of 1826 was that referring to the establishment of a Resident or Envoy at the capital. In 1830, when Major Burney was sent to Ava as Envoy, he reported unfavourably of the proposal to have a permanent representative at the Burmese Court. It was, he very shrewdly thought, with such regal material on the throne, sure to produce irritation, and, perhaps, eventual disaster.

The efforts made to open up good relations, or " a genuine and sympathetic intercourse with the ruler " (above mentioned) were abortive. The King had neither the sense nor the inclination to understand the value of commercial intercourse with the British. " Although averse from the shedding of blood," we read that one of his principal amusements was, Saul-like, " to fling his spear at or among those courtiers who came under his displeasure."†

We now come to his brother Tharawadi, who, with the usual fraternal affection of the Burmese Royal Family, deposed Phagyi-dau and placed him in confinement, in 1837. Tharawadi was the younger son of the Crown Prince, who had never reigned, and seemed to possess all the ability requisite for a great ruler and worthy descendant of Alompra. As Prince, Tharawadi had seemed a friend to the British, boasting of his " love of humanity and of a peaceful rule." But as King, he was " of a different turn of mind " ; eventually detesting " wise counsel," and especially the presence of all foreigners in his capital. At that time, Colonel Burney deemed it prudent to " withdraw himself from the presence of the tyrant "—which withdrawal was censured by Lord Auckland. During the next

* See General Fytche's " Burma, Past and Present," vol. i. p. 83.

† See an excellent article in the " Times," 11th of April, " The Kingdom of Burmah."

few years he consolidated his power by the murder of all his most formidable relatives.

Diplomatic intercourse with King Tharawadi closed when that worthy man and excellent officer Captain (now General) McLod withdrew from Burmese territory, early in 1840. In 1841, Tharawadi assumed a decidedly hostile attitude towards the British Government, ignoring the Treaty of Yandaboo, and threatening to drive us out of Arakan and Tenasserim. This, of course, had produced great excitement in Calcutta. Like his predecessor, the King became insane. Plots were formed against him; and, strange to say, in the very year in which his full brother died (1845), he was deposed and confined in the palace of Amarapura, the "new capital" which had been founded by Bhodan Prau (Phra), the third son of Alompra.

Tharawadi was succeeded by his son, the Prince of Pagan, or Pagan Meng. After the Second Burmese War, Pagan Meng was deposed. As has been well observed, the triumph of the British army was the knell of this sovereign—the "Cock-fighting" King, as he was called in Burma. For seven years he was in every sense "wickedly mad." He was succeeded by his younger brother, Prince Mengdon Meng. As King he refused to sign a treaty of peace, which caused Lord Dalhousie, after the Second Burmese War, to define his own boundary of the newly conquered territory. But Mengdon was a vast improvement on his late predecessors, and showed a decided turn for trade and business; and, notwithstanding his monopolising tendencies, with his love of the old "Burman custom," his reign was of considerable advantage to Burma. His practical reforms brought him not a few enemies; and his rule, as usual, was not free from internal sedition. In 1866, during a rising, many princes of the royal house were executed.*

* "Although the dynasty of Alompra has been maintained for more than a century, the kingdom has been constantly exposed to palace revolutions."—"Burma, Past and Present," vol. i. p. 211.

During King Mengdon's reign, also, most important events as regarded our relations took place. Elsewhere (No. 1, Paper on Burma) we have alluded to the complimentary mission in 1855 sent to Calcutta by the King of Burma. Then came a return mission to Amarapura, in the middle of the same year, under the present Sir Arthur Phayre (then Colonel). The Burmese capital was eventually transferred from Amarapura to Mandalay (founded by Mengdon in 1860); and, in January 1862, the three divisions of Arakan, Pegu, and Tenasserim were formed into the Chief Commissionership of British Burma. Up to 1873, the Chief Commissioners appointed were Sir Arthur Phayre, Major-General Fytche, and the Honourable Ashley Eden. The Chief Commissioner's power extends along the eastern shore of the Bay of Bengal from Chittagong to Siam in 10° N. lat. British Burma is geographically divided "into Arakan, the valley of the Irawady, the valley of the Salween, and Tenasserim."* And when we consider that he has the control of an extensive province, with one thousand miles of frontier, it will be seen that the Chief Commissioner is an Asiatic sovereign not to be despised! Sir Arthur Phayre, the first Chief, concluded the Treaty of 1862; but although the British Government abolished the duties on their side of the frontier, the Burmese did nothing whatever. It was our grand object to educate the Burmese in the principles of free trade. The King was always waiting for a more convenient season to carry out *his* idea of trade reform. It should be kept in mind that in 1855 the King had objected "to any treaty which would recognise the loss of Pegu." He said to the Envoy, "If a treaty is made there must be *mutual advantage!*" Mengdon, not seeming inclined to sign the treaty, was informed by Colonel Phayre that "without a treaty no gunpowder or warlike stores would be permitted to pass up the river Irawady;

* "Annals of Indian Administration in the Year 1871-2," p. 79.

but that if a treaty were concluded, a confidence would be established according to Western ideas, and commodities of all descriptions would be permitted to pass.”* The main object of the first mission had been to establish friendly relations, and to make another attempt to conclude a definite treaty with the King, which fact was broadly stated to His Majesty. The King refused to sign, but friendly relations were established. After 1862 other obstacles to free trade arose, the principal of which was that nearly every article of produce in Upper Burma was a royal monopoly. Burmese merchants could not sell “grain timber, cutch, or other commodities, except through royal brokers, or express permission of the local authorities.”

The next important event calculated to disturb British relations was—although the King was well-disposed towards us—the insult offered to two British officers, while exploring the intricate and dangerous Salween river, by arrogant Burmese officials. They were stopped and sent back, “in direct violation of the treaty!” An English gentleman was also beaten in the streets of the capital.

Another mission was to have started for Mandalay early in 1866, but it was checked by the insurrection in Upper Burma, during which the Crown Prince was assassinated. Captain Sladen was at this time the British representative at Mandalay; and it is curious to remark at present—when so many great events are on the gale—that “during the insurrection, the Burmese considered themselves more secure on the premises of the British representative than in their own houses!”†

Captain Sladen—one of the bravest and most energetic officers we have ever had in Burma—remained at Mandalay for

* For this information General Fytche refers to the splendid work, by Colonel Yule, C.B., of the Engineers, (who was Secretary to the Mission,) entitled “Narrative of the Mission to the Court of Ava,” pp. 97-98. See “Burma, Past and Present,” vol. i. p. 208.

† “Burma, Past and Present,” vol. i. p. 218.

seven days after the outbreak ; but, as the King could not guarantee either the safety of the lives or the property of the European residents, he embarked with nearly the whole of them in a "British merchant steamer," and proceeded to Rangoon. It should be recorded that the King, without permission, had been employing this steamer against the rebels headed by the two rebel princes ; but this can easily be excused from the danger the Golden Foot was subjected to. The insurrection was suppressed ; the rebel princes, having seized one of the King's steamers, came into British territory, when "Colonel Phayre took the necessary steps for preventing them from committing further mischief ; and they were required to reside at Rangoon, under the surveillance of the British authorities."

When the rebellion had passed away, about the end of 1866, Colonel Phayre again proceeded to Mandalay. Nothing of great importance apparently resulted from this mission, which must have been considered a disheartening failure by the very able and ever zealous Chief Commissioner. The King, true to his cloth, would not reduce his frontier duties, nor forego any one of his monopolies. Thus, at the end of a splendid career in Burma, and having, through the care of the rebel princes, relieved the King from danger—probably saved his life—our Chief met with the usual Burmese or Oriental ingratitude on this last occasion of his strong endeavour to put common sense into the head of the Golden Foot, a sovereign by no means wanting in ability.*

It has been remarked that King Mengdon, when (some twelve or fourteen years ago) the overthrow of the Panthays—Mahomedans of Yunnan, South-west China—brought Chinese arms into his vicinity, intrigued "with the representatives of the celestials in Yunnan." There was also a disagreeable

* Eventually, on return to Europe, General Sir Arthur Phayre's great services were rewarded with the Governorship of Mauritius.

question, in recent years, concerning the Karen frontier; but, notwithstanding these escapades in the reign of Mengdon, and the probability of the wild tribes on our frontier, nominally under his control, promising to become a permanent source of trouble and annoyance, "so long as the late King lived it was clear that no cause for just umbrage would be given to us." His death, early in October 1878, produced a period of barbarity and uncertainty at Mandalay, of which it is most difficult, at present, to see the end.

We have not yet alluded to a most important mission, with General (then Colonel) Albert Fytche as Envoy, in September 1867; but there are a few points in it which, in these unsettled and warlike times, may be of interest, before turning to the progress of King Theebau.†

The new Chief Commissioner was appointed in March 1867, and, in the following May, his Burman Majesty appeared to be about abolishing some of his monopolies and reducing the frontier duties; but the good news, made public through proclamations, was considered to be simply a blind. Then another conspiracy took place at Mandalay, in which Captain Sladen, who had resumed his duties at the capital, greatly distinguished himself. The Princes of the Blood were about to be executed. The Resident immediately went to the King, and got a reprieve with which he galloped off, but was too late to save all the victims. The eldest son of the Crown Prince was already in the agonies of death; but the younger brothers were saved by the gallant English representative. Strange enough, the King said he was unaware that the execution had been ordered by his ministers, and "warmly thanked" Captain Sladen for his interference. This was very properly accepted as "a proof of

* A complete account, with the official narrative, of this mission, will be found in General Fytche's valuable and beautifully got up work, "Burma, Past and Present"—a work containing more general information than any other we have read on the subject of Burma.

the friendly relations which were growing up between the British Government and the King of Burma." But yet there was room for suspicion that a good deal of Machiavelli hovered about this sort of conduct; and, perhaps, Mengdon would not have made a bad Chin-Indian model of a "Prince" for the great Florentine to work on! Truly, "the present state of political relations with Burma" had "no connection whatever with the old diplomacy of the eighteenth century." The voyage of the mission was made in two steamers, the "Nemesis" and "Colonel Phayre," and leaving Rangoon on the 20th of September, they arrived at Mandalay, seven miles above Amarapura—which old capital, with Ava, they passed on the left bank of the river—on the 7th of October. It almost seemed as if the gallant new Chief Commissioner had gone with his "Nemesis" to avenge the insults offered to his great predecessor by the King in not acceding to his requests! However that may be, the reception was a brilliant one. Mandalay had, for this occasion, cast away her bloody garments, and put on holiday costume. The Envoy was of opinion that Mengdon was "one of the most enlightened monarchs that ever sat on the Burmese throne," but, since his accession to the throne, he had been educated in a political school "perhaps the worst in the world." He boasted that he had never ordered an execution since his reign began, but left it all to his ministers; the Envoy was likewise of opinion that the King's reign had not been disgraced, like his predecessors', by wanton atrocities and wild excesses. The natural question then comes to be, From whom did King Theebau learn his jovial and severe lessons of drinking and murder? The King asked the Envoy for arms and steamers, "on which point, as he had been informed on several previous occasions by Sir Arthur Phayre, the English Government was inclined to be liberal." He wished to guard against rebellion; but, as a selfish Buddhist potentate, he cared nothing for the "well-being of his subjects." This hardly agrees with our ideas of an "enlightened" king.

After a discussion about the steamers required, when His Majesty was informed by Colonel Fytche that there were many varieties of steamers suitable for river navigation, the King said—"I also want eight thousand rifles; you have already assented to my having two thousand, which I am now getting from Dr. Williams; and if you let me have eight thousand more, I shall have ten thousand men well armed with rifles, and they will always remain near me at the capital."

To this Colonel Fytche replied, "that the rifles could be furnished, but that the kind of rifle wanted should be settled."—After some remarks on smooth-bores and breech-loaders, the King turned on his sofa to leave, saying, with a political sagacity which even Napoleon or Talleyrand might have envied, "Sladen, I am sorry you have been sick. I shall send you something to-morrow to make you well," and with that withdrew.* Could any Sovereign of the West have shown more courtesy than this?

The weak point in the treaty duly signed on the occasion of this mission, and which treaty had great mercantile advantages in largely increasing our exports to Upper Burma, is the latter portion of the eighth article, in which it is stated that "the Burmese Government shall further be allowed permission to purchase arms, ammunition, and war materials generally, in British territory, subject only to the consent and approval in each case of the Chief Commissioner." Had the Calcutta Secretariat—we presume the Foreign Office—before the ratification of the treaty, suggested some more stringent

* See vol. ii. p. 274. A copy of the signed treaty will also be found, with the Official Narrative, in the Appendix to "Burma, Past and Present." The eighth article of the treaty runs thus:—"In accordance with the great friendship which exists between the two Governments, the subjects of either shall be allowed free trade in the import and export of gold and silver bullion between the two countries, without let or hindrance of any kind, on due declaration being made at the time of import or export."

wording, or, what might have been better still, struck out the latter portion of the article altogether, leaving, without expressing it, the question entirely to the Chief Commissioner's good will and discretion, we respectfully venture to think that King Mengdon's mind would have been relieved from some doubt on the subject of arms. John Bull in his policy, East and West, too frequently injures himself by an excess of good nature. To have made obtaining arms conditional on a time of peace, also, would not have done; for it is just in these so-called times of peace in Burma and China, as in a few enlightened countries of Europe, that war and rebellion may be nigh at hand! It is the old, sad story; we need not seek it, but, until some radical change takes place in the relations of States, we must continue to be prepared for war!

We are not aware that the King ever got all the arms or stores he wanted; perhaps he had not the money to purchase them; but, some seven or eight years ago, after the expedition to the Looshai country, the present writer remarked elsewhere that our difficulty with regard to a then probable outbreak in Upper Burma was not lessened by a knowledge of the fact from Mandalay, that in order to put down local disturbances, and perhaps be able to resist the Chinese, the Russians, or the English, the King of Burma was "very anxious to arm his soldiers with rifles, and obtain rifled cannon" (1872). Had Mengdon been on the throne at the present time, he might have had more fear than ever as to China, on hearing of the restoration of Kuldja—which the Czar never had any right to take away—the adjustment of the so-called Russian Western Mongolian frontier—the forced payment of five millions of roubles to Russia by the Chinese, and the possibility of a Chinese army descending on Upper Burma to make up the losses sustained by the Celestials from Russian intrigue! On the other hand, it was believed that his successor had formed an alliance with China.

Let us, while writing at the end of September 1879—having just heard of a desperate outbreak and massacre at Herat (and consequently that “key” running more risk than ever of a “Russian *coup de main*”), following so soon after the insurrection and massacre at Cābul—now return to King Theebau.

Of the early days of this Chin-Indian potentate we know little or nothing; but it may be presumed that, unlike his traditionary prototype, Gautama, he was never contemplative, but always inclined for action. It is not difficult to picture him, when sowing his wild oats, enjoying the most harrowing *pooay*—Burmese drama—taking a rare pleasure in the society of “posture girls,” and being very savage (if it be usual for princes to play) at the Burmese game of football. Determined to prove himself a worthy descendant of his grandfather, King Tharawadi, at the commencement of his regal career, he was said to “habitually carry about the spear with which his savage relative was wont to deal out death to those of his attendants, ministers, or menials who displeased him.” Like Tharawadi, he was well educated, and at one time liked the English. The person of the King of Burma is thus described:—“He is little over twenty, and has been barely four months on the throne” (February 1879). “He is a tall, well-built, personable young man. He is very fair in complexion, has a good forehead, clear steady eyes, and a firm but pleasant mouth. His chin is full and somewhat sensual looking, but withal he is a manly, frank-faced young fellow, and is said to have gained self-possession, and left the early nervous awkwardness of his new position with great rapidity.”

He was by some considered to have a strong will of his own, was not always the victim of his ministers, and showed no fondness “for any diminution of the royal prerogative.” Here we have some good materials for a king; but we know appearances to be deceitful. After the death of the old King (October 3rd), it was the opinion in Mandalay that the accession of King Thebau was entirely due to harem intrigue. The Nyounge-

yan Prince was the favourite in the succession. Mengdon had desired it, and his election would have given satisfaction to the people ; but the Nyoungyan Prince was married, which at that time was his misfortune. "The mother of the ladies who have the honour of being King Theebau's wives, intriguing with the ministers, so managed matters that the Nyoungyan Prince, and his brother, the Nyoungoke, speedily found it expedient to flee with their families from the palace. This they did, and taking refuge in the British Residency, were, after a time,* sent down to Rangoon, and thence to Calcutta." Theebau, or his mother-in-law, fortunately for them, could not induce the two princes to return to the palace. We now arrive at the first "damned spot" in the royal progress. Towards the end of February news from Burma was received in Calcutta of the commencement in earnest of a new *régime*. Instead of constitutional reforms taking place, under an educated monarch, Theebau had proved himself to be a ferocious barbarian. Over "sixty relatives" (the number was found afterwards to be exaggerated), male and female, of the late King were said to have been executed in the palace and prisons, and Mandalay had become the scene of a reign of terror. Trade was paralysed. A monster, reminding us of Nero or Caligula, had appeared on the throne of the Golden Foot. It was indeed the beginning of a terrible end, and came home, especially in Mandalay and Rangoon, to "men's business and bosoms" with a rare intensity. The British Resident at the capital, Mr. Shaw (successor to Colonel Duncan), had of course, strongly remonstrated with the King on his barbarity, and was exerting himself to prevent further murders. It was wisely considered that the Government, having its hands full with Afghanistan, would not care to precipitate a war with Burma unless British interests were directly menaced ; but it was thought that, if the King's progress were marked by similar

* About the middle of February.

brutal conduct, a collision would, sooner or later, become inevitable. The Indian Government, meanwhile, had sent instructions to the Resident "to obtain protection for the King's surviving relations." Another "fell swoop" might be expected at any moment. Although horrible to write it, still, in an age desirous of every information, it may be remarked that, according to Mongolian tradition, no blood of any member of the royal race must be spilt. "Princes of the blood are executed by a blow, or blows, on the back of the neck." Princesses are put to death by a blow in front "instead of the back of the neck." * The bodies are then sunk in the river Irawady, not "usually burnt," as remarked by another writer. On the present occasion, we believe, they were buried in a pit. To show that the Government were fully alive to the importance of the situation in Upper Burma, it may here be remarked that, additional troops being asked for, they were at once granted; and, early in March, the 54th Foot and Madras troops embarked at Calcutta for Rangoon. The whole reinforcements ordered were nearly double the ordinary strength of garrisons in British Burma. The number of victims to the King's madness was now reported to be forty, instead of eighty or sixty. At this time it was telegraphed from Calcutta (March 9th), "The Rangoon and Irawady State Railway, one hundred and sixty-one miles long, and running three trains daily each way, connects Rangoon with Prome,* whence outposts at Thayetmyo and Toungoo are distant respectively forty and sixty miles, and at Mandalay about two hundred and twenty miles. There is a

* "Burma, Past and Present," vol. i. p. 217 (*note*).

† This railway "was pushed on rapidly during 1876-77, and was publicly opened to traffic on the 1st of May 1877. It connects Rangoon and Prome, a distance of one hundred and sixty-three miles. Its opening has caused a very appreciable increase of population in the tracts through which it runs."—From an admirable "Statement" drawn up in the India Office, and ordered by the House of Commons to be printed, August 1878.

telegraph from Rangoon to Mandalay, but the line beyond the British frontier, maintained by the Burmese authorities and working irregularly, is now interrupted."

Early in March also, in reply to Earl Granville, in the House of Lords, Viscount Cranbrook, with reference to the "precautionary measure of sending reinforcements to Burma, said the telegram from the Viceroy was in these terms:—"In compliance with strong recommendation of Chief Commissioner, Rangoon, and Resident, Mandalay, we have reinforced the garrison of British Burma by two regiments Native Infantry and one British."

The situation in Burma had assumed a really serious aspect. But the extensive military preparations going on at Mandalay were not so likely to produce King Thebau's downfall as his surrounding himself with advisers known to be hostile to the British Government. As was well remarked, the ill-advised Prince, having committed a shocking outrage on humanity, appeared to be making warlike preparations, "perhaps under the delusion that he may recover Pegu." But, like most Orientals, he had miscalculated his opportunity. Still, we had now lamentable experience enough to teach us not to undervalue any enemy whatever! By the middle of March it was considered that the Chief Commissioner, with the 54th Foot from Calcutta and the 43rd from Madras, with the native regiments from both Presidencies, was able to protect British territory in the event of aggression; but the position of the Resident at Mandalay, and other Europeans there, was, doubtless, critical in the extreme. Still, some were bold enough to think that the King and his advisers were "not so utterly lost to all sense of prudence as to precipitate their own downfall by rushing into hostilities with us." The "savage madman at Mandalay" was even talked of in the streets of Lahore. From that quarter we first learned that at Thayetmyo there was already a field battery, and at Toungoo a mountain battery, while a garrison battery was ready to take up the equipment

forwarded. There would, therefore, be no lack of field artillery, "while the defensive works at both the above outposts, as well as at Rangoon, were well armed and manned." Having again mentioned Toungoo, the present writer is led to think of twenty-five years ago, when, not long after we had taken possession of the now rising town, he was suddenly ordered to proceed with his detachment of artillery (guns and rockets) to the northward. An advanced infantry force, under Captain Geills, had met with determined opposition—the commanding officer was mortally wounded—while the frontier line was being marked out, some forty miles from Toungoo.* We then heard of a strong stockade at Ramathayu, another forty, or perhaps sixty, miles further north. This post must be the same as Yemethen, in the maps of the present day, or Ramethen; and, in the event of a column invading Upper Burma from Toungoo, it would only have to proceed direct north to Yemethen, and thence, in the same direction, passing Ava and Amarapura, to Mandalay—about two hundred and fifty miles, or less. With the flotilla of attack from Prome or the frontier town of Meaday, and the advance from Toungoo resolutely performed, King Theebau, should he give us trouble, would find himself in a critical position. This slight digression from the royal progress may be excused on the plea that "the King is still drinking!"

Later news informed us that King Theebau was constructing fortified works, and making various warlike preparations; also that the Burmese inhabitants of Rangoon had been summoned to return to their own country. Non-compliance with this order was to be punished by the execution of their families! The "Times of India" remarked, regarding the recent massacre:—"It is strange that, when the people of Mandalay carry their indignation against the atrocities of the King to

* See "Pegu," p. 407.

the length of expressing their desire for British intervention, and the slaughter of so many influential personages must have alienated the ruling classes, a revolution does not break out." And again, at the conclusion of the summing up—This butchery "of the butcher's own relations is an atrocity fully equalling any recorded in history, and shows to what frightful lengths unlimited and irresponsible power may carry a human being."

At the time of recording this progress (September 1879), and the period of our Cabul troubles—which, through the determination of the Indian Government and the valour of our troops, must be only temporary—it is of interest to think of what the King said to Mr. Archibald Forbes,* on his visit, early in the year, to the Burmese Court. "Whence does he come?" asked the Golden Foot, at the interview. "From the British army in Afghanistan, engaged in war against the Prince of Cabul," replied Dr. Williams, the interpreter. "And does the war prosper for my friends the English?" "He reports that it has done so greatly, and that the Prince of Cabul is a fugitive." Theebau may, before this last question, have been thinking even of the Afghans as allies; for, strange to say, history records that sixty-five years ago the Burmese asked the Sikhs in the far north-west to co-operate with them in driving the British out of India! The King made a remarkable speech during the above interview, which makes us think of the truthful saying, that "the Devil can cite scripture for his purpose." One of the ministers being absent, Theebau asked where he was. On being told, it being "Court day," he was in Court, the King replied, in quite a Charles-the-Twelfth fashion, "It is well. I wish the ministers to make every day a Court day, and to labour hard to give prompt justice to suitors, so that there be

* The well-known correspondent of the "Daily News." This important visit is quoted in the "Homeward Mail," March 29th, 1879.

no complaint of arrears." The "law's delay" was a more fearful crime, in the eyes of Theebau, than murder! O, poor Human Nature, what variety there is in thy composition! Had King Theebau moved in another sphere, unshackled by "Burman custom," his progress would have been different, and he might have become a fair specimen of an Eastern ruler! With reference to a remark of the Russian "Golos" in March last, that our first negotiations for peace in Afghanistan were due to "military disasters," one of our best public writers thought that in all the lucubrations of the "Golos" it seems to have been overlooked that, with the prospect of another Burmese war before us, in addition to South African military requirements, prudential motives, and not the prowess of the Afghans, would suggest some sort of compromise with their ruler." He concludes in the following remarkable strain:—"As regards the finances of India at the present moment, a war with rich Burma would certainly be more agreeable than a financially barren victory in Afghanistan." Notwithstanding assurances to the Resident of future tranquillity, the King appears to have gone on fortifying Mandalay, and, doubtless, to have gone on drinking. 'A Burmese Envoy (or Agent) also had been despatched to the Indian Government. It seemed that there was as yet "no good ground for interference." The Viceroy would only think of war as "a last resource," and even then, with our hands so full, that "last resource" might be delayed, to the heartfelt regret of Rangoon, Calcutta, Glasgow, and other commercial centres. That something would have to be done ere long was undeniable. Trade was at a comparative standstill, and there was no security for peace in British or Lower Burma while Upper was ruled by such a very strange sovereign as King Theebau. In the event of military operations, it was remarked—"Nothing like the protracted struggle of the two former Burmese wars need be anticipated, for it seems clear that King Theebau has completely alienated the affections of his subjects, and an invading army (British force) would be re-

ceived with welcome, as a new era of prosperity would dawn on Burma were Thebau dethroned and the Nyoungyan Prince (a refugee in Calcutta) established in his place and made a feudatory of the Indian Government." The King was reported to fear some such action on our part, and had despatched secret agents to Calcutta to assassinate the Nyoungyan Prince. Surely such an instance was never heard of before, that of a somewhat talented young sovereign rushing so madly on his fate. It was, indeed, a royal progress with a vengeance!

In one of his drunken fits he might attack us, if not first attacked by us. Such may have been his intention. But, of the reinforcements arrived at Rangoon, it was pleasing to learn that two thousand men, European and Native, with a small naval brigade from H.M.S. "Wild Swan," had been despatched to the frontier. It was not intended to send any ultimatum to the King of Burma. The policy seemed to be to wait for the movement of the Burmese troops massing at Meuhla, some thirty miles above our frontier. About the end of March, intelligence was received that a deceitful quiet prevailed at Mandalay; and King Thebau, since the despatch of reinforcements, was reported to be in a conciliatory mood. The Burmese ministers were uneasy, as well they might be; and, to make matters worse, Theinnee, the chief of one of the Burmese tributary (Shan) states, was contumacious, and disregarded the order of the head that wore a crown, summoning him to Mandalay. In the first week of April the situation was "practically unchanged." But some four thousand of the King's troops were stated to be on his side of the frontier.

It was alleged that King Thebau had sent a mission to Peking, acknowledging the suzerainty of China (of which he is a vassal), and invoking help against us. Trade at Mandalay continued paralysed, and anxiety regarding the safety of the Europeans there continued unabated. The Nyoungyan Prince, as if to profit by the situation, had gone to Rangoon in disguise; but he was detected, and promptly shipped back by the

Chief Commissioner (Mr. Aitchison) to Calcutta. Complications on the frontier were reported, in consequence of some powerful chiefs (we believe Shan) having declared that they would no longer pay any allegiance to the King of Burma. Mr. Shaw's steamer was lying, with steam up, in constant readiness for his departure, "in case of necessity." It was thought that, in the event of his departure, the Burmese war vessels at Menhla might intercept the Resident. The British Government had proclaimed that it desired no rupture, and would permit none, "unless forced by overt acts of insult or aggression."

The trading community at Calcutta, "with characteristic impatience," were anxious for definite action. The remaining events of some importance, early in April, chiefly consisted in arrangements for King Theebau's coronation, and the fact of several Shan chiefs, who had visited his Majesty, having been thrown into prison. The brave Shans,* it was thought, previously disaffected, would rise to a man. This would be a most telling point in our favour, in the event of future operations. If we can only secure the loyalty of the Shans, we become at once, in a great measure, the masters of Upper Burma.

* We have great faith in the Shans; and the heroism of the Shan ladies—to which allusion has already been made in the First Burmese War—is perfectly captivating. In addition to what has been said of their military ardour, two little incidents are worth recording. The fearless Amazons fought with their *chobwas* (chiefs) and petty princes, as has been noticed, against us in the first war. They were not only credited with the gift of prophecy and fore-knowledge, but with the possession of the miraculous power of turning aside the balls of the English. One of them, before Prome, received a fatal bullet in the breast, but the moment she was seen, and her sex recognised, the soldiers bore her from the scene of death to the rear, where she expired. Another of them was observed flying on horseback with "the defeated remnant of her people," but before she could gain the opposite bank of the river, a shrapnell shell exploded above her head, and she fell from her horse into the water; "but whether killed or only frightened," writes Major Snodgrass, "could not be ascertained."

By the middle of April several steamers were in readiness at Thayetmyo to convey our troops beyond the frontier in the event of war. New ministers were in the ascendant; and, although the Burmese Government "wished for peace," it declined to settle the "shoe question." This has long been a *vexata questio* in Burma and other countries of the East; and would be settled at once if we could only get them to understand that, although "Burman," it is not European "custom." On the conclusion of the first war, while Mr. Crawford's mission was at Ava, Captain Lumsden of the Bengal Horse Artillery, could not get his boots to come off, so was allowed to enter with them on. A horse artillery man without his boots (they wore jacks and leathers in those days) is almost as deficient a picture as a Golden Foot without his golden umbrella (*tee*), or a bishop without his lawn! The cultivators of the soil were now leaving, and no preparations were being made for sowing the crops. Never was Upper Burma in a worse state. Chaos was everywhere. Large masses of Burmese soldiery were said to be moving towards our frontier garrison of Toungoo, which was about to be reinforced.

Looking at the matter boldly, there can be no doubt that Burmese policy has always been hostile to England. Mengdon wished it to be known that he was entirely independent of the British, notwithstanding the loss of Pegu; and "at Rome and at Teheran, by his embassies, let it be clearly known he was anxious to obtain outside help."

Italians and Frenchmen at Mandalay have had their share of royal favour. If we do not, for the sake of peace in Eastern Asia, so effectually settle Upper Burma—if possible, without annexation*—before very long, Russians, and even Germans (on account of China) will probably be found "doing business" at the capital of the Golden Foot! There is a great game of

* It has been well said that if the late king had possessed a seaport, war would have occurred long ago. "We should have had to choose between the annexation of Upper Burma and a foreign protectorate."

chess being played all over the world; and Britannia must not allow herself to be checkmated.

We now return to King Theebau. Although twenty-five thousand men were reported to be on the Burmese frontier, there was a more pacific feeling at Mandalay, in producing which the terrible heat of the weather probably had the chief effect. Murders had been discontinued, owing to the energy of our Resident and of the Italian Consul. The number of executions, therefore, had fallen far short of that originally intended "by the bloodthirsty tiger, Theebau." From conversations with Burmese it was ascertained that the King had prepared a list of one hundred and fifty victims, "and had even gone into the details of those who should be killed on such and such a night." Of the royal family alone—wives, sons, and daughters of the late King—no less than forty-five persons were said to have met their fate. The people at the capital were beginning to discover that their property and lives were at the mercy of "a barbarous despot." With reference to previous remarks in this summary, it may be stated that a shrewd writer, on hearing that King Theebau had informed his counsellors that heretofore fear had prompted his yielding to the English demands, and that henceforth he would neither hear nor speak of proposals for an accommodation with England,* declared:—"It is all very well to ridicule the 'Golden Foot' when, seemingly playing the rôle of Macbeth, he determines to hang all that talk of fear, but this sudden change may not be the result simply of a tyrant's whimsicality. It looks rather as though he had just received 'Celestial' promptings, and it might not be difficult after all to connect a sequence of events which at present seem far apart." Theebau might prove to be the tool of "a greater potentate" already becoming conspicuous as the "third factor" in Asian affairs. By the end of April, information was received in London that the

* This assertion was afterwards officially denied by the Burmese Ministers.

Secretary of State for India had sanctioned the finally-revised estimate for the Rangoon and Prome Railway, which made provision for six additional miles of branch line; but, while civilisation in Lower Burma was thus becoming so apparent, in the Upper country affairs were in a strange condition. The King had been "drinking heavily"—what he had been drinking we are not informed;—power was slipping back into the hands of late King's advisers; and warlike preparations in Mandalay had ceased, doubtless from the effects of the never-ending royal indulgence. The King, it was said, never appeared in public. But still our diplomatic relations, through Mr. Shaw (appointed a second-class Resident), were being conducted with every courtesy, in the ordinary forms. This was but a poor consolation, while humanity and commercial enterprise were both suffering so wrongfully. So long as Theebau sat on the throne the peace of Burma was sure to hang by a thread; while the unfortunate British mercantile community conceived the bitterest dislike for the Burmese Government, "so hostile to all measures for developing the resources of the country."

Early in May, King Theebau was "still drinking"; the Prime Minister was out of favour; and the masses—perhaps with a meaning which the King did not think of—were for war.

The King was brooding over some scheme of revenge for the rebellious attitude of his maternal grandfather, the Theinnee Chief; and the Theinnee Shan tribes were in open rebellion. There was little, if any, actual change in the position. The following is a good story current at this time:—When the news of the Zulu affair (Isandula) reached Mandalay, Theebau, in a drunken fit, issued orders to invade British Burma *via* Prome, and to take Rangoon! Government, and the reinforcements, were too quick for him, when he said he was only making preparations to resist his enemies, the Shans!

At Mandalay the King's troops were being constantly drilled; and it was considered almost certain that Theebau had killed the young son of the Theinnee Princess, "because of the re-

bellion of her brother and other members of the Theinnee Shan tribes." Other murders were reported to have taken place; but the exact truth was not known. However, one thing was evident, that King Theebau's progress in massacre—contemplative as well as actual—was very considerable. "King still drinking—trade at a standstill," even in the middle of May, was the standard telegram; and it was also affirmed that General Elmhirst, an officer of repute, commanding a division in the Madras Presidency, would take the command of an expeditionary force for Upper Burma, in the event of war. We were then, as now, of opinion, that officers who had a good local acquaintance with Burma should be utilised as much as possible in any contemplated operations. Of these a large number could be found, ready at a moment's notice, to further the glory and promote the interests of Great Britain in Chin-India.

King Theebau's progress had now assumed a new phase: he had prohibited all Europeans (foreigners) from entering the palace walls under any pretext whatever. More surrounding tribes* were in open rebellion, and there was a steady secrecy hanging over everything taking place within the palace. Nothing, it seemed, could exceed the uncertainty of our relations with Mandalay. None could predict what "act of ignorant violence" the King might commit if he remained under the influence of the party compromised by the massacres.

Towards the end of May, Mr. Shaw had a long meeting with the Prime Minister; the King, however, was summoning fresh levies, which removed all hope that the crisis would pass away. The cultivators between Prome and Thayetmyo were reduced to a state of desperation. There were no workmen to get the fields ready, or to sow the grain. A cloud seemed to hang over all; but yet it was believed (doubtless with good reason)

* It was said, the Bha^{ka} Kachin (Kakhyen) tribes. The Kakhyens form a very large tribe, and are warlike when roused. Their territory extends from the Irawady to China, and from Bamo to Thibet.

at Simla, that affairs were more settled in Upper Burma. A telegram at the end of May brought the intelligence that the King had determined upon war ever since the Resident's remonstrance as to the massacres, and his threat to lower his flag and leave the capital if any more were committed. It was now undoubted that the Theinnee Prince was murdered, and that his mother had been tortured, if not actually slain. It was also said that, although there had been no more "whole-sale massacres," several cases of individual murder had taken place, generally by starvation or slow torture.

It will now be of interest to relate that the remonstrance of the Italian Government "against the Burmese massacres and shocking atrocities," which had horrified the world, was most keenly felt by the Burmese Government. Italy was the only country which had formally acknowledged King Theebau and "the ministers had hoped for her support against the British Government!" King Theebau's progress in alienating himself from the entire civilised world appeared to be most rapid. It is hard to believe that, towards the end of the nineteenth century, we should be writing about such a Burmese Caligula. The famous horse of the Roman Emperor, which he styled "High Priest" and "Consul," and which, adorned with pearls and splendid trappings, he kept in a hall of ivory, has at length found a counterpart in the White Elephant* of the Golden Foot, both of which noble and sagacious animals their masters equally disgraced.

Caligula and Nero died about the age of thirty—the former, as every schoolboy knows, having been assassinated, and the latter having killed himself to avoid a shameful death. If King Theebau's jovial fits go on as steadily as hitherto, the pro-

* Held in extraordinary veneration by the Burmese and Siamese—the King and his people deeming it inauspicious to be without one. For an excellent account of this "sacred" animal, see "Burma, Past and Present," vol. i. pp. 249-50.

gress towards destruction will soon be ended; and, like Addison's rake, he will die of old age at 'two-and-twenty! The Government of India might then be saved all further anxiety and trouble in remonstrance by placing (under certain conditions) either 'the Nyoungyan Prince or the Lunbin Prince, son of the War Prince (elder brother of Mengdon), who was killed in the rebellion of 1866, firmly on the throne! The last we heard of the "Lunbin" was that he 'was at Rangoon, studying English. There are, therefore, hopes yet for Upper Burma; but at present we must go back to King Theebau.

"Jolly Jñe," as Spenser hath it, found the King "still drinking." It was announced that he had sent letters and presents to the Viceroy, and asked for a personal interview; but it seemed doubtful whether his subjects would allow him to remain on the throne, or not. The same informant announced that his ministers had left off visiting him, and that his troops were "a mere rabble." The latter remark was highly silly and impolitic, and leads soldiers to undervalue an enemy. After our sad experiences, we should call not even the worst troops "mere rabble"!

For an Eastern or an African campaign, we should even be better prepared for an enemy, with whom Nature makes up for the want of Science, in men, material, and especially the Intelligence department, than if we were going to fight a highly civilised European power. This is the only true philosophy of war in such a vast and splendid Empire as ours!

The mother of the Nyoungyan Prince was heavily ironed; and the King was so terribly violent that none of the ministers dared to approach him. In British Burma, the merchants of Rangoon had memorialised the Chief Commissioner in reference to Burmese affairs. They alleged the existence of "an extraordinary stagnation of trade consequent upon the uncertainty of our relations with Upper Burma, and the insecurity caused by the large additions to the military force on the frontier.

They represented that the trade to Mandalay had, "since the massing of the troops, declined more than half a million," and that there was a decrease in the value of goods cleared at Rangoon for Lower Burma of "a million and a half." It was difficult to imagine "a more disastrous state of affairs." The matter was to be laid, without loss of time, before the Indian Government.

The King was considered to be seriously alarmed at the approach of our troops to his frontiers; and he had appointed "a lot of savage ruffians as his body-guard." Formerly youths of high rank used to hold the office; so the change had greatly annoyed the better class of people. Having had a fresh list of all connected with the royal blood submitted to him, it was naturally believed that he projected another massacre, at no distant period. But it was all set down to the stern fact that Theebau was "still drinking." "What a god-send," wrote an ever lively, instructive, and witty military journalist, "this royal 'horrid example' will be for the tectotal lecturers!"—As we before said, drinking and murder going hand in hand together!

It will naturally occur to every English reader, who has honoured these pages with a perusal, that the position of the British Resident at Mandalay, throughout so many escapades of King Theebau, must have been a very responsible as well as a very difficult and harassing one—calculated to spoil the best temper, and wear out the strongest constitution.

From Simla it had been announced that the Agent despatched by the King, with letters and presents to the Viceroy, had arrived; but his request for a personal interview could not be granted. The conduct of the Mandalay Court in requiring our Resident to submit to certain "undignified ceremonials" would never do; and his visits to the King had been, therefore, suspended. King Theebau had evidently lost his best friend. The difficulty was said to resemble that overcome in China; but where the Emperor of China yielded, the com-

paratively petty potentate of Upper Burma held out. Preparations were still in progress for the coronation of the King. On the 15th of June the amiable, energetic, and accomplished Resident breathed his last. His death was said to proceed from heart disease,* doubtless brought on, or aggravated, by too much worry and anxiety. Like a true soldier, Shaw died at his post, with harness on his back; and, although his end was not surrounded by a halo of tragical heroism, as in the instances of Sir Alexander Burnes and Sir Louis Cavagnari, at Cabul, still England lost in him a most worthy son, "a distinguished explorer, and trustworthy representative of the Indian Government in intercourse with border potentates, requiring tact and personal influence."

Reports of fresh massacres of royal princes were said to have reached the Indian Government. The coronation of King Theebau had passed over without any disturbance. It was now discovered that the King of Burma had been prosecuting "certain intrigues and encroachments" in the Karennee country, inconsistent with the special treaty made in 1875 regarding that important tract of "debatable border-land."

In addition to the late massacres, the "Rangoon Times" correspondent had gathered "from a reliable source" that "the poor mad Prince of Chabin had been put to an ignominious death, having undergone kicking and slapping for several years. It was said that like his grandfather, Tharawadi, he had tried to render himself "invisible"! *Pooays* were numerous; and a royal lottery, encouraging gambling, had been established since early in May. There were numerous royal lottery shops; and the Royal Rake's progress now appeared to be advancing at a more rapid pace than ever.

At the end of June we read that King Theebau's second

* Afterwards stated to be rheumatic-fever.

queen had succeeded in inducing him to degrade his chief queen, her elder sister.

An adventurer, who was for some time in King Mengdon's service, informed the public that this sovereign was "very anxious on the subject of ironclads and fortifications," and projected iron-works,* "from the furnaces for the smelting of ore, down to the mills for rolling the armour plates." But nothing was done. The city of Mandalay was also described :—"The city, with the palace in the centre, forms a square, and is surrounded by four brick walls, each wall being three-quarters of a mile long and twenty feet in height; nine feet thick at the base, finishing off at the top to three feet, all the slope of the walls being inside, where earth is also packed up to a height of about twelve feet. There are three entrances on either side, and the twelve great doors are shielded on the outer side by blocks of brickwork. These walls are again surrounded by a moat fifty feet wide, the inner edge of which is about thirty-five feet from the city walls. The city, with its walls and moat, is considered by the Burmese impregnable."†

It was pleasing to hear that the Burmese conducted themselves very well on the sad occasion of Mr. Shaw's death, and the funeral was largely attended. The deceased Resident had formerly been British Agent at Ladakh, and his knowledge of Central Asian affairs was very considerable. Colonel Horace Browne, of the Pegu Commission, had left Rangoon to take charge of the Residency at Mandalay, till the arrival of Mr. Shaw's succe o

* See page 373.

† For a most interesting and useful description of the present capital, varying, in some respects, from the above, see General Fytche's "Burma, Past and Present," vol. p. 250-254. The plan of the wall of the city of Mandalay, with its crenated top, flanking buttresses, and parapet, strongly resembles the great wall of China.

‡ Mr. St. Barbe, who had succeeded Mr. Cooper at Bhamo, acted till Colonel Browne's arrival.

Early in July, the British public were furnished with a most graphic account of an important military review at Mandalay. It must be kept in mind that the whole force of the Burmese army is generally concentrated at the capital, and at this time it was believed that "the actual influence of the King and his Court did not extend beyond a radius of fifty miles round, and a few miles on either side along the banks of the Irawady." The "Grand Review of Burmese Troops in Mandalay" was, doubtless, a most important local event; but for any purposes of war, of course, it was utterly useless, and no idea of Burmese warfare can be formed except when the enemy are in their jungles or behind their stockades. The ludicrous incidents of this review, at which some five or six thousand men were present, were admirably brought out by the writer*; and, like too many effusions of our highly gifted "Specials" of this railroad age, they deserved a more permanent place than in the ephemeral columns of a journal. From the terrace of Signor Andreino's residence, the view is described as "charming enough." "On our left front on the other side of the city was Mandalay hill, with its white pagodas (reached from the surrounding level by great staircases ornamented with colossal dragons) shining among the emerald vegetation. In the distant east the Shan Hills, gently rounded, lay in a purple shade. On the right rose a jagged peak, which local superstition avers to be the wild abode of the 'nats,' or evil spirits. At our feet was the city wall with its embroidered crest of notches, from behind which rose the roofs of the King's palace, and peaked kyoungs and pagodas innumerable; and then there was the splendid moat, with its brilliant green mantle of lotuses, decorated here and there with the large white flowers that are the true Buddhist's veneration and delight." Such description as

* Special Correspondent of the "Standard," dated May 20th, in issue of July 2nd, 1879.

this would do credit to the pen of a Warburton or a Kinglake. Most of the Marines, he observed, were armed with rifles.* One company had the dhá, "the national knife, which is almost the same as that terrible weapon of the Afghans, the charah." Among the extraordinary costumes, he observed the "gilded hats," worn by "spear-men,"—many of which kind (worn by the King's troops) we picked up at the capture of Rangoon. Signor Andreino (the Italian Consul) had received two letters conveying King Humbert's congratulations on Theebau's accession to the throne. But, at the same time, the Burmese ministers were informed that the late massacres had excited horror throughout the civilised world, and especially in Italy. Although the steamers of the Irawady flotilla at Mandalay, for a time, had left off their "banked fires"—ready in case of rebellion—King Theebau was said still to continue in his dangerous "mad lunes"!

Colonel Horace Browne was now the hero of the hour at Mandalay. On his arrival,† towards the end of June, he had been escorted to the Residency by several Burmese officials, and visits of ceremony were paid him by a few of the grandees of the Court. But no apparent change seemed to have come over the murderous spirit of King Theebau, or that of his executive. No sooner did we hear of the new Resident's arrival, than more massacres by the King were reported to have taken place. This time the victims were the cousin of Nyoungyan, and two sons of Paghan Myoza, supporters of the refugee princes. They had been sentenced to imprisonment in Mogoung, the Burmese Siberia. "Murder," it was said from Rangoon, "was the easier means of riddance."

* The musket was first introduced into the Pegu and Ava countries by the Portuguese. The stout Burman, with his dhá and Martini-Henry, may yet fight on our side in Upper Burma!

† Strange to say, his gun and sword were detained at the Custom-house on this occasion, for a short time, "though foreigners are allowed to land these ordinarily without a pass."

Rangoon, and of course Calcutta, considered the situation extremely unsatisfactory. But, by some, it was thought that matters were improving as regarded the chance of peace. All reports, however, were very conflicting. At first it was said that the King had commenced his extensive military preparations in "terror of the consequences of his barbarity"; and yet, no sooner had the new Resident arrived than more murders were reported. It seemed clear that the Golden Foot was not troubled with that active moral check and companion in life—a conscience!

Cholera, our Indian "Angel of Death," had at length "spread his wings on the blast" at Thayetmyo; and there was some alarm, owing to the crowded state of the troops. The excellent sanitary movement of forming a cholera camp on the other side of the river was at once adopted. While marching in India, we have found crossing a river, at all hazards, prove a valuable check to cholera. This would seem to argue in favour of the disease being of a local character; and, in the early stages, change or movement should, therefore, take place at once.

The King had said that nothing would induce him to agree to a settlement of "the shoe question." We have before touched on this point. It does seem eminently absurd, the political officer of Her Majesty the Empress of India appearing before the Golden Foot without his shoes! Life is too short for such useless etiquette, so we must just make the "Lord of Earth and Air" stoop a little to civilisation, and "the force of circumstances." We recollect being shoeless (or rather bootless) during the year of the great Mutiny (1857), when present at the installation of the Nizam (*lit.* putter in order) of the Dekhan, at Hyderabad. The Mussulmans in the grand audience hall, while apparently keeping the pressing crowd back with their sticks, in case of our being forcibly pushed too near the *guddee* (cushion or throne) of His Highness, had little regard to the safety of our boots, which were eventually

found with some difficulty; while a gallant horse-artilleryman, we believe, lost his helmet altogether. Should, by any chance, King Theebau reform, we trust that he will turn his strict attention to this important question.

Not long after the King's "homicidal fit," disturbances occurred in the country between Mandalay and Bhamo; but the officials and populace at the capital were so much engaged with State lotteries, that the fact of several of the King's servants having been killed, while collecting unusually heavy taxes, caused no sensation. Human life, or, "flesh and blood," had become very "cheap" at Mandalay.

At the end of July, it was said that a rectification of the British frontier in the direction of Thayetmyo was looked for at no distant date; the Shans near Bhamo were quiet; and it was rumoured that the very wise step of removing the British Residency at Mandalay to a more secure site had been determined on. The Resident's guard was also to be largely increased.

At this time public attention in Russia was devoted to the future relations between that Empire and China. The "development of commercial relations for the benefit of Russian trade," was the leading cause. As Russia trades with China mainly, if not solely, by land, it was demanded that similar privileges as have been accorded to "maritime trade" with China should be granted to "trade carried on by land." Perhaps most Englishmen wish that we would keep a stricter watch over the *Nunquam dormio* policy of Russia in the East. Like the science of geology, it never rests—its law is progress.

In Asia we had now obtained our "scientific frontier," and a vote of thanks was accorded to our victorious army in Afghanistan by both Houses of Parliament. There might now be time to look after a "scientific frontier" for Burma.

It was remarked in London that things were becoming "very 'red' in Mandalay." Perhaps no king was ever so earnestly watched. His "Progress" had become a sort of "household

word," and the questions, "Is he still drinking?" "Any more massacres?" resounded throughout the land. We are not aware of the authority on which a popular writer based the remark that, after the recent murders, Colonel Browne took no notice, although his predecessor, Mr. Shaw, said, on any more massacres occurring, he would haul down the British flag from the Residency and leave the capital. It was affirmed that, after the threat, some thirty princes were slaughtered, but this was an evident exaggeration. In the event of Theebau hereafter being one of our feudatories, it was interesting now to learn that, with reference to the question of disarming the native princes of India, it appeared that "twelve thousand British troops were required to watch the forty-five thousand troops of the Nizam." Holding Pegu as we do, and having the entire command of the Irawady and other Burmese rivers, about one-half of that number should suffice.

About the middle of August, some interesting information regarding Burma was received in Calcutta. It appeared there were two parties at Mandalay. The Government, or Court, and the Moderate parties—the latter party belonging to the preceding reign. The ascendancy of the Court party was shown "by the increasing attempts to isolate the British Resident." It became very questionable whether the Indian Government would long care to keep an officer of high political rank at Mandalay on such terms. It was now thought that when Colonel Browne returned to his post in British Burma, no officer of equal rank would relieve him, but that his present Assistant would carry on "the unimportant work which the system now pursued at Mandalay leaves for our Resident." The genuine and philanthropic desire of the Indian Government to keep matters quiet was steadily observable; but the King and the Court party sorely tried our patience. Their present policy seemed to be, to "evade open aggression or insult." The King, however, had made steady progress in wickedness, and at length was reported "mad through blood

and brandy." Executions and drinking-bouts continued. And it was thought that if Colonel Browne left the capital the King and Court party might be rash enough "to exceed the carefully defined limits" within which they had, so far, restrained their insolence.

Rain, during the year 1879, was by no means wanting in Burma. Up to July 13, the rainfall was 43·11 inches, when last year it was only 32·32. During one week the average was an inch a day. But even such an average appears to be considerably less than what the present writer recollects at Rangoon.*

With reference to our paper on the mineral wealth of Upper Burma, at the end of August we read that some Shans having made large sums of money by trading in sapphire and rubies from Siam, numbers of others had recently gone there from British Burma. The stones, though "inferior to those obtained in Upper Burma," were said by the Burmese to be so plentiful near Bangkok, that even women were anxious to proceed to the mines. But it was considered that the astute Siamese Government were not likely to allow foreigners many mining privileges, while they had so many subjects of their own anxious to make their fortunes.

If King Theebau did not prefer spirits to wine, living as he does among the finest rubies in the world, instead of murdering his relatives, he might be enjoying their society, governing his country well, while developing its resources, enjoying his wine in moderation, and, perhaps, occasionally breaking forth in the rapturous strain of the Persian Hafiz :—

"Boy, let the liquid ruby flow,
And let the pensive heart be glad!"

Early in September, London was startled by one of the "Latest Telegrams" (Rangoon, September 2), with most ominous headings, in large type. The British Resident had departed from Mandalay; and there was a probable ministerial conspi-

* For Meteorology of Burma, see *Addenda*, Part III.

racy against King Theebau. The rank of Resident was to be reduced. It was further said that twelve guns were mounted at Menhla, on the frontier, where there were forty thousand men.

With reference to troops sent by the King to Shwé-koo-gyee, near Bhamo, it was considered that the Red Karens had gained the day, and had "hacked, crucified, and chopped up three hundred of the royal army." It was difficult to get the Burmese soldiers to face these "wild creatures." The several tribes of Karens have been much written about, and much misunderstood. Perhaps our friend Dr. Mason knew them better than any other missionary or traveller. Although his success among them, as to conversion, was wonderful, he nevertheless speaks of them in terms of the severest depreciation. They are "a race of incorrigible liars, and as contrary as Balaam's ass. They are as cowardly as sheep, as savage as wolves, and as destitute of compassion as an alligator." To call a Burman a Karen is about the greatest insult you can offer him. They are generally considered to be a simple, docile, truth-loving people. Dr. Mason also remarks :—"I have never met a Karen, in the church or out of it, that when he had committed a wrong would not tell a falsehood to cover it." Still, with all this they are, writes Mr. St. Barbe, "a thrifty, industrious set of people, and when the English *raj* had introduced some notion of justice, order, and equal laws, they began to see that their tribal idiosyncracies, their barbarous language, and unspeakable habits, were considerable obstacles in the way of their realising these blessings to an equal extent with the Burmese and Talaings."

The Bghai tribes are usually divided into six clans, the chief of which is the Karennee or Red Karen; "so called," writes General Fytche, "by the Burmese from the colour of the bright red turban they wear; though they call themselves Kă-ya, their term for man. They inhabit the elevated plateau of Karennee (the name is equally applied to the country and

to the inhabitants), extending from the eastern slope of the Pong-loung range, immediately joining our territories on the north-east, to the right bank of the Salween river. It consists chiefly of high table-land about three thousand to four thousand feet above the level of the sea, is well cultivated, and in parts very fertile.”* Within the last hundred years we read that the Red Karens, originally under one chieftain, have split into two separate tribes, western and eastern Karennees.† “Since our occupation of British Burma,” continues the General, “the former tribe has been most friendly disposed towards the English Government, and has given every assistance in its power in keeping peace on the frontier and opening out trade; while the latter has kept entirely aloof from all communication with us, and has lately acknowledged the suzerainty of the Burmese Government.” From prudent motives in 1864, the old chief of Western Karennee was informed, in reply to his wish that we should act as protectors and governors, that we had then no desire to extend our frontier in that direction. The request was renewed in 1869 by the late chief’s two sons, when the Burmese were making encroachments on their territory, as also on Eastern Karennee, and that they would have to succumb unless assisted by the British Government. We urged the Burmese Government not to interfere in the internal affairs of Karennee. It was our wish that Western Karennee should retain its independence and nationality. Eventually, however, the Burmese Government menaced and assumed sovereignty over the hill state, which obliged our Government, in 1875, through the mission of Sir Douglas Forsyth to Mandalay, to exact a more effective guarantee. A boundary was then laid down, “between Western Karennee

* “Burma, Past and Present,” vol. i. p. 335-337.

† See Map. See also “Pegu,” Appendix X., p. 500, where some of the remarkable scriptural traditions of the Karens are cited.

and Burma, which has been formally recognised by all parties, and the autonomy of Western Karennee secured." The whole of the Karennee country may be considered of great "political as well as strategical importance." (*See map.*)

We have thought it of importance to bring forward these remarks in the present critical state of Burma, as they now become mixed up with the law of King Theebau's progress. In addition to his other troubles, the Karens were beginning to show their teeth; and it was severely remarked that "if he had not been a drunkard before, he would have been driven to the bottle now from pure distraction." He now claimed sovereignty over the Eastern Karennee country. Of course the British Government would not hear of such a claim for an instant. The independence of the Eastern half of the Karennee is no less dear than that of the Western half; and it has been well said that "to allow Burma to possess itself of Karennee would be a strategic error of the first magnitude," as, *in case of war it would enable the enemy to turn our flank, and threaten our communication between the frontier posts and the sea-ports!*"

In short, everything seemed to be tending with King Theebau to disturb the peace of our diplomatic relations, and above all, the Resident had not been treated with that respect due to his high rank. Still, the course pursued by the Government exhibited the wise caution of being "neither hostile nor friendly." This was the most dignified mode of conduct which could be pursued. If we were forced into a war, it would be only against "the blood-stained Prince, whose reign is a disgrace to humanity." It was also predicted that a British invading army would be hailed as "deliverers throughout the length and breadth of Upper Burma."

With regard to Colonel Browne's recall, it was reported from Simla that the Indian Government had given directions for him to return to his post as Commissioner in British Burma, leaving the accomplished civilian, Mr. Saint Barbe, as *Chargé d'Affaires* at Mandalay. It was again said to be considered that an

officer of junior rank would suffice for the discharge of the political routine duties in the present state of relations with Burma. Doubtless, Colonel Browne will never forget the month of August 1879 at the Burmese capital. The granaries empty; trade ruined; the people lottery-mad; the King ever drinking or seeking out a new victim; when it was forcibly written from Rangoon, that "ere long the people will have neither money nor food, and then young Theebau may well tremble!" The gallant Colonel, it was said, some time before his departure, with reference to the grain question, was nearly threatening to haul down his flag if some beneficial arrangements were not speedily come to. Upper Burma never produced "enough grain goods to support itself, and this year there was less by thousands of bushels than in any former year." Was ever a splendid country in such a sorry plight before?

London was now startled by news more serious than any we had received from Mandalay. Telegrams of the 6th and 7th September, from the Viceroy, announced the destruction, on the 3rd, of the Envoy, Staff, and Escort of the British Residency at Cabul; and our friend, the Ameer, was invoking British aid. The avenging angel was at once ordered to be got ready, in the shape of a strong force to march at once on the doomed city of treachery and rebellion. Following this sad news, it was prematurely affirmed that the British Resident in Upper Burma had left for Rangoon, fears having "grown lest King Theebau might have been tempted to follow the Cabul example."

With reference to that most important subject, the trade of Rangoon—in which Calcutta, Liverpool, Glasgow, and other great commercial centres are so much interested—Mr. O'Connor, of the Statistical Department in the City of Palaces, had recently declared that "the trade of Rangoon last year exceeded that of Madras," probably on account of the depression caused by the famine in that Presidency. It is evident, however, said Mr. O'Connor, "that RANGOON IS ONE OF THE MOST RISING

PLACES IN THE EAST, and it is quite as evident that the city of Madras is not particularly well suited for commerce, and that no great development of trade may be looked for there such as may be anticipated at Rangoon." With a King like Theebau, however, the trade of Rangoon is in a great measure crippled; and only a good and liberal ruler is wanted for Upper Burma to make Rangoon the second, if not the first, city in our Eastern Empire.

It is difficult to think how King Theebau received the news of the Cabul massacre. It was said by a good authority, "The slaughter of the British Mission has doubtless quickened Theebau's determination of putting our policy of 'repose and defence' to the test. We shall probably not contemplate a forward movement unless we are attacked; but that we shall be attacked is, in the circumstances of the case, only too probable." Truly, the very greatest forbearance at Rangoon and Mandalay was now required to avert an open rupture with the King of Burma, especially with a King so uncertain as Theebau. However, we thought that a very successful advance on Cabul might change the position in the land of the Golden Foot; and depression and ruin of trade might yet give us more anxiety than the chance of war. Again, it was thought that the "commercial interests" of Rangoon would not suffer from a war with Burma!

KING THEEBAU'S TARIFF.

At this time, the following information was of interest:—"The King of Burma has published his tariff for the Burmese year 1241. The English translation covers some twelve or thirteen folio pages. The Burmese Government is bound by treaty obligations not to levy more than five per cent. on goods which are imported from, or exported to, British Burma. The tariff, therefore, has only to give the quantity and value on which the duty is assessed. It professes to have been drawn up 'after consultation with brokers and revenue officers,' who among them seem to have forgotten nothing. Wash-hand basins, empty bottles, pills, frying-pans, onions, edible birds' nests, puff-boxes, are some of the things

included in the imports. Of the exports, the following may be noticed—walnuts, human hair, cheese, preaching-benches, dolls, brass finger-rings with mock jewels. Besides the imports from British territory, various goods 'brought in by Shans on their shoulders' are mentioned in the tariff, including ivory from across the mountains, rhinoceros' horns, camphor, silver, tigers' skin, tigers' milk, dried shrimps, peacocks' tails, gold dust, and ponies. The brokers and revenue officials must surely have been mistaken when they said that the last-named article was brought in by Shans on their shoulders."*

The situation at Mandalay was now by no means a pleasant one to contemplate. The lives of the Mission were not thought safe for a single moment. Still it would have been highly impolitic, as well as a serious matter, to have broken off diplomatic relations with the King's Court, "because of the probability that such a rupture would sooner or later end in war." It was also well said, that the withdrawal of our *Chargé d'Affaires* and suite would have been interpreted by King Theebau and his ministers as an indication of coming hostilities, and under that belief they would have done us what harm they could while opportunity offered.

It was now declared that "a settled and friendly rule, the strict observance of treaty, and the recognition of our hegemony" must form the bases of any future relations with Upper Burma. But we do not agree that these could recently have been attained "easily and effectively"—in fact they could not have been obtained at all with such an evil agent as King Theebau at the head of affairs! When the time for action comes—and we think it is nigh at hand—doubtless, the Home as well as the Indian Government will be ready. We could only hope that before such took place, the King and his dissolute advisers would not imitate the summary fashion of the Heratee mutineers at Cabul. It was curious to note in the tele-

grams from India the juxtaposition of news such as the massacre at Cabul and the Herat outbreak being almost simultaneous, and the apprehension felt regarding our Residency at Mandalay—the latter in a country so very different in every way from Persia and Afghanistan! Referring to Burma it was also published in London, at the end of September, that affairs were very critical in that part of the world, and that the Indian Government, between Cabul and Burma, was “on the horns of a dilemma.”

Early in October, “Anglo-Indian” wrote to a leading daily journal on the “Danger at Mandalay.” The writer was of opinion that “never before in the annals of British relations with an Asiatic Court had there been such an unsatisfactory condition of things as is now visible at Mandalay.” “Anglo-Indian” also said—which agrees with our previous remarks—that, “so long as the drunken and half-insane despot Theebau is supreme it is impossible to see how things can mend there.” Throughout this sketch of King Theebau’s progress, which we are now bringing to a close, perhaps our readers will be inclined to agree with the severe epithets here used towards the Golden Foot. It will be well if they only reach the Golden Ears, that the “Lord of Earth and Air” may change his mad career in time. In a few months he has done enough injury to himself and Burma to satisfy a whole line of wicked kings; so, when our troubles are over with Afghanistan, or before they are over, we shall, doubtless, see what can be done to better the condition of a hopeful people, and one of the fairest and most promising countries on God’s earth!

ANNEXATION AND NON-ANNEXATION.

WE think it will be of interest to follow up the lamentable “Progress” just related with a very few remarks on the above subjects, which to Englishmen are becoming more familiar than ever. While writing, we learn that Sir Garnet Wolseley has

solved a problem, how we may hold sway in Zululand without annexation. We trust that the solution will prove satisfactory, but still we are by no means sure that the energetic Sir Bartle Frere was wrong when he proposed annexation as the only security for the future peace of the colony. If we can get a controlling as well as a commercial power in a country we conquer, without putting the revenues into our own pockets, then, of course, annexation is unnecessary. If we cannot get these requisites to civilisation (to further which Destiny impels us forward) without annexation, then what remains to be done? We know little of Zululand, its chiefs, or its people; but, as to Upper Burma, it strikes us most forcibly that it is just one of those countries where, without annexation, in the event of a successful war, our obtaining any controlling or commercial power of a lasting, useful, and productive character, would be simply impossible. And the difficulty is greatly increased by the stern fact of Pegu having been so long a flourishing British possession, having at its command the noble Irawady and the chief ports of the old Burman Empire. One portion already annexed—let the annexation be right or wrong—the other portion, if anything were done, must follow as a natural consequence. One thing is plain; we could not annex a part of Upper Burma, and leave the rest to a reigning sovereign. The consequences of such a step would be at once fatal to peace and prosperity in British and Upper Burma.

If we conquered and left the whole to a reigning sovereign, in a short time, the work would have to be done over again. If we made the King of Burma a feudatory, with his levies, in a country of dacoits and Rob Roys of a most daring character, there would be continual local collisions, as well as with the British troops on our frontier stations in Pegu. If we partitioned out the country to chiefs, Myat-htoons would arise in abundance, and keep us in perpetual hot water. Then, again, the Shans, Karens, and other powerful tribes would be dissatisfied if we took any half measures. They would be in doubt

whom to serve. The grand sequence is, therefore, either do not act at all in the event of conquest, or, if we do act, let us put Upper Burma in exactly the same position as Pegu, Arakan, and Tenasserim. There is no fear of China. On the contrary the Chinese—keen traders as they are—and the ever-busy Shans, would welcome our appearance between Mandalay and Bhamo as a god-send, for the purposes of opening out a trade which in time would rival nearly all the commercial openings in the world ! Although, with the great Peter's traditional policy trying to extend her frontier in every direction, we have nothing to fear from the shifting character of Russian diplomacy in Asia, which is gradually working out its own destruction. This remark leads us to think of some important views expounded by Mr. Tre-lawney Saunders, in an admirable lecture delivered some years ago, and which are of especial interest at the present time:—" We should counteract Russian influence in Persia by taking a more direct interest in the affairs of that country, develop her commerce, and improve land and water communication. Then, also, if it was sound policy to convert Afghanistan into a barrier against Russian aggression, far stronger arguments could be adduced in favour of *so utilising the great Chinese Empire*. Non-aggressive and highly desirable as it has proved to be, its integrity should be maintained at all hazards. If those portions of its territory north of India should fall into the hands of Russia, we must be prepared for the consequences. The future of Mongolia, and perhaps of the world at large, might depend on the course of Anglo-Indian policy on this truly Central Asian question ! "

Again, to the question of annexation. When King Theebau's grandfather, Tharawadi, was on the throne, nearly forty years ago, supposing that Pegu had been annexed in the First Burmese War, there can be little doubt that he would have given us just cause for also annexing Upper Burma, which would very materially have altered the state of affairs at the present time. He would never have stood the loss of Rangoon, and

being deprived of all his other ports, any more than a Briton would consider his country independent if he saw London, Liverpool, and Glasgow in the hands of an enemy. Ever since the conquest of Pegu we have virtually had the entire Burmese Empire at our disposal; so even to talk of annexing now appears hardly correct. We wish peace, good government, and steady commercial prosperity in Upper Burma; and if those be not in Upper, there can be neither peace nor a thriving commerce in Lower Burma or Pegu. The one country, through the course of events, has become a part and parcel of the other, which would seem to put the word "Annexation" entirely out of the question.

It was, perhaps, some such considerations as these that kept the late King of Burma quiet. He was reported to be a great reader; and, like the intelligent and educated Mahomedan or Hindu, he took a deep interest in the passing events of the day, and mused over the stern vicissitudes of things. But Mengdon and Theebau are two very different specimens of a King: the former used his talents according to what he thought best under the circumstances; the latter abuses them, and for months has appeared to be incapable of forming any opinion whatever, except whom to kill next, or what the "proof" strength of his next draught may be! To take the country of such a ruler entirely under our charge, considering all the circumstances, would surely be a masterly stroke of policy for any government. It would be a humane, a generous act. It seems a pity now that Lord Dalhousie did not take charge of the "worthless rind" after all. For, really, partial annexation—especially where a capital always rife for rebellion is concerned—is a great mistake. You leave the root of evil in the ground while you only lop off and take care of the branches, till some fine day you behold springing up before you the "boundless Upas, the all-blasting tree," of fiendish treachery and rebellion! But, in the discussion of either policy—annexation or non-annexation—party must be left entirely out

of the question. It is simply a question of—for better or for worse?

You may as well try to put an amount of reason into the head of a strong party politician as to teach a monopolising Burmese Sovereign the principles of free trade. That great statesman, Mr. Cobden, was against the annexation of Pegu. We all know our Empire is too large already for more annexation anywhere. Conservatives and Liberals, as a rule, are now against it; and we know from Lords Beaconsfield and Cranbrook that neither annexation nor aggression, nor undue interference in the affairs of other States, is the policy of the present Conservative Government; but, in the case of Upper Burma, the Lord of Misrule now impels us forward, and as we are goaded on by “the force of circumstances,” so is he resolutely bent on his own destruction!

POSTSCRIPT.

THE LOOSHAI§S AND THE NAGAS.

At a time when so much uncertainty prevailed, in India and England, regarding the situation in Burma, it was natural for those who had given attention to that country to be struck with the intelligence, which was announced towards the end of October, that there was danger of a “Looshai rising”; and, again, that the recent revolt of the Nága hill tribes, or their rising, might “provoke the Burmese to some outrage that would render war inevitable.”* Such news tended to force on us more and more the impression that, were Upper Burma under British rule, there would be nothing to fear from Looshais, Nagas, or any other tribes in these wild quarters of

* In the middle of November, some hundreds of armed Burmans entered the Aeng Pass between Akyab and Kyouk Phyo; but they left on the appearance of the police. Still, the country between Upper Burma and our territory demands strong protection.

Eastern Asia. There would soon be no uncivilised tribes whatever to disturb our well-earned Imperial repose.

The Looshais, on our north-eastern frontier, gave us trouble in 1872; and the present writer had the temerity to assert in a London periodical that, "in the event of what has been termed 'the involuntary annexation' of those Looshai hills, wherever they are,' where Generals Brownlow and Bouchier have just been wandering, the Rajah of Munnipoor, with his men, doubtless, will ever be ready to do us good service. We think that out of the one hundred and thirty-one thousand native troops of India—or, say, out of the forty-two thousand Madrassis who were so staunch during the Mutiny, and who furnish the native garrisons of Burma—with a European regiment or two, a select force could be spared for some additional territory to strengthen our eastern frontier; and the geographical knowledge gained by the Looshai expedition will greatly tend to facilitate our movements." The grand stride of civilisation *in esse* points to this quarter of the universe, North-east, South-east, and to South-western China. China would never object when she saw the prospect of an increased trade founded, not on visionary schemes, but on the solid foundation of British Imperial progress!

In 1872 a popular writer was asked by a London map-seller whether Looshai was not an island on the coast of China! Yet it was nearly a hundred years since we first came into contact with the inhabitants of that region, and about three years before the above display of geographical knowledge we had despatched "an abortive expedition against those pests of our tea-planters in Cachar." The inhabitants of the Looshai region are termed indifferently Looshais or Kookies. They are not two separate tribes, as some suppose. The Looshai country is described as "an extensive tract of hilly country, densely covered with jungle, traversed by numerous streams and only sparsely inhabited by a semi-nomadic race of men, who pass their time alternately in rude cultivation, hunting, and internal

warfare, varied by occasional predatory incursions on territory occupied either by the British or the semi-independent States protected by them." The Looshai district is situated between $24^{\circ} 20''$ and $22^{\circ} 30''$ N. latitude, and lies north of the British province of Chittagong, south-west of the protected State of Munnipoor, south of the tea-district portion of British Cachar, and due west of the protected State of Tipperah. It is about sixty miles broad, and one hundred and thirty-five miles long. "The best way to find the Looshai country is to draw a line due east from Calcutta." At a distance of about three hundred miles this line strikes the south-eastern angle of the district in question." The inhabitants of the Looshai country are believed to be of Malay origin; but nothing can be pronounced with certainty regarding them, except that, when roused into action, they become very dangerous and troublesome neighbours, in three great tribes, numbering about twenty-five thousand; and the sooner they are *entirely* placed under British rule the better for the future peace of our south-eastern frontier.

As our Indian Empire advances, we must be prepared, especially in Eastern Asia, for local surprises, and tribal risings, which will give ample opportunity for the display of political talent, fortunately not rare in our Indian Services. Notwithstanding the new régime—which has its merits—the old spirit of Malcolm, Metcalfe, Munro, Outram, and many others, will cling to the soil, and make clever politicals, though it may not make great statesmen. Such an affair as a Nāga rising, in itself, seems of little importance; but it is just these little things that produce great results in "the stupendous whole" of our Government. A worthy and talented Commissioner is murdered; and the question comes naturally to be,—Why? And again, by the British public—always anxious to acquire knowledge—Who are the Nāgas; whence come they?

From a description of different tribes inhabiting in and around the old Burman Empire, by Howard Malcolm, "who sailed from America in September 1835, on an expedition to

explore a new field of missionary enterprise in the East," we learn that the Nágas are a numerous people on the borders of Cachar, Munnipoor, and Assam. Their country belonged partly to one and partly to the other of these States. They are called Nágas (literally "naked people") from their almost total want of dress; and they are divided into many clans or tribes, differing greatly in their measure of civilisation. "The better sort dwell in compact villages of well-built houses on high hills, and are reported to be a very handsome and athletic race, active both in agriculture and merchandise." Their religion is a rude sort of demonology, but they have little or no idea of a Supreme Being, or of the nature of the soul. Some of these tribes were—and possibly are at the present time—in the lowest state of humanity; and "Mr. Rae, of the Serampore Mission, has made extensive journeys among them and the Meekeers, and published ample and interesting details."

Some forty-three years later, Captain Forbes, in his interesting work on "British Burma and its People," says, with reference to the conquest of India by the Aryan races, and their wars with the people they found in possession:—"These non-Aryan tribes are described under various names, several of which have been identified with those so-called aboriginal tribes of the present day. Amongst these were the Nágas, who are described as having been a powerful and partly civilised people. We cannot, certainly, clearly connect these Nágas with those tribes of the same name which now occupy the East of Bengal and belong to the Tibeto-Burman family, but we may mark the coincidence."*

We are strongly inclined to think they are the very same. If not, who can they be? It is surely easier to believe in the Nága pure thus put before us, than in the idea that the White Karens of Burma and the Todars of the Neilgherries are descended from the Ten Tribes! The mysteries of mankind—

"names and natures"—are yet to be revealed. We are only just commencing the study. But our business at present is with the Nágas of our own day, on the north-eastern frontier of Assam; and it is highly probable, as has been remarked to us by a shrewd observer, that they, taking advantage of the withdrawal of our Envoy from Mandalay,* became ripe for revolt. The murder of the excellent Mr. Damant, Political Agent in the Hills, took place at Konoma, some twenty miles south-east of Kohima, which, at the beginning of the year, had been made the head-quarters of the Political Agency. Mr. Damant was one of the most promising members of the Assam Commission, and in 1876 had acted as Political Agent at Muni-púr (Munnipoor), and his political and administrative career was said to be marked by "courage, tact, and discretion." The fault on the last melancholy occasion appears to have been the want of a sufficient force at Kohima, on which position the rebels, after the murder, immediately advanced. And now, after the place has been relieved (27th October) we learn again the lesson that such uncertain posts in a wild region should be of considerable strength in men as well as material, and that a political agent's escort should always be very strong and select, composed partly of Europeans, and should never be divided.† Eventually, as remarked, Kohima, with its stockade, was relieved, and a "terrible catastrophe" probably averted. If severe measures be not adopted, we venture to think, the Nága hill tribes will yet give us much trouble, quite as much as the Looshais did some years ago. The former expedition to the Nága hills was in December 1877. About the middle of No-

* See Note, p. 426.

† We read that half the escort (of eighty sepoy) was left in the plain (Konoma) below when Mr. Damant advanced.—The relief of Kohima was entrusted to Colonel Johnstone (with two thousand Muni-púries), when some desperate fighting took place. "Showers of bullets, spears, and rocks" met our troops in each attack. Stone walls had been built by the enemy as obstructions.—Colonel Nuttall, Major Evans, and all the troops engaged did good service.

vember (1879) it was announced that Her Majesty the Queen had expressed her "heartfelt sympathy" to Mr. Damant's parents on the loss of their brave son under circumstances "exceptionally trying."—To the relatives and friends of all who die in the service of their country, nothing is more grateful than the kind and ever thoughtful expressions of the Queen-Empress.

NOTES. *

THE BURMESE ROYAL FAMILY.

Information has reached us from Burma (wrote the "Pioneer") in greater detail than we have previously received of the numerous family of the late King. The gay old monarch had during his life-time fifty-three recognised wives, by whom he had forty-eight sons and sixty-two daughters, or a nice little family of one hundred and ten children, of whom fifty-nine survived him. Of the fifty-three wives, twelve died before the King, and of the remainder two were imprisoned by him on account of their supposed complicity in plots by their children, the Meng-Gwan and Katha Princes; and two were expelled for adultery. Deducting those who died and these four, the King had, at the time of his death, thirty-seven recognised wives. Of these thirty-seven ladies one only was massacred by King Theebau. She appears to have been particularly obnoxious to him on account of her being the mother of the Mekhara Prince, a powerful rival of Theebau's. No fewer than fourteen of this lady's children and grandchildren were massacred with her; one of her grandsons had fled to Rangoon. Thirteen of the late King's wives quitted the palace either during his illness or just after his death. The remaining twenty-three wives are still in the palace, and of that number seven only are free or believed to be so. The other sixteen are in confinement more or less strict. Seven are known to be in what may be called rigorous imprisonment; some of them are in double-irons, half-starved, and not permitted to have any attendants. Out of the forty-eight sons born to the King, twenty-four died before him, leaving twenty-four alive at the time of his death. Of these twenty-four, fourteen are known to have been massacred by Theebau. Four are now alive in India, leaving only six, including the present King, alive in Mandalay. Of these six, only one beside the King is grown up. This one is the Kya-beng Prince, who is a lunatic;

and it is not certain that even he has been left alive. The other four are boys from ten to two years of age. Out of the sixty-two daughters of the late King thirty-five survived him. Four of these, all married to princes, were with their families killed by Theebau in February and March last; of the remainder twenty-one are now in confinement in the palace, nine of them being in close imprisonment.—*Sept. 1879.*

WITHDRAWAL OF THE BRITISH RESIDENT FROM MANDALAY.

This for some time expected event took place on the 6th of October, under instructions from the Indian Government. Due notice was given by Mr. St. Barbe, the Assistant-Resident, to the Burmese authorities, that he was about to quit the capital. The departure was announced by telegram from Simla on the 7th, which added:—"Since the departure of Colonel Horace Browne, the position of Mr. St. Barbe had daily become more and more unsatisfactory. The studied discourtesy with which he was treated, combined with the spirit of antagonism towards the British displayed by King Theebau and the Court party, and finally the system of espionage over the inhabitants of the Residency established by the Burmese authorities, rendered the continuance of diplomatic relations, even for routine business, impossible, and Mr. St. Barbe was accordingly instructed to leave. Notice of the withdrawal of the Residency was given to all the British subjects in Bhamo and Mandalay. Acts of barbarity continue to be committed by the Palace party." It was pleasing to know that he left without molestation for the British steamer, with the whole of his establishment. Soon after, all the English residents, with their property, and that of the flotilla were preparing to leave the capital. And so ended, for the present, our diplomatic relations with King Theebau and his Court at Mandalay! Nothing could have been more forbearing than the conduct of the Indian Government in this matter; and Mr. St. Barbe deserves credit for the true English "pluck" he displayed throughout the severe trial. The rising young Bengal civilian achieved distinction which would have been impossible as Political Agent at Bhamo. "The withdrawal of the Residency from Mandalay," we read ("Standard," 8th of October), "will involve the abandonment of the minor Residentsip which the Government of India used to uphold at Bhamo." It was thought that, excepting for information about Yunnan and the Kakhyen tribes, occasionally received, the abolition of the post would be of

little importance. However, there is certainly a great future in store for Bhamo—when British trade with South-west China becomes developed, which must be the case ere long! While on the subject of “Residents,” it is interesting to learn from General Fytche that, “in the present day the British Resident at Mandalay is (was) in direct communication with the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, without the intervention of the Chief Commissioner.” And, again, on the authority of Colonel Yule, that “King Tharawadi is said to have been much amused at the success of his efforts to extinguish the Residency, and thought it an especially good joke that the Residents somehow always got ill.” Simultaneous with the departure of the Resident, the Indian Government had ordered H.M.’s ships “Ruby” and “Wild Swan” to Rangoon.

THE POPULATION OF MANDALAY.

The Mahomedans in Burma.

We have received the following information from the most authentic source, which will constitute a valuable addition to the population statistics already given:—The number of houses in the city and suburbs of Mandalay is, in round numbers, about 12,000; and the population is roughly estimated at 65,000. We have no knowledge of the number of Mahomedans among them.

To this we may add:—It is curious to observe that, out of the 82,000 Mahomedans in Burma, the majority are the descendants of Mahomedan fathers and Burmese mothers—a strange alliance between the religion of Gautama and that taught by the Koran.—Truly, as has been well said, the whole Mussulman world—especially in India and Eastern Asia—requires from us the most serious attention at the present time, so as to avert any possible danger.

KING THEEBAU’S HEAD QUEEN.

A correspondent of the “Times of India” wrote from Mandalay:—“Extensive preparations are being made at the palace in prospect of a coming event, viz., the confinement of King Theebau’s head queen, the Soo-pyah-lat. The Phongyees (priests), Poonaks or astrologers, Baydin Sayas or fortune-tellers, have been duly consulted, and they have all unanimously come to the conclusive prediction that the new comer will be a royal son, and Theebau has declared that he shall be the Royal heir-apparent to the throne of the King of the Rising Sun, Lord of the White Elephant, the Golden Umbrella, &c. It is reported that the cradle, which has just been

completed, cost the State nearly two lakhs of rupees. The cradle was first framed with mango wood, and encased* with sheet gold inside and outside. Over this is ornamented gold-work, set with precious stones of all kinds—diamonds, rubies, sapphires, emeralds, &c., and the work is said to be very superior, as it is turned out by the best of the first-class goldsmiths of Upper Burma. The arrangements for fitting up the cradle are as follows:—A soft bed or cushion covered with green silk velvet, and the sides with embroidered work. I should have stated the manner in which the cradle was to be fixed, and how worked. A thick iron rod has been fixed across the room, some twelve feet above the floor, and the cradle is suspended by means of golden cords, made of golden wire for the purpose of swinging, and to work backwards and forwards like punkahs in your part of the world. The King objected to the old method of having the Royal cradle pulled by a parcel of old women, so the mechanical and engineering elements of his kingdom were called into requisition, and I am told that one of the Italian mechanics has invented a wind-up machine by which the cradle can be set going, once wound-up, for a day or night, or until further orders, to the great delight of the King. The Royal babe is to be nursed and brought up in the English style, and for this purpose the sum of five thousand rupees was given to one of the sisters of the convent here to purchase a complete outfit; and my informant says that the sister has faithfully executed the order, and the paraphernalia for the youth has been deposited in good time. The King and Queen are said to abhor the sight of Europeans, and of the English particularly, and yet we have the fact before us that the foregoing preparations are after the European fashion."

The belief in astrology in Burma being quite as strong as it was in Britain during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the writer of the foregoing graphic picture might, even before the advent of an infant Theebau, have introduced a Chin-Indian *Guy Mannering*, who, in his divinations regarding the future son and heir, might, taking the key from the Royal parent, have observed "that three periods would be particularly hazardous—his *fifth*—his *tenth*—his *twenty-first* year"*—about the latter age his father having ruled over Upper Burma!

* See "Guy Mannering," chap. iv.

BRITISH BURMA DIVISION.

(Adjutant-General's Office, Fort St. George, 1st July 1879.)

Head-quarters, Rangoon.

Two batteries, 8th Brigade, Royal Artillery; one company of Sappers and Miners; 89th Foot; 24th Native Infantry.

Thayet-myo.

K. battery, 1st Brigade, and half a battery Royal Artillery; Head-quarters and wing 44th Foot; 32nd Native Infantry.

Toungoo.

Two batteries, 8th Brigade, Royal Artillery; wing 44th Foot; 41st Native Infantry; two companies and a half 33rd Native Infantry.

Shwé-gyeen.

One company and a half 33rd Native Infantry.

Maulmain.

Wing 33rd Native Infantry.

Port Blair (Andamans).

One company 89th Foot; seven companies and a half 23rd Native Infantry.

Nicobars.

Half a company 23rd Native Infantry.*

Regiments specially on Service in Burma.

H. M.'s 43rd Foot; wing 54th Foot; C. company Sappers and Miners; wing 19th Native Infantry; 22nd Native Infantry; 31st Native Infantry.

ADDENDA.

PART I.

EXTRACTS FROM NARRATIVES OF THE CAMPAIGNS OF 1824-25.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GODWIN AT MARTABAN AND YE.

THE passage from Rangoon on the Irawady to Martaban on the Salween appears insignificant on the map. But the strong currents of the intermediate portion of the coast baffled day after day the fleet of Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin. He did not arrive near the romantic lake and heights of Martaban before the 29th September. On the 30th the Burmans were driven from its town, fortified pagodas, and stockaded lines, by a scientific attack. The Lieutenant-Colonel detached Captain O'Reilly of the 41st against Yé-Mijo. This also was rapidly captured. The occupation of Martaban brought the British upon the frontier line of the Siamese. But no efforts of either Burman or British agents, neither arguments, promises, nor threats, could ever divert that Government from their cautious and reserved system of policy. They persevered in an armed neutrality to the end of the protracted contest, carefully watching the trepidations of the balance of success. They could never be drawn into any overt act of hostility against the Burmans; but to keep well with their enemies, they filled the streets of Rangoon with a tinsel embassy, so soon as they heard of the

advance of the British; and during the third campaign the political agents at Martaban were amused from time to time with choice specimens of enigmatical eloquence by a General-in-Chief with the sonorous name of ROUNG-ROUNG.

THE HEALTH OF THE TROOPS AT RANGOON.*

Meanwhile the privations and sufferings of the troops at Rangoon were painfully aggravated. The continued use of salt provisions had added to the disease which preyed on them before, scurvy—a frightful scourge anywhere, but on the humid delta of an huge river, a foe to human health, which seemed to defy extirpation. The heavy rains, which had intermitted after the second week of October, were renewed in November with their former violence. Ships despatched from Rangoon in July, could not bring back any effectual succours in less than four months. Private adventurers had brought sheep and poultry to this mart of starvation. But they were few in number, and were sold at rates incredibly exorbitant. They furnished only an ephemeral repast for the tables of a few of the half-famished officers. Pine-apples abounded in the forests. Limes and citrons were to be found in rude orchards. The juice of these fruits might have been rendered sanative to a few, if used as antiscorbutics only. But the heedless voracity with which such unripe rarities were swallowed by hungry soldiers proved fatal to hundreds of dysenteric sufferers. Bread had been, from the month of August, supplied in sufficient quantities for the consumption of hospitals. But the rations of the soldier consisted of rice, a crude indigestible viand for the stomach of a native of Britain, salted beef and pork, which vitiated the animal juices, and biscuit seldom fresh, and commonly swarming with animalcules, or mouldy from long detention under hatches, or in damp magazines. The supply

* Towards the conclusion of November 1824.

of medicines was not abundant, nor assorted with a view to peculiar ailments, which could not have been anticipated. Of most of the articles included under the head of medical comforts, there was yet a greater scarcity. It may be surmised that where there were no cattle, milk was not procurable; yet a milk diet would have saved many valuable lives. Dropsical symptoms manifested themselves extensively. Dyspepsia, and acute hepatitis were yet more common. Diarrhœa and dysentery committed lamentable ravages. For dyspeptic, hepatic, dysenteric, and scorbutic patients, there were neither milk, vegetables, farinaceous food, nor nutritive broths. These deficiencies baffled the skill, though they could not extinguish the zeal, of the medical officers. The plan of mooring transports at the mouth of the river, on board of which convalescents might inhale the sea-breezes, did not produce very beneficial results. The most successful of the sanitary measures was the establishment of a dépôt at Mergui.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL GOPWIN AT TANTABAIN.

It was known to the British that Bandoola had concentrated a force, swelled by this time to a considerable amount, at Donabew. The Kee Woonghee, or first Woonghee of the Empire, commanded several detachments intended to cover the left bank of the Irawady. One of these had taken post at Tantabain. It was the plan of Sir Archibald Campbell to assume two principal lines of advance, one up the stream of the Rangoon river, Panlang branch, and great eastern branch of the Irawady, the other parallel to the prolongation of the left bank of this same branch; but at some distance from it, as far as Sarawah. At that point the two lines would become coincident. It seemed necessary as a preliminary measure to clear the Laing river. Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin was detached against Tantabain. This officer found the enemy on the 16th

of February, posted two thousand strong in a position on the point of a little peninsula. Two sides of their work were extended to eleven hundred paces each. It was lined with thirty-six guns. The Lieutenant-Colonel caused the "Satellite" armed ship, towed by the steam vessel, to enfilade one face of the defences. He paralysed the barbarians by her fire, and a shower of rockets launched from the deck of the "Diana," by Captain Graham's troop. The Burmans were amazed at the velocity, the dazzling light, the rapid succession, the fatal aim, and ominous hissing of this new weapon. The grenadiers of the 41st, transported by the boats to a point sheltered from fire, rushed upon the enemy in the moment of consternation. The work was carried. The barbarians left behind thirty-four out of thirty-six guns.—*Havelock*.

MAJOR SALE AT BASSEIN.

Sir Archibald Campbell had sent some troops to manœuvre on the line of the great western branch of the Irawady. Major Sale's transports were conveyed by H. M.'s frigate "Larne," and the Hon. Company's cruiser "Mercury." The passage of his fleet round the circumference of the coast was tedious. It reached Pagoda point in great Negrais on the 24th of February. Major Wahab had arrived here in May 1824, when all might have been attempted, which was now worth attempting. The enemy had constructed some works on both the greater and the lesser island. Their defenders were put to flight by the fire of the ships of war. Whilst the expedition was making its way with little opposition between the picturesque banks of the magnificent stream, the Burmese set fire to Bassein and retreated towards Lamina. The fleet anchored off the smoking ruins on the 3rd March. Major Sale having established his troops in the area of the Grand Pagoda endeavoured by assurances, and the distribution of proclamations, to restore confidence in the minds of the alarmed inhabitants.—*Ibid*.

PROME.

The fate of the campaign was decided, as it had been easy to foresee, under the walls of Donabew. Sir Archibald Campbell, regaining his former line of route, by recrossing the river at Sarawah, prosecuted an unopposed advance. He entered Prome on the 25th April 1825. General Cotton's division in rejoining him, encountered no obstacles but the rocks, shallows, and rapids of the Irawady.

But the army had lost half a month. Prome was its place of arms during the monsoon. A reconnoissance was pushed to Meaday fifty miles beyond it. Prome may be considered the third town in the Empire. The commercial advantages of Rangoon seem to entitle it to rank second. Prome stands on a somewhat lofty margin of the river. A timber stockade encloses three or four narrow streets of huts, the wooden houses of the local Government, those of the priesthood and numerous pagodas.

Considerable intervening spaces are partially planted with trees. From the platforms of the work the inhabitants look forth across a stream of a thousand yards at the rocky heights which guard the right bank. These are a portion of the chain of wooded hills, which extend in unbroken links from a point on the right bank forty miles below Prome to another one hundred and sixty miles above it.

This line of two hundred miles is beautiful throughout. The eye of the voyager on the Irawady is perpetually feasted with the sight of hanging woods, which in this climate are never entirely deprived of their foliage. In the more abrupt bends of the river the rocks, which occasionally decorate the left bank also, seem to unite themselves amphitheatrically with those of the right.

The spectator may fancy himself on a lake in a mountainous region. This, and sudden glimpses of pagodas perched adventurously on the summits of crags, like the castles of the Rhine,

are the principal features of the picturesque in Ava. The site of Prome is salubrious as well as beautiful. The town is a healthy place of residence even in the season of rain. The air of the breezy hills around it is yet more delicious.

A line of heights lower than those of the right bank extends along the left from Shwé'doungmyo, ten miles below Prome. A few hundred yards southward of the latter, these hills run off abruptly at a right angle, shaping their course into the interior. On the summits of the mounds and hillocks of this range the troops were cantoned. Roomy huts of mats, timber, and thatch, were quickly thrown up for them. The officers built themselves small bungalows of the same materials. Freed from care, from wants and sickness, they here spent their days nearly as agreeably as in the remoter stations of the Presidencies. Another monsoon was before the army; but how far different from the last! The defeat of Bandoola at Kokaing had restored its population to Rangoon. His death,* and the dispersion of his bands at Donabew, relieved the plains and villages of Pegu from the second reign of terror. The British army had acted on its march in the spirit of the benevolent proclamation of its leader. It had conciliated Pegu. From Rangoon to Yandaboo the conduct of the force was exemplary. Even the followers of the camp, by far the most intractable portion of an armament in India, were never guilty of serious indiscipline. This opinion does not rest solely on British testimony. He who should dispute its correctness, would find many thousands of Peguers to contradict him. The presence of General Sir A. Campbell's divisions was not only never felt as a calamity in Pegu, but regarded as a protection against the severity of the Burmans. In April 1826, their departure was bewailed in terms of clamorous regret, which no prudential arguments could restrain. The simple people of

* April 1, 1825. Supposed to have been caused by a Congreve rocket.

these provinces arrived at once at the secret of British superiority without the aid of metaphysics, or political economy. They said, "The *Inglee Rajahs* pay for everything, and do not cut off our heads." This surprised and delighted them.—
Havelock's Campaigns in Ava.

MALOWN.

Sir A. Campbell's Despatch reporting the result of the attack on the Burmese entrenchments at Malown (or Melown) on the 19th January 1826, has a peculiar interest; but, as there is hardly space for it in this volume, the reader is referred to the author's "*Rangoon: a Narrative*," Appendix vii. p. 262.

BURMESE GENERAL ORDERS.

Found in the Governor's House at Syriam, near Rangoon.

In the First Burmese War, hostility to the English "strangers" was intense; and anathemas loud and deep, like shells, were made to burst continually over the heads of our devoted countrymen. The following is a good specimen of the prayer (at length assuming the form of a general order) which, upwards of fifty years ago, was levelled against our gallant Anglo-Indian army, and is in the genuine vindictive, melodramatic style:—

"In order that not one of the wild foreigners may escape from being destroyed and slain, they must be apprehended, by *covering the face of the earth with an innumerable host*, to accomplish which, effectual measures are now in progress. . . . Having the district of Syriam under your personal inspection, should any deficiency exist, you will PETITION for whatever may be required, without delay.

"Although it is a business of great difficulty to shut up the course and channel of the river, yet by labour and constant exertion, night and day, it must be done; and as the men of

the war-boats have been detached from you, others from the grand army are sent to replace them."

"To Oona Penen and the Principal Men of the Yamhu-ganee Gold Boat.

"On the grounds subject to the Maywoon's war-boat (beyond Kemmendine), whoever is an inhabitant must not say he is free, or belonging to such and such a prince, but they must act unitedly in blocking up the ships' passage through the river and channels of Silva, by throwing in logs of wood and roots of trees, that the captive strangers may not escape; and if they attempt to do so, they must be apprehended and put to death.

. . . On arriving at Moroon, *let no man say he is at liberty, or in the service of such or such a chief; he that can wield a sword, let him take a sword; and he that can use a spear, let him take one.*"

The latter order is signed by the Burmese avenger, Kengee Awengee Bomien.

THE KING OF AVA'S ORDER.

"Our royal army will march in several divisions to seize, kill, and crush the rebel strangers, who are in Prome. The victorious advance division, under the chief Maha Nemiow, seized, killed, and crushed the strangers at Watty-goon; owing to the excellent power of the Golden Majesty, they could not resist or stand before us. . . . The strangers came with great confidence: as they have been beaten this first time, they cannot stand on another occasion; the royal army having conquered once, ten times it will be successful," &c. &c.

Probably such a proud assurance of conquest was never before penned in a general order.

The reader's attention is requested to the striking phraseology of the words in these orders marked in *italics*—the former being like what we meet with in the Old Testament of our Bible, and the latter in the New.

Buddha—especially shadowed forth in Oriental writings and with similar attributes to the Messiah in Isaiah—has often been considered the rude form of our Saviour—one of the skeletons of our Faith embedded in the far East. But Gautama, the incarnation of Buddha, the deity of the Burmese, when we consider the Gautamaic influence over the Golden Land, comes strikingly forward as a parallel in the above passage which refers to taking a *sword* in a case of emergency. See St. Luke, xxii. 36, “But now, he that hath a purse, let him take it, and likewise his scrip; and he that hath no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one!” This is at least remarkable. Compare also the previous verse with the Phongyees, or Burmese teachers, when they go abroad *without* either “purse” or “scrip.” See “Rangoon,” chapter x., on Gautama, page 138.

PATKOI.

With reference to the end of the fourth chapter and the term “Patkoi,” we find,—

“It is also written Patkai, which, Mr. Trelawney Saunders informs us, is an abbreviation of Pat-kai-seng-kan, which means Cut-fowls-oath-taken. It originated in consequence of an oath ratified between the Ahom Raja Cheedangpha on the north side, with Surunphai, the Nora Raja of the south side of the range, in 1399–1400 A.D. The oath bound them to respect the Nongyang pani as the boundary between them.”

PART II.

EXTRACTS AND NOTES.

THE "Friend of India" wrote (1852):—"In making Pegu British, we take from the kingdom of Burma its chief financial resources, and its political strength; we deprive it of the sinews of war. It is to this prostration of the power of the Burmese, and the dread inspired in the Court by our own power, that we must look for the security of our new borderline. For the last twenty-five years they have occupied the territory lying between our own provinces of Arakan and Maulmain. A line of hills separates the former from Pegu; but there are three or four passes, through which a barbarian army, unencumbered with artillery and commissariat stores, might at any time have invaded the province, while Maulmain has always been open to incursion."

PEGU.—OPHIR.

It was in the middle of 1852 that we first became acquainted with an admirable work by the Rev. F. Mason, M.A., entitled "Tenasserim; or, Notes on the Fauna, Flora, Minerals, and Nations of British Burma and Pegu." Its possession occasioned the following remarks:—In this work, by a learned missionary, will be found much valuable and interesting information. In this age, when gold in California and in Australia

is drawing so many adventurers from their native land, it may interest mankind to learn that, according to the work in question, gold is plentiful in Pegu; it is distributed all over the provinces; "all the streams from the lofty granite mountains bring down their tribute of the precious metal." "There is a rumour widely current in Burma, that valuable mines are known to the Burmese Court; but the secret is strictly guarded because *the treasures of the earth are regarded as a kind of royal reserve fund*, only to be drawn upon in great emergencies." One would have thought our present occupation of Rangoon, Bassein, and Martaban, to be "a great emergency"; but where, up to the middle of August, is the gold, the yellow, glittering gold, we require, with other conditions—and to which we are now legally entitled?

Pegu is called by the Talaings *Suburnubhumi*, or the land of gold. Mr. Mason endeavours to prove that it is no other than the Ophir of Solomon. "The ancient name of Moubee, in the delta of the Irawady, was Suvanna-nadee, or 'river of gold'; indicating that Pegu was famous in antiquity for its gold; and gold and silver appear to have been much more abundant than they are now, even three centuries ago." "The Sanscrit form of Suvana is *Suverna*; and this, when the final syllable is dropped, is nearly indetical with *Soupheir*, the Greek name of Ophir."

We had read somewhere of our *own* India supposed to be Ophir; but this proof of Mr. Mason's is quite new, and as convincing as most proofs from etymology.

The Burmese language is said to be a compound of the ancient Pali with the Sanscrit, the Tartar, and the Chinese. [The Burman language, as well as the Siamese, is written from left to right.]

RANGOON.

Regarding the capture of the Great Dagon Pagoda, the General's despatch contains the following reasons for not ad-

vancing on the 13th :—" On Tuesday, the 13th, it was reported, the heavy battery-guns could not be landed, and be with me, before the middle of that day ; and, also, that rations for the troops could not be prepared in time to enable me to advance. I therefore held my position till the next morning."

Nothing can be more natural in an officer of high standing than a disposition in favour of his own branch of the service ; that in which he has won honour and renown. The veteran warrior, Sir Charles Napier, at the Preston Waterloo dinner, said to the 50th Regiment,—" There has been a great deal of talk about the Minié rifle ; but I can assure you, 50th, there is nothing like ' Old Brown Bess,' with a fixed bayonet, a strong arm, a strong heart, and strong courage." Very true ; but to bring these grand qualities into highly successful operation, it strikes one, especially where attacks on outworks and a strongly-fortified position are probable, that the most powerful arm in war should occupy the chief importance. General Godwin, then, may have said he could not have advanced the first day without landing at least two of the heavy guns, with a large supply of ammunition for these, and ample for the light field batteries, to take along with him.

It may be brought forward in support of the advance on the 12th, that the artillery of the shipping had sufficiently exercised the powerful arm of destruction. In the chances of war, this would appear to carry a species of justification along with it. The military critic then replies—But why talk of chance, now-a-days, when an overwhelming display of ordnance, in the first instance, against *every point* of attack reduces operations almost to a certainty of success ? But, after all, it is more difficult to do, than to know " what were good to do " ; yet we were highly successful ; and history will record that the capture of Rangoon opened the Second Burmese War with " a brilliant feat of arms." *

* So was the capture styled by the " Times " of London :—" The capture of Rangoon has opened the Burmese War with a brilliant feat of arms, and

With regard to the works of the fortress, it may be mentioned, that the cutting off a long projecting right flank was proposed by that gallant and talented officer, Colonel Apthorp, 35th Madras Native Infantry; his suggestion was taken up by the field engineer, and a breast-work was thrown up (*en crémaillère*). The construction of the new barracks for the European troops did infinite credit to Major Fraser and the Engineer Department. We had now (middle of August) the commencement of a new and important British station. There was covering in Rangoon for a large army.

VOLUNTEERS.

One of the most important and interesting incidents of this war was to be found in the "volunteering for Burma." The 4th Sikhs, Ramghur Irregular Cavalry, and another Sikh corps were to form a portion of the gallant "army of Ava." Those who came forward as our bitterest enemies in December 1845, through the wonderful nature of our Government, probably were, in October, November, or December 1852, to assist us either in taking entire possession of Pegu, or in humiliating the Burmese, and planting the British standard on the walls of Ava! The two Sikh regiments for Burma were to commence their downward march on the 15th of August.

PROME.

The proceedings of Captain Tarleton's expedition, which was sent to reconnoitre Prome, have been briefly narrated. The Burmese, it appears, were located in great numbers on the left bank of the river. On this bank, in commanding positions, were bastions mounted with cannon. But the steamers took

we shall be happy to learn that the irresistible force of the British squadron on the coast, and the fall of the chief port of Burma, has at once convinced the Court of Ava," &c.—May 31, 1852.

the other channel, or right branch, and reached the main river uninjured. The steamers were "nine days in going up to Prome, staying there two days and returning." A small steamer, belonging to the King of Ava "had left for Ava only the day previous to the arrival of our steamers."

In a second expedition, Captain Tarleton repassed the fortified rock, a little below Prome, where General Bandoola had before taken up position. It was deserted; but more guns were found.

ARAKAN.

Some interesting intelligence was, in August, received from Sandoway and Arakan. The Aeng river had been proved to be navigable for steamers, having a light draught, upwards of thirty miles further than had hitherto been supposed to be the case. This was no trifling advantage, should the authorities decide on sending any troops to Burma by the Aeng Pass.

Lieutenant Fytche, the very active and enterprising civil officer at Sandoway, had, after great exertions, opened a land communication between that place and Bassein, a communication which is effected in seven days, and can be continued thence to Rangoon in three or four more.

The following intelligence was terrible!—"The Burmese, who come across, say the troops at the capital are determined to fight like devils; and that two brigades are formed, one termed the INVULNERABLES, the other the INVINCIBLES, which are to cut all the English to pieces!"

Captain Barry, commanding the Arakan Battalion, on hearing of General Godwin's successes, "turned out a couple of guns, and 'woke the slumbering echoes' of the passes with a Royal salute, much to the astonishment of the Natives."

THE AENG PASS.

An intelligent officer, at the commencement of the war, remarked that it was probable, in the cold weather, that Assam would make a demonstration against Burma. It now appeared

that the Manipúr Rajah was all energy to repel Burmese invasion. But an advance from Burma on Upper Assam or Munipore at this season would be impracticable. The distance that divides Manipúr from Burma Proper is three hundred miles. The routes, in every respect, are described as insurmountable. Nevertheless, in the last war, the Burmese poured their troops down on Arakan through the Aeng Pass, and into Cachar through Manipúr; so, in the rainy season, they might be tempted "to beat up our quarters in Cachar and in the province of Arakan." "The troops collected at Arakan might form the nucleus of the army which would march across the Aeng Pass, during the cold weather, into the valley of the Irawady, and co-operate with the army from Rangoon in its march to the capital, where," said the "Friend," "alone we can make peace with any confidence of its permanency."

AN ADVANCE TO AVA.

From all accounts, there appears to be no want of water to navigate the mighty Irawady with our small steamers. What a magnificent undertaking—the British ascending, perhaps slowly, but surely, "capturing Meaday, Patanago, Pagan, and many towns of importance, situated principally on the left bank," and then reaching and taking possession of the capital! From Rangoon, Donabew is less than one hundred miles up the stream; Prome is about one hundred and thirty from Donabew; and from Prome to Ava, say, is two hundred and sixty. By annexing the Delta only, we shall have a population which "would effectually counteract the hostility of the Burmese." Should this be done, to repel Burmese invasion of British Pegu—a crisis not altogether improbable—would bring on a third Burmese war, which would last but a short time, and surely end in the entire annexation to the British dominions of Alompra's once powerful empire. (August 1852.)

PART III.

PAPERS AND NOTES.

GENERAL GODWIN'S FAREWELL ADDRESS TO THE ARMY OF
BURMA.*

THE Major-General is about to resign the command of the army,—an army that for one year and four months has not given the Major-General one hour of trouble or anxiety. Whether in the field or in quarters its admirable conduct has held an even course. It is a singular fact that with troops of three distinct Services, of which this Force has been composed, not one collision of interests has come to the knowledge of the Major-General—all has been harmony; and the good of the service on which the Force has been employed has been the prevailing and first consideration of the combined whole.

Such creditable bearing must increase the painful feelings of the Major-General to know he is leaving so excellent a force, which he has never been absent from one day—sharing as he has done in its triumphs in the field and living with it in its quarters,—so that he does not consider the subject he is now addressing to them so much in the light of a farewell address as

* Dated Prome, 27th July 1858.

a testimony of the warmest feelings towards his brother soldiers. [The General, after acknowledging the services of the Staff, individually and collectively, proceeds.] The Major-General begs to offer his warmest thanks to Brigadier-General Sir J. Cheape, K.C.B., and to Brigadier-General S. W. Steel, C.B.; to the Brigadiers of the several Brigades, and to the Officers commanding Regiments, for their constant, valuable, and cheerful support, by which alone he has been able to sustain the honourable trust reposed in him by Government. [In the address very flattering mention is made of Majors, Mayhew, Allen, Boulderson, Budd, and Fraser,*—a galaxy of energy and talent that would do honour to any army. The “brave and ever ready Sappers” are likewise highly commended. Liberal thanks are also bestowed on Brigadier Foord and the Artillery of both Presidencies; on Superintending Surgeon Montgomerie, and the Medical Officers of Regiments; and on our excellent Chaplains the Reverend H. B. Burney and the Reverend J. W. Bull. The General evidently does his best to wish a kind farewell to all.]

BURMA.

Burma, or, as it is sometimes called, the kingdom of Ava, occupies nearly a third of the peninsula whose western shore borders the Bay of Bengal to the east, stretching to the Straits of Malacca to the south, and facing the shores of China on the west. It occupies a space of about one hundred and eighty-four thousand square miles,† extending from the fourteenth to the twenty-eighth parallel. The river Irawady, which is wholly within the empire, is supposed to be nearly a thousand miles in length.

* The indefatigable Bengal Engineer, at whose bidding towns rose as if by magic, where all before was desolation and ruin.

† The entire Indo-Chinese Peninsula, or Eastern India, has a surface of about 700,000 square miles, and a population of 25,000,000, giving 36 persons to each square mile.

With the empire in general we need not at present concern ourselves; it is on the delta and shores of the Irawady that our attention is pre-eminently concentrated. This noble stream discharges itself by fourteen different mouths into the Bay of Bengal, lat. 18° —just south of Cape Negrais. The delta is supposed to cover an area of about ten thousand square miles, or considerably more than that of the Nile—its three sides are about one hundred and thirty-five, one hundred and forty-five, and one hundred and thirteen miles in length respectively. So far as the tide reaches, the delta of the Irawady is thickly covered with jungle and small-sized trees; after this, vast tracts of lofty grass, interspersed at intervals with tall-sized trees, make their appearance. Rangoon is the marine capital of the empire.* From Rangoon to Ava the distance by the river is close on five hundred miles, and might be traversed against the current by the “Nemesis” or “Phlegethon” in four days. The population is estimated at twenty-five thousand. Amarapura is only accessible by vessels of inconsiderable size; and above this, the river rapidly diminishes in size and depth. Prome, in lat. $18^{\circ}50'$, contains a population of about ten thousand inhabitants; it is said to have been the earliest of the seats of the Government of the empire. Compared even to our second-rate Indian cities, those of Burma are in point of magnitude inconsiderable, and in architecture contemptible in the extreme. In lat. $20^{\circ}30'$ to the south of the banks of the Irawady, are the famous petroleum wells of Burma; they are about three hundred in number, and cover an area of sixteen square miles of ground. The quantity of mineral oil obtained from them is enormous: when drawn it is thin and watery, but speedily thickens on exposure, and affords the profitable source of lamp-light to all the country round. From this all along to Ava, numberless

* On the Panlang or Rangoon river, eastern channel of the Irawady.

fossils of great beauty, both wood and animal remains, similar to those of Perim, prevail; and should accident throw our warriors in the way of enriching our museums, we trust the opportunity presented will not be lost sight of; specimens sufficient to replace the weight of a single discharge of shot, would fill a cabinet. In the delta the monsoon sets in early in May, and for three months rain pours in torrents—the remainder of the season is almost rainless. The heat of April is oppressive, so the climate there is not unlike our own—with this difference, that they have the wet season a month sooner than we have.—“Bombay Times,” February 25, 1852.

MORTALITY AMONG THE TROOPS IN BURMA DURING THE WAR.

Frequent allusion has been made in the Narrative (“Pegu”) to the health of the troops employed in the operations. This being a subject of vast importance, especially as concerning the probability of our being in time to come urged on to further conquest in Eastern Asia, the writer, with a view of rendering his work as useful as possible for a reference now and hereafter, begs to submit the following matter to his readers. It has been already stated, from an official return, that in the First Burmese War, “during the first year $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the troops were killed in action, while 45 per cent. perished from disease. In the ensuing year the mortality decreased one-half; but the total loss during the war amounted to $72\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the troops engaged.” We were surprised to see a statement in June (1853) purporting to be from the annual returns, that in the Second Burmese War, “during the past year, fifty-four European officers, one thousand three hundred and fifty-three European soldiers, and probably above two thousand sepoys have *perished* in Burma”; including all who had from time to time gone away on medical certificate, the facilities for which were very great during the recent campaigns. These figures may be correct, but in our opinion they can scarcely be so,

With an army more than double the size of ours in the First War, which lasted nearly two years, the grand total of European officers killed and deceased amounted to sixty-five; native commissioned, non-commissioned rank and file, one thousand four hundred and twenty-nine; non-commissioned rank and file Europeans, three thousand one hundred and thirty-four; and extra killed, deceased, and missing, four hundred and fifty. As has been observed elsewhere, the privations and sufferings of the troops during the First War were infinitely greater than what were endured by us. Mortality throughout the recent campaigns was extremely variable in its character; the Angel of Death continually shifting his quarters, and often abiding in those places where he was least expected. On one or two occasions he made a steady residence at Prome. After recording the deaths of Lieutenants Pilmer and Montgomery of H. M.'s 51st and 80th Regiments, we had to add to the list the names of Lieutenant-Colonel Coote, H. M.'s 18th Royal Irish, and Lieutenant Chisholm, 40th Bengal Native Infantry. The former gallant officer, it will be remembered; commanded the storming party at the attack on the Great Shwé Dagon Pagoda. The Queen's regiments had certainly shared considerably in the mortality of the war. The Company's regiments were more fortunate. Of the former we had no exact statistics; but a tolerably accurate idea could be gained from what was written in the foregoing chapters. The Madras troops, on the whole, may be said to have suffered less than the Bengal. By the end of May last, out of one hundred and sixty European Bengal Artillerymen who came to Burma at the commencement of the war, upwards of forty had died. Out of say two hundred and thirty European Madras Artillerymen, up to the same time, not more than the above number had died. The Bengal European Fusiliers* had been more

* Captain Byng died *en route* from Toungoo to Shwé-gyeen.

severely visited than the Madras. From the convenience of a frequent communication between Rangoon and Calcutta, the Bengal sepoy^s were enabled when sick and unfit for duty to visit their country in considerable numbers; but notwithstanding this advantage we are not sure if their bill of mortality was less than the Madras. In the 5th Madras Native Infantry, which came to Rangoon from Kyouk Phyoo, in Arakan—a climate not particularly healthy—from June 1852 to June 1853 the deaths amounted to eighty-eight men. From June to August, at Toungoo, they had lost twenty-five—total one hundred and thirteen. Considering—as has been well remarked—that “all Eastern countries are at first unfavourable to the health of Europeans,”* and, it may be added, to that of native sepoy^s also, there was nothing very alarming in the aspect of the mortality among the troops in Burma. Before drawing attention to some interesting tables kindly furnished us by the officer commanding the 1st Madras European Regiment of Fusiliers, it may be remarked that the first is to show the few casualties in the Fusiliers since the day of landing at Rangoon till the end of August 1853, as compared with other European regiments in Burma. The second table is to show the salubrity of Toungoo from the few casualties in that corps—six in five months. The third table will interest those who make investigations into probable causes in producing certain effects, as it shows the quantity of arrack drank by four hundred and thirty-one men in five months at Toungoo.

It was the opinion of Dr. Robertson of H. M.’s 13th Regiment—reputed as one of the best informed practitioners for Indian maladies—that during the siege of Jellalabad he had no sickness, and attributed it entirely to the impossibility of obtaining liquor. From this, by casting the eye over the table now

* On the 22nd of April the service lost a very fine young officer, Lieutenant Harris, 19th M.N.I., of the Sappers, who died at Sittang.

presented, perhaps an inference may be drawn from the few casualties at Toungoo,—amounting only to five men, (one of whom, the Quartermaster-Sergeant, died from apoplexy the day after arrival)—that as the liquor drunk for five months at this station does not give on an average above half a dram to each man, the predisposition to infectious diseases, which always renders them more fatal where strong drinks are indulged in, had not been seen here. The Government allowance of liquor—two drams a-day when porter was not issued—was ample for the men; and it appeared to be necessary to health in such a climate as Burma. Often did we hear the highly respectable sergeant say—“I could not get on, sir, without my dram!” In the heavy monsoon the sentry is relieved from his duty in the morning; he is wet, cold, and aching—a dram to him then is worth an ocean of physic. The sobriety of the men of the Fusiliers—there is much to like in that word *sobriety*, it implies SELF-DENIAL, whereas *Total Abstinence* has no human grandeur about it—the sobriety of the Madras Fusiliers, we say, at Toungoo, had been the leading cause of so few casualties having occurred among them; and the same might have been said of the company of Madras European Artillery under the charge of the writer of this narrative. As regarded the soldier-like appearance and general behaviour of the Company’s European troops, they did not suffer by comparison with the best European troops in the world, in spite of some miserable calumnies, founded, as usual, on ignorance, brought at home against them.

After writing the above, a most interesting document appeared, professing to be a list of officers who had either died, been killed, or wounded, or who had been compelled to leave Burma since the commencement of the war, up to the 12th of June 1853. Thus—

	Killed and Dead.	Wounded.	s. c.*
Royal Navy	10*	9	7
Indian Navy and Bengal Marine . .	4	6	23
H. M.'s 18th Royal Irish	4	5	1
H. M.'s 51st K. O. L. I.	8	4	9
H. M.'s 80th Regiment	5	3	3
Staff	4	2	8
Madras Artillery	4	1	7
Bengal Artillery	2	...
Bengal Engineers	1	2	2
Madras Engineers	3	2	6
Bengal Fusiliers	2	...	1
Irregular Cavalry	1
5th Madras Native Infantry	2	2
9th Madras Native Infantry	1	2	3
19th Madras Native Infantry	1
1st Madras Native Infantry	1	1
35th Madras Native Infantry	4	1	11
4th Sikhs	2	...
40th Bengal Native Infantry	5	...	1
67th Bengal Native Infantry	3	1	1
49th Madras Native Infantry	1
	58	45	89

The Madras Fusiliers, of which corps a perfect statement is given in the subjoined table, had among officers 4 s. c. The above was a rather more numerous bill of mortality than we at first supposed, although the list was drawn out to the utmost statistical length, some having been set down who did not die in Burma. It will be seen that the two most unfortunate regiments in point of officers, were the 51st Kings Own Light Infantry and the 35th Madras Native Infantry.

* On Sick Certificate.

I.—MADRAS FUSILIERS.

	Lieut.-Colonel.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	2nd Lieutenants.	Surgeons.	Asst.-Surgeons.	Sergeants.	Drummers.	Corporals.	Privates.
Strength of Regiment on landing at Rangoon, 13th September 1852	1	1	9	15	10	1	3	48	20	47	845
Casualties by death up to 25th August 1853	3	...	2	4	...	5	57

II.—MARTABAN COLUMN.

	Lieut.-Colonel.	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	2nd Lieutenants.	Surgeons.	Asst.-Surgeons.	Sergeants.	Drummers.	Corporals.	Privates.
Detachment under Captain Geils, arrived at Toungoo, 22nd February 1853	1	2	5	2	5	136
Detachment under Captain Renaud, arrived at Toungoo, 6th March 1853	1	3	3	5	4	13	158
Head-quarters under Major Hill, arrived at Toungoo, 24th April 1853	...	1	...	4	2	1	...	11	5	1	56
Brigadier Williams's escort arrived 12th March 1853	1	1	...	1	28
Total	...	1	2	9	6	1	...	22	11	20	378
Casualties by death at head-quarters, up to 25th August 1853	1	1	4
Total	...	1	2	9	5	1	...	21	11	20	374

III.—QUANTITY of ARRACK issued at HEAD-QUARTERS during the Months specified below.

Months.	ARRACK.		Strength.	Average Consumption.
	Gallons.	Drams.		
April 1853.	410	21	431	Nearly 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ th drams per man daily.
May "	237	11	430	" 7-10ths " " "
June "	224	27	429	Less than 7-10ths " " "
July "	264	...	428	Nearly 4-5ths " " "
Aug. 25, "	201	24	427	" 3-4ths " " "
Total . .	1338	83	2145	General average, 5-6ths dram per man daily.

By an official memorandum from Simla, 16th August 1864, His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief directed that "commanding officers will report on the results of the general order dated 21st June 1864, restricting the issue of spirits from cantons to one dram per diem for each man." When these reports are compared, it may be found that the one dram only has some effect on the conduct, health, and saving propensities of the European soldier. Anyway, such a step shows the interest taken by His Excellency in the soldier's welfare in the East. In the garrison artillery battery at Rangoon (1864) we may say that every man, who was able, took his dram daily. Out of say sixty-four men, the generality of the gunners preferred arrack to porter, on account of their being able to get a dram for one anna, whereas two pints of porter cost three annas (fourpence half-penny). One dram and two pints of porter was the allowance for the soldier; and it used to be, as before remarked, two drams a day when porter was not issued. It is not good in Burma (so some doctors think) to drink much beer in the wet weather. In the writer's battery, the men smoked a good deal, though not to excess;

and, in five years in Burma, the average of mortality did not exceed one a year.

THE CAMPAIGN IN BURMA, 1853.

At Toungoo, towards the end of September, a new Indian periodical* fell into our hands, evidently most ably conducted, and to which we wished every success. The July number contained a paper with the above title, from which a few useful notes may be culled, supplementary to information which has already appeared.

In the beginning of January 1853, the British force in Burma under the command of General Godwin gave a body composed of—

- 1 Troop of Horse Artillery.
- 1 Light Field Battery.
- 5 Companies of Foot Artillery.
- 4 Companies of Sappers.
- 2 Troops of Cavalry.
- 5 Regiments of British Infantry.
- 8 Regiments of Native Infantry.

The above might, on the 1st of January 1853, be fairly reckoned as ten thousand men of all arms, who were scattered over the face of Pegu, from Prome to the sea.

During the autumn of 1852 the want of carriage being much felt by the army, and it being necessary to provide against the necessity of an advance by land upon the capital, the Governor-General decided on despatching two hundred elephants by way of Assam and the borders of Arakan, which, entering the valley of the Irawady through the Toungoo Pass, should proceed immediately to Prome and join the head-quarters of the army under General Godwin. With a small escort of sepoys under the command of Captain Baugh of the 26th Bengal Light Infantry, this enormous living column commenced its

* "East India Army Magazine and Military Review."

march. The frontier line in the immediate vicinity of Arakan was held by the 68th Bengal Native Infantry and the Arakan Battalion, under the command of Major Maling and Captain Barry; and a strong detachment of H. M.'s 18th Royal Irish and 4th Sikhs, under command of Major Edwards, marched from Prome to receive charge of the elephants and reinforce their escort whilst proceeding through the Toungoo Pass into Pegu. [Then follows a detailed account of Captain Nuthall's successful capture of the strong stockade of Nareghain, or as a London critic expressively styles the feat, "the brilliant taking of the Aeng Pass." Captain Sutherland being left in command of the stockade so gallantly captured, all fears regarding the safety of the elephants or their escort were at an end.]

About seventy-five miles to the eastward of Bassein the Burmese had strongly intrenched themselves in a stockade which they had erected on the left bank of the Duggah creek, and had not only planted some small guns within their entrenchments, but had staked the creek from bank to bank, with a view of preventing the possibility of an attack or approach by water. From this stockade bands of armed men would issue, eager for plunder and rapine, keeping the surrounding districts in a state of uneasiness and alarm, and ready to fall upon any detached parties of the British forces which might be escorting baggage or stores on the great lines of communication; and Captain Fytche saw the necessity of dispersing and destroying them before he could hope to restore the confidence of the inhabitants or settle the district. On the 21st January, then, accompanied by Captain Rennie, at the head of eighty armed sailors, and four small guns under the charge of Lieutenant Manderson of the Bengal Artillery, Captain Fytche sailed in the "Nemesis" to meet the boats of the "Zenobia," towing which the little steamer made its way up the Duggah Creek.

[The adventures of this gallant body till the end of the month were of the most brilliant description.] On the termination of the gallant affair against the Minku, the British sailors immediately returned to Laminah, worn out with fatigue, but full of rejoicing at their success, which all parties united in mainly attributing to the gallantry and untiring energy of Captain Fytche.

Regarding the Donabew disaster, the "Review" says—It would appear that Captain Loch, a truly gallant sailor, assumed improperly the command of the united force; an assumption which Major Minchin appears to have succumbed to, overlooking, or being ignorant of the rule, which assigns the command of a united force on land to the senior military officer, just as rigidly as it does to the naval officer at sea. [See also "Pegu," page 231.—Captain Loch died of his wounds 6th February 1853. His remains were interred at Rangoon, beside young Doran, who fell on the 14th of April.]

[We briefly narrated the insurrection at Beling in the Narrative ("Pegu"),* and the doings of the gallant detachment of the 1st Madras Native Infantry under Captain Wright and Ensign Newdick of that regiment.] It was then at once determined to recapture Beling. The Governor-General despatched four companies of the 2nd Bengal Europeans to occupy Maulmain, while a column advanced against Moung-Goung. Through the indefatigable exertions of the troops—men of the 49th and 1st Madras Native Infantry, a company of Bengal Fusiliers from Sittang, and a small detail of Madras Artillery—and the marked zeal of Colonel Bogle, Captain Berdmore, Majors Hall and Gottreux, and others, Beling was recaptured,† and Captain Berdmore offered a reward of one thousand rupees for Moung-Goung.

* Pp. 290-31.

† 19th April 1853.

METEOROLOGICAL NOTICE OF BURMA.

APRIL.—This is the hottest month in the year. The thermometer ranges during the day from 90° to 95° , and the heat is very oppressive, especially during the latter part of the month, relieved, however, by a breeze from the south and south-west, which springs up about 10 o'clock in the forenoon. Rain rarely falls in this month, although sometimes it does in small quantities. [At Toungoo, during this month, the thermometer in houses stood at 105° .]

MAY.—During this month the monsoon changes, which usually takes place from the 15th to the end. The weather, till this happens, is similar to that experienced last month. Occasional showers and north-westers prevail during the latter part, at times attended with the most vivid lightning and loud thunder. Average fall of rain during the month about fifteen inches.

JUNE.—This may be called the first month of the south-west monsoon. The heavy rains which fall now cool the air and encourage vegetation. Violent gusts of wind and heavy squalls, generally from the south, are frequent, commonly about the middle of the month. Average fall of rain forty inches.

JULY.—This month is attended with very heavy rains and much wind; the weather is gloomy, stormy, and cool, whilst at intervals it is fair and mild, particularly from 4 to 7 in the afternoon; with so much regularity does this occur, that during this and next month we can almost depend on twenty-three days to enjoy a fair afternoon. Average fall of rain from fifty to sixty inches, though seventy have been known to fall during the month.

AUGUST.—The heaviest rains usually fall in this month. The weather is cool and pleasant but for the dampness, which is very destructive to clothes, books, &c. The wind blows strong and steady from the south-west quarter during the whole of

the month, with few deviations from that point. Average fall of rain fifty-five inches.

SEPTEMBER.—The rains subside considerably towards the middle of the month; and from that to the first or second week of October the change of the monsoon usually takes place, with its accompaniments of north-westers, lightning, and thunder. Towards the end the winds are generally light and variable, and the weather is cool. Average fall of rain thirty inches.

OCTOBER.—Showers fall occasionally to the middle of the month. Winds light and variable, blowing from the north-east to the south; lightning and thunder are frequent during the evenings and nights, and the weather is cool. During the latter part of the month the wind blows light from the north-east in the day, veering to the south in the evening. Average fall of rain five inches.

NOVEMBER.—This is the first month of what is called the cold season. The days are hot, with scarcely any wind, but the nights are cool and agreeable. Towards the end a delightful breeze from the north springs up about 9 or 10 o'clock, changing to the south-east during the night. Rain seldom, and then trifling in quantity.

DECEMBER.—This is the most pleasant month in the year. A refreshing breeze from the north springs up about 10 o'clock, veering by the east to the south in the evening; mornings and evenings cold; fogs frequent from 7 to 9 o'clock in the mornings, and towards the end of the month dense. No rain.

Copied from the "Notice" in the Madras Artillery Hospital at Rangoon.

Addendum.—With the exception of increased heat, what is said above of December is nearly applicable to JANUARY and FEBRUARY. The month of MARCH (*ta-goo la* in Burmese, *la* meaning *month*), for the most part very hot and sultry, with an occasional breeze for a short period, day and night. During this month and the next the Burmese hold a water feast, to hail

a beneficial monsoon for their crops; also another water feast in September, towards the end of the monsoon.*

ANECDOTES OF DONABEW.

When the manuscript of "Pegu" had been despatched to Europe for publication, the Author received another account of Sir John Cheape's operations against Myat-htoon from an officer engaged. This being the second authentic description from the scene of action, in addition to the Despatch, the writer hoped to gather something more of interest for his readers. That he was not disappointed the following anecdotes of bravery will show:—

An Afghan havildar of the 4th Sikhs, named Jezut Khan, behaved splendidly on the 17th. On the 11th some of his caste were killed and wounded when the enemy attacked our rear-guard. He then took an oath on his sword that he would kill a Burman with it or die; accordingly on the 17th he advanced ahead of every one else, determined to be revenged. When he got about fifteen yards from the breastwork he received one shot in the hip and another in the arm, but this did not deter him in the least, and he still continued to push on. When he got almost within reach for the sacred sword to begin its work, he was shot right through the body; and thus the brave Afghan fell! [This anecdote has a special interest at the present time (Dec. 1879).] •

On the 19th Sergeant-Major Fury of the 4th Sikhs behaved very gallantly. When we got within eighty yards of the deadly breastwork, and some men did not move forward with that alacrity he thought desirable, he became almost frantic with rage. To use the graphic language of the narrator, "he

* According to Lieutenant Chase ("Burmese Hand-Book"), the true epoch of Burman time is the annihilation of Gautama, 540 years before Christ. Time is measured by lunar months, 12 of which make a common year, and every third year admits an intercalary month of 30 days. A month is distinguished into two parts, the waxing and the wane. The full moon falls on the 15th of the waxing, the change on the 14th or 15th of the wane.

began kicking and striking Europeans and Natives right and left, to make them go on; and whilst thus engaged he was shot dead, with three bullets through him."

Whatever people may say to the contrary, incidents such as these are always found in the *realities* of war; and there is no satisfactory way of accounting for them.*

THE LATE DUKE OF WELLINGTON ON THE SECOND BURMESE WAR.

Everything from the pen of the late illustrious Duke of Wellington is of interest to the British nation. The indefatigable Earl of Ellenborough had asked the Government for the production of a Despatch written twenty-eight years ago, which embodied the Duke's opinion regarding the First Burmese War. His Lordship, it is well known, had evinced a decided hostility to the cause and prosecution of the present war. The result of his demand was an answer from Lord Aberdeen, and a justification from Lord Derby. The latter was supported by the opinion of the Duke on the present war, which, "as one of the last public productions of His Grace, is worthy of perusal and record,"—and which the Author felt the necessity of inserting as a lasting ornament to his Narrative.

Earl Derby said—"I am sure your Lordships will not think I am trespassing on your patience if I read to the House this memorandum by the noble and gallant Duke, and which only his death has prevented us receiving from his own mouth:—

"'It appears to me,' he says, 'that the war could not be averted; that the operations fixed upon were judicious; have been ably carried into execution, and with great gallantry, by

* In jungle and stockade warfare particularly, it has occasionally (though very seldom) been found difficult to make young British troops advance on an enemy with the often desirable impetuosity; and, perhaps, this is an argument in favour of not employing too young and inexperienced soldiers on such service. The great Duke thought young cavalry more liable to panic than young infantry; and also that the bravest soldiers may be "terrified" in a peculiar state of action.

the Officers and troops; and that a commencement has been made to require from, and enable the Government to consider of the means to be adopted for the restoration of peace, and the terms on which peace should be restored. I concur with the Governor-General in thinking it will be absolutely necessary to retain possession of all that has fallen into the hands of the British troops—that is, Rangoon, Martaban, and even Bassein, Pegu, and the whole province so-called. My opinion is that it will be necessary to continue the preparations for carrying on the operations of the war till the Sovereign of Ava shall be convinced of the necessity of signing a treaty, by the provisions of which all these dominions will be ceded to the British Government, or till the State of Ava shall be destroyed. A mere military possession of these districts would be but an inglorious and little secure result of these successful operations. I confess that I am inclined to expect that the means adopted to cut off from Ava the supplies of corn usually received by imports from sea, will have the effect of producing efforts to obtain peace by negotiation; but if not, the British Government ought to be in a state of military preparation to advance upon Ava,—to enforce the abandonment of the capital, and even of Amarapura. It may be relied upon that the natives of the East are not better prepared than we are to abandon their dwellings in the winter, and to live in the jungles and mountains. The Government suspected of intending to take such a course would be abandoned by all its followers. At all events, the military possession and tenure of provinces and possessions upon the sea-coast would be considered in a very different light, the Government of Ava being there seated in strength, as under existing circumstances; or being driven out and weakened towards Amarapura, or farther on in the mountains, as is supposed in the printed papers. I conceive, therefore, that it will be necessary to assemble the large force proposed, even though it should be determined to insist upon the cession of all the maritime possessions of the State of Ava.

These must be ceded by the stipulations of a treaty of peace, or the State must be destroyed. If, after all, the Sovereign should treat for peace in order to save his State, he must be made to pay the expenses of the war. The necessity for providing specially for the security of the people of Pegu, discussed in the Minutes of the Members of the Council, appears to me to be disposed of; but it may be relied upon that the point will have much effect in both Houses of Parliament. It appears to me that the people of Pegu have already, by their conduct, acquired the right to claim protection by stipulation of treaty, if the province should be restored to the Government of Ava, however objectionable all such provisions of treaties, as leading to, and rendering necessary, interference in the internal affairs of a foreign nation. The demand of the cession would certainly be preferable to restoration, with a stipulation of amnesty to the people of Pegu, of which it would be necessary for the British Government to enforce the execution.'—*March 5, 1853.*

COST OF THE WAR.

Next to the expenditure of human life in a war, ranks the expenditure of treasure. This latter, in an age filled with rash "economists and calculators," had apparently been much overrated. Even two million pounds sterling was not too great a price to pay for the advantages gained by the annexation of Pegu. But nine hundred and twenty thousand pounds only was said to be a "close approximation" to the cost of the war for seventeen months. Among the items, of course the Commissariat charges were the principal, or two hundred and fifty thousand pounds. In round numbers the expense of the war, therefore, was little over six hundred and fifty thousand pounds a year. We thought, however, the entire cost might be safely put down at two millions. [Eventually, we heard it did not exceed three.]

MEADAY.

Meaday, signifying in the Burmese language "very rich," was nearly deserted on our occupation of it, there being scarcely a house in the whole place in a fit condition for quartering troops. There were but few inhabitants and a very inferior bazaar. The space occupied by the villagers was outside the south gate, extending one hundred yards in length and breadth; all beyond this was inundated during the monsoon, and cultivated in the dry season. "Our frontier station," wrote Lieutenants Bridge and Lloyd in their Report, "is about fifteen feet above the highest rise of the river, surrounded by a stockade, forming an island in the height of the monsoon. Our present position extends from the south gate to the breast-work marked C on the 'Plan of the Stockade of Meaday,'* but will be extended on the arrival of more troops. This has proved to be one of our healthiest stations, only six deaths having occurred from the end of January to the end of June, out of a force of nearly five hundred men. The heat is excessive during the months of March, April, and May, the thermometer averaging from 104° to 111° in the houses."

By a Government Notification of the 5th May 1853, Mr. E. O'Riley was appointed Assistant Commissioner at Toungoo, under the Commissioner of Pegu.

* "Pegu," p. 237.

PART IV.

BEFORE AND AFTER THE RESIDENT'S DEPARTURE.

"Meanwhile he drew wise morals from his play,
And in these solemn periods stalked away!"

Old Epilogue.

AFTER all that Mr. St. Barbe had borne and suffered at Mandalay, we can easily imagine him muttering to himself a couplet like the above as he went quietly and pensively on board the steamer which was to carry him to our frontier station of Thayetmyo. There could be little doubt that the day our Resident left the capital would be like that on which may yet be sounded the death-knell of Upper Burma's independence—an event, if not yet at hand, one which cannot be much longer delayed in the interests of humanity, commerce, and civilisation! The King and his advisers had been fairly weighed in the balances, and sadly found wanting; but now we must look on what is past as clouds of insignificant result in the prospect so "bright and advancing." After the Resident's departure, some interesting particulars were published. Even Major Halstead, on this occasion, could be "the last man" no longer.

"THAYETMYO, Sunday, October 12.

"The following is the true account of the withdrawal of our Mission from Mandalay :—

"Early on the morning of the 6th instant the Resident sent round a peon with the following circular to the various British residents :—

"October 6th.—The Government of India have decided to remove for the present their representative and establishment. They hope, however, that the temporary absence of a British officer from the capital will in no way affect the friendly relations at present existing between the two Governments.

"It is my duty, however, to apprise you of my intentions, and to advertise them publicly as speedily as possible. I am proceeding at once on board the "Panthay," leaving my baggage to follow.

"Should you consider it necessary to adopt similar measures, you will arrive at the wharf almost as soon as ourselves. In any case the steamer will be detained a sufficient time to admit of your communicating your resolve."

"At the Residency no packing was allowed, lest an alarm should be given. The circulars sent out, the Staff proceeded to the steamer, and the peon returning from delivering the circulars found the Residency closed and the Burmese in possession.

"These would not permit the baggage to be removed without orders from the King.

"Some hours afterwards a courteous letter was received allowing the removal of the baggage.

"Upon the receipt of the circular the European residents and British subjects hurried down to the wharf as fast as possible; even Major Halstead, the only man who remained behind during the troubles in Major Sladen's time, left on this occasion.

"Andriano, who is flotilla agent and Italian Consul, remained, as he considered that there was no danger.

"Commercial affairs, as might be imagined, are completely upset by this sudden move. Traders refuse to undertake the delivery of imports, and a feverish anxiety prevails all down the river to get goods for export away safely.

"At Mandalay all is quiet. The Ministers believe that a new Resident will be appointed directly, and they are showing their

confidence in peace by sending some of their steamers down to Rangoon; others are to follow in a few days.

"Two of the flotilla steamers left Mandalay on the 7th. Two others, which were on their way up, turned back on receiving the news.

"All arrived safely at Thayetmyo yesterday.

"Confidence is, however, rapidly returning, and three of the flotilla steamers are leaving Thayetmyo to-day for Mandalay.

"The American missionaries have remained at Bhamo. Should hostilities occur they purpose seeking safety in China.

"Before the 'Panthay' arrived at Menhla a slight disturbance occurred. The Burmese officials boarded the steamer and insisted upon arresting some Burmese British subjects who were coming down from Mandalay.

"The Resident interfered energetically, and the guard of Madrasces stood to their arms.

"Finally the Burmese officials gave way, and the 'Panthay' proceeded down the river.

"The Resident has reported to the Government that the King has summoned men from every village to proceed to Mandalay to protect it.

"Although there were numerous passengers proceeding to Mandalay by the steamers which were stopped on their way up and returned to Thayetmyo, none of them go up by the steamer which leaves to-day for Mandalay, but all return in the boats for Rangoon."—By telegraph, from the "Standard's" Special Correspondent.

Following up the telegraphic account given the previous day, the "Standard" of the 14th of October had an excellent leader on the withdrawal of our Resident, and the probable results; but we are afraid, when the writer talks of the chances of war having become "remote," he is over-sanguine, and has coloured the peaceful picture too highly. We may not have war; but something *must* be done to change the government of Upper Burma, in order to promote peace and commerce in Lower! The following extract from the article in question is most interesting at the present time:—

"On the whole it is difficult to conceive how a British Residency in a semi-civilised country, governed by an impetuous and blood-thirsty young autocrat like Theebau, could have been withdrawn with less friction.

"The departure of Mr. St. Barbe will, of course, have a serious

effect upon the trade which usually flows between British and Upper Burma. Six months ago the merchants of Rangoon were vaguely calling upon the Government of India to do something because their import trade was almost at a standstill, and articles of commerce were coming slowly from Upper Burma. The local Chamber of Commerce prepared a statement for the consideration of the authorities, showing that Rangoon traders were suffering at the rate of some millions a year. Now that something like a crisis has actually occurred in the relations between the Government of India and the Government of Independent Burma, business will become worse than ever. The cotton, teak, dye, and rice trade, which, under ordinary circumstances, flows briskly along the Irrawaddy, will be paralysed under the influence of two beliefs—one, that there will be no security for British goods sent into Upper Burma; and the other, that articles despatched from Upper Burma will neither be purchased nor paid for in Lower Burma. This injury to a trade which has made Pegu one of the most thriving countries under the Government of India, and transformed Rangoon from an unimportant mart into one of the most rising ports in the East, is to be regretted, but it is certain to be only of temporary duration."

Of course it would be wrong to credit all we hear from Mandalay; but, judging from the antecedents of the Golden Foot, the following royal act, after the Resident's departure, has a decided stamp of truth about it:—King Theebau telegraphed to the Chief Commissioner "sarcastically" ("Daily News" correspondent), stating he was sorry that the British Agent left so precipitately, as there was no chance of sending an officer of rank to escort him to the steamer! The force of political etiquette could surely no farther go. A telegram of the 14th, from Thayetmyo announced that a special boat from Menhla—some forty miles above the former station, and also on the right bank of the river—brought the report that large bodies of armed men were massing there. The Governor, however, who was "friendly," said that the flotilla steamer would be free from molestation. Of course we must conciliate the King's subjects on the frontier as much as possible. It is hardly to be believed that even King Theebau projects any attack on British territory—which would at once force on a war—especially when he has heard of General Roberts' splendid and successful march on Cabul! But, at any time, an insane fit

on the part of the Golden Foot may make him the aggressor, and force us into speedy action; so the only way is to keep on adopting the Napierian motto of **READY—AYE READY!**—16th October, 1879.

EULOGY ON MR. SHAW.

“In reply to the despatch of the Government of India reporting the death of Mr. Shaw, acting Political Resident at Mandalay, the Secretary of State makes the following remarks:—‘I have received this intelligence with great regret. Mr. Shaw had on various occasions rendered good service to the Government of India. His recent conduct of affairs at Mandalay was marked by coolness and sound judgment, and, had he survived, would have entitled him to high commendation. The loss of an officer of so much promise is the more to be deplored as the knowledge and experience he had acquired would have been of essential value in Upper Burma.’”—“Allen’s Indian Mail,” October 27th, 1879.

AN ENVOY FROM MANDALAY TO THE VICEROY.

At the end of October the most important news from Mandalay was that a Woondouk (Minister or Secretary of State) had been sent as an envoy to the Viceroy. The Deputy Commissioner of Thayetmyo had received orders to detain him and question him as to his mission. The envoy was detained by orders of the Chief Commissioner, pending the receipt of further orders from the Viceroy. Despatches from Thayetmyo, received by the “Standard” early in November, stated that the object of the mission sent by the King of Burma to the Viceroy was understood to be to re-establish diplomatic relations with England. The Embassy was still detained pending the sanction of the Chief Commissioner to their going on, and the King was said to be much irritated at their detention. A European lady had been permitted to have an interview with the King, who stated that, if attacked, he should defend his frontier, but that if beaten he would offer no further defence. He thought the English too impatient in their demand for a revision of the treaty with his father, and said that he would never yield to the claim that he should dispense with the ceremony of taking off shoes on entering his presence.

News had reached Rangoon from Mandalay that the King had

arranged that as soon as war was declared, Rangoon should be burnt down by his emissaries, who were also to receive 500 rs. "for each member of the royal family killed on the occasion." His Majesty was most anxious "that this kind service might be rendered to one of the princes, who, in the days of his childhood, dared to box his royal ears in some childish squabble," the memory of which still rankled in his royal breast. It was also affirmed that the Mandalay royal lotteries had been attended with the loss of not a few lives.

THE CUSTOMS OFFICERS.

Towards the end of October, the Irrawaddy flotilla continued to enter Burma; but the attitude of the Governor of Menhla towards the British preventive officers was by no means satisfactory. He strongly objected to their accompanying steamers; but as their right to accompany them is distinctly guaranteed by treaty, his objection, it was said, would not be regarded, and ample compensation would be demanded "in case of any insult or outrage to preventive officers." This difficulty alone was thought to "keep the door open" for hostilities. Another despatch from Rangoon said that the question of the customs officers in the flotilla was becoming serious; and the local Government was determined to send them up. Then, at the same time, the Burmese Premier had telegraphed, expressing his satisfaction at the continuance of steamer communication! Mandalay was quiet; the Residency was occupied by a Burmese Prince; and the Church compound by Phongyees. A Rangoon-Chinese firm had received orders from its Mandalay Agent to send up goods.

THE NYOUNG-YAN PRINCE.—THE CHURCH AT MANDALAY.

An opinion was entertained at Rangoon that, in the event of a campaign, it would be rendered easier if, on the declaration of hostilities, Nyoungh-Yan (or Nyounghyan) were publicly recognised as the British nominee, and received with royal honours, while a proclamation was issued placing him on the Burmese throne. This was thought by some to be preferable to annexation; but, as before remarked, we must, in some fashion or other—to secure the peace of British Burma—reign supreme at Mandalay. Great regret was expressed at the abandonment of the splendid church there. It

was built for the zealous missionary, Dr. Marks, by the late King, "but no option was left to the Rev. Mr. Colbeck." He found it impossible to save the font presented to the church by Her Majesty the Queen. There was a rumour that the church had been burnt to the ground; but it was said that respect for his father would induce even King Theebau "to spare the sacred building." It would probably be made into a Burmese monastery, or *Kyoung*.

REV. MR. COLBECK AND THE BURMESE LADIES.

In noticing the withdrawal of our Resident from Mandalay, it should have been mentioned that the party consisted of Mr. St. Barbe, Dr. Ferris, and the Rev. Mr. Colbeck. We also read in "Allen" the pleasing and noble fact that two ladies of rank belonging to the palace, who "had owed their previous immunity from massacre to Mr. Colbeck's humanity, were safely embarked on board the steamer."

TRADE OF BRITISH BURMA (1878-79).

"The annual trade and navigation returns for British Burma exhibit a very satisfactory increase. The large extension of trade carried on by private persons is especially referred to by the local Administration, who point with satisfaction to the legitimate demand which prevails both for the produce of the country and for goods imported, the improved condition of the people enabling them to purchase readily and at rates fairly remunerative to those engaged in the trade. We are told that, although the exports to Upper Burma, at one per cent. duty, show an increase in value rather than a decrease, yet the trade would have been much greater if the country had been more settled. In June 1878 the King actively interfered with both the import and export trade, and the dealers in imports declined to buy largely, while the exports of grain and pulses were practically prohibited, because the customs farmer demanded an extra five per cent. duty on this produce. In August, His Majesty purchased large quantities of piece-goods, and gave them to his soldiers as pay. These goods were re-sold in the Mandalay bazaar at any prices they would fetch, thus seriously interfering with the usual retail trade. Towards the end of September the rumoured death of the King, Moung

Lon (Mengdon), caused considerable excitement; the native merchants ceased shipping, and many who held stocks in Mandalay and in other towns beyond the frontier brought them back to Rangoon. After King Theebau had been proclaimed successor to his father, business improved, and continued brisk until the middle of February, when the reports which reached Rangoon in regard to the massacre of his relatives by the new King almost put a stop to purchases for Upper Burma, and there was no revival of trade up to the close of the year. The result of this was that the stocks of cotton, silk, and woollen goods in bond on March 31, 1879, were much in excess of the stocks on the same date in 1878. The imports from Bombay were valued at 8,22,849 rs.; from Bengal, 1,78,08,191 rs.; and from Madras 25,85,827 rs."

It was generally considered in Rangoon (October 19th) that the "rupture of diplomatic relations" between the British and Burmese Governments had given a severe shock to trade; and it was confidently affirmed that trade could never recover a really healthy condition until confidence was restored by a fresh treaty, properly enforced or guaranteed, or by a successful campaign. Early hostilities were considered by some as inevitable; but others held that they would be staved off as long as possible, as the Government of India was averse to war.

THE "MANDALAY GAZETTE."

DESPATCH FROM THE VICEROY.

To furnish intelligence regarding the Burmese Mission, to the latest date, the Author deems it advisable to add the following information from two of the London daily journals—the "Daily News" and "Standard" of the 11th and 8th December respectively. The former's correspondent, writing from Rangoon, November 9, gives important notes regarding the "Mandalay Gazette," evidently the "Court Journal" of Upper Burma.

No one had yet seen King Theebau's letter to the Viceroy; but the terms of it were understood to be embodied in an article

in this amusing specimen of Mandalay periodical literature. The "Gazette" is described as "a wonderful paper," full of "announcements of extraordinary dreams and portents and queer superstitions." Everything good proceeds from "the Majesty of the Ruler of Land and Sea, and proves his power not only over Upper Burma, but over the province of Pegu and the 'dismal swamps by the sea,' as the Burmans style our territories." Leaders are unknown in the "Gazette," except "when dictated by a Minister, as no doubt the following article was. It appeared in the issue of October 13, Thadingyart, waning moon, 1241"—

"The Political Agent in charge of the British Residency at the Golden City, considering it improper to continue in the place, and being about to leave, wrote to the Burmese authorities on the 6th October 1879, informing them of the same, and, immediately after sending the letter, left with three other officers and the Residency guard; also calling away a number of British registered subjects. Considering that nothing strange had occurred, and whilst the Burmese and British Governments continued on friendly terms, and no single instance of a breach of the Treaty conditions had taken place, to write, simply stating that it was thought improper to stay any longer in the Golden City, and then all of a sudden and at once to depart, like one who, seeing and fearing danger, leaves to avoid it, so hurriedly as the British officers have done, is a matter for wonder to all who have heard of it. The merchants, traders, and people generally of the two countries, seeing and knowing the manner in which the British officers acted, making matters out to be more serious than they are, by their hurried and sudden retreat, naturally ascribed it to various causes, resulting in the stoppage of trade and damage and ruin to traders. The Burmese authorities have always acted with the view to maintain friendly relations between the two countries, and were watchful that all they did should be in accordance with the terms of the Treaty. But the very sudden and hurried retreat of the British officers caused a serious panic; the people became uneasy, and imagined all sorts of things, resulting in the stoppage of trade and the consequent damage and ruin to business. The time having arrived when the Government

should protect and care for its people, it became necessary, in order to revive trade and to encourage traders to continue their business in an easy state of mind, and also to allow them to travel about freely and quietly, for the Government to nominate courageous and able Ministers of high rank to proceed to and protect and watch the towns of Melloon, Menhla, Tounghoo, Yameethen, the villages of Mobyai, Buigon, and other frontier towns and stations. When the British officers were leaving they also sent a letter asking the Burmese authorities to protect and take care of all goods, persons, and things (British property) in Mandalay. To enable the Burmese authorities to comply with said request a letter was sent back asking for a list of the property to be taken care of, to which, however, no answer was received, the officers leaving in the steamer suddenly. Nevertheless, the Burmese Government have with a noble heart caused all British subjects who are left behind in Mandalay, together with the goods and property, animate and inanimate, to be properly cared for and protected. The proceeding which has caused merchants, traders, and people generally to entertain imaginary fears, and in consequence uneasiness of mind, stoppage of and damage to trade, the stoppage in the movements of the people of the two kingdoms, the necessity on the part of the Burmese Government to nominate officers to watch and protect the frontier stations, the unsettled state of British subjects who are removed from one place to another, and the sufferings generally of everybody, are attributable to the action of the British Government only."

If this production does not "out-Herod Herod," nothing could ever do so. Such a last phase in King Theebau's progress—even if it be only partly authentic—gives the finishing touch to our knowledge of the present Golden Foot's shifting diplomatic character!

By telegram, dated Thayetmyo, 7th December, the "Standard's" Special Correspondent wrote:—

"The Burmese Embassy, which has for some time been detained here, awaiting permission from the Indian authorities to proceed, has received a communication from the Viceroy through the Chief Commissioner to the following effect:—

"The Viceroy states that he is seriously dissatisfied with the

position and treatment of our Resident lately at the Burmese Court; such treatment being altogether inconsistent alike with the professions of friendship of the Burmese Government and with ordinary diplomatic courtesy.

"It appears, then, altogether incongruous and premature for the King to send a complimentary mission, or for him to assume that it can be received in a friendly or honourable manner by the Government whose representative has been treated with habitual discourtesy at Mandalay.

"During the past twelve months the Resident has lost no occasion of placing fully before the Ministers of the King the views and wishes of the British Government upon various questions, particularly with regard to the diplomatic privileges to which he is entitled, and to the proper accommodation which should be afforded him at the capital.

"Since, then, the Embassy has not come with authority to propose anything likely to be acceptable in regard to these matters, or to the other points at issue, nothing would be gained by the Mission proceeding onward.

"If the Ambassador sees fit to refer to the Court for additional instructions, and in the event of his disclosing hereafter an intention to make substantial overtures, the Chief Commissioner will be authorised by the Government of India to receive and deal with such communications, otherwise the Ambassador cannot be received.

"The Embassy is now awaiting instructions from Mandalay."

At this uncertain stage of our relations with Burma, it is pleasing to notice an increasing British interest taken in Burmese affairs, which, with the remarks of the Press, will no doubt gain for them the importance they deserve. Regarding our policy in Central Asia, we cannot help being of opinion that it has been, in many respects, suited to "a commanding Asiatic Power"; and among what has been well styled the "collateral aspects of the revolt of Cabul," affairs on our South-Eastern Frontier, and the "undisguised hostility of the Buddhist Burmese"—it would be more correct to say of *a portion of the King's Court at Mandalay*, where there are some shrewd old woons (ministers) who keep King Theebau from actual

aggression—have been prominently brought forward. Doubtless, we shall look to the smallest causes of our anxiety, and be prepared for all contingencies. Meanwhile we must keep up a fixed attention on Eastern Asia. Cabul and Mandalay form the diamond and the ruby of our present Eastern policy, the lustre of which is to guide the fine old ship safe into port. Executions, we read, have been continued in the palace of King Theebau, and five unfortunate Princesses are reported to have been recently murdered for corresponding with Prince Nyongyan. If such be true, Humanity—to say nothing of discourtesy to our Resident, and an injured Commerce, brought about by the chronic insolence of a next-door neighbour—should rise and thunder for British rule or protection in Upper Burma!

December 26, 1879.

INDEX.

- Aeng stockade surprised by Captain Nuthall, 302; Pass, 444.
- Alexander (Captain) commands flotillá, 41.
- Allan (Captain) wounded, 116.
- Alompra, captured Ava, 8; founded Burmese empire, 8; in reign of, first political relations with British Government, 8; invaded Siam, 9; death of, 9.
- Amherst (Lord), Governor-General, 1823, 12; declares war against Burma, 12.
- Andaman islanders, 338, 339.
- Anderson's (Dr.) "Mandalay to Momien," 353.
- Annexation and non-annexation, 416; annexation of Pegu, 252.
- Ansley, Lieutenant, 144.
- Anstruther, Colonel, 215.
- Arakan, Portuguese settlers here, A.D. 1600, 5; recent account of, 444.
- Archibald, Lieutenant, 36.
- Armstrong (Ensign) mortally wounded, 110.
- Armstrong, Captain, 262.
- Armstrong, Major, 261, 269.
- Arrack issued to troops, April—August 1853, 453.
- Ashe, Lieutenant, 128, 261, 270.
- Assam, invaded by Meer Joomla, 6; by King of Ava, 11; ceded to the British, 15; Mandalay easily threatened from, 75.
- Austen (Admiral) arrives in Rangoon river, 102; death of, 196.
- Ava, British march on, December 1825, 52; situation of, 74; an advance to, 445.
- Back (Major) in command of artillery, 116, 127.
- Bamo (or Manmo), situation of, 368.
- Bandoola (Maha). — Burmese commander, 30; defeated by Sir A. Campbell, 31; total defeat at Kemmindine, 39; at Kokeen, 39; killed at Donabew, 43, 44, 436; summary of his character, 44; Major Snodgrass' account,

- 47; compared with Charles XII., 46.
- Bandoola, Junior, 172; delivered himself up, 201.
- Banks (Major) with Lord Dalhousie at Rangoon, 175; death of, 175 (note).
- Bassein, capture of, 141-144; official notification of capture, 144; river of, 347.
- Beantfleür, Dr., 229.
- Becher, Captain A., 206.
- Bengal attacked by Portuguese settlers, 1610, 5.
- Bernadotte, King of Sweden, served in India, 99.
- Binny, Captain, 39.
- Birrell (Mr.) at Rangoon, 83.
- Blair, Lieutenant, 127 (note).
- Blockade of Rangoon in Second War, 88.
- Blundell (Captain) mortally wounded, 115.
- Bogle (Colonel), Commissioner of Tenasserim provinces, 93, 107; wounded, 116.
- Boileau (Ensign) killed in action, 268.
- Bowen (Colonel) repulsed, 21.
- Brett, Major, 205 (note).
- Brisbane (Sir James) in command of flotilla in First War, 75.
- Broadfoot, Major, 299 (note).
- Brodie, Lieutenant-Colonel, 37.
- Brooking (Commander), cool courage of, 108; service in Irawady, 162.
- Browne (Colonel Horace) Resident at Mandalay, 405.
- Brown, Lieutenant P. A., 225.
- Burma.—British forces in, 1st July 1879, 429; campaign of 1853, 456; condition in 1854-55, 320-25; correct spelling of the name, 17; difficulties in subduing, 289; diseases in, 338; events (summary of), 1826-1879, 374; fauna, flora, and minerals, 309 (note); financial statement respecting, 314, 315; trade of British, 1878-79, 472; geographical description of, 447; meteorological notice of, 459; minerals in, 370-409; papers on, 318, Part IV.; population and health in, 328; position of principal towns, 260 (note); rainfall in, 1879, 409; routes to China, 362; sparseness of population in, 342; trade with Europe opened, seventeenth century, 3; Upper, value of, 369; writer's residence in, 319 and note.
- Burmese, empire founded by Alompra, 8; costume, 189; Envoy to the Viceroy, 470; feast, 191; funeral, 156; games, 154; general orders, 437, 438; mode of putting royalty to death, 328; royal family of, 425; sobriety of the, 338; wars with, first war, 12, 19; concluded, treaty of peace, 56-59; Burmese account of, 60; mortality among the troops, 449; second war, 81; mortality among the troops, 449; cost of, 288, 464; Duke of Wellington on, 462.
- Burney (Rev. Mr.), Chaplain at Rangoon, 163, 285.
- Burney (Major), Envoy at Ava, 377.
- Campbell's (General Sir Archibald) expedition to Rangoon, 22; capture of Rangoon, 23; success at Kemmindine, 27; victory over Bandoola, 32; despatch of, 31-40; storms Kokeen, 39; march on Donabew, 41; advance on Prome, 49, 435; cost of expedition, 287; criticisms on, 304.

- Campbell and Godwin (Generals) compared, 304-308.
 Campbell, Lieutenant, 230.
 Canning's (Right Hon. George) policy, 61.
 Carter (Lieutenant) wounded, 144.
 Cassay Horse at Pegu, 227, 229, 239, 241, 243, 244.
 Chads, Captain, R.N., 35; capture of war-boats, 40.
 Charles XII. compared with Bandoola, 46.
 Cheape, General Sir John, 194, 256 (note); operations against Myat-htoon, 257, 461; force commanded by, 261; at Henzada, 262.
 Cheape's (Sir John) complete triumph, 271; criticisms on, 274; divisional command, 366.
 "Cholera camps" check the disease, 406.
 Clarke (Lieutenant) wounded, 266.
 Cloeté (Lieutenant) severely wounded, 213.
 Cockburn (Lieutenant) severely wounded, 269; his death, 273.
 Cook (Lieutenant) mortally wounded, 214.
 Cooke, Captain, 116.
 Cooper, T. T., 360.
 Coote (Col.) commands storming party, 128.
 Cotton, Brigadier-General, 41; attack on Donabew, 42; command in First War, 75.
 Cotton (Brevet Major) in command at Pegu, 158; major, 265.
 Cowie's (Dr. A. J.) Report on Population, 334, 337.
 Crawford's "Embassy to Ava" quoted, 354.
 Crisp, C. M. (Mr.), description of the Shwé-Dagon Pagoda, 105.
 Dalhousie (Lord), Governor-General at outbreak of Second Burmese War, 91; arrives at Rangoon, 175; general order at Rangoon, 179; proclamation, 252; policy of, 275; Minute of June 30, 1852, 276; Secret Committee's reply to, 278; Minute, August 10, 1852, 279; Minute, November 3 and 6, 1852, 283; Secret Committee's reply, 295; letter to King of Ava, November 16, 1852, 295; notification, June 30, 1853, 310; autograph letter to Major Hill, 316.
 Dalla, naval attack on, 109.
 Damant (Mr.) murdered, 424.
 Darroch (Captain) wounded, 144.
 De Jomini (Baron) quoted, 69.
 Dennie (Major) at Kemmindine, 33, 36.
 Derby (Earl of), speech when Premier, 173; quotes the Duke of Wellington, 463.
 D'Orgoni, a French officer, 217.
 "Diana" steamer, part played by, 71.
 Dickenson, Colonel, 204.
 Donabew, partial failure of attack on, 42, 308, 436, 458, 461.
 Donaldson (Lieutenant) mortally wounded, 115.
 Donnahoe, Colour-Sergeant, 271.
 Donnelly (Dr.), on medical education, 334.
 Doodpatlee, Burmese success at, 20.
 Doran (Lieutenant) mortally wounded, 129.
 Dorville, Lieutenant, 127 (note).
 Dost Mahomed Khan, 291.
 Duke (Lieutenant-Colonel), 193; (Brigadier) at Rangoon, 250.
 Duplex not understood by the French, 99.

- Dweepdee, last of Burmese kings, defeated and taken prisoner, 7.
- Edwards (Mr.), interpreter at Rangoon, 84.
- Ellenborough, Earl of, 288, 462.
- Elliott* (Colonel K. H.), his command, 100.
- Embargo laid on British ships at Rangoon, 11.
- Envoys' (Burmese) reception at Calcutta, 321.
- Errington (Major) wounded, 144.
- Execution of royal personages in Burma, 388.
- Expedition to Burma resolved upon, February 1853, 94.
- Finances (Indian) after First Burmese War, 76-78; of British Burma, 350.
- Fiscal system in Burma, 299.
- Fishbourne, Captain, R.N.
- Foord, Colonel, 113, 114; disabled by sun-stroke, 116.
- Forbes (Mr. Archibald) at the Burmese Court, 391.
- Ford (Lieutenant) at White House Stockade, 114.
- Forsyth, Sir Douglas, 411.
- "Fox," frigate at Rangoon, 89.
- Fraser (Major), Chief Engineer, 114, 115; grand architect of Rangoon, 194.
- Free-trade anticipations disappointed, 309 (note).
- Funeral, Burmese, 156.
- Fury (Sergeant-Major), killed at Donabew, 462.
- Fytche, Captain, 256 (note), 272, 457.
- Fytche, Colonel, 331, 337.
- Fytche (General Albert) quoted, 357, 382.
- Games, Burmese, 154.
- Gardner (Captain) killed, 214.
- Godwin, Lieut.-Colonel, 32; (General) command in Second War, 107; despatch quoted, 113; official despatch, May 24, 1852, 146; British force under, January 1853, 456; advance on Prome, 181; anecdotes of, 187, 189; in command, 209; in the field, 243; want of decision, 249; general order of, 250; leaves Rangoon for Prome, 256; the difference of opinion as to his advance on Prome, 281; criticisms on, 304; narrative of campaign, 1824-25, 431; farewell address to army, 446.
- "Golden Foot," &c., meaning in Burmese State phraseology, 45 (note).
- Goldfinch, Lieutenant, R.N., 35.
- Goldworthy (Colonel) reinforces Maulmain, 183.
- Gore, Major, 36.
- Graham, Lieutenant, 262.
- Griffiths (Major) fatally struck by *coup-de-soleil*, 116.
- Hall, Major, 152; defence of Pegu, 224.
- Harrison, Lieutenant and Adjutant, 116.
- Harrison, Captain, 336.
- Harris, Lieutenant, 209.
- "Havelock's Saints" always ready, 71 (note).
- Havelock (Sir H.) quoted, "Campaigns in Ava," 132.
- Heat, intense in Burma, 240.
- Henzada, description of, 262.
- "Hermes" steamer at Rangoon, 89.
- Hewitt, Lieutenant, 128.
- Hewitt (Captain), success at Pantauno, 260.
- Hicks (Capt.) at Pegu, 158, 261.
- Higginson's (Governor) letter to King of Ava, 1698, 4.
- Hill, Major, 209; in garrison at Pegu, 223; thanked by Go-

- vernor-General, 235; thanked by General Godwin, 250; autograph letter from Lord Dalhousie, 316.
 Hill-tribes dangerous, 289.
 Hogg, Sir James Weir, 288.
 Holdich, Major, 264, 269, 270.
 Holmes (Lieutenant) at Martaban, 152.
 Impey, Captain, 165.
 Indigenous races, population and health of, 328.
 Irawady, high road of the Burman Empire; its importance in war and to commerce, 24.
 Irby, Captain, 261.
 Isolation, dangers of, 287.
 Johnson, Lieutenant, 266.
 Joomla Meer, invasion of Assam, 6.
 Judson, missionary, 309 (note).
 Judson (Mr. and Mrs.) in captivity, 304.
 Karen (the) tribe, 165, 410; births and deaths, statistics of, 341.
 Kellett, Lieutenant, R.N., 35.
 Kemmindine.—Sir A Campbell defeats the Burmese at, 27; defeat of Bandoola at, 31, *et seq.*
 Killed and wounded in Second War to June 12, 1853, 453.
 Kincaid (Rev. Mr.), American missionary, 87; returns to Maulmain, 164; interview with Lord Dalhousie, 179.
 Kokoon stormed by Sir A. Campbell, 39.
 Kully, Burmese army at, 241.
 Kykloo, repulse at, 305.
 Lambert, Commodore, 82, 84; notification of blockade of rivers of Rangoon, 88; additional notification, 98.
 Latter (Captain), interpreter, 85, 107; advises the general, 128; leads the storming party, 128; at Pegu, 158.
 Lesby, Conductor, 261.
 Littler, Sir John, 283, 295.
 Lewis and Shepperd. (Messrs.) imprisoned, 82.
 Livingstone, Corporal, 271.
 Lloyd, Lieutenant, 127 (note).
 Loch and his companions, 258.
 Loch (Captain, R.N.), death of, 458.
 Lockart, Major, 188.
 Looshai tribes and country, 420, 421.
 Luard, Captain, 93.
 Lushington, Commodore, 96.
 Lynch, Captain, I.N., 96, 109.
 Lynch, Commodore, 153.
 Macintosh (Lieutenant) at Pegu, 158.
 McDowall (Colonel) killed at Watty-goon, 67.
 MacKellar, Lieutenant, 264.
 McLeod, General, 378.
 McNeill, Brigadier, 193; in command of Pegu expedition, 209; disabled by sunstroke, 214; his death, 217.
 McReagh's (Brigadier) command against Rangoon, 22, 41.
 Madras Fusiliers, strength and losses, 454.
 Magrath, Lieutenant, 261.
 Maha Nemiou killed at Prome, 52.
 Maha Bandoola, Commander, (see Bandoola,) 29.
 Mallet, Lieutenant-Colonel, 32, 34, 37.
 Malloch, Captain, 127 (note), 209.
 Malown, attack on, (see Melloon,) 437.
 Mandalay becomes the capital, 379.

- "Mandalay to Momien," 353.
Mandalay, fortifications of, 1879, 403; political parties in, 408; withdrawal of the British Resident from, 426; population of, 427; "Gazette," 473.
Margafy (Mr.), fate of, 362.
Marr (Dr.) on Vaccination, 334, 337.
Marryat (Captain) on the Irrawaddy, 72.
Martaban, preparations to attack, 102-106; attacked by Burmese, 152; column, strength of, 454.
Mason (Lieutenant, R.N.), narrow escape, 226.
Mason (Dr.), statistics of births and deaths, 340.
Mason, Rev. F., missionary, 399; reference to his work, 440.
Mayne (Lieutenant) at Pegu, 158.
Meaday, once an important town, 74, 465.
Melloon, Burmese and British envoys meet near, 53; Sir A. Campbell's attack on, 437; situation of, 74.
Mengdon-Meng, King, 378.
Memiaboo, after defeat, retreats, 54.
Meteorology of Burma, 459.
Miles (Lieut-Colonel) captures Burmese seaports, 28, 37.
Minerals in Upper Burma, 369-374, 409.
Mission, withdrawal from Mandalay, 466-67.
Mitcheson (Lieutenant) severely wounded, 261.
Mogul Empire, Gibbon's opinion of, 1.
Mongolian race warlike, 2.
Montgomery (Major) in command of artillery, 100; leads the advance on New Rangoon, 125; death of, 166.
Morison, Brigadier-General, 41.
Mortality among the troops, 449.
Moung-Bwosh, Governor of Martaban, 152.
Moung-Shoay-Wang at Martaban, 154.
Mullins, Lieutenant, 261.
Murray (Captain) at Kemmindinge, 34.
Myat-htoon, bandit chief of Donabew, and Soult compared, 257, 258; entirely defeated, 271; British losses in operations against, 273.
Myat-za (Karen chieftain) at Rangoon, 259.
Nagas, the, 420; their religion, 423.
Napadee, Burmese driven back to, 51; Burmese routed at, 52.
Napier (Admiral Sir Charles), anecdote of, 265.
Negrais, massacre of English at, 1759, 8.
Neill, General, 236 (note).
Neoun-ben-Zeik, conference at, 51.
Newton's (Major) successes, 20.
Niblett, Captain, I.N., 158.
Nicolay (Captain) killed, 234.
Noton (Captain) defeated and slain, 21.
Nuthall, Captain, 302 and note.
Oakes (Major) in command, 99; at White House stockade, 114; receives his death-blow, 114; his death and character, 117.
Operations, remarks on, in First Burmese War, 64.
Ophir, identity with Pegu, 440.
Opportunity lost at Kully, 248.
"Oriental," P. and O. steamer, 195.

- Pagahm-Mew, British victory at, 55, 308; situation of, 74.
- Pagan-Meng, King, 378.
- Pagoda, gilding the great, 326; capture of, 441.
- Parlby, Lieutenant-Colonel, 37.
- Patkoi, meaning of, 439.
- Pegu.—Conquered by Burmese in sixteenth century, 3; regained its independence, 7; geographical description of, 74, 158; expedition against town of, 158; captured, June 1852, 161; capture and occupation described, 209; suggested identity with Ophir, 440; trade and prospects of province, 346; town attacked by Burmese, 216; surrounded, 218; military operations at, 221; defence by Major Hill, 224; relief of, measures for, 235, 236; relieved, 249; annexation of, 251, 255 (note); boundary of, 309 (note); troops in, 1864, 313; mineral wealth of, 411.
- Pepper (Colonel), advance upon Toungoo, 75.
- Percival, Lieutenant, 264.
- Phagy-dan, King of Burma, 376.
- Phayre (Captain), Commissioner of Pegu, 250, 294, 300, 322, 328 (note), 352, 357, 381.
- Phayre, Sir Arthur P., 319.
- "Phlegethon" steamer at Rangoon, 89.
- Piper (Captain) at Kemmindine, 34.
- Population, &c. of indigenous races, 328.
- "Precursor" steamer at Kyook Phyoo, 91.
- Preston, Private, 271.
- Preston, Sergeant, 271.
- Price (Dr.) sent to British commander by King of Ava, 54, 304.
- Prisoners liberated, 303.
- Proclamation by Lord Dalhousie, 252.
- Progress of King Theebau, 386-400.
- Prome, advance on, 49; Sir A. Campbell's entrance into, 50; Sir A. Campbell defeats Burmese besiegers, 51; occupied by Commander Tarleton, 168; Captain Tarleton's expedition, 443.
- "Proserpine" steamer at Rangoon, 86.
- Quarters of troops after war, 312.
- Quin, Sergeant-Major, 271.
- Quinn (Mr. Conductor) liberated, 303.
- Races, indigenous, health of, 328.
- Railway in Burma, 388.
- Rangoon.—Embargo laid on British ships, 1811, 11, 13; captured by British, May 1824, 23; new town, founded by Tharawadi, 96; naval operations before, 107; garrison of, 135; return of killed, wounded, and missing in storming of, 138; development of, 324; population of, 345; sanitary condition of troops at, 1824, 432; particulars of capture, 442.
- Reid, Major, 95, 113, 261, 270; wounded, 270.
- Renaud, Captain, 236.
- Renegade shot in action, 120.
- Revenues of Burma, 314, 350.
- Rice (Captain) wounded, 144.
- Rice, Lieutenant, R.N., 144.
- Richards, Lieut.-Colonel, 41.
- Rockets, effectiveness of, in First Burmese War, 72.
- Rundall (Captain) in command of Sappers, 114.
- Ryves, Captain, 35.

- St. Barbe (Mr.) quoted, 410, 412, 426; withdrawal from Mandalay, 466.
- St. Maur (Colonel), disabled in action by sun-stroke, 116.
- Sale (Major) at Kemmindine, 32, 36, 41; liberates Mrs. Judson, 134; at Bassein, 434.
- Sandford, Assist.-Surgeon, 55.
- Sanitary condition of troops at Rangoon, 432.
- Saunders, Mr. Trelawney, 418.
- Scindiah's good government, 78.
- Scott, Brigade-Major, 113.
- Seaton, Major, 244.
- Shadwell, Captain, R.N., 205.
- Shan ladies in First Burmese War, 13, 52, 394 (note).
- Shan tribes, 364, 394; countries, 366.
- Shaw (Mr.) and King Theebau, 387, 398.
- Shaw (Resident), death of, 402; eulogy on, by Secretary of State, 470.
- Shemburen, or Shembuan, succeeds Alompra, 10.
- "Shoe question," 395, 406.
- Shortland, Lieutenant, 209.
- Shouldham, Brigadier-General, 41.
- Shubrick, Major, 209.
- Shuparee attacked by Burmese, September 24, 1823, 20.
- Shway Ban, bandit chief, 259.
- Shwé-Dagon Pagoda, advance on, 122; captured the second time, 129.
- Shwé-gyeen, 256; troops at, 1864, 313; troops at, 1879, 420.
- Singleton, Captain, 262, 268.
- Sladen's (Major) expedition, 360, 361, 363.
- Sladen (Captain) at Mandalay, 380, 382.
- Smith (Dr.) slightly wounded, 127.
- Smith (Captain), Deputy-Commissioner, 262.
- Snodgrass, Major, 43; character of Bandoola, 47.
- Soonderbuns (the), origin of, 6.
- Spiers (Mr.) liberated, 303.
- Steel (Brigadier-General), C.B., 193, 238, 243, 256 (note), 313.
- Sturt (Colonel) commands expedition to Pegu, 158; forces under, 241, 242, 264, 267.
- Symes (Colonel) concludes treaty with Burma, 11.
- Tantabain, Lieutenant-Colonel Godwin at, 433.
- Tarleton, Commander (Sir J. W.), 158; occupies Promé, 168, 443; releases Myathtoon's captives, 272.
- Taylor, Lieutenant, 127 (note).
- Taylor (Lieutenant) mortally wounded, 270.
- "Tenasserim provinces" ceded to British, 15.
- Tharawadi, King, 377.
- Theebau, King, 374, 386; victims of, 397, 398, 425; tariff of, 414; head queen of, 427.
- Thornhill, Major, 36.
- Tonghoo, or Toungoo, situation of, 74.
- Transport, cost of, in Burmese and Chinese wars, 188.
- Travers, Captain, 246 and note.
- Treaties, Eastern disregard of, 284, 285, 291.
- Treaty of 24th February, 1826, 56; draft of, 1852, 296.
- Trevor (Lieutenant) wounded, 115, 261, 271.
- Troops in Pegu, 1864, 313.
- Tudor, Colonel, 199, 209.
- Turton, Major, 113, 128, 199.
- Umrappora (Amarapura), situation of, 74.
- Volunteers for Burma, 448.
- Voyle, (Lieutenant) ordered to Maulmain, 95.

- Wahab's (Major) command
 against Rangoon, 22, 36.
 Walker (Major) killed, 36.
 Wants in warfare. Correct in-
 formation, 274; sufficient
 provisions, 274.
 War declared against Burma by
 British Government, March 5,
 1824, 12, 20. •
 Warfare, Burmese tactics in,
 243 and note.
 Warren (Brigadier) disabled in
 action, 116. •
 Watty-goon, repulses at, 305.
 Welchman, Major, 204.
 Wellesley's (Marquis) Govern-
 ment, 11.
 Wellington (Duke of) on the •
 Second Burmese War, 463.
 White House Stockade, descrip-
 tion of, 118.
 White, Lieutenant, 128.
 Whitlock (Lieutenant) severely
 wounded, 213.
 Wigston, Major, 261, 264, 268;
 wounded, 269. •
 Williams (Lieutenant) in action,
 115; death of, 273. •
 Wilson (Captain, 38th Regi-
 ment) at Kemmindine, 34,
 37.
 Wolseley, Ensign, (Sir Garnet)
 257 (note), 270; severely
 wounded at Donabew, 271. •
 Wyndham, Captain, 209. •
 Yandaboo, treaty of, 15.
 Yates, Major, 32.
 Zaloon, Sir John Cheape's move-
 ment on, 262.

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